ML023460494
| ML023460494 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/12/2002 |
| From: | Conte R Division of Reactor Safety I |
| To: | Conway J Nine Mile Point |
| Shared Package | |
| ML021400073 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220/02-302 | |
| Download: ML023460494 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000220/2002302
Text
December 12, 2002
Mr. John T. Conway
Site Vice President
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC
P.O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093
SUBJECT:
NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 OPERATOR AND SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR
INITIAL EXAMINATION REPORT NO. 50-220/02-302
Dear Mr. Conway:
This report transmits the results of the reactor operator (RO) and senior reactor operator (SRO)
licensing examination conducted by the NRC during the period of September 30 to October 7,
2002. This examination addressed areas important to public health and safety and was
developed and administered using the guidelines of the Examination Standards for Power
Reactors (NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1).
Based on the results of the examination, four of the five SRO and one of four RO applicants
passed all portions of the examination. One SRO applicant and three RO applicants failed the
written portion of the examination. The nine applicants included five instant SROs and four
ROs. Mr. J. Caruso discussed performance insights observed during the examination with
Mr. M. Navin on October 3, 2002. On November 18, 2002, final examination results, including
individual license numbers, were given during a telephone call between Mr. J. Caruso and Mr.
R. Thurow.
Please note from the enclosed report that 5% of the RO exam answer key changed due to post
exam comments. In accordance with section C.2.c of the Examination Standard (ES) 501, the
NRC is requesting that Constellation Energy Group provide a written response within 60 days to
explain why these post exam changes were necessary and what actions will be taken to
improve future license exams.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system
(ADAMS). These records include the final examination and are available in ADAMS ({RO and
SRO} Written - Accession Number ML023240459; {RO and SRO} Operating Section A -
Accession Number ML023240485; {RO and SRO} Operating Section B - Accession Number
ML023240491; and {RO and SRO} Operating Section C - Accession Number ML023240525;
also, Licensee Post Written Examination Comments (Attachment 2) Accession ML023240550.
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html
(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Mr. John T. Conway
2
Should you have any questions regarding this examination, please contact me at (610) 337-
5183, or by E-mail at RJC@NRC.GOV.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Richard J. Conte, Chief
Operational Safety Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No(s). 50-220
License No.
Enclosure:
Initial Examination Report No. 50-220/02-302
cc w/encl:
M. J. Wallace, President, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC
L. Pisano, Manager - Nuclear Training
G. Wilson, Esquire
M. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston and Strawn
J. M. Petro, Jr., Esquire, Counsel, Constellation Power Source, Inc.
J. Rettberg, New York State Electric and Gas Corporation
P. D. Eddy, Electric Division, NYS Department of Public Service
C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York
Department of Law
J. V. Vinquist, MATS, Inc.
W. M. Flynn, President, New York State Energy Research
and Development Authority
J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research
and Development Authority
Supervisor, Town of Scriba
C. Adrienne Rhodes, Chairman and Executive Director, State Consumer Protection Board
T. Judson, Central NY Citizens Awareness Network
Mr. John T. Conway
3
Distribution w/encl: (VIA E-MAIL)
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
G. Hunegs, SRI - NRC Resident Inspector
H. Miller, RA
J. Wiggins, DRA
M. Evans, DRP
H. Nieh, RI EDO Coordinator
S. Richards, NRR (ridsnrrdlpmlpdi)
N. Perry, DRP
P. Torres, DRP
R. Junod, DRP
T. Byron, INPO (ByronTR@Inpo.org)
W. Lanning, DRS
R. Crlenjak, DRS
R. Conte, DRS
J. Caruso, Chief Examiner, DRS
C. Buracker, DRS (Master Exam File)
DRS File
DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML023460494.wpd
ADAMS PACKAGE: ML021400073
After declaring this document An Official Agency Record it will be released to the Public.
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy
OFFICE
RI/DRS
RI/DRS
RI/DRP
RI/DRS
NAME
CBuracker
JCaruso
MEvans
RJConte
DATE
11/22/02
11/22/02
11/25/02
12/12/02
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket No(s):
50-220
License No:
Report No:
50-220/02-302
Licensee:
Constellation Nuclear
Facility:
Nine Mile Point Unit 1
Dates:
October 7, 2002 (Written Examination Administration)
September 30 - October 3, 2002 (Operating Test Administration)
October 7 - November 1, 2002 (Examination Grading)
Examiners:
J. Caruso, Senior Operations Engineer (Chief Examiner)
D. Muller, Senior Operations Engineer
P. Peterson, Senior Operations Engineer
G. Johnson, Operations Engineer (under instruction)
Approved by:
Richard J. Conte, Chief
Operational Safety Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
ii
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000220/02-302; September 30 - October 7, 2002; Nine Mile Point Unit 1; Initial Operator
Licensing Examination. There were a total of nine applicants (4 ROs, and 5 SRO instants) who
took the initial licensing examination. Five of the nine applicants passed all portions of the
examination.
The written examinations were administered by the facility and the operating tests were
administered by two NRC region-based examiners and one NRC program office examiner.
A.
Inspector Identified Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
B.
License Identified Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Report Details
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Mitigating Systems - Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) Initial
License Examination
a.
Scope of Review
The Nine Mile Point Unit 1 training and operations personnel developed the written and
operating initial examinations and together with the NRC examination team verified or
ensured, as applicable, the following:
The examination was prepared and developed in accordance with the guidelines
of Revision 8, Supplement 1 of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination
Standards for Power Reactors. A review was conducted both in the Region I
office and at the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 plant and training facility. Final resolution
of comments and incorporation of test revisions were conducted during and
following the onsite preparation week.
Simulation facility operation was proper.
A test item analysis was completed on the written examination for feedback into
the systems approach to training program.
Examination security requirements were met.
The NRC examiners administered the operating portion of the examination to all
applicants from September 30 - October 3, 2002. The written examination was
administered by the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 training staff on October 7, 2002.
b.
Findings
Grading and Results
There were a total of nine applicants (4 reactor operators, and 5 SRO instants) who took
the initial licensing examination. Five of the nine applicants passed all portions of the
examination.
There were five post-written examination comments that were submitted by the licensee
and one of these comments (i.e., regarding common question RO 015/SRO 054) was
later amended by the licensee (Attachment 2). The NRCs resolution of these comments
is addressed in Attachment 3.
The NRC staff review of post exam comments resulted in deleting or changing the
answers to 5% of the questions on the RO written exam and 2% of the questions on the
SRO written exam. In accordance with NUREG-1021,Section ES-501, paragraph
C.2.c., if the facility licensee recommends deleting or changing the answers to 5 percent
or more of the questions on a written exam that it developed, the regional office should
request that the facility licensee address the problem.
2
Examination Preparation and Quality
The submitted examination was within the acceptable range. However, as explained in
the preceding section the number of post exam comments is reflective of the exam
submittal quality and adequacy of technical exam review conducted which was primarily
the licensees responsibility.
Examination Administration and Performance
An apparent generic applicant weakness was identified during the NRCs administration
Simulator Operating Test, Scenario #1, APRM failure/Recirc Pump seal failure/LOCA
with degraded core spray systems. Five of six applicants when questioned
demonstrated a lack of knowledge concerning the HPCI logic (interlock). In addition,
the licensee initiated DER-NM-2002-4256, on October 1, 2002 to further evaluate the
adequacy of procedure EOP-2.
4OA6 Exit Meeting Summary
On November 18, 2002, the NRC provided conclusions and examination results to a
Nine Mile Point Unit 1 management representative via telephone. License numbers for
four of nine applicants were also provided during this time. The issuance of one license
will be delayed in accordance with NUREG-1021, Section ES-501, paragraph D.3.c,
because the individual passed the written examination with a grade of 81 percent or
below, until those applicants who failed the examination have had an opportunity to
appeal their license denials. Four applicants passed the operating portions but failed
the written portion of the initial licensing examination and therefore were denied licenses
at this time.
The NRC expressed appreciation for the cooperation and assistance that was provided
during the preparation and administration of the examination by the licensees training
staff.
3
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
LICENSEE
G. Bobka
Senior Instructor, Operator Training
R. Thurow
Manager, Operator Training
NRC
J. Caruso
Senior Operations Engineer
D. Muller
Senior Operations Engineer
P. Peterson
Senior Operations Engineer
G. Johnson
Operations Engineer (under instruction)
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
ITEM NUMBER
TYPE
DESCRIPTION
NONE
4
ATTACHMENT 2
LICENSEE COMMENTS
ATTACHMENT 3
5
NRC RESOLUTION OF LICENSEE COMMENTS
Question: RO 015
Comment: The question asks the effect of flow reduction on the APRM margins to rod blocks
and scrams following a malfunction resulting in a lowering speed on all five running
Recirculation Pumps given that operator action has been taken to stop the lowering flow and
operation remains outside the Restricted Zone on the Power to Flow Map. The question is
recommended for deletion since none of the 4 choices correctly answers the question, in its
entirety; i.e., how the margins behave during the flow reduction, and how they behave after the
flow reduction. All 3 of choices B, C, and D can correctly answer the first part of the question
(i.e., the margin response during the flow reduction). This occurred because the question failed
to identify the initial flow (or rod line), the flow value at which the transient stopped and did not
frame the question stem within a time-line.
NRC Resolution: Recommendation accepted. The question is deleted due to no correct
answer. The intended answer assumed regardless of where the recirculation flow reduction
stops, power will then slowly rise as the reduced feedwater inlet temperature contributes
positive reactivity via the Negative Temperature Coefficient as a result margins will become
even less. However, if one were to continue to observe the Power to Flow Map relationship
for some additional amount of time after the flow transient, power would eventually turn. That
is, power would at least stop rising and even begin lowering again (if post-transient Xenons
negative reactivity is sufficient to overcompensate for the feedwater inlet temperatures positive
reactivity addition).
Question: RO 090
Comment: The question asks the response of the 13 FW FCV indication during the RPV level
transient given that 13 FW FCV is in BAL, RPV level is 73 inches and stable, and then power is
reduced from 10% (100% to 90%). The question is recommended for deletion since none of
the 4 choices correctly answers the question, in its entirety, since the correct answer should
have been Deviation meter swings to the right and remains there.
NRC Resolution: Recommendation accepted. The question is deleted due to no correct
answer. The intended answer assumed the GEMAC controller would null out (balance).
However, as the steam flow demand lowers so, too, does feed flow demand and because the
GEMAC controller is not capable of automatically changing its internal manual mode signal to
remain matched (in size) with the automatic signal coming from the Mater Level Controller
(MLC), the DEVIATION meter begins to swing to the right of center. After the flow/level
transient, FCV 13 will remain in its new position (more closed than before) as determined by the
smaller automatic signal size from the MLC. However, until the operator physically adjusts the
GEMAC controller knob to, again, null out (balance) the two signals, the DEVIATION meter
indication will remain to the right of center.
6
Comment: The question assumes a loss of Instrument Air to the CAM and H2-O2 Monitors has
occurred and asks the response of the sample stream isolation valves, and the required
alternate method for monitoring the primary containment atmosphere. The question is
recommended for deletion since a lack of stem focus resulted in there being no correct answer
to this question. The use of the label sample stream isolation valves in the stem and in the
heading for the left-column portion of the choices is inappropriate. No such valves, by this
name, exist in either the CAM or H2-02 Analyzer systems; nor does Table 6.1 of N1-SOP-6
allude to any valves by this name. Additionally, an applicant could argue that any one of 3
groups of system-related valves could be interpreted as sample stream isolation valves.
NRC Resolution: Recommendation of licensees amended submittal (Amendment 1 dated
November 1, 2002) accepted. The question is deleted due to no correct answer. The question
stem lacked focus, ignored the influence of the System 12 H2-O2 monitoring isolation valves
(DC-operated) on the set of answer choices, and used incorrect valve designations.
Consequently, none of the 4 choices can be defended as the only correct answer.
Comment: The question asks about the response of the FCV 13 valve and the response of its
position indication on the F Panel assuming a fuse blows in the FCV 13 control circuit (loss of
control signal). The Constellation Energy Group recommends acceptance of an additional
answer - the valve fails as is and the position indication fails upscale. The recommendation
was made based on an argument that references drawing # C-23077-C, Sheet 4 and concludes
if the applicant assumed fuse FU-16 was blown then the intended answer would be correct.
However, if the applicant assumed fuse FU-18 was blown then the affect would be for the valve
to again fail as is but the position indication would fail upscale making a second choice also
correct.
NRC Resolution: Recommendation not accepted. As written this was a closed book question
with no reference provided. In follow-up conversations with a Constellation Energy Group, it
was determined that the applicants were expected to understand the general design and
operation of this circuit upon a loss of control signal. However, detailed knowledge of the
referenced drawing ( # C-23077-C, Sheet 4) from memory was not required. The stem should
have been properly focused to avoid applicant confusion. The reliance on detailed circuit
knowledge from memory makes this question excessively difficult and therefore this question is
deleted.
Question: RO 054
Comment: The question asks what the status of the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU)
and Reactor Sample Return lVs (63-04 and 63-05) would be without power to Battery Board
11, with Liquid Poison initiated and with RPV water level intentionally lowered to -41 inches.
The Constellation Energy Group recommends acceptance of choice A as the correct answer
rather than choice B as originally designated in the answer key. Each air-operated valve (63-04
and 63-05) is equipped with two DC solenoids per valve. One solenoid is powered from Battery
Board (BB) 11 and the second solenoid is powered from BB 12. Energizing either solenoid
allows air to be supplied to the actuator and the valve to be open. De-energizing both solenoids
will block and vent air from the actuator, closing the sample return isolation valve.
7
NRC Resolution: Recommendation accepted. Change the answer key to reflect choice A as
the only correct answer. From the conditions stated in the question stem, BB 11 is de-energized
resulting in one of the two solenoids being positioned to block and vent. When RPV water level
is lowered below 5 inches to -41 inches, as stated in the question stem, Vessel Isolation
Channel 12 Logic will actuate to de-energize the remaining solenoid. Air will be vented from the
actuator resulting in 63-04 and 63-05 valve closure as indicated in answer choice A. The
answer and justification stated in the key, incorrectly identified choice B as the correct answer.