ML022620220

Technical Specifications Pages for Amendment 140 Relocation of Reactor Coolant System Chemistry Requirements

ML022620220
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	09/18/2002
From:	NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD1
To:
References
TAC MB4717
Download: ML022620220 (6)

Text

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION Table 3.3.9-2 Feedwater/Main Turbine Trip System Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints.......

Table 4.3.9.1-1 Feedwater/Main Turbine Trip System Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirement.............................

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM Recirculation Loops.....................................

Figure 3.4.1.1-1

% Rated Thermal Power Versus Core Flow..........................

Jet Pumps...............................................

Recirculation Loop Flow.................................

Idle Recirculation Loop Startup.........................

3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES Safety/Relief Valves....................................

Safety/Relief Valves Low-Low Set Function..............

3/4 4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Leakage Detection Systems...............................

Operational Leakage.....................................

Table 3.4.3.2-1 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves......................

Table 3.4.3.2-2 Reactor Coolant System Interface Valves Leakage Pressure Monitors......

3/4.4.4 3/4.4.5 PAGE 3/4 3-107 3/4 3-108 3/4 4-1 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-6 3/4 4-7 3/4 4-9 3/4 4-10 3/4 4-11 3/4 4-13 3/4 4-14 DELETED......................................................

3

-15 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY.......................................

3/4 4-18 Table 4.4.5-1 Primary Coolant Specific Activity Sample and Analysis Program......................

3/4 4-20 Amendment No. 140 HOPE CREEK I

X

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.4 DELETED UnDP CREEK 3/4 4-15 Amendment No. 140

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK Amendment No. 140 HOPE CREEK 3/4 4-16

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK Amendment No. 140 3/4 4-17 HOPE CREEK

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE 3/4.4.3.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems", May 1973 and Generic Letter 88-01, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austinitic Stainless Steel Piping."

Proceduralized, manual quantitative monitoring and calculation of leakage rates, found by the NRC staff, in GL 88-01, Supp. 1, to be an acceptable alternative during repair periods of up to 30 days, should be demonstrated to have accuracy comparable to the installed drywell floor and equipment drain sump monitoring system.

3/4.4.3.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE The allowable leakage rates from the reactor coolant system have been based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of cracks in pipes. The normally expected background leakage due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system leakage was also considered. The evidence obtained from experiments suggests that for leakage somewhat greater than that specified for UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such leakage would grow rapidly. However, in all cases, if the leakage rates exceed the values specified or the leakage is located and known to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, the reactor will be shutdown to allow further investigation and corrective action.

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA. Leakage from the RCS pressure isolation valves is IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE and will be considered as a portion of the allowed limit.

The limit placed upon the rate of increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE meets the guidance of Generic Letter 88-01, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austinitic Stainless Steel Piping."

3/4.4.4 This section has been deleted.

HOPE CREEK B 3/4 4-3 Amendment No.

140

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.5 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY The limitations on the specific activity of the primary coolant ensure that the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> thyroid and whole body doses resulting from a main steam line failure outside the containment during steady state operation will not exceed small fractions of the dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100. The values for the limits on specific activity represent interim limits based upon a parametric evaluation by the NRC of typical site locations. These values are conservative in that specific site parameters, such as site boundary location and meteorological conditions, were not considered in this evaluation.

The ACTION statement permitting POWER OPERATION to continue for limited time periods with the primary coolant's specific activity greater than 0.2 microcuries per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131, but less than or equal to 4.0 microcuries per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131, accommodates possible iodine spiking phenomenon which may occur following changes in THERMAL POWER.

Monitoring the iodine activity in the primary coolant and taking responsible actions to maintain it at a reasonably low level will aid in ensuring the accumulated time of plant operation with high iodine activity will not exceed 800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> in a consecutive 12-month period. The results of all primary coolant specific activity analyses which exceed the limits of Specification 3.4.5 will be documented pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.5.

Information obtained on iodine spiking will be used to assess the parameters associated with spiking phenomena.

A reduction in frequency of isotopic analysis following power changes may be permissible if justified by the data obtained.

Closing the main steam line isolation valves prevents the release of activity to the environs should a steam line rupture occur outside containment. The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that excessive specific activity levels in the reactor coolant will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action.

Amendment No. 140 B 3/4 4-4 HOPE CREEK