ML022460153

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Undated Document, Current Status of High Susceptibility Plants That May Receive Orders
ML022460153
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse, Surry, Robinson, Cook  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/29/2002
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
BL-01-001, FOIA/PA-2002-0229
Download: ML022460153 (3)


Text

THAT MAY RECEIVE ORDERS CURRENT STATUS OF HIGH SUSCEPTIBILITY PLANTS Davis Besse called FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating On September 28, 2001, NRR senior management the staff's initial assessment of the Company (FENOC), the licensee for Davis-Besse, regarding management indicated that the Bulletin response for the Davis-Besse plant. NRR senior basis for delaying their inspection Davis-Besse bulletin response did not provide sufficient or additional pertinent information, the schedule until April 2002, and unless FENOC had new, a 100% inspection of VHP nozzles by staff's position was that Davis-Besse should perform a conference call between the staff and December 31, 2001. This position was reiterated on FENOC on October 3, 2001.

NRR management and FENOC.

On October 11, 2001, a drop-in meeting was held between that had not previously information During this meeting FENOC indicated that they had new the staff document its requested that been submitted for staff review. In addition, FENOC Davis-Besse plant. The relative to the acceptance criteria used to develop the staff position available. The staff plans once it was staff agreed to provide FENOC with such documentation additional 5, 2001. FENOC provided to issue their technical assessment by November the presence of leakage paths for the information (a finite element analysis to demonstrate a Framatome risk assessment) to the NRR CRDM penetrations at the operating conditions, and to provide docketed information, and Project Manager on Friday, October 12, 2001, committed requested a meeting with the NRC staff.

additional information (RAI) via e-mail to On October 18, 2001, the staff issued a request for inspection, the finite element analysis of FENOC regarding the April 2000 Davis Besse nozzle The licensee met with the NRC staff CRDM penetrations, and the Framatome risk assessment.

committed to provide a response by on October 24, 2001, at NRC headquarters. FENOC the licensee characterized their prior October 31, 2001. In the Bulletin 2001-01 response, four nozzles could not be demonstrated inspections as a qualified visual inspection. However, analysis. In addition, the scope of the prior to have annular gaps in the licensee's finite element due to boric acid deposits from other visual inspection only covered 65% of the VHP nozzles The licensee plans to perform a qualified sources (e.g., canopy seal and Conoseal leaks).

for April 2002. The prior inspection, visual examination at the next refueling outage scheduled inspection in Arpil 2002, which is more even if qualified, was 24 months from the next planned justification. Unless the responses to the than the 18 month maximum assumed in the staff's schedule, the staff proposes to issue an order staff's RAIs are timely and justify the April 2002 qualified visual inspection. The staff's to the licensee to shutdown and perform a 100%

for the maximum of 18 months between prior technical assessment provides the justification and planned inspections.

Surry Unit 2 Electric and Power Company completed a During their previous outage in Fall 2000, Virginia with Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion visual inspection of Surry Unit 2, in accordance in PWR Plants." The inspection was of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components metal inspection as described in not a bare performed with the insulation on the head (e.g.,

in detecting boric acid deposits from VHP Bulletin 2001 -01), and would not have been effective a qualified visual examination at the next refueling nozzle leaks. The licensee plans to perform outage scheduled for March 2002. The licensee has not submitted supplemental plant-specific information to demonstrate that their future inspection will be a qualified visual examination.

was dolctd Inormation in t~his record in accordance ,,*&iI Act, exemptions -

The staff has had numerous conference calls with this licensee to discuss the North Anna Unit 1 inspection results and inspection plans for the remaining North Anna and Surry Units in an attempt to achieve resolution of the relevant technical issues. Since this plant has not been inspected previously using a "qualified visual examination," the unit should be shut-down in immediately to facilitate such an examination.

D.C. Cook Unit 2 Indiana Michigan Power Company's original Bulletin response stated that DC Cook Unit 2 intends to perform a remote visual examination of all accessible VHPs under the reactor vessel head insulation during the next (2001) Unit 2 refueling outage. The response also stated that eddy current (ECT) and ultrasonic (UT) examination will also be used. However, due to a recent forced outage, the licensee has decided to delay its outage until January 19, 2002, as confirmed per a conference call on October 9, 2001.

During their outage in Fall 1994, the licensee completed an eddy current examination of the inner diameter of 71 of the 78 VHPs. The results showed three axial indications in one penetration that were subsequently repaired in 1996. The licensee plans to perform a remote visual inspection with ECT and UT at the next refueling outage scheduled for January 2002.

The planned inspection in January 2002 is more than 7 years from the prior inspection.

H. B. Robinson The NRC staff had a conference call with Carolina Power & Light regarding H.B. Robinson's response to Bulletin 2001-01. The staff requested clarification on the chronology of the April 2001vessel head examination, and confirmation on the chronology of the VHP nozzle inspection and head cleaning, in particular whether the VHP nozzles were inspected prior to head cleaning. The licensee submitted a supplemental Bulletin response on October 2, 2001, and requested a meeting with the staff. On October 4, 2001, the licensee (via conference call) stated that the April 2001 visual examination was not able to access the entire circumference of all nozzles. Since this is not well-defined, the licensee was asked to provide a semi-quantitative assessment of the coverage of the visual examination. In addition, the licensee stated that they do not have "as-built" dimensions for the plant-specific analyses to qualify the Robinson head for visual examination. The staff told the licensee that it would need to justify the use of design drawing dimensions. One method suggested by the staff was to use data from RPV heads of a similar vintage and from the same manufacturer as the Robinson RPV head to demonstrate reasonable assurance that the Robinson VHP nozzles were installed in accordance with the design drawing dimensions. During a teleconference on October 11, 2001, the licensee committed to provide a shutdown schedule to permit inspections as a contingency should efforts to qualify the visual examination prove unsuccessful.

On October 20, 2001, the licensee provided the staff with two finite element analyses to demonstrate that the Robinson VHP nozzles would have leakage paths at the operating conditions, and a summary of information related to the conformance of the Robinson VHP nozzles with design drawing tolerances. On October 24, 2001, the staff issued a RAI via e-mail to the licensee regarding the finite element analysis. The licensee met with the NRC staff on October 24, 2001, at NRC headquarters. The licensee provided the staff with a summary of information to support conformance with the design drawing tolerances. However, the staff had additional questions regarding the conclusions from the finite element analyses. The licensee committed to provide a revised submittal which summarizes their information to support conformance with the design drawing tolerances, and to reconcile the finite element analyses with relevant fabrication and installation details. The licensee plans to perform a qualified visual

examination at the next refueling outage scheduled for Acceptability of the licensee's approach is predicated on the acceptability oithe pending supplemental response to demonstrate qualification of the prior visual examination.