ML022390274
| ML022390274 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/2002 |
| From: | Hornick J Constellation Nuclear |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| References | |
| 50-317/02301, 50-318/02301 | |
| Download: ML022390274 (89) | |
Text
ES-301 Control Room and Facility Walk-Through Test Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination:Julv 15, 2002 Exam Level: SRO(U) Operating Test No: 1 B. 1 Control Room Systems System l JPM Title Type Safety Code* Function
- a. 062 Parallel OC Diesel to 24 4KV Bus D/S 6 A4.06 /13.9
- b. 071. Waste Gas Discharge RMS checks S./ N/A 9 A3.03 /13.8
- c. 013 Respond to an inadvertent CIS Dl S 2 A2.06 /4.0 d
e.
f.
g.
B.2 Facility Walk-Through
- a. 029 Align system for alternate containment purge N/R/L 8 per OI-36 A2.03 IH3.1
- Type Codes: (D)irect from bank, (M)odified from bank, (N)ew, (A)lternate path, (C)ontrolroom, (S)imulator, (L)ow-Power, (R)CA
CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-21C-3 (MODIFIED)
TASK: Parallel DG to a 4KV Bus PURPOSE: Evaluate the Operator's ability to parallel OC DG to 24 4KV, after an emergency start JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSED OPERATOR Rev. 1
Page 2 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-21C-3 (MODIFIED)
ELEMENT STANDARD
= CRITICAL STEP)
PERFORMERS NAME:
APPLICABILITY:
for Completion of the knowledge requirement of the Initial License class training program the Diesel Generator System.
EVALUATION LOCATION:
PLANT SIMULATOR CONTROL ROOM EVALUATION METHOD:
ACTUAL PERFORMANCE DEMONSTRATE PERFORMANCE ESTIMATED TIME ACTUAL TIME TIME CRITICAL TASK:
TO COMPLETE JPM: TO COMPLETE JPM:
15 MINUTES MINUTES NO TASK LEVEL:
LEVEL 1 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:
None REFERENCE PROCEDURE(S):
OI-21C TASK STANDARDS:
This JPM is complete when the OC DG has been paralleled to 24 4KV bus and loaded to 1.000 MW.
Rev. 1
Page 3 CCNPP 'LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-21C-3 (MODIFIED)
ELEMENT - STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
Simulator Setup
- 1. IC-13 Unit 1 100% power.
- 2. Emergency start the OC DG.
Rev. 1
Page 4 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-21C-3 (MODIFIED)
ELEMENT STANDARD
= CRITICAL STEP)
TIME START lCUE: Initial Conditions and General Precautions have been met.
CAUTION: The OC DG should not be paralleled with a 4KV Bus during periods when power is suspect (for example during a severe storm).
Locate OI-21C, Step 6.7.B. 1. Same as element.
- 2. IF OC DG was emergency started, Determines step is THEN PERFORM the following to select applicable.
parallel mode:
Same as element Same as element Same as element
- e. VERIFY 07 4KV Bus is Monitors 07 4K.V bus de-energized by observing zero voltage on voltage.
07 4KV BUS VOLTS, O-EI-0702.
- f. CHECK the Synchroscope pointer on Same as elemen t 1C18B is NOT rotating.
Note to Evalua,tor: Frequency must be within .1 Hz of 60 to allow breakerto shut Rev. 1
Page 5 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-21C-3 (MODIFIED)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
CONTR, 0-CS-0705.
- i. REMOVE the Sync Stick from OC DG Same as element OUT BKR, 0-CS-152-0703.
ICUE: After next step, when dispatched, PO reports all equipment running.
- j. VERIFY the following equipment Dispatches PO to check RUNNING by observing the associated equipment.
red indicating light is illuminated on OC188:
OC I HT RAD FAN SEL SW, 0-HS-10082 0C2 HT RAD FAN SEL SW, 0-HS-10102 OCI FO B/U PP SEL SW, 0-HS-10051 0C2 FO B/U PP SEL SW, 0-HS-10061
- k. RESET the following bus U/V flags: Dispatches operator to 07 4KV Bus reset flags 07 480V Bus
g Dispatches PO to shut Disc 189-2406.
2406 as the PO.
Rev. 1
Page 6 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-21C-3 (MODIFIED)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
- 6. INSERT the Sync Stick for the selected OC DG Inserts into sync jack for 4KV Bus feeder breaker. 152-2406 OCDG 24 4kv Bus fdr
- 7. ADJUST INCOMING VOLTS equal to Monitors incoming and RUNNING VOLTS using OC DG AUTO VOLT running volts. Lowers CONTR, 0-CS-0704. OC DG Auto Volt Contr as necessary to match incoming and running vlts.
- 8. ADJUST OC DG frequency so the Synchroscope Monitors synchroscope.
pointer is rotating slowly in the FAST direction using OC DG SPEED CONTR, 0-CS-0705.
Shuts 2-CS-152-2406 at approximately 5 degrees prior to the 12 o'clock position.
When checked, annunciator is in alarm. (Unit 2) Raises OC DG Speed Contr and monitors OC DG MW load.
- 10. IMMEDIATELY ADJUST OC DG load using OC DG SPEED CONTR, 0-CS-0705, to obtain between 0.45 MW AND 1.0 MW load on OC DG VAR/WATT, 0-JI-0701B.
- 11. CHECK annunciator "SEQUENCER Checks annunciator INITIATED" alarm is received. window in alarm.
4KV BUS PANEL 11/14 1C08 21/24 2C08
- 12. REMOVE the Sync Stick AND RETURN to Same as element Home Base.
Rev. 1
Page 7 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-21C-3 (MODIFIED)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
- 13. LOAD OC DG as follows:
- a. REFER to FIGURE 1, OC DIESEL Refers to FIGURE 1, OC GENERATOR ELECTRICAL LIMITS, DIESEL GENERATOR AND PERFORM the following: ELECTRICAL LIMITS.
(1) RAISE MW load by approximately Raises load with OC DG 1.0 MW, using OC DG SPEED SPEED CONTR, 0-CS-CONTR, 0705.
0-CS-0705.
(2) MAINTAIN 0 to 500 KVARs using OC DG AUTO VOLT CONTR, 0-CS-0704 and FIGURE 1, OC DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRICAL LIMITS.
(3) MONITOR the selected 4KV Bus voltage between 4.1 KV and 4.35 KV.
TIME STOP -
TERMINATING CUE: This JPM is complete when the OC DG has been paralleled to 24 4KV bus and loaded to 1.000 MW. No further actions are required.
Rev. 1
Page 8 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-21C-3 (MODIFIED)
TASK: Parallel DG to a 4KV Bus Document below any instances of failure to comply with industrial safety practices, radiation safety practices and use of event free tools. NOTE: Violation of safety procedures will result in failure of the JPM.
NOTES:
DID A NEAR MISS OCCUR DUE TO INAPPROPRIATE PERSONNEL ACTIONS/INACTIONS OR PROCEDURAL QUALITY? YES NO (If yes, provide comments below)
COMMENTS:
The operator's performance was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:
Rev. 1
CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
- 1. To complete the task successfully, you must:
- perform each critical element correctly. You must inform the evaluator of the indications you are monitoring. Where necessary, consider the evaluator to be the CRS.
- comply with industrial safety practices, radiation safety practices and use of event free tools. NOTE: Violation of safety procedures will result in failure of the JPM.
- 2. Initial Conditions:
- a. The OC DG has been started, from the Control Room, with an Emergency Start signal.
- c. You are performing the duties of an extra Licensed Operator.
- 3. Initiating Cue: The CRS directs you to parallel OC DG to 24 4KV bus per the appropriate procedure, and load it to 1.0 MW. Are there any questions? You may begin.
Rev. 1
Page 1 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-17B-1 (NEW)
TASK: Verify RMS Operability for a Waste Gas Release PURPOSE: Evaluates an Operator's ability to align the Waste Gas System for a release per OI-17B JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING
Page 2 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-17B-1 (NEW)
ELEMENT STANDARD
{* = CRITICAL STEP)
PERFORMER'S NAME:
APPLICABILITY:
Completion of the Initial License class classroom and simulator training.
EVALUATION LOCATION:
PLANT SIMULATOR CONTROLLROOM EVALUATION METHOD:
ACTUAL PERFORMANCE DEMONSTRATE PERFC IRMANCE ESTIMATED TIME ACTUAL TIME TIME CRITICAL TASK:
TO COMPLETE JPM: TO COMPLETE JPM:
15 MINUTES MlNUTES M__ NO TASK LEVEL:
TRAIN TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:
None REFERENCE PROCEDURE(S):
OI-17B TASK STANDARDS:
This JPM is complete it has been determined what actions are required to perform a Waste Gas release with O-RI-2191 inoperable.
Page 3 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-17B-1 (NEW)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
- 1. Simulator Setup
- a. IC-any
- b. Enter Overrides
- 1. Override O-RI-2191 indication to 3.99, place arrow on indicator.
Page 4 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-17B-1 (NEW)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
TIME START Locate OI-17B Section 6.4.B Step 12 Without error
- 12. OPEN the WF DISCH ISOL valves using Same as element 0-HS-2191 AND 0-HS-2192 (1C33):
- 0-WGS-2191-CV
- 0-WGS-2191-CV
- 13. IF a rise in flow rate is indicated on Directs PO to monitor flow.
0-FI-2192 OR 0-FI-2193 (1C63) When report received on THEN... zero flow, determines step is N/A lCUE: IF ABO contacted, no flow is indicated on 0-FI-2193.
- 14. IF the Gaseous Waste Dishcarge Radiation Checks 1-RI-2191 in Monitor O-RI-2191 is out of service, service and determines step THEN... is N/A
- 15. PERFORM an RMS operability check on 0-RI 2191 by performing the following:
Places switch to CHECKSOURCE follows:
Determines no meter deflection occurred
Page 5 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-17B-1 (NEW)
ETLEWNT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
Considers the monitor out of service Steps 15.c,d ande are not requiredto beperformed if the RMS is declaredinoperable.
- 16. IF the Gaseous Waste Discharge Radiation Monitor, O-RI-2191 fails any part of its operability check in Step 15 OR is declared out of service in Step 14, THEN COMPLETE the following:
Same as element ENSURE the Gaseous Waste Places Operate Selector Discharge Radiation Instrument Switch in LEVEL CAL Operate Selector Switch, 0-HS-2190 in the LEVEL CAL position.
Locates 01-35 Section 6.12
Page 6 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-17B-1 (NEW)
EIL PMEPNT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
Determines ODCM requirement 3.3.3.9 Action 35 is required.
CHECK Technical Sp Determines no Technical for applicability. Specifications apply
- c. CHECK TRM for applicability. Determines no Technical Requirements apply Checks ODCM Section 3.3.3.9 page 16 Locates table and determines Action 35 is applicable Notifies CRS or Shift Manager that discharge may continue if requirements of Action 35 are met.
.I TERMINATING CUE: This JPM is complete when the trainee states that the Waste Gas release can continue as long as Action 35 is completed.
No further actions are required.
TIME STOP
Page 7 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE OI-17B-1 (NEW)
TASK: Verify the operability for a Waste Gas release Document below any instances of failure to comply with industrial safety practices, radiation safety practices and use of event free tools. NOTE: Violation of safety procedures will result in failure of the JPM.
NOTES:
DID A NEAR MISS OCCUR DUE TO INAPPROPRIATE PERSONNEL ACTIONS/INACTIONS OR PROCEDURAL QUALITY? YES NO (If yes, provide comments below)
COMMENTS:
The operator's performance was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:
CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
- 1. To complete the task successfully, you must:
- perform each critical element correctly. You must inform the evaluator of the indications you are monitoring. Where necessary, consider the evaluator to be the CRS.
- comply with industrial safety practices, radiation safety practices and use of event free tools. NOTE: Violation of safety procedures will result in failure of the JPM.
- 2. Initial Conditions:
- a. A Waste Gas discharge permit has been approved for releasing a WGDT.
- b. You are performing the duties of a Unit 1 CRO.
- 3. Initiating Cue: 13 WGDT is being aligned for discharge per 0I-17B Section 6.4. Steps 6.4.B, 1 through 11 are complete. Begin on Step 12.
Are there any questions? You may begin.
CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE AM-1C08-3G (UPGRADE)
TASK: Verify Validity of CIS Actuation PURPOSE: Evaluates an Operator's Ability to Determnine the Validity of a CIS Actuation JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING Rev. 1
Page 2 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE AM-1C08-3G (UPGRADE)
TASK: Verify Validity of CIS Actuation PERFORMER'S NAME:
APPLICABILITY:
Completion of the knowledge requirement of the Initial License class training program for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System.
EVALUATION LOCATION:
PLANT SIMULATOR CONTROL ROOM EVALUATION METHOD:
ACTUAL PERFORMANCE DEMONSTRATE PERFORMANCE ESTIMATED TIME ACTUAL TIME TIME CRITICAL TASK:
TO COMPLETE JPM: TO COMPLETE JPM:
10 MINUTES MINUTES NO TASK LEVEL:
TRAIN TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:
None REFERENCE PROCEDURE(S):
Alarm Manual IC08, G-06 TASK STANDARDS:
This JPM is complete when CIS has been reset, Instrument Air and Component Cooling have been restored to Containment.
Page 3 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE AM-1C08-3G (UPGRADE)
TASK: Verify Validity of CIS Actuation Simulator Setup
- a. Reset simulator to IC-1 3, 100% power
- b. Initiate malfunctions ESFAO9_00 1 and then delete the malfunction after components reposition.
- c. Place simulator in "freeze".
- d. IF contacted to reset CIS from ESFAS, acknowledge request, but do NOT reset CIS.
Page 4 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE AM-1C08-3G (UPGRADE)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
TIME START Locate and reference Alarm Manual for Same as element.
IC08, G-06.
- 1. PERFORM the following:
Checks pressure indications for pressure > 2.8 psig on 1C09.
Determines that CIS actuation is not valid.
No action taken - CIS invalid.
- c. IF the CIS is invalid Checks temperatures on IC06 and the THEN MONITOR the RCPs plant computer.
Controlled Bleed-off and bearing temperatures while performing the following:
(1) IF the RCP Controlled Determines that Controlled Bleed Off Bleed-off temperature(s) temperature(s) are NOT exceeding exceed 200'F or bearing 2000 F AND bearing temperature(s) temperature(s) exceed are NOT exceeding 195°F.
195°F, THEN:
- d. Informs CRS that CIS is invalid, requests resetting CIS.
Places 1-HS-3832 & 1-HS-2080 in SHUT per Attachment 4 of EOPs and reports handswitches are matched per the attachment. Depresses Channel A CIS reset pushbutton on IC10 and verifies ACTUATION SYS CIS TRIP alarm on C08 clears.
Page 5 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE AM-1C08-3G (UPGRADE)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
Places 1-HS-2080 and 1-HS 3832 in OPEN and verifies each valve opens.
Verifies RCP temperatures are lowering.
TIME STOP ___
TERMINATING CUE: This JPM is complete when Component Cooling and Instrument Air are restored to Containment. No further actions are required.
Page 6 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE AM-1C08-3G (UPGRADE)
TASK: Verify Validity of CIS Actuation Document below any instances of failure to comply with industrial safety practices, radiation safety practices and use of event free tools. NOTE: Violation of safety procedures will result in failure of the JPM.
NOTES:
DID A NEAR MISS OCCUR DUE TO INAPPROPRIATE PERSONNEL ACTIONS/INACTIONS OR PROCEDURAL QUALITY? YES NO (If yes, provide comments below)
COMMENTS:
The operator's performance was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:
CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
- 1. To complete the task successfully, you must:
- perform each critical element correctly. You must inform the evaluator of the indications you are monitoring. Where necessary, consider the evaluator to be the CRS.
- comply with industrial safety practices, radiation safety practices and use of event free tools. NOTE: Violation of safety procedures will result in failure of the JPM.
- 2. Initial Conditions:
- a. Unit 1 is in Mode 1 at 100% power.
- b. Annunciator IC08 G-06 "Actuation Sys CIS Tripped" in alarm.
- c. You are performing the duties of the Unit 1 RO and CRO.
- 3. Initiating Cue: The CRS directs you to respond to the alarm per the Alarm Manual for IC08. Do you have any questions? You may begin.
CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 01-36-1 (NEW)
TASK: Starting an Alternate Purge of Containment PURPOSE: Evaluates an Operator's ability to operate Containment purge hand switches locally.
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING Rev. 2
Page 2 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 01-36-1 (NEW)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
PERFORMER'S NAME:
APPLICABILITY:
ABO PREREQUISITES:
Completion of the Initial License classroom and simulator training.
EVALUATION LOCATION:
x_ PLANT SIMULATOR CONTROL ROOM EVALUATION METHOD:
ACTUAL PERFORMANCE _x DEMONSTRA TE PERFORMANCE ESTIMATED TIME ACTUAL TIME TIME CRITICAL TASK:
TO COMPLETE JPM: TO COMPLETE JPM:
15 MINUTES _ MINUTES IN;O TASK LEVEL:
TRAIN TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:
None REFERENCE PROCEDURE(S):
01-36 TASK STANDARDS:
This JPM is complete when key switches on breakers 52-20231 and 52-20311 are in TEST/ALT PURGE.
Rev. 2
Page 3 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 01-36-1 (NEW)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
ICUE: Initial conditions are met, begin at Step 6.7.B. 1.
Locate 01-36 Section 6.7, Step B. 1 Without error NOTE:
- All steps in this subsection apply only to controls and equipment on the unit to be vented.
- The key will be captured in the Test/Alt Purge position.
- The Purge Supp Fan Test/Alt Purge handswitch is located on breaker 52-10231 (52-20231).
Simulates inserting key, places 2-HS-5290A in TEST/ALT PURGE.
be captured in the Test/Alt Purge position.
- The Purge Exh Fan Test/Alt Purge handswitch is located on breaker 52-10311 (52-20311).
Simulates inserting key, places ROEhanswich.1(241$528A~n 2-HS-5289A in TEST/ALT PURGE.
TERMINATING CUE: This JPM is complete when the CRO is informed that HS-5289A and 5290A are in TEST/ALT PURGE. No further actions required.
Rev. 2
CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 01-36-1 (NEW)
TASK: Starting an Alternate Purge of Containment Document below any instances of failure to comply with industrial safety practices, radiation safety practices and use of event free tools. NOTE: Violation of safety procedures will result in failure of the JPM.
NOTES:
DID A NEAR MISS OCCUR DUE TO INAPPROPRIATE PERSONNEL ACTIONS/INACTIONS OR PROCEDURAL QUALITY? YES NO (If yes, provide comments below)
COMMENTS:
The operator's performance was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:
Rev. 2
CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
- 1. To complete the task successfully, you must:
- perform each critical element correctly. You must inform the evaluator of the indications you are monitoring. Where necessary, consider the evaluator to be the CRS.
- comply with industrial safety practices, radiation safety practices and use of event free tools. NOTE: Violation of safety procedures will result in failure of the JPM.
- 2. Initial Conditions:
- a. Unit 2 is in a refueling outage.
- b. An approved Containment purge permit is held by the CRO.
- c. You have been given the required keys.
- d. You are performing the duties of Unit 2 ABO.
- 3. Initiating Cue: You are directed by the CRO to perform 01-36 Section 6.7, Steps B. 1 and B.2. Are there any questions? You may begin.
Rev. 2
CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE AOP-7H-2 (NEW)
TASK: Monitor CEA Position PURPOSE: Evaluates an Operator's Ability to Verify CEA Position by Alternate Methods JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING Rev. 0
Page 2 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE AOP-7H-2 (NEW)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
PERFORMER'S NAME:
APPLICABILITY:
Completion of the knowledge requirement of the Initial License class training program for Nuclear Engineering Operating Procedures.
EVALUATION LOCATION:
PLANT SIMULATOR CONTROL ROOM EVALUATION METHOD:
ACTUAL PERFORMANCE DEMONSTRATE PERFORMANCE ESTIMATED TIME ACTUAL TIME TIME CRITICAL TASK:
TO COMPLETE JPM: TO COMPLETE JPM:
15 M[NUTES MINUTES NO TASK LEVEL:
TRAIN TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:
AOP-7H Attachment 7 REFERENCE PROCEDURE(S):
AOP-7H TASK STANDARDS:
This JPM is complete when "full out" position indication is selected as the operable position indication system to replace pulse counting.
Rev. 0
Page 3 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE AOP-7H-2 (NEW)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITTiCAL STEPS TIME START Identify and locate AOP-7H Same as element.
Section IV.H. 1.b.
CUE: Hand candidate filled out Attachment 7, explain using "part length" pulse counter readings for Group 5 CEAs as indicated. Secondary position indication is 132.5 for each CEA listed.
1.b Perform verification of the two Same as element position indications at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to comply with TRM TVR 15.1.4.1:
ATTACHMENT (7)
- 1. Record the following... N/A, data given CUE: Provide blank copy of Computer Outage Log page for Coil Power Programmer.
Take Pulse Counter Readings, in CSR, and compares readings to Attachment (7) readings.
Determines CEAs have moved and discontinues method. Refers to AOP-7H Section IV.H.
Refers to TRM 15.1.4.
Reviews TRM and determines a Non-Conformance condition exists Rev. 0
Page 4 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE AOP-711-2 (NEW)
ELEMENT STANDARD
(* = CRITICAL STEP)
Non-Cormance .1' L'
. Determines that CEAs shall be fully
-- withdrawn or non-conformance condition B applied.
TIME STOP TERMINATING CUE: This JPM is complete when it is determined that the CEAs should be fully withdrawn to comply with the TRM. No further actions are required.
Rev. 0
Page 5 CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE AOP-7H-2 (NEW)
TASK: Monitor CEA Position Document below any instances of failure to comply with industrial safety practices, radiation safety practices and use of event free tools. NOTE: Violation of safety procedures will result in failure of the JPM.
NOTES:
DID A NEAR MISS OCCUR DUE TO INAPPROPRIATE PERSONNEL ACTIONS/INACTIONS OR PROCEDURAL QUALITY? YES NO (If yes, provide comments below)
COMMENTS:
The operator's performance was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:
Rev. 0
CCNPP LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
- 1. To complete the task successfully, you must:
- perform each critical element correctly. You must inform the evaluator of the indications you are monitoring. Where necessary, consider the evaluator to be the CRS.
- comply with industrial safety practices, radiation safety practices and use of event free tools. NOTE: Violation of safety procedures will result in failure of the JPM.
- 2. Initial Conditions:
- a. Unit 1 is at 100% power and has been operating at full power for seven weeks.
- b. The plant computer has "crashed" and is inoperable.
- c. You are performing the duties of the Unit- I RO.
- 3. Initiating Cue: AOP-7H was implemented 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago. The CRS directs you to verify CEA position per Section IV.H. 1.b, Attachment 7, Step 2, using CEA pulse counter readings. For the purpose of this JPM, use the part length (retired in place) pulse counters instead of the actual Group 5 pulse counters. Are there any questions? You may begin.
Rev. 0
ft.' .,
Simulation Facility Calvert Cliffs Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: SRO CRO To evaluate the applicant's ability to conduct a unit power reduction and to implement the ARMs, OIs, AOPs, Objectives: as appropriate, for malfunctioning systems and/or controls including a failure of the Hotwell Level Controller, 11 Circulating Water Pp, and a VCT Level Transmitter with a failure of CVC-501-MOV to reopen, preventing realignment to the VCT. This scenario also evaluates the applicant's ability to respond to a leaking PORV and a condenser waterbox tube rupture requiring a rapid downpower to a target value of 300 MWe. Multiple CEA drops will require a reactor trip but an ATWS condition exists. In EOP-0, a SGTR begins in 12 SG. The crew will cooldown and isolate 12 SG.
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% Power, MOC 13 HPSI Pp is OOS.
13 CCW Pp is OOS 11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
INSTR AIR COMPR(S) alarm (K-25) hanging.
Turnover: Present plant conditions: 100% power, MOC; Unit 2 is in MODE 5 - no CW Pps and 23 AFW Pp unavailable.
Power history: 100% power for previous 68 days.
Equipment out of service:
- 1) 13 HPSI Pp motor bearing failure during STP. It is disassembled, expected to be returned to service in 2 days. T.S. 3.5.2 Action Statement entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago.
- 2) 13 CCW Pp has a broken shaft, expected repair tomorrow-noon.
- 3) 11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
- 4) Alarm K-25 INSTR AIR COMPR(S) is hanging. No problems with the compressors, I & C is investigating, alarm card has been swapped out.
Surveillances due:
None Instructions for shift:
Maintain 100% Power.
0202.doc 1
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. T Description Preload SI002_03 13 HPSI OOS.
PNL OVR HS for VCT remains in SHUT.
RPS005 ATWS.
RPS006 PNL OVR INSTR AIR COMPR(S) alarm hanging.
(K-25) l l CDO02 I CRO Several minutes after the crew takes the watch, the Hotwell Level Cont. (4405)
(high) fails high, dumping fully to the CST. The CRO will receive the Hotwell Level Low alarm, will inform the CRS and refer to the ARM. The CRO should determine 4405 has failed high, take manual control and restore hotwell level.
The OWC should be contacted for assistance.
2 CWOO1_01 C CRO After hotwell level control has been reestablished, 11 CW Pp trips. The crew will notice this via computer alarm. The CRS should direct the CRO to investigate. They will implement AOP-7L. The crew should monitor condenser delta T. The OWC should be contacted for assistance.
3 CVCSO09 I RO Next, VCT Level transmitter LT-227 fails low. This causes Chg. Pp suction to (LO) shift to the RWT. The RO should inform the CRS. The CRS should direct the RO to shift Chg. Pp suction back to the VCT. RO should note the failure of VCT outlet (501-MOV) to reopen. The CRS should direct the plant boration be stopped by placing all Charging Pumps in PTL. The ABO may be dispatched to open CVC-501 locally. The crew should isolate letdown and set up charging to cycle on the backup pump. The OWC should be contacted for assistance.
4 RCS021 C RO Next, PORV-402 starts to leak. The RO should acknowledge the Quench Tank (5% over 2 alarm and note on the acoustic monitor the indicated leakage. The ARM will be min) referenced and the CRS will direct the PORV Block Valve, RC-403-MOV be closed. The CRS will refer to T. S. 3.4.11. The OWC will be contacted for assistance.
5 CDO09_04 R RO After T.S. have been addressed, a condenser tube ruptures in 12B waterbox.
N CRO This will first be noticed with a Turbine Plant Sample Alarm. Chemistry and the TBO should be dispatched. AOP-10 will be implemented. Once a tube rupture has been determined in 12B waterbox a rapid power reduction to 300MW should be started and water dropped in the box. Chemistry and other appropriate plant management notifications should be made.
6 CEDS012_35 M ALL After power has been reduced at least 5%, CEA 35 drops into the core. The CEDS012_37 crew should reduce turbine load to maintain Tc on program then about a minute later a 2nd CEA drops. The CRS should direct the unit be tripped and EOP-0 implemented. When the RO attempts to trip the reactor an ATWS condition exists and the RO must take ATWS actions.
7 MS002_02 M ALL During the performance of EOP-0 (after VA is Complete) a SGTR begins in 12 (1 tube) SG. The crew is expected to diagnose the SGTR and implement EOP-6. While in EOP-6 the crew will cooldown to less than 5150F Th and isolate 12 SG. The scenario can be terminated after 12 SG is isolated.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient 0202.doc 2
SCENARIO 2 OVERVIEW The candidates will take the shift at 100% power, MOL.
After the crew takes the watch, the Hotwell Level Controller (4405) fails high, dumping fully to the CST. The CRO will receive the Hotwell Level Low alarm, will inform the CRS and refer to the ARM. The CRO should determine 4405 has failed high, take manual control and restore hotwell level. The OWC should be contacted for assistance.
After hotwell level control has been reestablished, 11 CW Pp trips. The crew will notice this via computer alarm.
The CRS should direct the CRO to investigate. They will implement AOP-7L. The crew should monitor condenser delta T. The CRO will isolate the waterbox using guidance from 01-14. The OWC should be contacted for assistance.
Next, VCT Level transmitter LT-227 fails low. This causes Chg. Pp suction to shift to the RWT. The RO informs the CRS. The CRS directs the RO to shift Chg. Pp suction back to the VCT. RO should note the failure of VCT outlet (501-MOV) to reopen. The CRS should direct the plant boration be stopped by placing all Charging Pumps in PTL. The ABO may be dispatched to open CVC-501-MOV locally. The crew should isolate letdown and set up charging to cycle on the backup pump. The OWC should be contacted for assistance.
Next, PORV-402 starts to leak. The RO should acknowledge the Quench Tank alarm and note on the acoustic monitor the indicated leakage. The ARM will be referenced and the CRS will direct the PORV Block Valve, RC-403-MOV be closed. The CRS will refer to T. S. 3.4.11. The RO should monitor RCS pressure and Quench tank parameters to be returning to normal values. The OWC will be contacted for assistance.
After T.S. have been addressed, a condenser tube ruptures in 12B waterbox. This will first be noticed with a Turbine Plant Sample Alarm. Chemistry and the TBO should be dispatched. AOP-10 will be implemented. Once a tube rupture has been determined in 12B waterbox a rapid power reduction to a target value of 300MW should be started and water dropped in the box. Additionally the waterbox should be isolated using 01-14. Chemistry and other appropriate plant management notifications should be made.
After power has been reduced at least 5%, CEA 35 drops into the core. The crew should reduce turbine load to maintain Tc on program then about a minute later a 2nd CEA drops. The CRS should direct the unit be tripped and EOP-0 implemented. When the RO attempts to trip the reactor an ATWS condition exists and the RO must take ATWS actions to trip the reactor and meet the reactivity control safety function.
During the performance of EOP-0 (after VA is complete) a SGTR (1 tube) begins in 12 SG. The crew is expected to diagnose the SGTR and implement EOP-6. While in EOP-6 the crew will cooldown to less than 515'F Th and attempt to isolate 12 SG. The scenario can be terminated after 12 SG is isolated.
0202.doc 3
Scenario No: l 2 Event No. I 1 Page 4 of 13 Event
Description:
Failure of Condenser Hotwell level controller (4405) high Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Annunciator alarms 1C03 - C-16 CNDSR HOTWELL LEVEL CRO
- Acknowledges alarm, identifies and reports 1-CD-4405-CV has failed high
- Acknowledges report and:
- Directs CRO to take 4405-CV to manual and shut the dump CV
- Implements AOP-3G
- Verifies 11 CST level
- Restores and Monitors hotwell level CRO
- Perform actions as directed by SRO SRO
- Contacts OWC/I&C to investigate failure of 1-LIC-4405.
Scenario No: 2 Event No. l 2 Page 5 of 13 Event
Description:
Trip of 11 Circ. Water Pump l Time I Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Plant computer alarm for trip of 11 CW Pp Annunciator C CNDSR HOTWELL LVL CRO
- Notes trip of 11 CW Pump and informs the SRO SRO
- Acknowledges report and directs:
- CRO to monitor Main Condenser delta T, vacuum, screen D/P, etc.
- Dispatching the TBO and OSO to investigate pump, bkr.
l Implementation of AOP-7L
- Reduces power if necessary to maintain vacuum CRO
- Perform actions as directed by SRO
- Secures I1lA waterbox per 0I-14A
- Secures amertaps
- May decide to drop water in the waterbox SRO . Contacts OWC to investigate trip of 11 Circ. Water Pp
Scenario No: l 2 l Event No. l 3 Page 6 of 13 Event
Description:
VCT Level Transmitter, 1-LT-227 fails low l Time ] Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Annunciator - F46 CHG PP SUCT FROM RWT Charging Pump suction swaps to the RWT RO
- Acknowledges report:
- Directs RO to monitor primary parameters
- Directs CRO to reduce turbine load as necessary to maintain Tc on program RO
- Shifts Charging suction back to the VCT
- Monitors primary parameters SRO
- Directs all Charging Pumps put in PTL to stop the boration
- Directs letdown be isolated and charging set up to cycle on the backup pump
- May direct the ABO to open I-CVC-50 1-MOV locally, (however, if opened locally should dedicate an operator to close in the event of a SIAS)
- Places all Charging Pps in PTL
- Isolates letdown
- Aligns Charging to cycle on the backup pump
- If CVC-501 is opened locally, shifts suction to the RWT and restores charging and letdown CRO
- Maintains Tc on program SRO
- Contacts OWC for support for failure of I-LT-227
Scenario No: 2 Event No. 4 Page 7 of 13 Event
Description:
PORV 402 Leakage l Time I Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Annunciator Alarm - E-1, QUENCH TK TEMP LVL PRESS Quench Tank computer alarm RO
- Notes alarms on 1C06 and informs SRO
- Refers to ARM
- Determines, based on acoustic monitor indications (or print) that PORV 402 or Safety RV-200 is leaking SRO
- Acknowledges report and concurs with the ROs diagnosis.
- (May direct RO to vent the Quench Tank per QI-1B)
- Performs action as directed by the SRO
- Directs RO to return Quench Tank parameters to normal per O-lB, Quench Tank Operations l Refers to T.S. 3.4.11
Scenario No: l 2 IEvent No. l 5 Page 8 of 13 Event
Description:
Tube rupture in 12B waterbox/downpower Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Annunciator Alarm - C-52, 11 TURB PLANT SMPL SYS, IT21 L-11, U-1 SG SMPL PANEL CRO
- Informs SRO
- Refers to ARK, directs TBO to IT21 SRO
- Directs Chemistry to investigate sample panel alarms
- Determines a large leak exists in the condenser
- Following report of affected waterbox directs: (may start downpower prior to knowing which waterbox)
- 12B waterbox be taken off
- Rapid downpower to a target value of 300 MWe (upper limit is 400MWe)
- Initiates PZR spray flow to equalize RCS Boron:
- Energizes all PZR backup heater banks
- Adjusts PZR Pressure Controller setpoint to maintain 2250 psia
- If not inservice, may consider restoring letdown
. Commences boration from the BASTs followed by shifting suction to the RWT:
- Opens BA direct makeup valve
. Verifies two charging pumps running
- Runs a BA pump for 30 seconds
- After BA Pump is secured, shuts BA direct makeup valve
- Verifies open RWT outlet valve
. Verifies Shut VCT outlet (may close locally)
. Requests Peer checks for reactivity manipulations CRO
- Reduces turbine load to maintain Tc within 50F of program
- Monitors turbine parameters not to exceed
- 150 1Ffhr rate of change of 1st stage shell inner metal temperature (Point 6 on TR-4404)
- 750 F 1"t stage shell metal temperature differential (Diff between Points 6 & 7 on TR-4404)
- Unloading rate of 10% step change or 5°/Jmin SRO
- Coordinates power reduction between RO and CRO
Scenario No: 2 Event No. l 6 l Page 9 of 13 Event
Description:
Dropped CEAs/Reactor Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Annunciator alarms IC05 - D-31 SECONDARY CEA POSITION DEVIATION +/- 4" D-32 CEA MOTION INHIBIT Dropping Rx power, RCS temp. and press.
- Acknowledges report
- Directs CRO to reduce turbine load to restore Tc to program CRO
- Directs RO to manually trip the reactor
- Depese ne siet12A anda reAtr trip pue ycoigAYbraesoee bv l *C ohes rALLCtor fullyditsetrip l ~~~~* Veifies SROioatemakeupcodtionR ieue l
- Chec eRO reactor th tripped .s
- 11 ens 12A.48MU.Bums secred2-3 Open MI2A12
- Depresses vav480C-1V
. ChecksALL Turbine biCes fully TRIP..button Bis
- 0 inser Checs the shu(t2 urbineMAIN.SOP.VALES.shu l ~~~~~*Opef RC 3 J13B is in DIREC s (52P,4312). UT ave1CC-0 Vissu
- Checks.urbine.SEED.drop
- Verifes turine geeratoroutputbreakes.open
... 11. .E. USB..OC-52 l* ReeeprgizesTuAband TRIA butto BuelycoigAN
- IE BKR...C.......
11 GEN raesoee l .~ Verifiesdem bine watermakeptorC ispu sreuersoed :
l*
l E T11CT M iEvalvehasUS T t-V-1-CV rIppEd: s shut
Scenario No: 2 Event No. l 6 Page 9 of 13 Event
Description:
Dropped CEAs/Reactor Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Continued from Turbine Trip on previous page
- Verifies 11 GEN and EXCITER FIELD BKRs 1-CS-41 and 1-CS-41E are open
- 1-MS-4025-MOV (1 lMSR)
- 1-MS4026-MOV (12 MSR)
Informs SRO the Turbine is Tripped CRO
- Checks 125 VDC and 120 VAC busses energized
- Verifies Switchgear Ventilation in service per OI-22H Informs SRO Vital Auxiliaries Safety Function is complete RO
- Determines PZR pressure is not stabilizing between 1850 psia and 2300 psia and is continuing to drop l Isolates letdown (if in service)
- Manually operates heaters and sprays to attempt to restore pressure
- Performs RCP Trip Strategy:
l When pressure drops to 1725 psia, trips either l l lA and 12B RCPs OR
.* 1 B and 12A RCPs
- Determines PZR level is not stabilizing between 80 and 180 inches or trending to 160 inches l Ensures RCS subcooling GREATER THAN 300 F Informs SRO RCS Pressure and Inventory Safety Function cannot be met due to low PZR pressure and PZR level CRO . Verifies Turbine Bypass Valves or ADVs operating to maintain:
- SG pressures between 850 and 920 psia
- Tc between 5250 F and 5350 F
- Checks at least one SG available for controlled heat removal
- SG level between -170 and +30 inches
- Main or Aux. Feed operating to maintain level
- Tc>5250 F
- Checks at least one RCP running
- If any RCPs are running, checks loop delta T in a SG available for heat removal <10TF Informs SRO Core and RCS Heat Removal Safety Function complete
Scenario No: 2 Event No. 6 Page 11 of 13 Event
Description:
Dropped CEAs/Reactor Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW
- Checks Containment pressure is <0.7 psig
- Checks Containment temperature is <120 0F.
- Checks containment radiation monitor alarms CLEAR with NO unexplained trends
- Checks RMS alarms CLEAR with NO unexplained trends:
- 1-RIC-5415 U-1 wide range noble gas
- I-RI-1752 Condenser Offgas
- 1-RI-4014 Unit 1 SG Blowdown
- 1-RI-5415 Unit 1 Main Vent Gaseous
- Verifies SG B/D is isolated Informs SRO CNMNT environment is complete and Rad Levels External to CNMNT cannot be met due to SG B/D and Condenser Offgas.
- Conducts EOP-0 nmd-brief and directs operators to reverify Safety Function Crew . Reverifies Safety Functions SRO
- Determines Recovery Procedure per Diagnostic Flowchart:
- All Safety Functions met - NO
- Single Event Diagnosis - EOP-6
- Directs transition to EOP-6
Scenario No: 2 I Event No. 7 Page 12 of 13 Event
Description:
EOP-6, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO
- Briefs crew prior to EOP-6 implementation
- Monitors RCS depressurization:
- Monitors RCS temp and pressure limits per ATTACHMENT 1 for minimum pump operating pressure for running RCPs
- Commences RCS Boration.
CRO
- Commences RCS Cooldown
- Commences a rapid cooldown to <515 0F Th
- Uses ADVs and records time ADVs open
- When SGIS Block permitted alarms are received, blocks SGIS,
- Evaluates the need to throttle HPSI flow
- When the following conditions are met:
. At least 25 0F subcooling based on CETs
- PZR level > 101 inches
. At least one S/G available for heat removal
- RVLMS indicates level is above the top of the hot leg
- Maintain subcooling between 25 and 140 0F based on CETs
. PZR level between 101 and 180 inches
- With PZR pressure >200 PSIA and constant stops both LPSI pumps
- If the HPSI throttle criteria can not be maintained, reinitiates flow to restore subcooling or level
Scenario No: 2 Event No. 7 Page 13 of 13 Event
Description:
EOP-6, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO
- Depressurizes the RCS to reduce subcooling and maintain PZR level
- Uses Aux. Spray to depressurize the RCS to maintain the following:
l Reduce RCS pressure to approximately affected S/G pressure
- Aux. Spray use:
- Opens Aux Spray valve
- Operates charging loop stop valves as necessary to adjust Aux. Spray flow
- Shifts PZR Spray control to manual
- Shuts normal PZR Spray valves
- Maintains PZR cooldown <2000 F per hour
- Controls RCS subcooling by the following methods:
- Controlling Aux Spray flow
. Operating PZR heaters
- Raising or lowering RCS cooldown rate
- Throttling or raising BPSI flow
- Use of PZR vent valves
- When backflow is anticipated and HPSI throttle criteria are met and a bubble exists in the PZR maintains PZR level between 101 and 120 inches until backflow is initiated CRO
- Identify, Isolate and Confirm the Affected S/G
- Shutting the Main Steam Upstream Drain valves
- Dispatches a plant operator to observe locally from the Aux. Bldg. Roof the S/G Safeties are shut When 12 SG is isolated, the cooldown is established at <100'F/hr and PZR level and subcooling are being maintained the scenario can be terminated.
Note the ERPIP classification for this event in an ALERT under category BAI from RCS Barrier Table for EOP-6 is implemented for RCS leakage. (ATWS is not applicable since no automatic trip signal was received.)
SCENARIO #2 SETUP OVERVIEW/OBJECTIVES To evaluate the applicant's ability to conduct a unit power reduction and to implement the ARMs, Os, AOPs, as appropriate, for malfunctioning systems and/or controls including a failure of the Hotwell Level Controller, 11 Circulating Water Pp, and a VCT Level Transmitter with a failure of CVC-501-MOV to reopen, preventing realignment to the VCT. This scenario also evaluates the applicant's ability to respond to a leaking PORV and a condenser waterbox tube rupture requiring a rapid downpower to a target value of 300 MWe. Multiple CEA drops will require a reactor trip but an ATWS condition exists. In EOP-0 a SGTR begins in 12 SG. The crew will cooldown and isolate 12 SG.
INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION
- 1. Reset to IC-13. Draft Spin #0202
- 2. Perform switch check. Spin # Used
- 3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.
- 4. Place simulator in FREEZE.
- 5. Enter Malfunctions
- a. 13 HPSI Pp Trip SI002_03 at time zero
- b. 13 CCW Pp Trip CCW002_03 at time zero
- c. Failure of Reactor to Trip (ATWS) automatically and manually RPS005 & RPS006 at time zero
- d. Condenser Hotwell Level Controller Fails High CDO02 (High) on FI
- e. I ICW Pp Trips CWOOI 1 on F2 f VCT Level Transmitter Fails Low CVCS009 (Low) on F3
- h. PORV-402 leakage RCS021 (0-5% over 2 minutes) on F4
- i. Condenser Tube Ruptures in 12B Waterbox CD009_04 (1 tube) on F5
SCENARIO #2 SETUP
- j. 2 Dropped CEAs (35 and 37)
CEDS012_35 and _37 on F6 and F7
- k. 12 SG Tube Rupture MS002_02 (1 tube) on F8
- 6. Enter Panel Overrides
- a. IC13 - INSTR AIR COMPR(S) Annunciator (K-25) to ON.
- b. 1C07 - VCT Outlet MOV Handswitch, CVC-501, in CLOSE on Event Trigger for MOV CVC-501 in close (-21 on trigger index).
- c. I C09 - Annunciators (2) for 13 HPSI Pp tagout- OFF.
- d. IC13 - Annunciators (2) for 13 CCW Pp tagout - OFF.
- 7. Enter Remote Functions / Administrative
- a. Danger tag 13 CCW Pump.
- b. Danger tag 13 HPSI Pump.
- c. Place off-normal tags on the CCW Head Tank due to Makeup CV
- d. Remote Functions to rackout 13 HPSI Pp.
- e. Remote Functions to rackout 13 CCW Pp.
- 8. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE.
9.Give crew briefing.
- a. Present plant conditions: 100% power - MOC/10,200 MWDIMTU. Unit 2 is in Mode 5. RCS Boron - 900 PPM.
- b. Power history: 100% for previous 68 days.
- c. Equipment out of service: 13 CCW Pump out of service due to a broken shaft.
Estimated return to service is tomorrow-noon.
13 HPSI Pump out of service due motor bearing failure during the STP 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago. Estimated return to service in 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. IAS 3.5.2.
SCENARIO #2 SETUP
- d. Abnormal conditions: 11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
Alarm K-25 (INSTR AIR COMPR(S) is hanging, air compressors check out ok, alarm card swapped out but still in alarm. I&C is working up a troubleshooting plan.
- e. Surveillances due: STP-029 (CEA Movement Test) due by end of shift.
SM will discuss with CRS shortly after turnover.
- f. Instructions for shift: Maintain 100% power.
- 10. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
- 11. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
- a. Activate malfunctions F1-F5 when each is cued by the lead evaluator.
- b. Activate the next malfunction (F6) after about a 5% power move and with the Lead Examiner's concurrence, then about 30 seconds activate F7.
- c. When Vital Auxiliaries is complete activate F8.
SCENARIO #2 SETUP RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
REQUEST RESPONSE
- 1. OWC/E&C investigate failure of the Acknowledge request.
Hotwell Level Controller (4405).
- 2. OWC coordinate investigation of failure of 11 Acknowledge request. After 5 minutes the CW Pump. electricians report the breaker is tripped on over current.
- 3. TBO close CAR-101 and Inlet MOV-5225 Acknowledge each request. Three minutes after and secure II A amertap. each request report the action complete.
- 4. OWCIE&C investigate failure of VCT Acknowledge request.
Level Transmitter.
- 5. OWC/GS-NPO contacted regarding PORV Acknowledge report.
402 leakage.
- 6. TBO/Chemistry investigate Turbine Plant Acknowledge report. After 2 minutes report as sample alarm and SG Sample Panel alarm Chemistry, there is a bad tube leak in 12B waterbox. 45 ppb Na and Conductivity of 18 micro seimens.
- 7. TBO close CAR-104 and 12B Inlet MOV Acknowledge each request. Three minutes after and secure 12B amertap. each request report the action complete.
- 8. OSO ensure all demins ready to be placed in Acknowledge report. After three minutes report service. all demins ready to be placed in service.
- 9. Chemistry contacted for additional info. Report secondary chemistry is in Action Level 2.
- 10. Chemistry contacted to sample SGs. After about 15 minutes report quantitative samples show significant activity in 12 SG.
- 11. Directs TBO to align 12 ADV to 1C43 with After three minutes operate as directed.
zero percent output.
SCENARIO #2 SETUP SHIFT TURNOVER I. Present Plant Conditions 100%
II. Burnup: 10200 MWD/MTU (MOC)
III. Power History 100% for previous 68 days.
IV. Equipment out of Service: 13 CCW Pump out of service due to a broken shaft. Estimated return to service is tomorrow-noon.
13 HPSI Pump out of service due motor bearing failure during the STP 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago. Estimated return to service in 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. IAS 3.5.2.
V. Abnormal Conditions: 11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
Alarm K-25 (INSTR AIR COMPR(S) is hanging, air compressors check out ok, alarm card swapped out but still in alarm. I&C is working up a troubleshooting plan.
VI. Surveillances Due: STP-029 (CEA Movement Test) due by end of shift. SM will discuss with CRS shortly after turnover.
VII. Instructions for Shift Maintain 100% power.
VIII. U2 Status and Major Equipment OOS: Mode 5 - no CW Pps and 23AFW Pp is OOS.
j.-' L -
Simulation Facility Calvert Cliffs Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO CRO To evaluate the applicant's ability to conduct a unit power reduction, to implement the ARMs, Ols, AOPs, as Objectives: appropriate, for malfunctioning systems and/or controls including a failure of PRZR level control channel (lIOX) which causes a broken shaft on 12 Charging Pp, a failed FRV Controller (1121) and a SGFP oil leak causing a rapid power reduction. A loss of 11 BA Pp occurs at the start of the downpower. The crew will be forced to trip the unit when the running SGFP trips. Two stuck CEAs require boration to meet reactivity but a loss of 11 4KV Bus will force the crew to EOP-8 for reactivity not being met. In EOP-8, boration will be restored via BPSI injection and 11 AFW Pp will trip resulting in a loss of feed. The crew can restore AFW by aligning 12 AFW Pp.
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 67% Power, MOC (IC-17) 11 Chg Pp is OOS 12 SGFP Pp is OOS.
11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
INSTR AIR COMPR(S) alarm (K-25) hanging.
Turnover: Present plant conditions: 67% power, MOC; Unit 2 is in MODE 5 - no CW Pps and 23 AFW Pp unavailable.
Power history: 67% power for previous 4 days.
Equipment out of service:
- 1) 11 Chg Pp packing replacement. Expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. All Chg. Pumps have been repacked, currently running in the packing on 13.
- 2) 12 SGFP Pp to repair steam leak on LP poppets. It is disassembled, expected to be returned to service tomorrow
- 3) 11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
- 4) Alarm K-25 INSTR AIR COMPR(S) is hanging. No problems with the compressors, I & C is investigating, alarm card has been swapped out.
Surveillances due: lB DG STP-0-8 due today. SM will bring STP to CR when ready.
Instructions for shift:
0203.doc 1
Event l Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description Preload FW004_02 12 SGFP OOS.
CEDS010_28 2 stuck CEAs.
CEDS010_42 Remote Func 11 CHG Pp OOS. (bkr rackout)
PNL OVR INSTR AIR COMPR(S) alarm hanging.
(K-25)
RCS026_01 I RO About 3 minutes after the crew has taken the watch, PRZR level contr. (1lOX)
(low) fails low. The RO should acknowledge the alarm, inform the CRS and refer to the ARM. Level control should be shifted to channel Y and the OWC notified.l T.S. 3.3. 10 should be entered.
2 CVCS003_02 C RO 12 Chg. Pp shaft breaks on start following 1loX failure, however, the pump stops again when channel Y is selected. It is unlikely the crew will notice the failure here, but probably later during the downpower or boration to meet reactivity control in EOP-0. When discovered the crew is expected to attempt to ensure boration via another means and to contact the OWC for assistance.
3 FW018_02 I CRO Next, 12 SG FRV Controller (1121) fails. The CRO should acknowledge the (LO) alarm and inform the CRS. The CRS should direct the CRO to maintain SG level and implement AOP-3G. The CRS should direct the CRO to place the controller switch in the Main Fail position. The CRS should direct the OWC to contact the System Engineer for assistance.
4 PNL OVR C CRO The CRO acknowledges the SGFP Conditioner Level Low Alarm, informs the (Conditioner R RO CRS and dispatches the TBO. Following the TBO report, a rapid downpower level low C RO will be initiated to take 11 SGFP off. (The crew may notice the charging pump alarm) N CRO malfunction at this time.) The OWC should be contacted for assistance and CVCS014_01 notifications. As the power reduction to take 11 SGFP off is begun, 11 BA Pp FW004_01 trips off when started. The RO will either use 12 BA Pp or gravity feed from the BASTs. At z50% power, 11 SGFP trips. The CRS should order the unit tripped due to loss of feed.
5 M ALL EOP-0 is implemented, the RO notes 2 stuck CEAs and commences boration.
The CRO verifies Turbine Trip and commences Vital Auxiliaries. The RO commences Pressure and Inventory.
5a 4KVOO1_01 After the RO reports on Pressure and Inventory, a loss of 11 4KV Bus occurs (may refer to AOP-71). The CRS orders a reassessment of safety functions. The RO should determine reactivity is no longer being met due to no charging and direct the TBO to align 13 Chg. Pp to 14 bus. With the TBO being unsuccessful the CRS will enter EOP-8 for failure to meet reactivity.
6 AFWOOI_01 M ALL EOP-8 is entered and the selected Success Paths begun. Boration is restored via HPSI injection. While working to establish boration, 11 AFW Pp trips the CRS or CRO should direct the TBO to investigate and align 12 AFW Pp. After AFW has been restored and boration established, the scenario can be terminated.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient 0203.doc 2
SCENARIO 3 OVERVIEW The candidates will take the shift at =67% power.
About 3 minutes after the crew has taken the watch, PRZR level contr. (1 OX) fails low. The RO should acknowledge the alarm, inform the CRS and refer to the ARM. Level control should be shifted to channel Y and the OWC notified. T.S. 3.3.10 should be entered.
12 Chg. Pp shaft breaks on start following 1lOX failure, however, the pump stops again when channel Y is selected. It is unlikely the crew will notice the failure here, but probably later in the scenario during the downpower or boration to meet reactivity control in EOP-0. When discovered the crew is expected to attempt to ensure boration via another means and to contact the OWC for assistance.
Next, 12 SG FRV Controller (1121) fails. The CRO should acknowledge the alarm and inform the CRS. The CRS should direct the CRO to maintain SG level and implement AOP-3G. The CRS should direct the CRO to place the controller switch in the Main Fail position. The CRO will control level via the PDI. The CRS should direct the OWC to contact the System Engineer for assistance.
The CRO acknowledges the SGFP Status Panel alarm and determines the alarm to be a SGFP Conditioner Level Low Alarm, informs the CRS and dispatches the TBO. Following the TBO report of a bad oil leak on 11 SGFP pump, a rapid downpower will be initiated to take 11 SGFP off. (The crew may notice the charging pump malfunction at this time.) The OWC should be contacted for assistance and notifications. As the power reduction to take 11 SGFP off is begun, 11 BA Pp trips off when started for the initial boration. The RO will either use 12 BA Pp or gravity feed from the BASTs to borate. At =50% power, 11 SGFP trips. The CRS should order the unit tripped due to loss of feed.
EOP-0 is implemented, the RO notes 2 stuck CEAs and commences boration. The CRO verifies Turbine Trip and commences Vital Auxiliaries. The RO commences Pressure and Inventory.
After the RO reports on Pressure and Inventory, a loss of 11 4KV Bus occurs (may refer to AOP-71). The CRS orders a reassessment of safety functions. The RO should determine reactivity is no longer being met due to no charging and direct the TBO to align 13 Chg. Pp to 14 bus. With the TBO being unsuccessful the CRS will enter EOP-8 for failure to meet reactivity.
EOP-8 is entered and the selected Success Paths begun. Boration is restored via BPSI injection. While working to establish boration, 11 AFW Pp trips the CRS or CRO should direct the TBO to investigate and align 12 AFW Pp.
After AFW has been restored and boration established, the scenario can be terminated.
0203.doc 3
Scenario No: 1 3 Event No. 1 Page 4 of 12 Event
Description:
PZR level Control channel l1OX fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE Annunciator E PZR CH. X LVL alarms.
E PZR HTR CUTOUT All Charging pumps start.
- Acknowledges alarm, identifies and reports LT-1lOX has failed low.
- Acknowledges report and directs RO to:
- Shift PZR level control to channel Y
- Shift PZR heater cutout to channel Y
- Resets Proportional Heaters RO
- Perform actions as directed by SRO SRO
- Refers to T.S. 3.3.10 SRO
- Contacts OWC/1&C to investigate failure of 1-LT-I lox.
Scenario No: l 3 Event No. 2 Page5of12 Event
Description:
12 Chg. Pp Shaft Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Low amps on 12 Chg. Pp Low charging flow for running pump combination (Note it is unlikely this failure will be noticed here, it is expected that it will be picked up either on the rapid downpower or the fast boration for 2 stuck CEAs)
- Identifies and reports 12 Chg. Pp appears to be degraded SRO
- Acknowledges report and directs RO to:
- Ensure charging flow via 13 Chg. Pp
- Align 13 Chg. Pp to 14 Bus, (if necessary)
- Perform actions as directed by SRO
- Directs TBO to shift 13 Chg. Pp to 14 Bus (in EOP-0)
- Dispatches ABO to investigate 12 Chg. Pp SRO
- Contacts OWC/I&C to investigate failure of 12 Chg. Pp and assist in getting 13 Chg. Pp aligned to 14 Bus
Scenario No: l 3 Event No. l 3 Page 6 of 12 Event
Description:
Failure of FRV Controller (1121)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: SG level deviation alarm (computer alarm)
Big "F' on face of FRV Controller 1121 CRO
- Acknowledges report
- Implements AOP-3G
- Directs CRO to:
- Place the 1121FRVControllerinMAINFAIL
- Determines BYP OVERRIDE is not available CRO
- Performs actions as directed by the CRS.
- Directs OWC to investigate FIC-1 121 and to contact the system engineer.
Scenario No: 3 Event No. 4 Page 7 of 12 Event
Description:
Oil Leak on 11 SGFP (Rapid Downpower)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: SGFP Conditioner Level Low Alarm on SGFP Status Panel CRO
- Acknowledges Alarm, informs SRO and Dispatches TBO to 11 SGFP to investigate
- Acknowledges report from CRO
- When TBO reports control oil leak on 11 SGFP, directs the crew to commence a rapid downpower to take the unit ofifine per OP-3:
- Directs CRO reduce turbine load to maintain Tc on program
- May direct TBO to fill 11 SGFP oil reservoir RO
- Initiates PZR spray flow to equalize RCS Boron:
- Energizes all PZR backup heater banks
- Adjusts PZR Pressure Controller setpoint to maintain 2250 psia
- Commences boration from the BASTs followed by shifting suction to the RWT:
- Opens BA direct makeup valve
- Verifies two charging pumps running (may notice 12 Chg. Pp failure here (Event 2))
- Runs 12 BA Pp for 30 seconds (BAST gravity feed may be used instead)
- After 12 BA Pp is secured, shuts BA direct makeup valve
- Verifies open RWT outlet valve
- Verifies Shut VCT outlet
- Requests Peer checks for reactivity manipulations CRO
- Reduces turbine load to maintain Tc within 50F of program
- Monitors turbine parameters not to exceed
- 1500 F/hr rate of change of Ist stage shell inner metal temperature (Point 6 on TR-4404)
- 750 F lt stage shell metal temperature differential (Diff between Points 6 & 7 on TR-4404)
- Unloading rate of 10% step change or 50Imin SRO
- Contacts OWC for support for oil leak for 11 SGFP CRO
- Recognizes 11 SGFP has tripped, informs the SRO SRO
- Recognizes a total loss of feed has occurred:
Scenario No: l 3 Event No. l 5 Page 1 of 12 Event
Description:
11 SGFP TriplReactor Trip Time J Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Manual Reactor Trip initiated RO Perform Post-Trip Immediate Actions:
- Depresses ONE set of Manual RX TRIP buttons
- Checks reactor tripped
- Prompt drop in NI power
- Negative SUR
'o .si W riisMUMD S a l, Informs ResR Ceativty Safty~
Fut ndcio complPte eiece~~tion CRO
- Sheck raco has$1Y tripped~
- Ensuens
. turbinAEIhVas1 trppd /
M cr M
- ,* 1/Uv5e.I C-312-CV
- .Chckptei ATurbinye e STOP
.AIN VALVE-S shutn l Informs
- SRO Reactivity Staets Tl~urinaeSafety S harginFunction drpsm~(ais complete oie1 h pfil CR0 .ChecksVerifies4turbne gener atorutputbe
- reactor has tripped pn
- " 11& 12 BLCUpu~SaB~,0Cc-552
- Ensures turbine has tripped:
- Depresses Turbine TRIP button
- Checks the Turbine MAIN STOP VALVES shut
- Checks Turbine SPEED drops
- Verifies turbine generator output breakers open:
1iGEN BUS BKRS F-CS-552-22
- 11IGEN TIEBKR, -CS-552-23
- Verifiesl11GEN and EXCITERFIELD BKRsl1-CS41 andl1-CS4lE are open
- I-MS-4025-MOV (IlMSR)
- 1-MS-4026-MOV (12 MSR)
Informs SRO the Turbine is Tripped CR0
- Checks 125 VDC and 120 VAC busses energized
Scenario No: l 3 Event No. l 5 Page 9 of 12 Event
Description:
11 SGFP Trip/Reactor Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO
- Ensures PZR pressure stabilizes between 1850 psia and 2300 psia and is trending to 2250 psia
- Determines PZR level is stabilizing between 80 and 180 inches or trending to 160 inches
- Ensures RCS subcooling GREATER THAN 300 F Informs SRO RCS Pressure and Inventory Safety Function can is complete CREW
- Notes loss of 11 4KV Bus (refer to sheet 5a [page lOlfor operator actions for loss of bus)
- Notes boration is no longer in progress, informs the SRO
- Directs TBO to shift 13 Chg. Pp to 14 Bus Reports Reactivity cannot be met due to two stuck CEAs and no boration in progress CRO Reverifies and reports Turbine is Tripped CRO Reverifies Vital Auxiliaries Reports Vital Auxiliaries are complete RO Reverifies RCS Pressure and Inventory and reports is complete (may report not met due to lowering PZR level with no Chg. Pps running)
CRO
- Verifies Turbine Bypass Valves or ADVs operating to maintain:
- SG pressures between 850 and 920 psia
- Tcold between 5250 and 535 0 F
- Directs ABO to operate ADVs locally to maintain RCS temperature
- Checks at least one SG available for controlled heat removal
- SG level between -170 and +30 inches
- Initiates Aux Feedwater to maintain S/G level
- Tc >5250 F
Scenario No:l 3 Event No. I 5a Page 10 of 12 Event
Description:
LOSS 11 4KV BUS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW
- Notes loss of 11 4KV Bus
- Notes boration is no longer in progress, informs the SRO
- Directs TBO to shift 13 Chg. Pp to 14 Bus Reports Reactivity cannot be met due to two stuck CEAs and no boration in progress CRO
- Reverifies Vital Auxiliaries
- Starts OC DG
- Verifies Switchgear Ventilation in service per OI-22H
- May refer to AOP-71
- Directs OWCITBO to tie 1Y09 and lYIO with lYIO supplying
Scenario No: 1 3 Event No. l 5 Page 11 of 12 Event
Description:
11 SGFP Trip/Reactor Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW
- Checks Containment pressure is <0.7 psig
- Checks Containment temperature is <120 0F.
- Checks containment radiation monitor alarms CLEAR with NO unexplained trends
- Checks RMS alarms CLEAR with NO unexplained trends:
- 1-RIC-5415 U-1 wide range noble gas
- 1-RI-1752 Condenser Offgas
- 1-RI-4014 Unit 1 SG Blowdown
- 1-RI-5415 Unit 1 Main Vent Gaseous Informs SRO CNMNT Environment and Rad Levels External to CNMNT are complete SRO
- Conducts EOP-0 mid-brief and directs operators to reverify Safety Function Crew
- Reverifies Safety Functions SRO
- Determines Recovery Procedure per Diagnostic Flowchart:
- All Safety Functions met - NO
- Event Diagnosis - Reactivity NOT MET
- Directs transition to EOP-8
Scenario No: l 3 Event No. l 6 Page 12 of 12 Event
Description:
EOP-8, Functional Recovery Procedure/Loss of Feed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO
- Directs operators to select success paths for all safety functions.
- Verifies selected success paths [RC-3(or 1), VA-1, PIC-4, HR-1, CE-1, RLEC-1]
- Directs operators to implement success paths (PIC and RC)
- Commences RC-3
- Verifies power <104%
- Verifies SUR is negative CRO
- Commences PIC4
- Continues to monitor RCS temperature and reactor power
- With Reactivity Control established, directs RO to Commence next Success Path (VA-i) or RO to take over PIC from CRO and assign VA-1, HR-I to CRO CREW l Informs SRO 11 AFW Pp has tripped and all feed has been lost g~~~~ s ss s , s .... ... ...-. ....
-A W A ...- ...
Note: The ERPIP classification for this event is an ALERT under QAl for EOP-8 Implemented.
SCENARIO #3 SETUP OVERVIEW/OBJECTIVES To evaluate the applicant's ability to conduct a unit power reduction, to implement the ARMs, Os, AOPs, as appropriate, for malfunctioning systems and/or controls including a failure of PRZR level control channel (1 OX) which causes a broken shaft on 12 Charging Pp, a failed FRV Controller (1121) and a SGFP oil leak causing a rapid power reduction. A loss of 11 BA Pp occurs at the start of the downpower. The crew will be forced to trip the unit when the running SGFP trips. Two stuck CEAs require boration to meet reactivity but a loss of 11 4KV Bus will force the crew to EOP-8 for reactivity not being met. In EOP-8, boration will be restored via HPSI injection and 11 AFW Pp will trip resulting in a loss of feed. The crew can restore AFW by aligning 12 AFW Pp.
INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION
- 1. Reset to IC-17. Draft Spin #0202
- 2. Perform switch check. Spin # Used
- 3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm.display.
- 4. Place simulator in FREEZE.
- 5. Enter Malfunctions
- a. 12 SGFP Trip FW004_02 at time zero
- b. 2 Stuck CEAs (Untrippable)
CEDSOI_28 and _42 at time zero
- c. PZR Level Controller (1 OX) Fails Low RCS026-01 (Low) on F1
- d. 12 Chg. PP Shaft Breaks CVCS003_02 on F2
- g. 11 SGFP Trips FW004_01 onF5
- h. Loss of 11 4KV Bus 4KVOO1_01 F6
- i. Trip of I IAFW Pp AFWOO1_01 on F7
SCENARIO #3 SETUP
- 6. Enter Panel Overrides
- a. IC13 - INSTR AIR COMPR(S) Annunciator (K-25) to ON.
- b. 1C09 - Annunciators (2) for 11 Chg. Pp tagout- OFF.
- 7. Enter Remote Functions / Administrative
- a. Danger tag 11 Chg. Pp
- b. Danger tag 12 SGFP Pp.
- c. Place off-normal tags on the CCW Head Tank due to Makeup CV
- d. Remote Functions to rackout 11 Chg. Pp.
- 8. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE.
9.Give crew briefing.
- a. Present plant conditions: 67% power - MOC/10,200 MWD/MTU. Unit 2 is in Mode 5. RCS Boron - 980 PPM.
- b. Power history: 67% for previous 4 days.-
C. Equipment out of service: 11 Chg. Pp out of service for packing replacement.
Expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. All Chg. Pps have been repacked, currently running in packing in 13.
12 SGFP out of service to repair steam leak on LP poppets. It is disassembled, expected to be returned to service tomorrow.
- d. Abnormal conditions: 11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
Alarm K-25 (INSTR AIR COMPR(S) is hanging, air compressors check out ok, alarm card swapped out but still in alarm. I&C is working up a troubleshooting plan.
- 10. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
SCENARIO #3 SETUP
- 11. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
- a. Activate malfunction F1 when cued by the lead examiner then immediately activate F2.
- b. Activate the next malfunction (F3) when cued by the lead examiner.
- c. When cued by the lead examiner, insert SGFP Status Panel "Conditioner Level Low" alarm and immediately after Panel Override Annunciator C-69 ON (SGFP Status Panel).
- e. After power has been reduced at least 5%, and with the lead examiner's concurrence activate F5.
- f. After the unit is tripped, remove Panel override for annunciator C-69.
SCENARIO #3 SETUP RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
REQUEST RESPONSE
- 1. OWC/E&C investigate failure of the Acknowledge request.
PRZR Level Controller, 1-LT- IIOX.
- 2. OWC/E&C investigate failure of the Acknowledge request.
- 3. TBO investigate SGFP Conditioner Level Acknowledge request. After Two minutes, report Low alarm. a large control oil leak on 11 SGFP and recommend the SGFP be removed from service as soon as possible.
- 4. ABO investigate trip of 11 BA Pp. Acknowledge request. After 3 minutes, report 11 BA Pp tripped on overcurrent.
- 5. ABO investigate 12 Chg. Pp low flow. Acknowledge report. After three minutes, report 12 Chg. Pp has a broken shaft.
- 6. TBO/OWC/Electricians shift 13 CHG. Pp to Acknowledge report. After 2 minutes report as 14 Bus. TBO unable to get it to shift, seems to be hung up.
As additional assistance is rendered continue to give report of unable to get it shifted to 14 Bus.
- 7. TBO investigate trip of 11 AFW Pp and align Acknowledge request. After three minutes, align 12 AFW Pp for service. 12 AFW Pp for operation.
SCENARIO #3 SETUP SHIFT TURNOVER I. Present Plant Conditions 67%
II. Burnup: 10200 MWD/MTU (MOC)
III. Power History 67% for previous 4 days.
IV. Equipment out of Service: 11 Chg. Pp out of service for packing replacement. Expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. All Chg. Pps have been repacked, currently running in packing in 13.
12 SGFP out of service to repair steam leak on LP poppets. It is disassembled, expected to be returned to service tomorrow.
V. Abnormal Conditions: 11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
Alarm K-25 (INSTR AIR COMPR(S) is hanging, air compressors check out ok, alarm card swapped out but still in alarm. I&C is working up a troubleshooting plan.
VI. Surveillances Due: 1B DG STP-0-8 due today. SM will bring to CR when ready.
VII. Instructions for Shift Maintain current power level. Perform 1B DG STP-0-8 when directed by SM.
VIII. U2 Status and Major Equipment OOS: Mode 5 - no CW Pps and 23AFW Pp is OOS.
Simulation Facility Calvert Cliffs Scenario No.: 1 (Spare) Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO CRO To evaluate the applicant's ability to conduct a unit power increase, to implement the ARMs, Ols, AOPs, as Objectives: appropriate, for malfunctioning systems and/or controls including failure of 11 CCW Pp, the PZR pressure control channel and selector switch, an RCP seal and the ADV controller. After the ADV controller fails the remaining seals fail on the affected RCP resulting in an RCS leak. After EOP-0 is entered, the RCS leak causes a SIAS actuation. SIAS 'A' fails to actuate requiring 11 or 12 IHPSI Pump to be started manually to establish HPSI flow. As EOP-0 progresses, a steam leak begins in CNMNT from 12 SG requiring EOP-8 be implemented. The ADV Controller will not operate from the Control Room, the crew will have to operate the ADVs locally.
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% Power, EOC 12 Main CPU is failed for 12 SG DFWCS 11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
13 CCW Pp is OOS INSTR AIR COMPR(S) alarm (K-25) hanging.
Turnover: Present plant conditions: 100% power, MOC; Unit 2 is in MODE 5 - no CW Pps and 23 AFW Pp unavailable.
Power history: 100% power for previous 68 days.
Equipment out of service:
- 1) 12 Main CPU is failed for 12 SG DFWCS. System engineer is investigating.
- 2) 13 HPSI Pp motor bearing failure during STP. It is disassembled, expected to be returned to service in 2 days. T.S. 3.5.2 Action Statement entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago.
- 3) 11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
- 4) 13 CCW Pp has a broken shaft, expected repair tomorrow-noon.
- 5) Alarm K-25 INSTR AIR COMPR(S) is hanging. No problems with the compressors, I & C is investigating, alarm card has been swapped out.
Surveillances due: STP-0-29 (CEA Movement Test) due by end of shift. SM will discuss with CRS shortly after turnover.
Instructions for shift:
- 1) Maintain 100% power.
0201.dococ
Event l Malf. l Event Event No. [ No. Description Preload FWOO1_03 12 Main CPU on 12 SG DFWCS OOS.
ESFA002_01 SIAS 'A' fails to actuate automatically and manually.
ESFA001_01 SI 002_03 13 HPSI Pp OOS.
PNL OVD Pressurizer Press Controller Selector Switch in channel X.
PNL OVR INSTR AIR CONIPR(S) alarm hanging.
K-25 I 1 CCW002_01 C CRO About 3 minutes after the crew takes the watch, 11 CCW Pp trips. The CRO will acknowledge the alarms, inform the CRS and refer to the ARM. The crew will check for common mode failure and the CRS will direct the CRO to start 12 CCW Pp. The CRS should refer to AOP-7C and T.S. 3.7.5. The CRS contacts the OWC for assistance.
2 RCS023_01 I RO PRZR Press Channel 10OX fails high. The RO should acknowledge the alarms, (high) inform the CRS and refer to the ARM. The RO should note the lowering RCS pressure and the open spray valves. Pressure control should be shifted to channel Y and the spray valves verified shut. The RO should note the spray valves did not shut. The CRS should direct the spray controller be taken to manual and the spray valves closed. The CRS should contact the OWC for assistance.
3 RCSO11_01 C RO Next, the lower seal (first stage) fails on 11A RCP. The RO should note the (0-100% over alarm, inform the CRS and refer to the ARM. The crew should determine the 3 min) lower seal on 1lA RCP has failed. The OWC and system engineer should be contacted.
4 MS015 I CRO Two minutes after the notifications have been made the ADV controller fails (high) high causing the ADVs to open. The CRO will inform the CRS. The CRS should direct the CRO to take manual control of the ADVs and shut them. The RO should maintain reactor power less than 100%. The CRS should refer to AOP-7K. The CRS should contact the OWC for assistance.
5 RCS012_01 R RO After the CRS has referenced AOP-7K, the I IA RCP middle seal fails. The (0-100% over N CRO crew should implement ARM guidance and begin an expeditious shutdown.
2 min) The CRS should refer to OP-3 for guidance on for the shutdown.
6 RCS013_01 M All After power has been reduced at least 5%, the l lA upper seal begins to fail (over 2 min) followed shortly thereafter by the failure of the vapor seal. With all the seals RCS003 (50 failed RCS leakage begins via the seals. The CRS will trip the unit based on gpm over 5 high RCP seal temperature and EOP-0 implemented. When SIAS actuates, min) train A fails to automatically and manually initiate. To establish HPSI flow 11 RCS014_01 or 12 HPSI must be started manually.
(over 4 min) 7 MSO10_02 M All After the first pass through the safety functions is complete, a steam break in (0-25% over CNMNT begins. When the crew attempts to operate the ADVs, they will not 3 min) operate from the Control Room. To establish heat removal via 11 SG, the ADV will have to be operated locally. The CRS should recognize two events are Panel taking place and implement EOP-8. After the Success Paths have been selected Override and 12 SG isolated, the scenario can be terminated.
ADVs closed
- (N)ornal, (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient 0201.dococ
SCENARIO 1 OVERVIEW The candidates will take the shift at 100% power with instructions to maintain power.
After the crew has taken the shift, 11 CCW Pp trips. The CRO will acknowledge the alarms, inform the CRS and refer to the ARM. The crew will check for common mode failure and the CRS will direct the CRO to start 12 CCW Pp. The CRS should refer to AOP-7C and T.S. 3.7.5. The CRS contacts the OWC for assistance.
Several minutes later, PRZR Press Channel 1OOX fails high. The RO should acknowledge the alarms, inform the CRS and refer to the ARM. The RO should note the lowering RCS pressure and the open spray valves. Pressure control should be shifted to channel Y and the spray valves verified shut. The RO should note the spray valves did not shut. The CRS should direct the spray controller be taken to manual and the spray valves closed. Once the spray valves are closed, the RO should stabilize RCS pressure. The CRS should contact the OWC for assistance.
About 3 minutes after the crew has regained RCS pressure control, the lower seal (first stage) fails on 1 A RCP.
The RO should note the alarm, inform the CRS and refer to the ARM. The crew should determine the lower seal on 1 A RCP has failed and monitor RCP parameters. The OWC and system engineer should be contacted.
Two minutes after the notifications have been made the ADV controller fails high causing the ADVs to open. The CRO diagnoses the open ADVs and inform the CRS. The CRS should direct the CRO to take manual control of the ADVs and shut them. The RO should maintain reactor power less than 100%. The CRS should refer to AOP-7K. The CRS contacts the OWC for assistance.
After the CRS has referenced AOP-7K, the 11A RCP middle seal fails. The crew should implement ARM guidance and begin an expeditious shutdown in accordance with OP-3. The CRS should refer to OP-3 and direct the unit shutdown at a rate less than 30 A/dhour. The appropriate notifications should be made.
After power has been reduced at least 56/e, the 1IA RCP upper seal begins to fail followed shortly thereafter by the failure of the vapor seal. With all the seals failed RCS leakage begins via the seals. The CRS will trip the unit based on high RCP Controlled Bleed Off temperature and EOP-0 implemented. When SIAS actuates, train 'A' fails to initiate automatically and manually. To establish HPSI flow 11 or 12 HPSI must be started manually.
After the first pass through the safety functions is complete, a steam break in CNNT begins. When the crew attempts to operate the ADVs, they will not operate from the Control Room. To establish heat removal via 11 SG, the ADV will have to be operated locally. The CRS should recognize two events are taking place and implement EOP-8. After the Success Paths have been selected and 12 SG isolated, the scenario can be terminated.
0201.dococ
Scenario No: 1 Event No. 1 Page 4 of 13 Event
Description:
11 CCW Pp Trips.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE After the crew takes the watch, the following alarms occur:
Annunciator Alarm - 1C13 - K CC PP DISCH PRESS LO RCP Status Panel Alarms CCW pressure indicates zero CRO
- Acknowledges report and directs CRO to check for common mode failure (head tank level, motor overload alarm)
- Directs CRO to start 12 CCW Pp
- Monitors RCP temperatures CRO
- Performs actions as directed by the SRO
- Refers to T.S. 3.7.5. and exits AOP-7C
- Contacts OWC for assistance
Scenario No: l 1 I Event No. l 2 Page S of 13 Event
Description:
PZR Press. Control Channel 10OX Fails High Time J Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Annunciator alarm IC06 - E-29 PZR CH 100 PRESS Both PZR Spray valves come full open Lowering RCS pressure RO
- Acknowledges alarm, identifies and reports PT-IOOX has failed high
- Refers to the ARM
- Notes both PZR spray valves are open SRO
- Acknowledges report and directs RO to:
- Shift PZR pressure control to channel Y
- Verify the PZR spray valves go closed
- Perform actions as directed by SRO
- Takes HIC 100 to manual and demand to minimum
- Verifies Spray Valves go closed and RCS pressure restoring to normal
- Informs SRO SRO
- Contacts OWC/I&C to investigate failure of I-PT-IOOX and failure of spray valves to close
Scenario No: II I Event No. 1 3 Page 6 of 13 Event
Description:
1st Stage (Lower) Seal Fails on 11A RCP Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Annunciator E i IA RCP SEAL - TEMP HI - PRESS RO
- Identifies/acknowledges report of 11A RCP seal failure
- Directs RO to monitor parameters
- Contacts System Engineer
- Monitors RCP parameters (bleedoff flow, pressures, temperatures)
- Contacts OWC/GS and System Engineer regarding 1 A RCP seal failure
Scenario No: 1 Event No. 4 Page 7 of 31l Event
Description:
Atmospheric Dump Valves Fail Open Time J Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Audible steam dump to atmosphere occurring Open indication of both ADVs Changing RCS parameters, temperature and pressure lowering CRO
- Identify and report both ADVs have gone full open, recommends taking to manual and closing SRO
- Identifies/acknowledges report of open ADVs
- Directs CRO to take ADV controller to manual and shut ADVs
- Implements AOP-7K, OVER COOLING EVENT IN MODE ONE OR TWO l* Determines a reactor trip is not required
- Monitors reactor power:
- Directs CRO to reduce/adjust turbine load as necessary to restore/maintain Tc on program (if necessary)
- Monitors reactor power and borates or inserts CEAs if necessary to maintain power CRO
- Takes ADV controller to manual and verifies both ADVs go closed
- Adjusts turbine load as necessary to maintain Tc on program SRO
- Contacts OWC to investigate failure of ADV Controller
Scenario No: I 1 Event No. 1 5 Page 8 of 13 Event
Description:
2nd Stage (Middle) Seal Fails on 11A RCP/Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Degrading parameters on 11A RCP seals. (Lowering middle seal d/p and increased pressure drop across the upper seal)
- Reports suspected 2 nd seal failure on 1 A RCP
- Identifies/acknowledges report of 1 A RCP middle seal failure
- Monitors RCP parameters (bleed-off flow, pressures, temperatures)
- Performs brief of expeditious power reduction per OP-3
- Notifies the System Operator a power reduction is being commenced to take the unit offline
- Directs crew to begin a power reduction (at specified rate) per OP-3, Section 6.4
- Instructs crew to:
- Use RPS Delta T power as primary power indication
- Energize all PRZR backup heaters
- Adjusts the PRZR pressure spray controller to maintain PRZR pressure at 2250
- Reduce power by use of boration (and CEAs if necessary)
- Maintain Tc within 20F of program by reducing turbine load
- Informs chemistry if power reduction is greater than 15% in one hour and requests a boron sample for a power change >5%
- Initiates PZR spray flow to equalize RCS Boron:
- Energize all PZR backup heater banks
- Adjusts PZR Pressure Spray Controller to maintain 2250 psia
- Commences boration - cycles charging pump suction between the RWT and the VCT to achieve desired rate of power reduction per OP-3
- Requests Peer checks for reactivity manipulations CRO
- Reduces turbine load to maintain Tc within 20 F of program
- Monitors feedstation to verify S/G levels are being maintained approximately 0 inches SRO
- Coordinates power reduction between RO and CR0
Scenario No: 1 Event No. 6 Page 9 of 13 Event
Description:
Failure of 11A RCP Seals(RCS leak Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE: Degrading parameters on 1lA RCP seals. (Rising RCP temperatures, bleedoff flow)
Possibly PZR Level Deviation alarm RO
- Reports:
- Suspected failure of all RCP seals
- Indications of loss of RCS inventory
- Acknowledges report.
l Directs the unit be tripped and EOP-0 implemented
- Directs RO to trip Unit I
- Perform reactivity
- Trip I1ARCP RO Perform Post-Trip Immediate Actions:
- Depresses ONE set of Manual RX TRIP buttons
- Checks reactor tripped
- Prompt drop in NI power
- Negative SUR
- Checks ALL CEAs fully inserted
- Verifies demin water makeup to RCS is secured
- 11 & 12 RCMU pumps secured
- VCT MWU valve 1-CVC-512-CV is shut
- If RCS MWU is in DIRECT LINEUP, RWT CHG PP SUCT valve 1-CVC-504-MOV is shut (I-CVC-501-MOV must be opened first)
Informs SRO Reactivity Safety Function is complete RO Trips 1IA RCP and informs SRO CRO
- Checks reactor has tripped
- Ensures Turbine has tripped:
- Depresses Turbine TRIP button
- Checks the Turbine MAIN STOP VALVES shut
- Checks Turbine SPEED drops
- Verifies turbine generator output breakers open:
- 11 GEN BUS BKR, O-CS-552-22
- 11GENTIEBKR,0-CS-552-23
- Verifies 11 GENandEXCITERFIELDBKRs l-CS41 and 1-CS41E are open
- I-MS-4025-MOV (1 lMSR)
- 1-MS-4026-MOV (12 MSR)
Informs SRO the Turbine is Tripped
Scenario No: I1 Event No. 6 Page 10 of 13 Event
Description:
Failure of 11A RCP Seals/RCS leak Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRO
- Checks 125 VDC and 120 VAC busses energized
- Verifies Switchgear Ventilation in service Informs SRO Vital Auxiliaries Safety Function is complete RO
- Determines PZR pressure is not stable between 1850 psia and 2300 psia and is trending lower
- Closes PZR Spray Valves
- Determines PZR level is not stabilizing between 80 and 180 inches or trending to 160 inches
- Ensures RCS subcooling GREATER THAN 300 F
- Trips 12B RCP Informs SRO RCS Pressure and Inventory Safety Function can NOT be met due to low PZR pressure and PZR level CRO
- Verifies Turbine Bypass Valves or ADVs operating to maintain: (ADVs are in manual)
- SG pressures between 850 and 920 psia
- Tcold between 5250 and 5350 F
- Checks at least one SG available for controlled heat removal
- SG level between -170 and +30 inches Informs SRO Core and RCS Heat Removal Safety Function is met CREW
- Checks Containment pressure less than 0.7 psig
- Checks Containment temperature less than 1200 F
- Checks containment radiation monitor alarms CLEAR with NO unexplained trends
- Checks RMS alarms CLEAR with NO unexplained trends:
- 1-RIC-5415 U-1 wide range noble gas
- 1-RI-1752 Condenser Offgas
- 1-RI4014 Unit 1 SG Blowdown l* -RI-5415 Unit 1 Main Vent Gaseous
- Determines CNMNT parameters cannot be met due to rising press. and temp (negative trends)
Informs SRO CNMNT environment cannot be met and Rad Levels External to CNMNT is met SRO
- Conducts EOP-0 mid-brief and directs operators to reverify Safety Function
Scenario No: I1 Event No. 7 Page 11 of 13 Event
Description:
LOCA with steam line break/EOP-8 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Crew
- Reverifies safety functions.
- Report Reactivity, and Vital Auxiliaries still complete and Pressure and Inventory still out.
CRO
- Verifies Turbine Bypass Valves or ADVs operating to maintain RCS temperature:
- Notes SG pressure is <850 psia and lowering
- Notes Tcold is <5250 F and lowering
- Checks at least one SG available for controlled heat removal
- SG level between -170 and +30 inches
- Verifies SGIS actuation when SGIS signal received
- Initiates Aux Feedwater to maintain S/G level Informs SRO Core and RCS Heat Removal Safety Function cannot be met due to low Tc, low SG pressure in 12 SG and no RCPs (if secured due to CIS actuation)
CREW
- Checks Containment pressure less than 0.7 psig (notes rapidly rising CNMNT pressure)
- Notes CIS and CSAS actuations have occurred
- Verifies CIS and CSAS
- Trips all RCPs
- Checks Containment temperature less than 1200 F (notes rapidly rising CNMNT temperature)
- Checks containment radiation monitor alarms CLEAR with NO unexplained trends (notes rising CNMNT Rad. Levels on CNMNT Hi Range)
- Checks RMS alarms CLEAR with NO unexplained trends:
- 1-RIC-5415 U-1 wide range noble gas
- 1-RI-1752 Condenser Offgas
- 1-RI-4014 Unit 1 SG Blowdown
- l-RI-5415 Unit 1 Main Vent Gaseous Informs SRO CNMNT Environinent cannot be met due to high CNMNT pressure, temp and rad. levels and Rad Levels External to CNMNT is complete SRO
- Determines Recovery Procedure per Diagnostic Flowchart:
- All Safety Functions met - NO
- Single Event Diagnosis - NO - EOP-8 (EOP flowchart may recommend EOP-4 however SRO should recognize an RCS leak exists due to I lA RCP seals and implement EOP-8)
- Briefs crew prior to EOP-8 implementation
- Directs actions per EOP-8
Scenario No: 1 Event No. 1 7 Page 12 of 13 Event
Description:
LOCA with steam line breaklEOP-8 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO
- Directs Chemistry to sample SGs and to place the H2 monitors in service
- Directs operators to select success paths for all safety functions
- Verifies selected success paths
- Determines sequence of success path performance (PIC4, HR-2, CE-3, RC-1, VA-1, RLEC-2)
- Establishes Pressure and Inventory Control:
- Verifies SIAS actuation
- Verifies SI flow
- Maintains subcooling
- Throttles SI flow when criteria are met:
- Subcooling of >250 F based on CETs
- PZR level > 101"
- At least one SG available for heat removal:
- SG level > -170"
- Capable of being supplied with feedwater
- Capable of being steamed
- RLVMS indicates level above the top of the hot leg
- Reactivity Control Safety Acceptance Criteria are met RO
- Verifies letdown isolation
- Verifies no PORV leakage
- Verifies head and PZR vent valves are shut
- Checks for leakage into the CC system CRO . Establishes Core and RCS heat removal (SG heat sink with SIS operation)
- Determines if a SGTR exists
- SG samples
- RMS trends
- SG level trends
- Determines a SGTR does not exist
Scenario No: 1 Event No. 7 Page 13 of 13 Event De cription: LOCA with steam line break/EOP-8 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRO
- Determine if an ESDE exists:
- Determines an ESDE does exist and 12 SG is the affected SG:
- Isolates 12 SG:
aq shiftos. U AP ssslsl ~~ilscnrllra uio upt
[ gMg
- Verifies 12 S/G B/D valves shut
- Shuts the Main Steam Upstream Drain valves
- Dispatches a plant operator to observe locally from the Aux. Bldg. Roof the S/G Safeties are shut
- Verifies 12 SG is isolated
- Notes ADVs do not operate from the Control Room
- Informs SRO
- Directs ABO to open 11 ADV locally
- Verifies boration in progress
- Evaluates the need for HPSI throttling/termination
- Throttles SI flow to maintain PZR level
- Maintains RCS subcooling between 30 an 140 0F
- Maintains PZR level between 141" and 190" When 12 SG is isolated and RCS pressure and inventory are being controlled per PIC4, then the scenario can be terminated.
Note: The ERPIP classification for this event is an ALERT based on BAI for Loss of RCS barrier or OA1 for EOP-8 implementation.
SCENARIO #1 SETUP OVERVIEW/OBJECTIVES To evaluate the applicant's ability to conduct a unit power increase, to implement the ARMs, WIs, AOPs, as appropriate, for malfunctioning systems and/or controls including failure of 11 CCW Pp, the PZR pressure control channel and selector switch, an RCP seal and the ADV controller. After the ADV controller fails the remaining seals fail on the affected RCP resulting in an RCS leak. After EOP-0 is entered, the RCS leak causes a SIAS actuation. SIAS 'A' fails to actuate requiring 11 or 12 HPS1 Pump to be started manually to establish HPSI flow. As EOP-0 progresses, a steam leak begins in CNMNT from 12 SG requiring EOP-8 be implemented. The ADV Controller will not operate from the Control Room, the crew will have to operate the ADVs locally.
INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION
- 1. Reset to IC-13. Draft Spin #0202
- 2. Perform switch check. Spin # Used
- 3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.
- 4. Place simulator in FREEZE.
- 5. Enter Malfunctions
- a. 13 HPSI Pp Trip S1002_03 at time zero
FWOO1_03 at time zero
- c. Failure of SIAS Channels A to Actuate automatically and manually ESFAOO1_01 & ESFA002_01 at time zero
- d. 13 CCW Pp Trip CCW002_03 at time zero
- e. 11 CCW Pp Trip CCW002_01 on FI f PZR Pressure Channel 1OOX Fails High RCS023_01 (High) on F2
- g. 1 A RCP Lower Seal Failure RCSOI 101 (0-100% over 3 min) on F3
- h. ADV Controller Fails High MS015 (High) on F4
SCENARIO #1 SETUP
- j. 1IA RCP Upper Seal Failure RCS013O01 (0-100% over 2 min) on F6
- k. I IA RCP Vapor Seal Failure RCSO14401 (0-100% over 4 min) on F7 I. RCS Leak RCS003 (5 to 50 GPM over 3 minutes) on F8
- m. Steam Break in CNMNT MS010_02 (0-25% over 3 min) on F9
- 6. Enter Panel Overrides
- a. IC06 - PZR Press. Controller Selector Switch to Channel X.
- b. IC13 - INSTR AIR COMPR(S) Annunciator (K-25) to ON.
- c. IC09 - Annunciators (2) for 13 HPSI Pp tagout- OFF.
- d. IC13 - Annunciators (2) for 13 CCW Pp tagout - OFF.
- e. IC03 - ADV Manual Setpoint to Zero. (Insert in EOP-0 per setup instructions)
- 7. Enter Remote Functions / Administrative
- a. Danger tag 13 CCW Pump.
- b. Danger tag 13 HPSI Pump.
- c. Place off-normal tags on 12 FRV controller for 12 Main CPU Failure.
- d. Place off-normal tags on the CCW Head Tank due to Makeup CV
- e. Remote Functions to rackout 13 LHPSI Pp.
- f. Remote Functions to rackout 13 CCW Pp.
- 8. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE.
9.Give crew briefing.
- a. Present plant conditions: 100% power - MOC/10.200 MWD/MTU. U rnit 2 is in Mode 5. RCS Boron - 900 PPM.
- b. Power history: 100% for previous 68 days.
- c. Equipment out of service: 13 CCW Pump out of service due to a broken shaft.
Estimated return to service is tomorrow-noon.
13 HPSI Pump out of service due motor bearing failure during the STP 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago. Estimated return to service in 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. IAS 3.5.2.
SCENARIO #1 SETUP 12 Main CPU failed for 12 SG DFWCS. System Engineering is investigating.
- d. Abnormal conditions: 11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
Alarm K-25 (INSTR AIR COMPR(S) is hanging, air compressors check out ok, alarm card swapped out but still in alarm. I&C is working up a troubleshooting plan.
- e. Surveillances due: STP-029 (CEA Movement Test) due by end of shift.
SM will discuss with CRS shortly after turnover.
f Instructions for shift: Maintain 100% power.
- 10. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
- 11. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
- a. Activate malfunctions Fl-F5 when each is cued by the lead evaluator.
- b. Activate the next malfunction (F6) after about a 5% power move and with the Lead Examiner's concurrence, then activate F7 and F8.
- d. When the crew exits EOP-0, panel override the ADV controller manual setpoint to Zero.
SCENARIO #1 SETUP RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
REQUEST RESPONSE
- 1. OWC coordinate investigation of failure of 11 Acknowledge request. After 5 minutes the CCW Pump. electricians report the breaker is tripped on over current.
- 2. OWC/E&C investigate failure of the Acknowledge request.
PRZR Press Controller, 1-PT-100X.
- 3. OWC/System Engineer contacted regarding Acknowledge request.
11 A RCP lower seal failure.
- 4. OWC/E&C investigate failure of the Acknowledge request.
ADV Controller in Auto.
- 5. OWC/System Engineer contacted regarding Acknowledge request.
1 A RCP regarding middle seal failure and GS-NPO and ESO of expeditious power reduction
- 6. Directs ABO to manually open 11 ADV or After three minutes operate as directed.
TBO to operate from 1C43.
SCENARIO #1 SETUP SHIFT TURNOVER I. Present Plant Conditions 100%
II. Burnup: 10200 MWD/MTU (MOC)
III. Power History 100% for previous 68 days.
IV. Equipment out of Service: 13 CCW Pump out of service due to a broken shaft. Estimated return to service is tomorrow-noon.
13 HPSI Pump out of service due motor bearing failure during the STP 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago. Estimated return to service in 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. IAS 3.5.2.
12 Main CPU failed for 12 SG DFWCS. System Engineering is investigating.
V. Abnormal Conditions: 11 CCW Head Tank Makeup CV is isolated due to leakby.
Alarm K-25 (INSTR AIR COMPR(S) is hanging, air compressors check out ok, alarm card swapped out but still in alarm. I&C is working up a troubleshooting plan.
VI. Surveillances Due: STP-029 (CEA Movement Test) due by end of shift. SM will discuss with CRS shortly after turnover.
VII. Instructions for Shift Maintain 100% power.
VIII. U2 Status and Major Equipment OOS: Mode 5 - no CW Pps and 23AFW Pp is OOS.