Text

Plan (WBN) - Revisions to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, Including Revision 20 to EPIP-1, Revision 19 to EPIP-2, Revision 22 to EPIP-3 & Revision 23 to EPIP-4
	ML022200491
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	08/02/2002
From:	Pace P; Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
	Download: ML022200491 (154)
	v • d • e

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 AUG 0 2 2002 10 CFR 50, App E.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of

)

Docket No.

50-390 Tennessee Valley Authority WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN)

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISION In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the EPIPs as listed below.

EPIP Rev Title Effective Date EPIP-I 20 Emergency Plan Classification 7-9-2002 Flowchart EPIP-2 19 Notification Of Unusual Event 7-30-2002 EPIP-3 22 Alert 7-30-2002 EPIP-4 23 Site Area Emergency 7-30-2002 EPIP-5 24 General Emergency 7-30-2002 EPIP-8 17 Personnel Accountability And 7-30-2002 Evacuation EPIP-II 10 Security and Access Control 7-30-2002 Filing instructions are included with this document.

Printed on recycled paper

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 AUG 0 2 2002 There are no regulatory commitments in this letter.

If you should have any questions, please contact me at (423) 365-1824.

Sincerely, Manager, Licensing and Industry Affairs Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

NRC Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure)

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2 copies)

Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St.,

SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

FILING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT NUMBER REMOVE REVISION 2

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATING PROCEDURES EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART Revision 20 Unit 0 NON-QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY:

B. F. McNew (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:

Emerqency Planninq APPROVED BY:

Frank L. Pavlechko EFFECTIVE DATE:7/9/2002 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 20 FLOWCHART Page 2 of 49 j

REVISION LOG Revision Implementation Description of Revision Number Date 0

04113/90 New WBN-EPIP. Supersedes IP-1.

1 02/04/91 Revised to separate RCS leak and identified S/G tube leak initiating conditions. Clarified initiating condition in fire. Updated ODS telephone numbers.

2 11/28/91 Add initiation conditions. Clarify reference to Attachment 1 Definitions. Define Protected Area, Owner Controlled Area, and Vital Areas throughout procedures. Clarify NOUE declaration for Uncontrolled Shutdown.

3 03/04/92 Change all Technical Specification references to reflect new "Merit" Tech Specs and ODCM references.

4 02/10/93 Procedure revised to reflect the new methodology for development of Emergency Action Levels per: NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 3, 1/92, endorsed by REG GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors Rev. 3, 8/92.

5 09/15/93 Editorial (non-intent) and formal changes. Text changes made to EALs to meet review comments identified by the NRC.

6 01/01/94 Procedure revised to reflect new 10 CFR 20 changes.

7 05/27/94 Procedure revised to reflect changes to System 90 (Radmonitoring) and establish site perimeter monitoring points.

8 01/10/95 FPBM, EAL 1.3.4, CNTMT, Bypass, Loss (1), revised to eliminate potential for misclassification. Maps revised to reference north and wind direction. Table 7-2, Alert, Radiation Levels enhanced to KUprovide Operators additional information.

9 4/28/98 Revised Revision Log to include page numbers. References added to the document. Fission Product Barrier Matrix revised to reflect information found in the EOP Set Point Verification Document (WBN-OS64-188). Reference to AOI-27 revised to AOI-30.2. Phone numbers to the National Weather Service changed due to their reorganization. Annunciator window references for the earthquake corrected to match Main Control Room alignment. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents. Tables in section seven revised to reflect the following:

System 90 changes, monitor efficiencies, default flow rates, release time durations, and annual meteorological data enhancements.

Revision Implementation Date Pages Description of Revision Number Affected D

CN-1 09/28/95 10, 14, 26 The following non-intent enhancements were made:

(CCP) Acronym added to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix in 1.2 RCS Barrier, (2. RCS Leakage LOCA),

to enhance description. New SI reference number for Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance identified in event 2.5 (RCS Unidentified Leakage) and 2.6 (RCS Identified Leakage). Area code and phone number in event 5.2 (Tornado) revised to new number.

CN-2 11/10/95 3, 6, 34 The following non-intent enhancements were made:

Corresponding ERFDS system identifiers were added next to the rad monitors on Table 7-1; Table 7-1 was realigned to improve its usability; an enhanced description for RE-404 was provided in Note 3 of Table 7-1; the ERFDS Operators Manual was added to the Reference section.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 20 FLOWCHART Page 3 of 49 REVISION LOG(Continued)

Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected I

CN-3 05124/96 8,11, 16, The following non-intent enhancements were made: Due 19, 23, 24, to revisions made to AOI-27, it was added back to the 26, 29, 32, EALs in event 4.5 "Control Room Evacuation"; The 34 Assessment Method on Table 7-1 was enhanced to correspond with the note at the top of the table. In addition, the reference to TI-30 was removed since this procedure will be terminated due to the enhancements being made to EPIP-16 and ERFDS. The word Projectile was added to the index and title reference to event 5.3 "Aircraft/Projectile Crash", to make it consistent with the EALs within it's classification.

10 3/15/99 All The following non-intent enhancement were made:

Software revised to Microsoft Word which re-formatted pages along with other enhancements; minor typographical errors corrected; two references revised - one added; SOS/ASOS replaced with SM/US; index page, effluent added to gaseous; vital area definition enhanced; spent fuel pit revised to pool on Table 7-2; SP revised to EAB in Event 7.1; TVA Load Dispatcher/Water Resources revised to River Systems Operations and revised ERFDS/P-2500 to ICS.

11 4/15/99 2,34 Non intent change. Typo corrected. Changed >1.0 to >0.1.

11A 7/1/99 3,26 Corrected typo on phone number The remaining pages of this procedure are Rev 11 only page 3, and the fold out page for 26 have been changed.

12 9/30/99 All Non intent change. Minor editorial\\format changes made. Typographical errors corrected. Seismic windows revised to reflect DCN-50007 per ERPI Report 6695.

(LTL) Lower toxicity limit replaced with (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit. This revision is also part of the resolution to PER 99-009326-000.

13 12/08/99 All Non-intent change. Revised page 33 for resolution of PER 99-015478-000. Minor editorial change to Event 5.1 step I of the Alert classification.

14 04/10/00 All Non-intend change. Revised page 45 for DCN 50484, (Pg.4 & 45) stage I which moved 0-RE-90-1 01 B, & -132B from ICS Screen 4RM2 to 4RM1. DCN also moved 1-RE-90-421B thru -424B and 0-RE-90-120 & -121 from ICS Screen 4RM1 to 4RM2. This revision allows all liquid radiation monitors to be observable on one ICS screen and all gaseous radiation monitors to be observed on a separate ICS screen.

15 08/17/00 All Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (Pg. 4, 11A & (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to correspond B) with the new TI-RPS-1 62, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to the EALs 1.1.5 on the Barrier matrix page, 11 b. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER 99-000038-000.

This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 20 FLOWCHART Page 4 of 49 REVISION LOG (Continued)

Revision Implementation f Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 16 3/30/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the (Pg. 11 &14) following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors readings in the Barrier Matrix (1.3) to support new dose assessment methodology.

Non intent change. Revised reference from annunciator alarm printer to annunciator monitor per DCN D-50301.

17 09/251101 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of Page 6, 11 B effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2.

The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.

Non-Intent change. Corrected typo on Barrier Matrix.

18 02/15/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the 2, 11B, 44 following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-Intent change. Changes to the EALs in this revision consist of changing 03-y to gamma in Section 7.0 to ensure consistency with NUMARC/NESP-007, Reg Guide 1.101, and NEI 99-01 rev 4. Clarification to EAL 1.3.3 (containment isolation status also made per this reference.) This standardizes these issues with the other TVAN sites. These changes were approved by the State of Tennessee.

19 06/05/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of 4, 7 &30 effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Intent change(s): A revision to the Security Event (4.6) was made to incorporate change(s) resulting from the NEI to NRC (Mr. Bruce Boger) letter dated 12/18/01 requesting conformation for an EAL basis change to include response to a Credible Site Specific Threat.

Table 4-3 was revised to incorporate this additional EAL.

This meets the compliance of the NRC's 10/6/01 Safeguards Advisory on this matter. This represents an additional EAL and does not change existing criteria in the Security Event Basis.

Revised 5.1 Interfacing documents by noting the termination of EPIP 9 with reference to EPIP 16.

20 07/09/02

ALL, Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) pg. 2, 10, indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of 13,15, 20, effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

24, 30, 32, Intent change(s): Reference to T/S 3.4.16 in Event 2.4 EAL 39, 43 1(a) revised to correspond to levels in AOI-28. Credible Site-Specific was added to the definition pages. Removed reference to the definition in Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS to standardize with other TVAN sites.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 20 FLOWCHART Page 5 of 49 1.0

-PURPOSE 4

This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 2'4 The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site Emergency Director (SED). These duties CAN NOT be delegated.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4

3.1 The criteria in WBN EPIP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY:

knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a classification for a particular set of circumstances.

3.2 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected.

3.3 Classification Determination 3.3.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or suspected conditions and CARRY OUT the notifications and actions referenced.

3.3.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart.

3.3.3 The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 20 FLOWCHART Page 6 of 49 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.3.4 After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination.

3.3.5 IF an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred SHALL be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared.

3.3.6 IF the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition CAN NOT be reasonably discounted (i.e.,

spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered MET and the SM/SED SHALL follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.3.7 IF an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate shall not be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist KJ(ODS) at the same clock time.

3.3.8 The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

4.0 RECORDS 4.1 Non-QA Records None

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 20 FLOWCHART Page 7 of 49 K>

5.0 REFERENCES

5.1 Interfacing References BP-236, Event Critique and Root Cause Analysis SPP 3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements WBN-EPIP-2, Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-3, Alert WBN-EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-5, General Emergency WBN-EPIP-9, Loss of Meteorological Data (Canceled see EPIP-16)

WBN-EPIP-13, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPIP-14, Radiological Control Response WBN-EPIP-16, Initial Dose Assessment For Radiological Emergencies CECC-EPIP-9, Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures SI-4.04, Measurement of Identified and Unidentified Leakage of the Reactor Coolant System 5.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection From Radiation REG GUIDE-I.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.

Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOls),

Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

ICS Operator's Manual EPPOS #2, "NRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 8 of 49

[EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page9of49 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Technical Specification Safety Limit 2

3 LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4

Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B3 Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 10 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, Le within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFRPart 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of seventy of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g, Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more ofthe following (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15%thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection>

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas inthe immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE AC'TION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

IEPIP'I Revision 20

. Page llAof 49 Potential LOSS Core Cooling Orange OR Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service)

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-ULEtILeaIdl I. J Containment (FR-Z.1) Red OR Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE Revision 20 Pag IIB of 49 Modes: 1, 2,.3,,4 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE: A conditon is considered to be METaif, in the judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , in the absence of a viable success path).

The classificaton shagl be made a soon as this determination is made.

i RCS sample activity is Greater Than 300 gCl/gm Not applicable dose equivalent iodine-131 IGreater Than 1 200OF Greater Than 7270F

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Potential LOSS VALID RVLIS level <33%

(No RCP running)

Vo GIUreatierin Than:

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74 RPhr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 OR 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274 I

RCS Leak results in Loss of subcooling

(<65-F Indicated),

[85-F ADV]

XIA Non Isolatable RCS Leak Exceeding The Capacity of One Charging Pump (CCP)

In the Normal Charging Alignment.

ORR RCS Leakage Results In Entry Into E-1 VALILJ r VLIO IUVI N

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<33%

(No RCP Running)

Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier Com arable to the Conditions Listed Above.

rIdFpiu unexplainedU Ucrease following initial increase OR Containment pressure or Sump level Not increasing (with LOCA in progress)

CLontainment Isoiation is Incomplete (when required)

AND a Release Path to the "

Fnv mfntV ni-;ete RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside CNTMT OR Prolonged (>4 Hours)

Secondary Side release outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits Potential Not Applicable Potential LOSS Unexplained VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors in areas adjacent to CNTMT (with LOCA in progress)

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Not Applicable VALID Reading increase of Greater Than:

108 R/hr on 1-RE-90-271 and 1-RE-90-272 OR 86 R/hr on 1-RE-90-273 and 1-RE-90-274 Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

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In the matrix to the left, review the INITIATING CONDITIONS in all columns and identify which, if any, INITIATING CONDITIONS are MET.

Circle these CONDITIONS.

For each of the three barriers, identify if any LOSS or Potential LOSS INITIATING CONDITIONS have been MET.

If a CSF is listed as an INITIATING CONDITION; the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the EVENT classification for the Modes listed on the classification flowchart.

Compare the barrier losses and potential losses to the EVENTS below and make the appropriate declaration.

EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT Loss or Potential LOSS of Containment Barrier SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers ALERT Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier GENERAL EMERGENCY LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier l t I

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EPIP-l Revision 20 Page 12 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment I

l~f LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 12 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

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RS tifed Lekage rn S fmttni LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 3

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Secunty Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling 7

Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-l Revision 20 Page 13 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): Aplant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFRPart 100 RefertoFigure7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure ofpressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction inthe level of seventy is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ORANGE PATHi: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0,hich indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regardingthe integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine nnback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, s e, within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes-deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blermishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

wY.x-i -

maT-aiim a are] am.um,e1i wzQ W1 I*I% k lEE L2*

WIN I

I Mode 1,2 3,4 1,2 3,4 1,2 3,4 J

Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barter Matnx" and "Radiological Effluents" (Section 7)

Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4)

1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications

2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress 3 Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS 4 Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs Sub-cnrticality Core Cooling Heat Sink PTS Containment Inventory UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS computer and SPDS Unavailable (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes 2 SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment) 3 (a orb) a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress b Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety System annunciators or indications in the Control Room for >15 Minutes (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes

2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment) 3 ICS Computer or SPDS is in service and capable of displaying data requested EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 14 of 49

-i II P1 rQQ rT InOTMIM131-ITEM""

I Si*s o

F Mode InitiatinglCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx" Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown (1 or 2)

1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red 1,2 3,4

2. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (RHR not in service)

Note: Also Refer to 'Failure of Rx Protecton* (2.3) and "Fission Product Bamer Matrix" Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs (1 and2 and 3) 4

1. Shutdown is required

2. Loss of RHR capability 3 Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser A Unplanned loss of all In-Plant Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3)

ALL

1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX) phones

2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones 3 UNPLANNED loss of all radios or B UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5) 1 UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones 2 UNPLANNED loss of all Radio frequencies 3 UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system 4 UNPLANNED loss of all 1 FB-Bell lines 5 UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system

I EPIP-I II Revision 20 r

l-

-A S

p-

____z_

LO ve11 rT UJ-

.e Lor rJ Ja~ifThirf" Mode Initiating/Condition Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals 1,2 did not result in a reduction of Rx power to <5% and decreasing (1 and 2)

1. (a orb)

a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red b CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red

2. FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions Did Not result in a Rx Power of <5% and decreasing 1,2 Rx power Not <5% and decreasing after VALID Auto and Manual trip signals (1 and 2 and 3)

1. VAUD Rx Auto Tnp signal received or required 2 Manual Rx Tnp from the MCR was Not successful 3 FR-S 1 has been entered.

Automatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Trip signal and manual trip from MCR was successful (1 and 2) 1 VALID Rx Auto Tnp signal received or required

2. Manual Rx Tnp from the MCR was successful and power is <5% and decreasing Not Applicable I

ý2.

Fue Cla IDegado

-0 01 Mode InitiatinalCondition 4-4 I

1,2, 3,4, 5

__________I Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix" Refer to "Fssion Product Barner Matnx" Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3.4.16) 1 Radjochemistry analysis indicates (a orb) a Dose equivalent Iodine (1-131) >0.265 l.tCi/gm for >48 Hours or in excess of Appendix A of AOI-28 b

Specific activity >100OE. Cdgm S

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M D

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R A

D A

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I

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 16of49 2.5-L e Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barnier MatnxW Refer to 'Fission Product Earner Matrix" Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matnx" Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage

>10 GPM 1 Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined byTech Spec.) >10 GPM as indicated below (a orb) a 1-SI-68-32 results

b. With RCS Temperature and PZR Level Stable, VCT Level Dropping at a Rate >10 GPM moe -

Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fssion Product Barrier Matnx"

________ 4-1,2, 3,4,

5 Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matnx" Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx" Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech Spec.)

>25 GPM (a orb)

a. I -SI-68-32 results b Level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, RCDT or CVCS Holdup Tank

Note Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized I

Mode 1,2 3,4,

5 I

1 I *Note, App/lies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressunzed

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 17 of 49 2.8~ Tubn alr Refer to 'Fission Product Banter Matrix' Refer to "Fission Product Barrer Matnx" Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx' UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety Injection Initiation (1 and 2)

1.

Rapid depressunzation of Main Steam System

(<675 psig) 2 Safety Injection has initiated or is required mode I I1 1,2,3 1,2,3 Initiatinq/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx' Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matrix" Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area containing Safety Related equipment

1. Turbine PROJECTILES has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE in any of the following areas Control Building Auxiliary Building Unt #1 Containment Diesel Generator Bldg RWST Intake Pumping Station CST Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration 1 Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the Turbine Casing or Damage to Main Generator Seals I-

+

4-1,2,3 S

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R A

D A

T 0

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1 I J

EPIP-I Revision 20 Page 18 of 49 2 T s,

ci

,,to Mode InitiatinglCondition Not Applicable NotAAppicab/e Not Applicable Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech.

Spec. limits (1 and 2) 1,2

1. Any Tech Spec LCO Statement, requiring a Mode 3,

reduction, has been entered 2 The Unit has not been placed In the required Mode within the time prescnbed by the LCO Action Statement Mode Initiating/Condition Not Applicable 1,2, 3,4, 5

Not Applicable Not Applicable Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or 2)

1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and RCS pressure > safety limits as indicated by WBN Tech Spec. Figure 2 1.1-1 'Reactor Core Safety Limits"

2. RCS/Pressunzer pressure exceeds safety limit (>2735 psig)

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 19 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Technical Specification Safety Limit L..OSS OF POWI 3 2 Loss of AC.I!i) 3.....

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4

4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4

Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4

Figure 4-A Figure 4-B3

.5

.6

.7 Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 2

4 II

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 20 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in tlus definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFRPart 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LO'WVER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition IHOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of seventy of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction inthe level of seventy is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ORANGE PATHi: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence ofprimaryto secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following. (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e, within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

Revision 20 Page 21 of 49 Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power (I and 2) 1,2,

1. 1A and 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 3,4 for >15 minutes

2. (a orb) a Core Cooling Red or Orange

b. Restoration of Either 1A or 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of loss Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power> 15 minutes

1. 1A and IB 69KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 1,2, for >15 minutes 3,4 Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 1,2, 3,4

2. 1 A or 1 B Diesel Generator not available Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) 1,2 1 C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 3,4 2 Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board Mode Initiating/Condition Not Applicable Not Applicable UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power for >15 minutes 5,6,

1. IA and 1 B 6 9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized or for >15 minutes De fuel Also Refer to 'Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6 1)

UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) 5,6, 1 C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes or De-2 Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board fuel

Initiating/Condition iMode Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix" and "Loss of Function' (2.2) 1,2, Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes 3,4

1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-11 and 1-111 and I-IV for >15 minutes Also Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix',

"Loss of Funcbon' (2 2),

and 'Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1)

Also Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx',

"Loss of Functon" (2.2),

and "Loss of Instrumentabon' (2.1)

UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of DC power for >15 minutes (1 or 2)

1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-111 for >15 minutes

2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-11 and I-IV for >15 minutes EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 22 of 49 L

0 S

S 0

F P

0 W

E R

U 1

5,6, or De-fuel

EPIP-l Revision 20 Page 23 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC JLA...S a.

JUDGMEN

.. :.~.

4..

Fire..

4,3 Fl!"Iii

"~ea otrloivautio 4~2.Tq'loion.4 To~&O~

46 Se..i......

4.Tbl..

4.

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash5 Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdownm) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)6 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling/

Table 7-1 Table 7-27 Figure 7-A

EPI:P-1 Revision 20 Page 24 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4 7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): Aplant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed FLA.MMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWVER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the stationto ensure that demands will be met by the station INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of seventy of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g, Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offstte Dose Calculation Manual ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, rmsalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following- (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e, within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

IIEPIP-I Revision 20 Page25of337 Refer to SS Refer to 'Control Room Eva cuabon,* (4.5) or Fission Product Bamer Matrix FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2) 1 FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 2 (a or b) a VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or Safety Related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE b Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the FIRE FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is Not extinguished within 15 minutes from the Time of Control Room notification or verification of Control Room Alarm (Figure 4-A) moat!

J All

-4 All InltlatingiL;OniaitiOn Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx' Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" EXPLOSION In any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed In Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)

1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1

2. (a orb) a An EXPLOSION has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to Safety Related equipment b Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the EXPLOSION Refer to "Security" (4 6)

UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure or equipment (Figure 4-A)

Refer to "Secunty* (4 6)

Modie All All I

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 26 of 49 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building CST Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Unit 1&2)

RWST Figure 4-A PROTECTED AREAISITE PERIMETER H

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Initatinglcondlition Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matnx*

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within a facility structure containing Safety Related equipment or associated with Power production All

1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a -1 Oft tnangular Area Is

>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitonng instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2 A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within the SITE PERIMETER All

1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a -1 Oft Tnangular Area is

>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitonng instrument within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 4-B)

OR B Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials that a Large Offsite Flammable Gas release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >25% of LEL Lower Explosive Limit (Refer to Figure 4-B)

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which Prohibits Safe Operation of systems required to establish or maintain Cold SID (1 and 2 and 3)

All

1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within any building listed in Table 4-2

2. (a orb) a Plant personnel report Severe Adverse Health Reactions due to TOXIC GAS (I e., burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness)

b. Sampling indications > (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit

3. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropnate personnel protection equipment A. Normal Operations Impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS concentrations within a Facility Structure listed in Table 4-2 All OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials that a Large Offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the Site Perimeter in concentrations >than the (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit thus causing an Evacuation (Figure 4-B)

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 28 of 49 TABLE 4-2 Plant Structures Associated With TOXIC or Flammable Gas EALs Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1&2)

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u iy-1 Condition Barrier Matrix" Refer to Evacuation of the Control Room has been initiated and Control of all necessary equipment Has Not been established within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room (1 and 2 and 3)

1. (a orb) a AOI-30.2 "Fire Safety Shutdown" entered

b. AOI-27"Main Control Room Inaccessibility' entered

2. SWSED Orders Control Room evacuation 3 Control has Not been established at the Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of manning the Auxliary Control Room and transfer of switches on Panels L 1A and LIi B Evacuation of the Control Room is Required (1 and 2)

1. (a orb) a AOI-30 2 "Fire Safe Shutdown" entered b AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered

2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation Not Applicable Modie Initiating/Gondition Mode All All i

Security Event resulting in loss of Control of the Plant 1 Hostile Armed Force has taken Control of the Plant.

All Control Room, or Remote shutdown capability Security Event has or is occurring which results in Actual or Likely Failures of Plant Functions needed to Protect the Public All

1. VITAL AREA, other than the Control Room, has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force Confirmed Security Event which indicates an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2 or 3)

All

1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA

2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA 3 PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force Refer to Figure 4-A For a Drawing of Protected Area and Site Perimeter Confirmed Security Event which indicates a Potential Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2)

1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA All 2 Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-3

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m El 1.1.1 m i i__ i1 InitiatinalCondition Events are in progress or have occurred All which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonable expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.

Events are in progress or have occurred All which involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public. Any releases are not expected to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.

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Events are in progress or have occurred which involve Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels.

Unusual Events are in Progress or have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.

Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS a SABOTAGEIINTRUSION has occurred or is occurring within the PROTECTED AREA

b. HOSTAGEIEXTORTION Situation that Threatens to interrupt Plant Operations c CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the SITE PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA

d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA which threatens to interrupt Normal Plant Operations (Judgment Based on behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence received) e A CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC security threat notification.

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EPIP-I Revision 20 Page 31 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of FunctionlCommunication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment KFigure 4-A Figure 4-B3 Table 4-3 4

.DISTRUCTIVE ?I*ENOMENON Si Erhuake4

.ieLve Hih 5 :.2 Torado:

55iitii Rivr L~eve Lw CrashFgte5 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling 6

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling 7

Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 32 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure ofpressurzed equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to igmution.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of seventy ofthe RED PATH condition within 15 rmnutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction inthe level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g, Increasing Trend m Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ORANGE PATIH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence ofprimaryto secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or nutigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unimomtored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit inthis definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e, within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes-deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistenng Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to 'Fission Product Barmer Matnx' Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2)

1. (a and b) a Ann 166 D indicates "OBE Spectra Exceeded" b Ann 166 E indicates "Seismic Recording Initiated" 2 (a orb) a Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel b National Earthquake Information Center at 1 -(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.

EaI qaedtce yst esi Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2)

1. Ann 166 E indicator "Seismic Recording Initiated"

2. (a orb) a Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel b National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.

EPIP-I Revision 20 Page 33 of 49 Initiating/Condition All All Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx" Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matrix" Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)

1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph > one minute) stnkes any structure listed in Table 5-1

2. (a orb) a Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE b Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to event Note: Site Met Data Instrumentation fails to 0 at >100 mph.

Nabonal Weather Service Momstown 1-(423) 586-8400 can provide additonal informatron if needed.

Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report a Tornado has been sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

5. Tornad Mode Initiating/Condition All All

EPIP-1 Revsion 20 Page 34 of 49

.UWAWiI1 iii f(.TL7e II kUW tIi s Initiatinq/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx' Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any Plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1 2 (a orb) a Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE b Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to the event within the specified areas Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report a Aircraft Crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

Table 5-1 Plant Structures Associated With Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit #1 and 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Units 1 & 2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building RWST CST SI Mode All All Zi _j Htrrr.3WiPrniiPrT1IPur;,sn D

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EPIP Revision 20 Pg35of 49 Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matix" Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" River Reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning River Reservoir level is at Stage 11 Flood Warning (1 or 2)

1. River Reservoir level >727 Ft 2 Stage II Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning (1 or 2 or3)

1. River Reservoir level >726.5 Ft from April 16 thru September 30

2. River Reservoir level >714 5 Ft from October 1 thru April 15 3 Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations Mi MoefeItn"issionPoutinamernMatrix 1.

All All Refer to 'Fission Product Bamner Matnx*

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrer Matnx" River Reservoir level is <668 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations River Reservoir level is <673 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations I

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I Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Refer to Fission Product Bamer Matnx" Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water (RCW)

(1 and 2)

1. Plant personnel report a Watercraft has struck the Intake Pumping Station 2 (aor b or c) a ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train A O-PI-67-18A is <15 psig b ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train B O-PI-67-17A is <15 psig c RCW Supply Header Pressure O-PI-24-22 is

<15 psig

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Revision 20 Page 37 of 49 Figure 5-A PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER

Revision 20 Page 38 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC (

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED, Judgment4 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5 6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SIT.-Dl OWN SSTE-M GADTO RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling 7

Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 39 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4 7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN semor plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFRPart 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LO'WER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction mathe level of seventy of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of seventy is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g, Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ORANGE PATII: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (I) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit inthis definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3)by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this defimtion is the need for timely assessment, i.e, within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

[PIP-I Revision 20 Pape 40 of 49 I

I Mode 1 61LsofShudw Sysem InitiatinglCondition 5,6 Note Additional Information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

Loss of water level in the Rx vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel with CNTMT closure established (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5) 5,6 1 Loss of RHR capability 2 Rx vessel water level < el. 718'

3. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp >2000 F 4 RCS is vented/open to CNTMT 5 CNTMT closure is established Note: If CNTMT open, refer to 'Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

Inability to maintain Unit in Cold Shutdown (1 and 2 and 3)

1. RHR capability is not available for RCS Cooling 5,6

2. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp >2000 F 3 CNTMT closure is established 5,6 Note Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs 6

Lss of AC (Sudon Mode Initiating/Condition Not Applicable 5,6 or De Fuel 5,6 or De Fuel Not Applicable UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power for >15 minutes 1 IA and 1B 69 KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes (I and 2)

1. C and D CSSTS not available For >15 minutes 2 Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board i

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 4 l of149 1

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InitiatinplCondition Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable UNPLANNED loss of the required Train of DC Power for >15 minutes (1 or2) 1 Voltage <1 05V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I and 1-111 for >15 minutes 2 Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-11 and 1-IV for >15 minutes.

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All All InitiatinqlCondition Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)

1. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-101 or O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112 or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400

2. (a or b) a Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods b Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capability such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal

2. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-1 02 or O-RE-90-1 03 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60

3. Fuel remains covered with water I I Mode 4

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SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6 4 Fuel Handling p:

RAD}IOLOGICAL::*:.ii :

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EPIP-I Revision 20 Page 43 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4 7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs" Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action atthe station by threat of force.

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FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWNER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition HOSTAGE: Aperson(s) held as leverage against the stationto ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source ofthe projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g, alarm setpomts, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, Le, within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

"VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

[ PIP Revision 20 Page 44 of49 I =Ioe; 1 InitiatinqlCondition All All All All

.1 EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 6000 mrern Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (I or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time penod confirms that the Criterion Is Not exceeded 2 Field survey results indicate >1000 mremnhr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3 9E-6 j-Cicc at SP 3 EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>1000 mrem TEDE or >5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Fioure 7-A)

EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 600 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Site in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time penod confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >100 mrem/hr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3 9E-7 ji Ci/cc at SP

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or2 or3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time penod confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >10 mremlhr gamma at SP >15 minutes 3 EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes (1 or2 or3) 1 A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time penod confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded 2 Field survey results indicate >0.1 mrem/hr gamma at SP for >60 minutes 3 EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>0 1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Mode Initiating/Condition Not Applicable Not Applicable Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or 2)

All

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded.

2 Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for

>60 minutes (1 or2) 1 A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the All Criterion is Not exceeded.

2. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity

>60 minutes in duration

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 45 of 49 TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS(')

NOTE:

The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading As used here, the radiation monitor indications as displayed on ICS are the primary indicators. If ICS is unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local indication as necessary.

Monitor ICS Screen Units UE Alert Site General Total Site EFFI

ý,Ci/s (2) 1.5E+05 1.5E+07 2.5E+08 2.5E+09 Ul Shield Building 1-RE-90-400 EFF1 gtCi/s 6.7E+04 6.7E+06 1.0E+08 l.OE+09 U2 Shield Building 2-RE-90-400 EFFI 1.5E+04 1.5E+06 2.5E+07 2.6E+08 Auxiliary Building O-RE-90-101B 4RM1 cpm 1.2E+04 1.2E+06 W1 :i Service Building 0-RE-90-132B 4RM1 cpm 4.3E+03 4.3E+05 9.8E+06 Ul Condenser Vacuum Exhaust 1-RE-90-404A 3PAM

ýtCi/cc(3) 5.5E-02 5.5E+00 8.83E+01 8.83E+02 1

,-RE-90404B 3PAM

.iCi/cc 5.5E-02 5.5E+00 8.83E+01 8.83E+02 S/G Discharge Monitors 1-RE-90.421 thru 4RM2 mR/hr(4)

NA 3.5E+02 3.5E+03 3.5E+04 424 (B)

Liquid Monitors n/a jtCi/mln2) 1.8E-05 1.8E-03 N/A N/A O-RE-90-122 4RM2 cpm 1.1E+06

i.(li N/A N/A 1-RE-90-120,121 4RM2 cpm 1.OE+06

- - - (l N/A N/A 0-RE-90-225 4RM2 cpm 9.2E+05

!(1 N/A N/A 0-RE-90-212 4RM2 cpm 1.5E+04 1.5E+06 N/A N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes 60 15 15 15 ASSESSMENT METHOD: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the MCR or local indication as necessary Note:

(1) Table values are calculated values. The ***** indicates the monitor is off scale.

(2) These releases rate values in ýtCi/s and ýtCi/ml are provided on the gaseous and liquid release points for Information Only. Actual monitor readings are given in the table corresponding to the monitor for the four emergency classifications.

(3) This eberline channel reads out in cpm in the MCR. Indications of a radioactivity release via this pathway would be S/G blowdown monitors or other indications of primary-to-secondary leakage such as S/G level increase or pressurizer level decrease. ICS calculates ýtCi/cc and has a visual indication of an alarm condition when the indications exceeds 5.5E-02ýXCi/cc. This channel was included in the table to provide a means to further assess a release detected by other indications and to provide a path I

for possible escalation.

(4) These unit values are based on flow rates through one [1] PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1,185 psig, 6000F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing (e.g PORV)

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EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 46 of 49 Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA, SITE BOUNDARY and SITE PERIMETER NOTE: The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Do Not confuse this boundary with the SITE PERIMETER defined in these EALs, or with other definitions of "Site Boundary."

Note: Numbered points are [SP] radiological survey point for all sectors.

EPIP-1 Revision 20 Pa[e 47 of 49 I~~~~

73RdainLvl Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Banier Matnx" or "Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" or "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within the Facility that impedes Safe Operations or establishment or maintenance of Cold Shutdown (1 or 2)

1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings or survey results exceed 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room or CAS 2 (a and b) a VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2

b. Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for Safe Operation or the ability to establish Cold Shutdown See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Below UNPLANNED increase in Radiation levels within the Facility

1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings Increase by a factor 1000 over normal levels Note, In Either the UE or ALERT EAL, the SED must determine the cause of Increase in Radiation Levels and Review Other INITIATINGICONDITIONS for Applicability (e g, a dose rate of 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA).

Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

All I

I All Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)

1. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-1 01 or O-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112 or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400 2 (a orb) a Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods

b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity _r Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report water level drop In Spent Fuel Pool, or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal

2. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60

3. Fuel remains covered wth water.

I I Mode All 4

All

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All

EPIF-1 Revision 20 Pa.e 48 of 49 Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS Location Monitor Monitor No.

Building and Elevation Reading

1&2 RE-90-1 1-RE-90-2 O-RE-90-3 O-RE-90-4 O-RE-90-5 1&2-RE-90-6 1&2-RE-90-7 1&2-RE-90-8 0-RE-90-9 1&2-RE-90-10 O-RE-90-11 1-RE-90-61 O-RE-90-230 0-RE-90-231 Note- *These monitors read out in mR/hr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mrem/hr.

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Auxiliary El. 757.0 (spent fuel pool)

Auxiliary El. 757.0 (personnel air lock)

Auxiliary El. 729.0 (waste pac. area)

Auxiliary El. 713.0 (decon room)

Auxiliary El. 737.0 (spt. fuel pool pmp. ar.)

Auxiliary El. 737.0 (comp. cl. wtr. ht. ex. ar.)

Auxiliary El. 713.0 (sample room)

Auxiliary El. 713.0 (aux. feed pump area)

Auxiliary El. 692.0 (wst. cond. evap. tk. ar.)

Auxiliary El. 692.0 (cvcs area)

Auxiliary El. 676.0 (ctmt. spry. & rhr pmp ar.)

Auxiliary El. 736.0 (RB low. cmpt. inst. rm.)

Turbine El. 685.0 (conden. demin.)

2.5 x 10' mR/hr 2.5 x 10' R/hr 2.5 x 10' mR/hr 1.5 x 10' mR/hr 1.5 x 103 rnR/hr 1.5 x 10' mR/hr 2 x 10 3 mR/hr 1.5 x 10' mR/hr 1.5 x 10' mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 10' mR/hr 2.5 x I0W mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 20 FLOWCHART----,.

Page 49 of 49 SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of 1

1. NIR-0551, DV-847100 F00012, and MC 850321 809004, MSC-00956, NCO 920030366.

2. MC-84 0827 005 035A, MCS-2400

3. MC-8407 1900 3003, MSC-00701, NCO 920030222 CNTMT

4. ANSI Standard N. 18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01 POI

5. MSC-02401, NCO-920030998

6. EPPOS#2 Monitor readings and challenges to barriers are provided in EPIP-1, Section 1 in (1.1 Fuel Clad 1.1.5 and 1.3 CNTMT Barrier 1.3.5), Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluents, 7.2 Liquid Effluents, Table 7-1, 7.3 Radiation Levels, 7.4 Fuel Handling and Table 7-2). Barriers are covered in Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix. Monitor readings are also provided in EPIP-5, App. B, Note 3.

SED duties that can not be delegated. Section 2.0 Responsibility.

Rad Monitors used in conjunction with a plant parameter to determine emergency classifications.

Monitor readings are included with plant parameters for the purposes of emergency classifications. Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix (1.1 Fuel Clad, 1.2 RCS, 1.3 Containment),

Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluent, 7.2 Liquid Effluent and 7.3 Radiation Levels and 7.4 Fuel Handling).

EPIPs will contain the following elements Chemistry detection of failed fuel.

Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on timeliness of classification of emergency conditions

FILING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT NUMBER REMOVE REX, I INSERT REV___l COMMENTS_____________

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP-2

-NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Revision 19 Un it 0 NON-QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY: Frank L: Pavlechko (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:

Emergency Planninq APPROVED BY Frank L. Pavlechko EFFECTIVE DATE: 07/30/2002 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE -

REVISION LOG Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 8

7/5/96 4,5,6,7,8 Phone number and titles revised. Procedure (TI-30) replacement identified. All revisions were evaluated to be non-intent.

9 10/10/96 3,4,5, 8,9 The following non-intent revisions were made:

SM designee identified by title, OSC and TSC support personnel instruction added, a reference was added and the non-QA record instructions revised.

CN-1 3/27/97 3,5,6 TEMA additional back-up number added.

CN-2 2/2/98 3,5,7,8 SSP-4.05 was replaced by SPP-3.5 in new procedure system. Editorial.

10 6/30/98 All Non-Intent Change. Incorporated Change Notices 1 and 2. Changed reference SSP 3.4 to SPP 3.1.

11 10/21/99 All Non Intent Change. Moved termination of emergency step from Appendix A to Appendix B.

STD-3.2 reference canceled.

12 6/14/00 All Non Intent Change. Revised reference number.

Added backup call to the ODS should the EPS fail to operate. Added the word actions after notifications in Step 4 for clarification.

13 10/31/00 All Non-Intent change. Revised NRC dedicated pg. 5 phones from FTS-2000 to TVA phone circuits pg (RIS) 2000-11 "NRC Emergency Telecommunications Systems".

14 3/30/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions Page 6,10 indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-Intent change. Revised phone number.

Revised initial notification form to standardize within TVAN and meet new NEI PI requirements to the NRC.

15 4/25/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions pg. 2, 10 indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-Intent change. Corrected typo.

16 9/25/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions pg. 9,10 indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.

Non-Intent change. Corrected typo on Appendix A.

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NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EPIP-2 WBN EVENT Revision 19 Page 3 of 12 Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 1 17 01/24/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions pg. 3, 5, 7 indicate the following revisions do not reduce the "level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-intent change. Added step to receive ODS "confirmation call to TEMA. This standardizes with other TVAN units. Per NRC Safeguards Advisory, revised caution statement to include security adversary attack.

18 06/05/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these 3-5 & 7 changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Intent change(s): per NRC Recommended "Actions for Licensee Response to a Site Specific Credible Threat at Nuclear Power Plants".

Revised step 8 and note(s) to require activation of the TSC/OSC for a Security Site Specific Credible Threat.

Non-intent change(s): added fax number to TEMA.

19 07/30/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these 3, 4, 5, 7, changes indicate the following revisions do not 8

reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Intent changes made to the procedure to support the NRC Safeguards Advisory and actions associated with IN 2002-14. (ie) Added Step 8 on the two person line of site rule, and assembly and accountability requirements. Realigned steps in instruction concerning Security Site Specific Credible Threat.

Added Steps 18 and 19 to enhance termination instructions. Added NRC IN 2002-14 to the references.

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EPIP-2 WBN EVENT Revision 19 Page 4 of 12 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To provide a method for timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager (SM) or Site Emergency Director (SED), Technical Support Center (TSC) has determined by WBN, EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT.5 1.2 To provide a method for periodic reanalysis of the current situation by the SED to determine whether the NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT action(s) should be terminated, continued or upgraded to another classification.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY The SED who is initially the SM (or other SM on-site during the emergency) or designee (Unit Supervisor, US) until properly relieved by the TSC SED, has the responsibility and authority for implementation of the action(s) in this instruction. 5 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 Upon determining that existing conditions are classified as a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT according to EPIP-1 (independent evaluations by crew members may be beneficial), the SED, or designee, will: 4, 5

1.

IF there are personnel injuries, IMPLEMENT EPIP-10, "Medical 0

Emergency Response."

2.

COMPLETE Appendix A, Notification Information El

3.

IF the Unusual Event declaration is based on a Credible Site Specific Security Threat Notification indicated by EVENT 4.6 Security EALs or TSC and OSC support is needed for any other reason then DIRECT Shift Personnel to activate the Emergency Paging System (EPS) to staff the TSC and OSC. Shift Personnel should confirm activation and provide the 20 minute printed report to the SM for review.

o NOTE 1 IF the EPS system fails, call the ODS, ringdown or (5-751-1700) and have him activate the EPS.

NOTE 2 IF the above methods of activating the EPS fail, Shift Personnel must use the Radiological Emergency Response Call Lists to staff the TSC and OSC. This list is located in the EPS Manual near the terminal.

CAUTION If there is any possibility of a radiological release or security adversary attack, do not send personnel into areas of unknown radiological conditions or security risk without first contacting Radiological Contr(I 4

(RADCON) or Security.

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NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EPIP-2 WBN EVENT Revision 19 Page 5 of 12 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

4.

ANNOUNCE to the ci&ew: "A" Notification of Unusual Event 13 is being declared based on I will be the Site Emergency Director."

5.

NOTIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or No. 5-751-1700 or 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE the information from Appendix A. IF the ODS cannot be contacted within 10 minutes, the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency is to be notified of the Radiological Emergency Plan activation by calling:

9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-615-741-0001 or 9-1-800-262-3400.2 E

6.

FAX Appendix A to the ODS. (# pre-programmed or 5-751-3400),

or TEMA'at 9-1-615-242-9635.

El

7.

ANNOUNCE to the plant, "ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL.

ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL. A Notification of Unusual Event is being declared based on conditions." (Repeat).

8.

IF the NOUE has been declared due to a Security EAL and Nuclear Security recommends Accountability to establish the "Two Person (Line of-Sight) Rule". Then implement EPIP 8 for Assembly and Accountability.

El

9.

NOTIFY Duty Plant Manager, and PROVIDE Appendix A information (SEE duty list for telephone numbers). The Duty Plant Manager will call the Plant Manager or alternate.

0

10.

RECEIVE confirmation call from the ODS (to verify notification of the State of Tennessee) (NA this step, if the state was contacted directly).

El

11.

NOTIFY NRC, using the designated NRC phone (ENS), of plan activation.

El NOTE NRC notification should be made as soon-as practicable, within one hour of "NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL'EVENT" declaration. Whenever NRC requests,ýa qualified person must provide a continuous update to the NRC Operations Center. The following commercial numbers are for the NRC Operations Center:3 '6 9-1-301-816-5100 (MAIN) 9-1-301-951-0550 (Backup) 9-1-301-816-5151 (FAX)

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EPIP-2 WBN EVENT Revision 19 Page 6 of 12 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

K.

12.

EVALUATE the need to implement EPIP-16, "Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies, "for a dose projection if radioactivity is being released through normal plant release paths.

Eo

13.

NOTIFY WBN Emergency Preparedness.

0 NOTE Notification to Emergency Preparedness should be made as soon as practicable, but only when notification does not interfere with emergency actions or notifications in progress.

Work - 3232 or Work - 8004 or 1838 Home 1-423-337-2911 Home 1-865-376-4691 Pager - 30374 Pager - 70215

14.

REEVALUATE the event using WBN EPIP-1 as necessary to determine if conditions warrant reclassification.

0 A

IF the situation no longer exists, TERMINATE the emergency by informing the ODS and the Duty Plant Manager.

B.

IF the condition warrants upgrading to a higher classification, INITIATE the appropriate steps of WBN EPIPs 3, 4, or 5.

C.

IF other plant conditions warrant the need for follow-up information, COMPLETE the Follow-up Notification Form, Appendix B and NOTIFY the TSC/CECC (if it is staffed), or NOTIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or No. 5-751-1700 or 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE the information. IF the ODS cannot be contacted within 10 minutes, the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency is to be notified of the information by calling:

9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-615-741-0001 or 9-1-800-262-3400.2 n

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EPIP-2 WBN EVENT Revision 19 2.,

Page 7 of 12 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

15.

FAX Appendix A to the ODS. (# pre-programmed or 5-751-3400),

or TEMA at 9-1-615-242-9635.

0

16.

ENSURE applicable notifications/actions required by SPP-3.5 and SPP-3.1 have been made.

-0 13

17.

NOTIFY the NRC Resident'Inspector by calling 1776 and PROVIDING the information on Appendix A.

0]

18.

IF the emergency no longer exist complete Appendix B and E3 terminate.

19.

NOTIFY the NRC and ODS/TEMA of the termination and fax Appendix B to the ODS # pre-programmed or 5-571-3400 or TEMA at 9-1-615-242-9635.

E 0

20.

After the event is'terminated, SEND the completed WBN EPIP-2 and associated documentation to WBN Emergency Preparedness (EP) Manager. The EP Manager shall forward documentation to DCRM for storage as appropriate.

03

4.0 4.1 4.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50.72 Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.

ANSI N 18.7 -1976 NRC IN 2002-14 REFERENCES Interfacing Documents SPP-3.1 Corrective Action Program SPP-3.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements WBN-EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart WBN-EPIP-3 Alert WBN-EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-5 General Emergency WBN-EPIP-10 Medical Emergency Response WBN-EPIP-1 3 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPIP-14 Radiological Control Response WBN-EPIP-16 Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies CECC-EPIP-9 Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures

5.0 APPENDIX AppendixA, Notification Information Appendix B, Follow-up Notification Form 6.0 RECORDS

.6.1 Non QA Records All EPIP-2 records generated, when the REP is activated, will be stored by EP Manager for Life of Plant.'

All EPIP-2 records generated during the course of a drill/exercise will be assembled by the EP Manager and stored appropriately.

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EPIP-2 WBN EVENT Revision 19 Page 10 of 12 APPENDIX A (Page 1 of 1)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT 1,4 D] THIS IS A REAL EVENT I-THIS IS A DRILL This is NAME A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT has been declared at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant affecting:

El Unit 1 LI Unit 2 Event Declared:

Time:

Date:

EAL Designator (e.g., Fire 4.1):

Brief Description of the Event:

Radiological Conditions:

-I No Abnormal Releases Offsite I1 Airborne Release Offsite Il Liquid Release Offsite F-1 Release Information Not Known at this time L-There is no Protective Action Recommendation at this time.

F-1 Ask, "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EPIP-2 WBN EVENT Revision 19 Page 11 of 12

-'APPENDIX B (Page 1 of 1)

WBN FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION FORM NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

1.

3'THIS IS A REAL EVENT" or 0 'THIS IS A DRILL."

2.,-'This is ___at the Watfs Bar Nuclear Plant.

This is follow-up information regarding the Notification of Unusual Event at Watts Bar:

Unit 1 o Unit 2 E."

3.

"Reactor:

Shutdown 13 At power ["

4.

"Plant conditions are:

Stable o]

Deteriorating E"

5.

'"Follow-up information: (e.g., key events, status changes)

"The radiological conditions are:

E3 No Abnormal Release Offsite o1 Airborne Release Offsite o

Liquid Release Offsite o3 Release Information Not Known."

"Additional Rad information: (e.g., release duration)

8.

] '"There is no Protective Action Recommendation at this time."

9.

'The event terminated at

/

Time Date

10.

03 "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."

11.

/

Signature Time Date

6.

7.

SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of 1 1

NRC IE Information Notice 89-89 2

NRC IE Information Notice 86-97 3

NRC IE Information Notice 86-28 4

MC 840827 00500 4A, MSC-02375, NCO 9200 30985 5

ANSI N18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01POR 6

NRC Administrative Letter 94-04 Event Notification Worksheets Emergency Communications System Telephone Numbers to the NRC Operations Center and Regional Offices.

Section 3.0 Instructions, 3.1, and Appendix A (Page 1 of 1).

EPIPs will contain the following elements.

Change of NRC Operation Center commercial telephone and facsimile numbers.

U i

FILING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT NUMBER REMOVE REN INSERT REVA_2Z COMMENTS_____________

Z3

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN'IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP-3 ALERT Revision 22

°Unit 0 NON-QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY:

Frank L Pavlechko (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:

Emergency Planning APPROVED BY:

Frank L. Pavlechko EFFECTIVE DATE:

07/30/2002 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

EPIP-3 WBN ALERT Revision 22 Page 2 of 12 REVISION LOG Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 11 7/5/96 4,5,7,8 Phone number and titles revised. Procedure replacement (TI-30) identified. All revisions were evaluated to be non-intent 12 10/10/96 3,4,8,9 The following non-intent revisions were made: Shift Personnel replaced Shift Clerk to reflect additional personnel trained on the paging system, SM designee identified by title, a phone number added, a reference was added and the non-QA record instructions were revised.

CN-1 3/27/97 3,5,7 TEMA added altemate phone number.

CN-2 2/2/98 3, 5, 7, 8 SSP-4.05 was replaced by SPP-3.5 in new procedure system.

Editorial changes.

13 6/30/98 All Non-Intent Changes. Incorporated Change Notices 1 and 2.

Changed reference SSP 3.4 to SPP 3.1.

14 10/21/99 All Non Intent Change. Moved termination of emergency step from Appendix A to Appendix B. STD-3.2 referenced canceled.

15 06/14/00 All Non Intent Change. Revised reference number. Added reference to the direct line to the ODS for clarification. Added the word actions after notifications in Step 19 for clarification.

16 10/31/00 All Non-Intent change. Revised NRC dedicated phones from FTS-2000 to TVA phone circuits per (RIS) 2000-11 "NRC pg. 6 Emergency Telecommunications Systems".

17 3/30/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of Page 10 the procedure or REP:

Non-Intent change. Revised initial notification form to standardize within TVAN and meet new NEI PI requirements to the NRC.

18 4/25/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the pg. 2, 10 following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-Intent change. Corrected typo.

19 9/25/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of pg. 9 the procedure or REP:

Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.

20 01/24/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of pg. 3, 5, 6 the procedure or REP:

Non-intent change. Added step to receive ODS confirmation call to TEMA. This standardizes with other TVAN units.

Enhanced caution statement to include Security adversary attack. Per NRC Safeguards Advisory, moved caution step to enhance information. Changed the word Activate to Sound this makes the wording similar to EPIP 3 & 4 on step 9.

EPIP-3 WBN ALERT Revision 22 Page 3 of 12

~ REVISION LOG Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 21 06/05/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate

,.the following revisions do not reduce the level of 3, 5 & 7 effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Non-intent change(s): added fax number to TEMA.

22 07130/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of 3, 5, 8 effectiveness of the procedure or REP.,

lnt6rit change. Revised caution statemerit on assembly and accountability. Added NRC IN 2002-14 to the references.

-7'

EPIP-3 WBN ALERT Revision 22 Page 4 of 12 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To provide a method for timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager (SM) or Technical Support Center (TSC) Site Emergency Director (SED) has determined by WBN EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as an ALERT.4 1.2 To provide a method for periodic reanalysis of the current situation by the SED to determine whether the ALERT should be terminated, continued or upgraded to another classification.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 4 The SED who is initially the SM (or other SM onsite during the emergency) or designee (Unit Supervisor, US) until properly relieved by the TSC SED, has the responsibility and authority for implementation of the actions in this instruction.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4

3.1 Upon determining that existing conditions are classified as an ALERT according to EPIP-1 (independent evaluations by crew members may be beneficial), the SED, or designee, will:

1.

DIRECT Shift Personnel to activate the Emergency Paging System 0

(EPS) to staff the TSC and Operations Support Center (OSC).

Shift Personnel should confirm activation and provide the 20 minute printed report to the SM for review.

NOTE 1 IF the EPS systems fails, call the ODS, ringdown or (5-751-1700) and have him activate the EPS.

NOTE 2 IF the above methods of activating the EPS fail, the Shift Personnel must use the Radiological Emergency Response Call Lists to staff the TSC and OSC. This list is located in the EPS Manual near the terminal.

2.

COMPLETE Appendix A, Notification Information.

0

3.

ANNOUNCE to the crew.

"An Alert is being declared based on 01

_ I will be the Site Emergency Director."

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

4.

NOTIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or No. 5-751-1700 or 0l 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE the information from Appendix A. If the ODS cannot be contacted within 10 minutes, the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency is to be notified of the Radiological Emergency Plan activation by calling 9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1 -615-741-0001 or 9-1 -800-262_3400.2

5.

FAX Appendix A to the ODS.

0

(# pre-programmed or 5-751-3400), or TEMA. at 9-1-615-242-9635.

6.

ANNOUNCE to the plant:

"ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL.

0 ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL. °.An ALERT emergency has been declared based on_

Staff the TSC and OSC." - (Repeat)

CAUTION If there is any possibility, of a radiological release or security adversary attack, HOLD assembly and accountability actions until these conditions have been resolved. Do not send personnel into areas of unknown radiological conditions or secUrity'risk without first contacting Radiological Control (RADCON) or Security.

7.

EVALUATE plant conditions, and IF conditions warrant, INITIATE C

assembly and accountability by. (For'additional details, go to WBN

-EPIP-8, "Personnel -Accountability and Evacuation"). -IF you are not going to initiate assembly and accountability, GO TO step 10.

8.

NOTIFY Security (CAS) that assembly and accountability is to be 0

conducted.

9.

ANNOUNCE to the plant:

"ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL.

0 ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL. Report to your assembly areas for accountability"-

(Repeat)° 'AND, SbUNb'a'sembly alarm for personnel assembly and acc, oduitability. INITIATE WBN EPIP-8, "Personnel Accountability and Evacuation."'

10.

CALL RADCON Lab and SAY: "We are in an Alert, implement 0

WBN EPIP-14 and CECC EPIP-9."

EPIP-3 WBN ALERT Revision 22 Page 6 of 12 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

11.

IF there are personnel injuries, IMPLEMENT WBN EPIP-1 0, 0

"Medical Emergency Response."

12.

IF there is a security threat, IMPLEMENT WBN EPIP-1 1, 0

"Security and Access Control."

13.

NOTIFY Duty Plant Manager, and PROVIDE Appendix A information 0

(SEE duty list for telephone numbers). The Duty Plant Manager will call the Plant Manager or his alternate.

14.

EVALUATE the need to implement EPIP-16, "Initial Dose Assessment 0

for Radiological Emergencies," for a dose projection if radioactivity is being released through normal plant release paths.

15.

RECEIVE confirmation call from the ODS ( to verify notification of the 0]

State of Tennessee) (NA this step, if the state was contacted directly).

16.

NOTIFY the NRC, using designated NRC phone (ENS), of plan 03 activation.

NOTE NRC notification should be made as soon as practicable but within one hour of "ALERT' declaration. Whenever NRC requests, a qualified person must provide a continuous update to NRC Operations Center. The following commercial numbers are for the NRC Operations Center.3 '

9-1-301-816-5100 (MAIN) 9-1-301-951-0550 (BACKUP) 9-1-301-816-5151 (FAX)

17.

NOTIFY the NRC Resident Inspector by calling 1776 and 0

PROVIDING the information on Appendix A.

1 -1

EPIP-3

"-WBN ALERT Revision 22 Page 7 of 12 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

18.

REEVALUATE conditions using WBN EPIP-1 as necessary.-

0 A.

IF the conditions are under control, INITIATE actions identified in WBN EPIP-13, 'Termination of the Emergency and :

Recovery."

B.

IF the conditions warrant upgrading to a higher classification, INITIATE the appropriate steps of WBN EPIP-4 or EPIP-5.

C.

IF other plant conditions warrant the need for followup information, COMPLETE the Followup Notification Form, Appendix B, and NOTIFY the TSC/CECC (if it is staffed) or, NOTIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or No. 5-751-1700 or 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE the information.

IF the ODS cannot be contacted within 10 minutes, the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency is to be notified of the information by calling:

9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-615-741.001 or 9-1-800-262-34002

19.

FAX Appendix A to the ODS.

(# pre-programmed or 5-751-3400), or TEMA at 9-1-615-242-9635.

,,20.

ENSURE applicable notifications/actions required by SPP-3.5 and,

SPP-3.1 have been made.

21.

SEND the completed WBN EPIP-3 and associated documentation to 0

the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Manager. The EP Manager shall forward documentation to DCRM for storage as appropriate.

EPIP-3 WBN ALERT Revision 22 Page 8 of 12

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Interfacing Documents SPP-3.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements SPP-3.1 Corrective Action Program WBN-EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart WBN-EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-5 General Emergency WBN-EPIP-10 Medical Emergency Response WBN-EPIP-1 1 Security and Access Control WBN-EPIP-13 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPIP-16 Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies CECC-EPI P-9 Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures 4.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50.72 Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.

ANSI N18.7-1976 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-14 CECC-EPIP-8 Dose Assessment Staff Activities During Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergencies K-,

EPIP-3 WBN ALERT Revision 22 Page 9 of 12 5.0 APPENDIX Appendix A, Notification Information Appendix B, Followup Notification Form 6.0 RECORDS 6.1 Non QA Records All EPIP-3 records generated, when the REP is activated, will be stored by EP Manager for Life of Plant.

All EPIP-3 records generated during the course of a drill/exercise will be assembled by the EP Manager and stored appropriately.-

EPIP-3 WBN ALERT Revision 22 Page 10 of 12 APPENDIX A (Page 1 of 1)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM-'

ALERT

-I THIS IS A REAL EVENT LI THIS IS A DRILL This is NAME An ALERT has been declared at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant affecting:

[] Unit 1 I-I Unit2 Event Declared:

Time:

Date:

EAL Designator (e.g., Fire 4.1):

Brief Description of the Event:

Radiological Conditions:

'I No Abnormal Releases Offsite

-I Airborne Release Offsite EI Liquid Release Offsite LI Release Information Not Known at this time I There is no Protective Action Recommendation at this time.

-I Ask "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."

K>

A -----------

A-

EPIP-3 WBN ALERT Revision 22 Page 11 of 12 APPENDIX B (Page 1 of 1)

WBN FOLLOWUP INFORMATION FORM ALERT

1.

El 'THIS IS A REAL EVENT' or El 'THIS IS A DRILL."

2.

'This is at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

This is followup information regarding the Alert at Watts Bar:

Unit1 El

'Unit2 0-."

3.

"Reactor:

Shutdown 0l At power of"

4.

"Plant conditions are:

Stable El Deteriorating 0l"

5.

"Followup information: (e.g., key events, status changes)

6.

"Site Assembly and Accountability is ongoing: Yes El No E"

7.

'The radiological conditions are:

El No Abnormal Release Offsite El Airborne Release Offsite El Liquid Release Offsite El Release Information Not Known."

8.

"Additional Rad information: (e.g., release duration)

9.

El

'There is no Protective Action Recommendation at this time."

10.

'The event terminated at

/

Time Date

11.

El "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."

12.

/

Sianature Time Date

EPIP-3 WBN ALERT*

Revision 22 Page 12 of 12 SOURCE NOTES Page I of I NRC IE Information Notice No. 89-89 2

NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-97, NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-28 ANSI N18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01POI NRC Administrative Letter 94-04 Event Notification Worksheets Emergency Communications System Telephone Numbers to the NRC Operations Center and Regional Offices EPIPs will contain the following elements.

Change of NRC Operations Center commercial telephone and facsimile numbers.

FILING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT NUMBER fYjf

1/2'

REMOVE REV ______

INSERT REV c2 COMMENTS______________

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

-EPIP-4 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Revision 23 Unit 0 NON-QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY:

Frank L. Pavlechko (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: 'Emergency Planninq APPROVED BY:

Frank L. Pavlech'ko EFFECTIVE DATE: 07/30/2002 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE ii

",.i REVISION DESCRIPTION Revision Implementatio Pages Description of Revision Number n

Affected Date CN-1 9/28/95 5

Revised phone numbers. Editorial (non-intent) changes made.

11 7/5/96 4,5,7,8 Phone number and titles revised. Procedure replacement (TI-30) identified. All revisions were evaluated to be non-intent.

12 10/10/96 3,4,5,8,9, The following non-intent revisions were made: Shift Personnel 10-replaced Shift Clerk to reflect additional personnel trained on the paging system, SM designee identified by title, a phone number was added, assembly and accountability instruction enhanced, a reference was added, the non-QA record instructions were revised, and wind speed and direction were added to the initial notification form per TEMA request.

CN-1 3/27/97 3,5,6,7.

TEMA additional back-up number added, changed county primary and back-up numbers CN-2 7/31/97 3,5 Phone number change.

CN-3 2/2/98 3,5,7,8 SSP-4.05 was replaced by SPP-3.5. Editorial change.

13 6/30/98 All Non-intent changes. Incorporated Changes Notices 1, 2 and 3.

Changed reference SSP 3.4 to SPP 3.1.

14 10/21/99 All Non-intent change. Moved termination of emergency step from

'Appendix A to Appendix B. STD-3.2 reference canceled.

15 02/08/00 ALL Non-Intent change. Phone numbers revised.

16 06/14/00 All Non Intent change. Reference number revised. Phone number

'revised. Added the word actions after notifications in Step 17 for I

clarification. Added reference to the ODS, direct line for clarification.

This revision resolves problem identified in WBN PER, 006394.

17 10/31/00 All Non-Intent change. Revised NRC dedicated phones from FTS pg. 6 2000 to TVA phone circuits per (RIS) 2000-11 "NRC Emergency Telecommunications Systems".

18 3/30/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following Page 5,10 revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-Intent change. Revised phone numbers. Revised initial notification form to standardize within TVAN and meet new NEI PI requirements to the NRC.

19 4/25/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following pg. 2, 10 revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-Intent change. Corrected typo.

20 9/25/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following pg. 9 revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.

21 01/24/02 All pg.3,5,6 Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-intent change. Added step to receive ODS confirmation call I to TEMA\\Local Counties. This standardizes with other TVAN Units. Per NRC Safeguards Advisory, enhanced caution statement to include Security adversary attack.

EPIP-4 WBN SITE AREA'EMERGENCY Revision 23 Page 3 of 12 Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 22 06/05/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the 3, 5 & 7 following revisions do not reduce the. level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Intent change(s) removed county EPZ phone numbers per direction from Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA)..

Non-intent change(s): added fax number to TEMA.

23 07/30/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the 3, 5, 7, 8 following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Intent change(s): Revised caution statement on assembly and accountability. Added Step 16 on evacuation of non emergency responders. Added NRC IN 2002-14 to the references.

EPIP-4 WBN SITE AREA EMERGENCY Revision 23 Page 4 of 12 1.0 PURPOSE 4 1.1 To provide a method for timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift' Manager (SM) or'Technhical Support Center (TSC) SED has determined by WBN EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

1.2 To provide a method for periodic reanalysis of the current situation by the SED to determine whether"the SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be terminated, continued or upgraded to a General Emergency.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 4 The SED who is-initially the SM (or other SM onsite during the emergency) or designee (Unit Supervisor, US) until properly relieved by the TSC SED, has the responsibility and authority for implementation of the actions in this instruction.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 Upon determining that existing conditions are classified as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY according to WBN EPIP-1 (independent evaluations by crew members may be beneficial), the SED, or designee, will: 4

1.

DIRECT the Shift Personnel to activate the Emergency Paging System (EPS) to staff the TSC and Operations Support Center (OSC).

Shift Personnel should confirm activation and provide the 20 minute 0

printed report to the SM for review.

NOTE 1 IF the EPS system fails, call the ODS, ringdown or (5-751-1700) and have him activate the EPS.

NOTE 2 IF the above methods of activating the EPS fail, Shift Personnel must use the Radiological Emergency Response Call Lists to staff the TSC and OSC. This list is located in the EPS Manual near the terminal.

EPIP-4 WBN SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

Revision 23 Page 5 of 12 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

2.

COMPLETE Appendix A Notification Information.

El

3.

ANNOUNCE to the crew:. "A Site Area Emergency is being declared El based on _

I will be the Site Emergency Director, all support and job assignments must be authorized through me."

4.

NOTIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or No. 5-751-1700 or El 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE the information from Appendix A.

IF the ODS cannot be contacted within 10 minutes, the Tennessee Emergency Managemerit Agency is to be notified of the Radiological Emergency Plan activation by callirig-"9-1-800-262 3300 or 9-1-615-741-0001, or 9-1-800-262-3400.

5.

FAX Appendix A to the ODS. (# pre-programmed or 5-751-3400),

El or TEMA at 9-1-615-242-9635.

CAUTION If there is any possibility of a radiological release or security adversary attack, HOLD assembly and accountability actions until these conditions havre been resolved. Do not send personnel into areas of unknown radiological conditions or security risk without first contacting Radiological Control (RADCON) or Security.

6.

NOTIFY Security (CAS) that assembly and accountability is to be El conducted.

I i

'K)'

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

7.

ANNOUNCE to the plant: "ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL.

ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL. A SITE AREA EMERGENCY has been declared based on __All personnel report to your assembly areas for accountability.

Staff the TSC and OSC." (Repeat)

SOUND assembly alarm AND 0l INITIATE WBN EPIP-8, "Personnel Accountability and Evacuation."

0

8.

CALL RADCON Lab and SAiý: 'We a*re in a Site Area Emergency, 0

implement WBN EPIP-14 and CECC EPIP-9."

9.

IF there are personnel injuries, IMPLEMENT WBN EPIP-10, "Medical 0

Emergency Response".

10.

IF there is a security threat, IMPLEMENT WBN EPIP-1 1, "Security El and Access Control".

11.

NOTIFY Duty Plant Manager, and PROVIDE Appendix A information El (SEE duty list for telephone numbers). The Duty Plant Manager will call the Plant Manager or alternate.

12.

EVALUATE the need to implement. EPIP-16, "Initial Dose Assessment El for Radiological Emergencies," for a dose projection if radioactivity is being released'through normal plant release paths.

13.

RECEIVE confirmation call from the ODS (to verify notification of the El State of Tennessee/local counties.) (NA this step, if the state/counties were contacted directly).

14.

NOTIFY the NRC, using designated NRC phone (ENS), of plan El activation.

NOTE NRC notification should be made as soon as practicable, within one hour of "SITE AREA EMERGENCY' declaration.

Whenever NRC requests, a qualified person must provide a continuous update to NRC Operations Center. The following commercial numbers are for the NRC Operations Center:3'5 9-1-301-816-5100 (MAIN) 9-1-301-951-0550 (BACKUP) 9-1-301-816-5151 (FAX)

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 0

15.

NOTIFY the NRC Resident Inspector by calling 1776 and PROVIDING the information on Appendix A.

0

16.

Once Assembly and Accountability has been COMPLETED, review EPIP 8, Appendix G for actionsiassociated with the evacuation of non emergency responders.

IF this action has already been initiated, disregard.

17.

REEVALUATE conditions using WBN EPIP-1 as necessary.

A.

IF the conditions are under control, INITIATE actions"':

identified in WBN EPIP-13, "Termination of the Emergency and Recovery."

B.

IF conditions warrant upgrading to a 'higher ýclaissification, INITIATE the appropriate steps of WBN EPIP-5.

C.

IF other plant conditions warrant the need for followup information, COMPLETE the Followup Notification Form, Appendix B, and NOTIFY the TSC/CECC (if it is staffed) or, NOTIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or No. 5-751-1700 or 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE the information.

IF the ODS cannot be contacted within 10 minutes, the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency is to be notified of the information by calling 9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-615-741 -0001 or 9-1-800-262-34002

18.

FAX Appendix A to the ODS. (# pre-programmed -or 5-751-3400),

El or TEMA at 9-1-615-242-9635.

19.

ENSURE applicable notifications/actions required by SPP-3.5 and El SPP-3.1 have been made.

20.

SEND the completed WBN EPIP-4 and associated documentation to El the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Manager. The EP Manager shall forward documentation to DCRM for storage as appropriate.

EPIP-4 WBN.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY Revision 23 Page 8 of 12

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Interfacing Documents SPP-3.1 Corrective Action Program SPP-3.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements WBN-EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart WBN-EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-3 Alert WBN-EPIP-5 General Emergency WBN-EPIP-1 0 Medical Emergency Response WBN-EPIP-1 1 Security and Access Control WBN-EPIP-1 3 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPIP-1 6 Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies CECC-EPIP-9 Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures 4.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50.72 Imme diate'Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Pieparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.

ANSI 18.7-1976 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-14 CECC-EPIP-8 Dose Assessment Staff Activities During Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergencies

EPIP-4 WBN SITE AREA EMERGENCY Revision 23 Page 9 of 12 5.0 APPENDIX Appendix A, Notification Information Appendix B, Followup Notification Form 6.0 RECORDS 6.1 Non QA Records All EPIP-4 records generated, when the REP is activated, will be stored by EP' Manager for Life of Plant.

All EPIP-4 records generated during the course of a drill/exercise will be assembled by the EP Manager and stored appropriately.

K,,I APPENDIX A (Page 1 of 1)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM '

SITE AREA EMERGENCY EI THIS IS A REAL EVENT LI THIS IS A DRILL This is NAME An SITE AREA EMERGENCY has been declared at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant affecting:

[I Unit 1 El Unit2 Event Declared:

Time:

Date:

EAL Designator (e.g., loss of AC 3.1):

Brief Description of the Event:

Radiological Conditions:

EI No Abnormal Releases Offsite Ei Airborne Release Offsite I-Liquid Release Offsite

[] Release Information Not Known at this time

-- There is no Protective Action Recommendation at this time.

Meteorological conditions are:

Wind Speed:

m.p.h.

Wind Direction From:

degrees Ii Ask "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."

EPIP-4 WBN SITE AREA EMERGENCY, Revision 23 Page 11 of 12 APPENDIX B (Paae 1 of 1)

WBN FOLLOWUP INFORMATION FORM SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

El 'THIS IS A REAL EVENT'- or 0 'THIS IS A DRILL."

"This is at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

This is followup information regarding the'Site Area Emergency at Watts Bar Unit 1 E

Unit2 E-I."

"Reactor:

I Shutdown El At power El "Plant conditions are:

Stable 'E Deteriorating E"

"Followup information: (e.q., key events, status chanqes)

6.

"Onsite assembly and accountability is ongoing: Yes El

7.

'The radiological conditions are:

o1 No Abnormal Release Offsite El Airborne Release Offsite El Liquid Release Offsite El Release Information Not Known."

8.

"Additional Rad information: (e..q., release duration)

No 0 "

9.

'The meteorological conditions are: Wind speed:

Wind direction from:

I

10.

El

'There is no Protective Action Recommendation at this time."

11.

'The event terminated at

/

Time Date

12.

El "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."

13.

/

K>

Signature Time Date I m M

to Signature Time Date

EPIP-4 WBN SITE AREA EMERGENCY Revision 23 Page 12 of 12 SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of 1 1

NRC IE Information Notice No. 89-89 2

NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-97 NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-28 ANSI 18.7-1976, Subsection, 5.3.9.3: 01 POI NRC Administrative Letter 94-04 Event Notification Worksheets Emergency Communications System Telephone Numbers to the NRC Operations Center and Regional Offices EPIPs will contain the following elements.

Change of NRC Operations Center commercial telephone and facsimile numbers.

FILING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT NUMBER REMOVE REV _____

INSERT REV a 2 COMMENTS_____________

5

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP-5 GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 24 Unit 0 NON-QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY:

Frank L Pavlechko (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:

Emerqency Planning APPROVED BY:

Frank L Pavlechko EFFECTIVE DATE: 07/30/2002 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

ii WBN EPIP-5 Revision 24

-REVISION LOG Revision Implementationr Pages D

Number J Date Affected I

Description of Revision CN-1 9/28/95 3,5,11 Revised phone numbers. Editorial (non-intent) changes made. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents.

11 7/5/96 4,5,6,7,8 Phone number and titles revised. Procedure replacement (TI-30) identified. All revisions were evaluated to be non-intent.

12 10/10/96 3,4,5,8,9 The following nori-intent reisions were made: Shift Personnel replaced Shift Clerk to reflect additional personnel trained on the paging system, SM designee identified by title, a phone number was added, assembly and accountability instruction enhanced, a reference was added, and the non QA record instructions were revised.

CN-1 3/27/97 3,5,6 TEMA additional back-up number added, counties changed phone numbers CN-2 2/2/98 3,5,6,7,8 SSP-4.05 was replaced by SPP-3.5. Editorial changes were made.

13 6/30/98 All Non-intent Changes. Incorporated Change Notices 1 and 2. Changed reference SSP 3.4 to SPP 3.1.

14 10/21/99 All Non-intent change. Moved termination step from Appendix A to Appendix C. STD-3.2 reference canceled.

15 02/08/00 All Non-intent change. Revised phone number.

16 6/14/00 All Non Intent change. Revised phone number. Reference number revised.

Added reference to the ODS, direct line for clarification. Added the work actions after notifications in Step 17 for clarification. This revision resolves problem identified in WBN PER, 006394.

17 08/16/00 All Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273,

& 274) readings to correspond with the new TI-RPS-162, "Response of (Pg. 3, 11) the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to Table 2 on the PAR Chart. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER-99 000038-000. This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

18 10/31/00 All Non-Intent change. Revised NRC dedicated phones from FTS-2000 to pg. 6 TVA phone circuits per (RIS) 2000-11 "NRC Emergency Telecommunications Systems".

19 3/30/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:,

Intent change. Re-paginated. Revised phone numbers. Revised initial notification form to standardize within TVAN and meet new NEI PI requirements to the NRC. Revised PAR chart to meet requirements of RTM 96 Vol. 1 Rev. 4. Revised follow-up form to reflect changes in PAR chart.

20 4/25/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following pg. 2, 9 revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-Intent change. Corrected typo.

GENERAL EMERGENCY

EPIP-5 WBN' GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 24 Page 3 of 12.

Revision Implementation Pages Number Date Affected Description of Revision 21 09/25/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the pg.8 following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.

22 01/24/02 All

-Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the pg. 3,5, 6 following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-intent change. Added step to receive ODS confirmation call to TEMA XLocal Counties. This standardizes with other TVAN Units. Per NRC Safeguards Advisory, enhanced caution statement to include Security adversary attack.

23 06/05/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate 3, 5 & 7 the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure'or REP.

Non-intent change(s): added fax number to TEMA.

24 07/30/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate 3, 5, 6, 8 the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP. -.

Intent Change. Revised caution statement on assemlbly and accountability: Added Step 16 on Evacuation of Non Emergency Responders. Added NRC IN 2002-14 to the references.

1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To provide a method for timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager (SM) or Technical Suplport Center (TSC) Site Emergency Director (SED) has determined by WBN EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as a GENERAL EMERGENCY.11 1.2 To provide a method for periodic reanalysis of the current situation by the SED to determine whether the GENERAL EMERGENCY should be terminated orcontinrued.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY, The SED who is initially the SM (or other SM onsite during the emergency) or designee (Unit Supervisor, US) until properly relieved by the TSC SED, has the responsibility and authority for implementation of the actions in this instruction.1'0"1 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 Upon determining that existing conditions are classified as a GENERAL EMERGENCY according to WBN EPIP-1 (independent evaluations by crew members may be beneficial), the'SED,-or designee, will:'1 E0

1.

DIRECT Shift Personnel to activate the Emergency Paging System (EPS) to staff the TSC and Operations Support Center (OSC). Shift Personnel should confirm activation and provide the 20 minute printed report to the SM for review.

NOTE I IF the EPS system fails, call the ODS ringdown or (5-571-1700) and have him activate the EPS.

NOTE 2 IF the above methods of activating the EPS fail, Shift Personnel must use the Radiological Emergency Response Call Lists to staff the TSC and OSC. This list is located in the EPS Manual near the terminal.

0

2.

COMPLETE Appendix A and B, Notification Information.

0

3.

ANNOUNCE to the crew: "A General Emergency is being declared based on I will be the Site Emergency Director, all support and job assignments must be authorized through me."

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY-Revision 24 "Page 5 of 12 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

CAUTION If there is any possibility of a radiological release or security adversary attack, HOLD assembly and accountability actions until these conditions have been resolved.

Do not send personnel into areas of unknown radiological conditions or security risk without first contacting Radiological Control (RADCON) or Security.

o

4.

IF Assembly Alarm has not been activated, NOTIFY Security (CAS) that assembly and accountability is to be conducted.

SOUND the assembly alarm AND INITIATE WBN EPIP-8, "Personnel Accountability and Evacuation".

o

5.

ANNOUNCE to the plant: "ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL.

ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL. A GENERAL EMERGENCY has been declared based on All plant personnel report to assembly areas for accountability. Staff the TSC and OSC." (Repeat)

E0

6.

NOTIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or 5-751-1700 or 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE the information from Appendix A.

IF the ODS cannot be contacted within 10 minutes, then directly notify Rhea County, Meigs County, McMinn County, and the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) of the classification.

Rhea County EMA (Alternate)

Meigs County EMA (Alternate)

McMinn County EMA (Alternate)

Tennessee EMA (Alternate)

(Alternate) 9-775-2505 9-775-7828 9-1-423-334-3211 9-1-423-334-5268 9-1-423-744-2724 9-1-423-744-2721 9-1-800-262-3300 9-1-615-741-0001 9-1-800-262-3400 El

7.

FAX Appendix A to the ODS. (# pre-programmed 6r 5-751-3400)

, or TEMA at 9-1-615-242-9635.

El

8.

CALL RADCON Lab and SAY: "We are in a General Emergency, implement WBN EPIP-14 and CECC EPIP-9."

E0

9.

IF there are personnel injuries,, IMPLEMENT EPIP-IO, "Medical Emergency Response".

__(TIME)

__(TIME)

(TIME)

__(TIME)

^-(TIME)

(TIME)

__(TIME)

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) o 10 IF there is a security threat, IMPLEMENT EPIP-11, "Security and Access Control".

o

11.

NOTIFY'Duty Plant Manager, and PROVIDE the Appendix A information (SEE duty list for telephone numbers). The Duty Plant Manager will call the Plant Manager or his, alternate.

o

12.

EVALUATE the need to implement EPIP-16, "Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies," for a dose projection if radioactivity is being released through normal plant release paths.

o

13. RECEIVE confirmation call from the ODS (to verify notification of the State of Tennessee/local counties.) (NA this step, if the state/counties were contacted directly).

14. NOTIFY the NRC by the NRC designated phone (ENS) of plan activation.

NOTE NRC notification should be made as soon as practicable, but within one hour of "GENERAL EMERGENCY" declaration. Whenever NRC requests, a qualified person must provide a continuous update to NRC Operations Center. The following commercial numbers are for the NRC Operations Center: 3.13 9-1-301-816-5100 (MAIN) 9-1-301-951-0550 (BACKUP) 9-1-301-816-5151 (FAX) 0

15. NOTIFY NRC Resident Inspector by CALLING 1776 and PROVIDING the information on Appendix A.

o 16:

Once Assembly and Accountability has been COMPLETED, review EPIP 8, Appendix G for actions associated with the evacuation of non-emergency responders. IF this action has already been initiated, disregard.

El

17. REEVALUATE conditions using WBN EPIP-1 as necessary. IF conditions are under c-'ontrol, INITIATE actions identified in WBN EPIP-13, "Termination of the Emergency and Recovery."

El IF other plant conditions warrant the need for followup information, COMPLETE the Followup Notification Form, Appendix C, and NOTIFY the TSC/CECC (if it is staffed) or NOTIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or No. 5-751-1700 Or 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE the information.

IF the ODS cannot be contacted Within 10 minutes, the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency is to be notified of the information by calling 9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-615-741-0001 or 9-1-800-262-3400.2

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 24 Page 7 of 12 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

O]

18.

FAX Appendix A to the ODS. (# pre-programmed or 5-751-3400), or TEMA at 9-1-615-242-9635.

Ol

19. ENSURE applicable notifications/actions required by SPP-3.5 and SPP-3.1 have been made.

o

20. SEND the completed WBN EPIP-5 and associated documentation to the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Manager. The EP Manager shall forward documentation to DCRM for storage as appropriate.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Interfacing Documents SPP-3.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements SPP-3.1 Corrective Action Program WBN-EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart WBN-EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-3 Alert WBN-EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-10 Medical Emergency Response WBN-EPIP-1 1 Security and Access Control WBN-EPIP-1 3 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPIP-16 Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies CECC-EPIP-9 Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 24 Page 8 of 12 4.2 Other Documents Response Technical Manual (RTM) 96 Vol. 1, Rev. 4 10 CFR 50.72 Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.

ANSI N18.7-1976 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-14 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection From Radiation EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents Implementation of New EAL Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents CECC-EPIP-8 Dose Assessment Staff Activities During Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergencies 5.0 APPENDICES Appendix A, Notification Information Appendix B, Protective Action Recommendation Guidance Appendix C, Follow-up Information Form 6.0 RECORDS 6.1 Non QA Records All EPIP-5 records generated, when the REP is activated, will be stored by EP Manager for Life of Plant.

All EPIP-5 records generated during the course of a drill/exercise will be assembled by the EP Manager and stored appropriately.

APPENDIX A (Page 1 of 1)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM 1,8 GENERAL EMERGENCY M-THIS IS A REAL EVENT

-' THIS IS A DRILL This is NAME There has been a GENERAL EMERGENCY declared at Watts Bar Nuclear affecting:

0l Unit 1 M Unit2 Event Declared:

-Time:

Date:

EAL Designator (e.g., Fission Product Barrier Matrix):

Brief Description of the Event:

Radiological Conditions:

El No Abnormal Releases Offsite El Airborne Release Offsite El Liquid Release Offsite El Release Information Not Known at this time The following Protective Action Recommendation is provided El Recommendation 1 - Evacuate 2 mile radius and 10 miles downwind and shelter remainder of 10 mile EPZ.

El Recommendation 2 - Evacuate 2 mile radius and 5 miles downwind and shelter remainder of 10 mile EPZ.

Meteorological Conditions are:

Wind Speed: -

m.p.h.

Wind Direction From:

degrees El Ask, "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 24 Page 10 of 12 APPENDIX B

"(Page 1 of 1)

PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION 4.5,6.7,8.9,12 Note 1: If conditions are unknown utilizing the flowchart, then answer NO.

General Emergency D e cIa re d monitorii

Locate ai hot spots.

5 miles is the ProjectedNO or Measured Dose Greater than PAG Table 1 Limits AL p

L A

A L K>;#

C NT UE ASSESSMENT rotective actions based ble plant and field ig information.

id evaluate localized RECOMMENDATION 1 EVACUATE 2 miles radius and 10 miles downwind AND SHELTER remainder of 10 mile EPZ RECOMMENDATION 2 EVACUATE 2 mile radius and 5 miles downwind AND SHELTER remainder of 10 mile EPZ TABLE I Protective Action Guides TYPE LIMIT Measured 3.9E-6 microCi/cc of Iodine 131 or 1 REM/hr External Dose Projected 1 REM TEDE or 5 REM Thyroid CDE CONTII

Modify p on availa A

F 6

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 24 Page 11 of 12 Signature Date Date APPENDIX C (Page 1 of 1)

WBN FOLLOWUP INFORMATION FORM

.GENERAL EMERGENCY

1.

11

'THIS IS A REAL EVENT" or Ef "THIS IS A DRILL."

2.

"This is

-at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

This is followup information regarding the General Emergency at Watts Bar:

Unit 1

[]

Unit 2 El."

3.

"Reactor:

Shutdown El At power 0"

4.

'The Plant conditions are:

Stable

[3 Deteriorating El

5.

"Followup information: (e.g., key events, status chan-ges)

6.

"Evacuation of nonessential site personnel is ongoing: Yes El No El

7.

"The radiological conditions are:

El No Abnormal Release Offsite E3 Liquid Release Offsite 13 Airborne Release Offsite 11 Release Information Not Known."

8.

"Additional Rad information:, (e.g., release duration)

9.

'The meteorological conditions are: Wind speed:

Wind direction from:.

10.

"The following protective action recommendation is provided:"

"El Recommendation 1 "El Recommendation 2

11.

"The event terminated at:

/

Time Date

12.

El "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."

13.

-,, Signature

S~EPIP-5 WBN GENERALSEMERGENCY Revision 24 Page 12 of 12 SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of 2 1 NRC IE Information Notice No. 89-89 2 NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-97 3 NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-28 4 NRC IE Information Notice No. 83-28 5 MC-850321809004, MSc-00956, NCO-920030366 6 NIR-0588, DV-851601F 00001.

7 MC-840827005037, MSC-02402.

8 MC-840827005005, MSC-02376, NCO-920030986 9 MC-840719003003, MSC-00700, NCO-920030221 10 MC-840827005035A, MSC-2400 1 ANSI N18.7-1976 12 390/93-64A 13 NRC Administrative Letter 94-04 Event Notification Worksheets Emergency Communications System Telephone Numbers to the NRC Operations, Center and Regional Offices Criteria For Protective Action Recommendations For General Emergencies Monitor readings included in Logic Diagram for Protective Action Recommendations App. B, Note 3 Include sheltering and immediate Protective Action.

Appendix B_(Page 1 of 1) Recommendation 2 and Note 1 Initiating Conditions.

Revision to Instructional Notes. Appendix B (Page 1 of 1) Notes 1 through 5.

Range of Protective Action Recommendations by the Site Emergency Director. Appendix A (Page 1 of 1) Number 9. Appendix B (Page 1 of 1) Protective Action Recommendation Guidance.

Recommendations 1 through 9.

CNTMT Rad Monitor Levels used in Protective Action Recommendations. Appendix B (Page 1 of 1)

Note 3.

SED duties that can not be delegated. Section 2.0 responsibility. Also~see EPIPs 6 and 15.

EPIPs will contain the following elements.

Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01POI 10 CFR 20 revision made to the PAR chart.

Change of NRC Operations Center commercial telephone and fax numbers.

FILING I DOCUMENT NUMBER INSTRUCTIONS EPIC -K4 REMOVE REX INSERT REV

/J7 COMMENTS_____________

7 161

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-8 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION REVISION 17 PREPARED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko PHONE: # 3232 RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS APPROVED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko EFFECTIVE DATE: 7/30/02 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE VALIDATION DATE: 7/30/02 NON-QUALITY-RELATED

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION EPIP-8 HISTORY OF REVISION/REVIEW Implementation Date 2-29-96 8/16/96 2/15/97 3/27/97 2/2/98 6/30/98 12/08199 02/07/00 06/14/00 12/11/00 09/25/01 Pages Affected 3,11,17, 18, 20, 27,28, 29 3, 4, 6,10 13, 15-18, 20, 22, 23, 25,27, 29 Revision Number 8

9 CN-1 CN-2 Description of Revision Non-intent changes made to offsite assembly areas due to removal or nonutilization of the structures. Construction references revised to MODS. Phone number revisions made.

Non-intent changes made to identify new shift titles, offsite assembly areas, new building titles, and other format changes, to enhance usability.

Non-intent revision. Added step concerning decontamination support from SQN to the SMs check list so that it corresponded "to the Radcon check list. Added owner controlled area ID to the map in Appendix A.

3,10,12,13 TEMA additional back-up number added, counties changed phone numbers.

3,17,18,20, 25,27,28,29 Removed references to MODs Inprocessing Center All Non-intent Changes. Incorporated Change Notices 1, 2, and 3. Phone

revision. Typographical Error corrected.

All Non-intent change. Warehouse phone number revised on page 17.

All Non-intent change. Revised phone number.

All Non Intent change. Revised phone numbers to the MET station and McMinn Co. Revised description location of security portal to include (West) portal. Added TVA Police number to near site organizations.

This revision resolves problems identified in WBN PER, 006394.

All Non Intent changes. Corrected the fax number for the Main Warehouse to use the fax closest to the assembly area. Revised requirements for visitor(s) and MODS personnel to remain in the Protected area during assembly and accountability operations per directions of the EP PEER Team and TVAN requirements for standardization. Removed reference to the all clear alarm which is being eliminated for standardization' purposes.

All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure pg. 6 or REP:

Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per' requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.

K>

REVISION 17 8,12 CN-3 10 11 12 13 14 15 PAGE 2 OF 36

WBN PERSONNEL-ACCOUNTABILITY ANDEEPIP-8 I

t, EVACUATION IE I-HISTORY OF REVISION/REVIEW Revision Implementation Number Date 16 01/24/02 17 07/30/02 Description of Revision Pages Affected All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure pg. 3, 9, 10, or REP:

15,20 Intent revision.'Per guidance provided in the NRC Safeguards advisory revised App. B, C & D to direct SM and Security to hold limited area evacuations or assembly and accountability activities during a Security Event ( adversary attack) or take cover in specific area until the concern is resolved.

Non-intent change. Revised phone number on APP F.

All Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Intent revision.' Per guidance provided by the TVAN EP PEER Team this procedure was re-written in the new standardized methods of operation and format. Enhancements made to instructions for notifications to outside protected area assembly areas and near site facilities per IN 2002-14. This reference was added to the procedure.

PAGE 3 OF 36 REVISION 17

EVACUATION EPIP-8],

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

5 1.1 Purpose..........................................................................................................................................................

5

2.0 REFERENCES

5 2.1 INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS.....

5 2.2 Plant Instructions...........................................................................................................................................

5 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS........................

6 3.1 General Personnel Information...................................................6 A. Entering and Exiting the Plant Protected Area......................................................................................

6 3.2 Activating of the Assembly and Accountability Process..............................................................................

6 "A. Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director................................................................................................

6 3.3 Site Assembly and Accountability.........................................................................................................

7 A. Non-Emergency Responders W ith Assigned Assembly Area..............................................................

7 B. Non-Emergency Responders With No Assigned Assembly Area (Outside the PA)................................

7 C: Emergency Responders.............................................................................................................................

7 D. Emergency Responders having Escort Responsibilities........................................................................

7 E. Visitors.......................................................................................................................................................

7 F. Special Conditions concerning Assembly and Accountability..................................................................

7 G. Shift Manager(SM)/Site Emergency Director(SED)................................................................................

8 H. Nuclear Security (NS)................................................................................................................................

8 I. Radiological Control (RADCON)............................................................................................................

8 3.4 Particular Limited Area Evacuation............................................................................................................

9 3.5 Evacuation of Site Non-Emergency Response Personnel...........................................................................

9 A. Non-Emergency Response Personnel within the Plant Protected Area.................................................

9 B. Non-Emergency Response Personnel within the OCA........................................................................

10 C. Emergency Responders...........................................................................................................................

10 D. Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director..............................................................................................

10 E. Nuclear Security (NS)..............................................................................................................................

11 F. Radiological Control (RADCON).........................................................................................................

11 4.0 DOCUMENTATION......................................................................................................................................

11 5.0 ILLUSTRATIONS/APPENDICES............................................................................................................

11 Appendix A - Protected Area Assembly Areas.........................................................................................

12 Appendix B - Assembly Areas (Outside the Protected Area) Notifications...............................................

13 Appendix C - Near Site Organization(s) Notifications.............................................................................

16 Appendix D - Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director-Assembly and Accountability Actions...................

19 Appendix E - Nuclear Security - Assembly and Accountability Actions...................................................

22 Appendix F - Radiological Control - Assembly and Accountability Actions..............................................

26 Appendix G - Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director - Limited and Site Evacuation Actions.................. 27 Appendix H - Nuclear Security - Evacuation Actions...............................................................................

31 Appendix I - Radiological Control - Evacuation Actions...........................................................................

34 Appendix J - Accountability Roster..........................................................................................................

36 PAGE 4 OF 36 REVISION 17

WeN PERSONNELACCOUNTABILITY AND EPIP-B EVACUATION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose This Procedure provides instructions for accounting for all onsite personnel and visitors prior to an orderly evacuation of a specific area(s) or the site during a radiological or toxic hazard emergency. This Procedure describes the method for notifying all site personnel and gives guidance for re-entry initiation. This Procedure also describes the method for notifying and conducting an orderly evacuation of the near site facilities within the Owner Controlled Area (OCA).

The scope of this procedure includes emergency and non-emergency response personnel, visitors, contractor/construction personnel and other persons who may be within the OCA during an emergency situation.

This procedure will be initiated by way of an emergency classification procedure step (i.e. EPIP-2, 3, 4, and 5). If situations where to exist, where in the judgment of the Shift Manager(SM) / Site Emergency Director (SED) it becomes prudent to initiate the process of Assembly and Accountability and/or Evacuation, this procedure can be entered and initiated via that judgment.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Industry Documents A. NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants B. 10 CFR 50.47, Code of Federal Regulations K>C.

NRC Information Notice 2002-14, Ensuring a Capability to Evacuate Individuals, Including Members of the Public, from the Owner-Controlled Area 2.2 Plant Instructions A. TVA Radiological Emergen.y Plan B

EPIP - 2, Notification of Unusual Event C. EPIP - 3, Alert D. EPIP - 4, Site Area Emergency E. EPIP - 5, General Emergency F.

EPIP - 6, Activation And Operation Of The Technical Support Center (TSC)

G. EPIP - 7, Activation And Operation Of The Operations Support Center (OSC)

H. EPIP - 11, Security and Access Control' I.

EPIP - 13, Termination Of The Emergency And Recovery PAGE 5 OF 36 R

REVISION 17

WBN-PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND E

EVACUATION 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 General Personnel Information A.

Normal Entering and Exiting of the Plant Protected Area (PA).

1.

Individuals entering the plant PA shall:

Swipe their badge into the entry card reader, Enter the PA in accordance with security procedures.

2.

Individuals exiting the PA shall:

"* Swipe their badge into the exit card' reader in the appropriate exit portals.

"* Exit the PA in accordance with security procedures.

3.

Exit card readers function as accountability card readers for personnel exiting the PA.'

4.

Protected Area assembly/Accountability card reader locations are identified in Appendix A.

3.2 Activating the Assembly and Accountability Process A.

Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director

1.

The Shift Manager (SM) or Site Emergency, Director (SED) shall initiate the activation of the assembly and accountability process.

a.

The SM\\SED can delegate a designee to carry out the actions of this process, but can not delegate the decision to activate the process.

2.

Refer to Appendix D for activation.

3.3 Site Assembly and Accountability A three-minute undulating siren (a siren that raises and lowers in volume and pitch, or public address announcements are the general methods for notifying personnel that emergency conditions exists requiring the assembly and accountability of site personnel. Upon recognition that the assembly and accountability process has been activated, all personnel shall begin immediately to take applicable actions.

A.

Non-Emergency Responders With Assigned Assembly Areas

1.

Upon recognition of the assembly and accountability process, non-emergency responders, shall proceed immediately to their designated assembly areas as listed on Appendix A.

2.

Arriving at the assembly area, personnel shall:

a.

Swipe their badge into the accountability card reader (applies only to those assembly areas within the protected area).

b.

Remain in the designated assembly area until released by the (SED) or a plant evacuation is ordered, following the instructions on the plant address system or through Nuclear Security.

REVISION 17 PAGE 6 OF 36

WBN PERSONNEL'ACCOUNTABILITY AND' EPIP-8 EVACUATION 3.3 Site Assembly and Accountability (Continued)

B.

Non-Emergency Responders With No Assigned Assembly Area (outside the PA)

1.

Non-Emergency Responders with no assigned assembly area represent unescorted visitors, contractors/construction personnel, and others persons in public access areas on or passing within the OCA.

2.

Upon recognition of the assembly and accountability process, non-emergency responders with no assigned assembly area, shall proceed immediately to their vehicle and exit the OCA.

C.

Emergency Responders

1.

Upon recognition of the Assembly and Accountability process, emergency responders, shall proceed immediately to their designated

,assembly area(s) as listed on Appendix A.

2.

Arriving at'the designated assembly area, personnel shall:

a.

Swipe their badge into the accountability card reader.

b.

Sign the facility Accountability Roster.

c.

Review their emergency responsibilities and begin work.

d.

If a plant evacuation is ordered, all emergency responders will K

remain in their designated assembly area.

D.

Emergency Responders Having Escort Responsibilities Emergency Responders, will take the applicable steps to have their visitor transferred to a non-emergency responder for relocation to an appropriate assembly area.

E.

Visitors Visitors shall remain with escorts and swipe their badge into the appropriate accountability card reader.

F.

Special Conditions Concerning Assembly and Accountability

1.

If a person cannot reach his designated assembly area within 20 minutes, he should go to the nearest designated area and swipe his badge into the card reader. He should remain in that assembly area.

Review Appendix A for a list of Protected Area (PA) assembly area locations.

2.

If the accountability card reader will not accept a badge or an assembly area cannot be accessed, Nuclear Security should be contacted immediately at ext. 8464 or ext. 8495.

PAGE 7 OF 36 REVISION 17

WPN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION 3.3 Site Assembly and Accountability (Continued)

G.

Shift Manager (SM)/Site Emergency Director (SED)

When conditions have been met that require the-activation of the assembly and accountability process, the SM/SED will implement Appendix D of this procedure.

H.

Nuclear Security (NS)'

When notified that conditions have been met that require the activation of the assembly and accountability process, or upon indications that assembly and accountability has been initiated, Nuclear Security will implement Appendix E of this procedure.

1.

Radiological Control (RADCON)

When notified that entry conditions have been met that require the activation of the assembly and accountability process, or upon indication that assembly and accountability has been initiated, Radiological Control will implement Appendix F of this procedure.

REVISION 17 PAGE 8 OF 36

WBN PERSONNEL'ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION EPP 3.4 Particular Limited Area Evacuation K..7 Plant conditions require Operations to evacuate or request through the TSC the evacuation of a particular plant area(s).

A.

The SM/SED or designee shall make a public address (PA) announcement and follow the instructions in Appendix G.

B.

Personnel in the affected area(s), upon hearing the public address announcement or being notified of the particular area evacuation by any means shall do the following:,

1. If working in a contaminated zone, exit the zone in accordance with Radiological Control (RADCON) procedures, unless instructed otherwise by RADCON.

2. Exit the affected area in an orderly manner.

C.

Personnel not in the affected area(s), should continue assigned tasks if not instructed otherwise and should not enter the affected area(s) until the "All Clear" has been announced or directed through emergency response processes.

3.5 Evacuation of Site Non-Emergency Response Personnel A site evacuation will be conducted upon an order issued by the SM/SED.

This Order will be issued to the TSC Nuclear Security Manager or the Nuclear Security Shift Supervisor or their designee, following the completion of Assembly and Accountability.

A.

Non-Emergency Responders Within thePlant Protected Area.

1..

All personnel assembled in designated assembly areas within the protected area shall 'remain in those areas until released for the purpose

.of evacuation. Visitors shall remain -with escorts until they have exited the protected area.

2.

The TSC or NS will by public address announcement(s) or dispatching Security personnel, brief and release persons in assembly areas.

3.

Once released, personnel shall go immediately to the protected area exit portal. Personnel shall swipe their badge into the exit card reader or as instructed by NS. The protected area shall be exited in accordance with security procedures unless otherwise instructed.

a.

If for any reason personnel can not go directly to their designated Protected Area exit portal, NS should be contacted immediately.

b.

If for any reason the exit card reader will not properly acknowledge a badge, NS should be contacted immediately.

PAGE 9 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION EPIP 3.5 Evacuation of Non-Emergency Response Personnel (continued) 4.-

Personnel shall proceed to their vehicle and evacuate from the site to their place of residence or if needed to one of the remote assembly area(a), following all briefing information provided to them by the TSC or NS. Exit routes leading away from the plant will be identified.

5.

All personnel evacuating should anticipate that the Owner Controlled Area (OCA) Security Check Point will be established and if conditions require, RADCON will be monitoring vehicles and personnel as they exit.

6.

Upon exiting the OCA, personnel shall follow all guidance of state and local authorities.

B.

Non-Emergency Responders Within the OCA

1.

All personnel assembled in designated assembly areas outside the PA and within the OCA shall remain in those areas until released for the purpose of evacuation.

2.

NS will notify by phone or dispatch security personnel directly to OCA Assembly Areas, brief and release assembled personnel.

3.

Once released personnel shall proceed to their vehicle and evacuate from the site to their place of residence or if needed to one of the remote assembly area(s), following all briefing information provided to them by NS. Exit routes leading away from the plant will be identified.

If for any reason personnel can not proceed directly to their vehicle ari.j evacuate the site NS shall be contacted immediately.

4.

All personnel exiting.the site Protected Area should anticipate that OCA Security Check Point will be established and if conditions require, RADCON will be monitoring vehicles and personnel as they exit.

5.

Upon exiting the OCA, personnel shall follow all guidance of state and local authorities.

C.

Emergency Responders Emergency Responders shall remain in Emergency Centers and shall not evacuate from the site.

D.

Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director When conditions have been met that require an order to evacuate non-emergency response personnel, the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director will implement Appendix G of this procedure.

PAGE 10 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONVN ELACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION EPIP-3.5 Evacuatio'";of Non-Emergency Responsie Personnel (continued)

E.

Nuclear Security (NS)

When notified that an order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel has been issued by the SM/SED, Nuclear Security will implement Appendix B, C, & H of this procedure.

F.

Radiological Control (RADCON)

When notified that an order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel has been issued by-the SM/SED, Radiological Control will implement Appendix I of this procedure.

4.0 DOCUMENTATION Non-QA Records Checklist(s), Logs, and Security Computer Roll Call List of accountability operations, will be sent to the WBN Emergency Planning Manager and stored appropriately.

5.0 ILLUSTRATIONS /APPENDICES Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix A

B C

D E

F G

H J

Protected Area Assembly Areas Assembly Areas (Outside the Protected Area) Notifications Near site Organization(s) Notifications.

Shift Manager/Site Emergency' Director -Assembly and Accountability Actions Nuclear Security - Assembly and Accountability Actions Radiological Control - Assembly and Accountability Actions Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director - Limited Area &'Site Evacuation Actions Nuclear Security - Evacuation Actions Radiological Control - Evacuation Actions Accountability Roster PAGE 11 OF 36 REVISION 17

WoN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND I

EVACUATION.

APPENDIX A Page 1 of-1 PROTECTED AREA ASSEMBLY AREAS El. 713' Mechanical Maintenance Shop Mechanical Maintenance personnel El. 713' Chem Lab Chemistry Laboratory personnel El. 713' RADCON Lab RADCON personnel, AUOs, OSC responders, Fire Operators/others El. 729' Electrical Maintenance Shop Electrical Maintenance personnel El. 729' Instrument Maintenance Shop Instrument Maintenance personnel El. 729' MOB Maintenance Engineering Maintenance Planning/Engineering/others Support Office El. 741' Ops. Procedures Office Procedure Writers/NRC Office/others El. 755' Technical Support Center (TSC)

TSC emergency responders El. 755' Main Control Room' Control Room and Operations personnel Plant Assembly Room Main Office Building occupants/others EQB, Vending Area EQB and MDB Occupants, MODS personnel/others PAGE 12 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL 'ACCOUNTABILITY AND E

I I wB.

IEPIP-8 1

EVACUATION APPENDIX B K

(Page 1 of 3)

ASSEMBLY AREA(S)

(OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA) NOTIFICATIONS Nuclear Security (NS) will provide the information "'from this' appendix to all assembly areas outside the protected area (listed below) as it becomes available or as directed by the

,SMISED or TSC Security Manager.

Initial contact should be by phone with Fax message used for follow-up.

"* Should phone contact not be made, (i.e. off-hours / weekends / phone trouble) direct the outside OCA Security Motor Patrol to check the area(s) for personnel and provide information as needed.

"* After evacuation orders have been initiated, the OCA Security Motor Patrol will ensure all non essential personnel have left the area(s).

WBN Training Center Mgr. Office (cafeteria)

x3758, x1216, or x8962 x3797 Administration Building Vending Area, Office Area(s) x8767 x1 924 Conference Room(s) or x8768 Main Warehouse Conference Room Area x1 436 x3233 PAGE 13 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION I EPIP-81 APPENDIX B (continued)

(Page 2 of 3)

Time:

Date:

ASSEMBLY AREAS (OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA)

NOTIFICATIONS, A.

'This is a REAL EMERGENCY."

0l OR

'This is a DRILL."

D

'This is a REAL EMERGENCY."

'This is a DRILL."

B.

WBN has declared a emergency.

(enter emergency classification.)

C.

Radiological conditions are:

No release El Release Ongoing 0'

D.

Please convey the following instructions to all people in your assembly area(s).

"* Stay indoors 0

"* Close off HVAC Systems l

"* Check out doors or in adjacent buildings and direct all personnel to the Assembly Area to await instructions.

"* Follow general instructions for the assembly area.

U E.

Additional instructions are as follows:

Return to work D

Remain in assembly area U

Additional instructions/information:

F.

Site Evacuation has been ordered by the SED.

0 YES 0l NO G.

Remain calm and exit the site by your normal route unless otherwise directed.

E-YES El NO H.

You will be informed when it is safe to return to work.

El

WBN Training Center Main Warehouse

Administration Building PAGE 14 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL'ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION....

APPENDIX B (continued)

Kj (Page 3 of 3)

ASSEMBLY AREAS (OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA)

NOTIFICATIONS "FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY" ASSEMBLY AREA - GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA)

1)

START ASSEMBLING PERSONNEL 11

2)

CLOSE ALL DOORS AND WINDOWS 0I

3)

SHUT DOWN VENTILATION SYSTEM LI

4)

NO EATING, DRINKING OR SMOKING 11

5)

CALL IN PEOPLE FROM OUTSIDE LOCATIONS OR SURROUNDING BUILDINGS TO THE ASSEMBLY AREA

[]

6)

KEEP PAGE SYSTEM AND PHONES CLEAR FOR USE DURING THE EMERGENCY El

7)

LISTEN FOR INSTRUCTIONS El

8)

IF EVACUATION OF SITE IS DIRECTED, LEAVE IN A SAFE AND ORDERLY MANNER BY THE MAIN ACCESS ROUTE/_____

(ALTERNATE ROUTE)

PAGE 15 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND' EVACUATION EPIP-8 APPENDIX C (Page 1 of 3)

NEAR SITE ORGANIZATION(S)

NOTIFICATIONS Nuclear Security (NS) will provide the following information to the near site organizations listed below when directed by the SM/SED or TSC Security Manager.

RADCON will provide technicians to monitor personnel (if necessary).

"* These contacts should be made by phone with Fax Message for follow-up.

" Should phone contact not be made, (i.e. off-hours/weekends/phone trouble) direct the OCA Security Motor Patrol to check the area for personnel and provide information as needed.

" After evacuation orders have been initiated, the OCA Security Motor Patrol will ensure all non essential personnel have left the area(s).

i.. )iiii~iiii~ ii~~i~iii!;

H E )'¢ i~i~iiiiiiii,ii! iiiiiiiiiiiiF ii# ;i..

i~iii~ii~l WBN Weapons Range 9-365-1400 NA WBN Grounds Maintenance 9-365-3334 NA' WBN Facilities Trailer(s) 9-365-1 890 or 1895 9-365-1710 Watts Bar Dam (Hydro) 9-365-7600 or 6300' 9-365-7640 TVA Police/TVA TPS Building 9-365-3776 or 3778 or 1965 9-365-3873 or 8450 Watts Bar Maintenance Facility 9-365-8720 or 8722 or 7849 9-365-8709 WBN Environmental Data Station 9-365-8484 NA (not normally manned)_

Reservoir Property (Maintenance Base) 9-365-5256 9-365-7628 Lock Master (Watts Bar) 9-365-7634 or 9-1-423-334-4521 9-1-423-334-3522 Watts Bar Dam Spill Way fishing Area

NO PHONE IN THIS AREA NA OCA SECURITY MOTOR PATROL OR TVA POLICE SHALL NOTIFY PEOPLE TO LEAVE THE AREA.

REVISION 17 PAGE 16 OF 36

WBN PERSON NEL-ACCOU NTABILITY AND EP EVACUATIONEPP 8

Time APPENDIX C (continued)

Date _

(Page 2 of 3)

NEAR SITE ORGANIZATION(S)

NOTIFICATIONS A.

'This is a REAL EMERGENCY."

Li OR

'This is a DRILL."

D "This is a REAL EMERGENCY."

'This is a DRILL."

B.

WBN has declared a _

emergency.

(enter emergency classification.)

C.

Radiological conditions are:

No release Li Release Ongoing Li D.

Please convey the following information to all people at your location.

Stay indoors D

Close off HVAC Systems Li Check outdoors or in adjacent buildings and direct all personnel to Li an assembly area to await instructions.

E. Additional instructions/information:___

WBN Site evacuation has been ordered by the Site Emergency Director.

LYES L NO F.

Remain calm and initiate an evacuation of your organization unless otherwise directed.

Li YES EL oO G.

You will be informed when it is safe to return to work.

L

"* Watts Bar Dam (Hydro)

Reservoir Property (Maintenance Base)

"* WBN Weapons Range WBN Grounds Maintenance

"* Watts Bar Maintenance Facility WBN Environmental Data Station

Lock Master (Watts Bar)

TVA POLICE/TVA TPS Building

WBN Facilities Trailer(s)

PAGE 17 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION APPENDIX C (continued)

(Page 3 of 3)

NEAR SITE ORGANIZATION(S)

"NOTIFICATIONS "FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY" GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (NEARSITE ORGANIZATIONS)

1)

START ASSEMBLING PERSONNEL U

2)

CLOSE ALL DOORS AND WINDOWS U

3)

SHUT DOWN VENTILATION SYSTEM U

4)

NO EATING, DRINKING OR SMOKING El

5)

CALL IN PEOPLE FROM OUTSIDE LOCATIONS OR SURROUNDING BUILDINGS TO A ASSEMBLY AREA U

6)

KEEP PAGE SYSTEM AND PHONES CLEAR FOR USE DURING THE EMERGENCY El

7)

LISTEN FOR INSTRUCTIONS U

8)

IF EVACUATION OF SITE IS DIRECTED, LEAVE IN A SAFE AND.

ORDERLY MANNER BY THE MAIN ACCESS ROUTE/

(altemate route)

PAGE 18 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL-ACCOUNTABILITY-AND EPIP-8 ]

EVACUATION APPENDIX D K,

Page 1-of 3 HSEMERGENCYDIRECTOR:" ASSEMBLY ANDACCOUNTABILIT*Y.... i, SHIFT.. MA A ERST EM RG NC AC.N x

The following appendix shall be utilized by the Shift Manager(SM)/Site Emereneiby Director(SED) or designee for the purpose of conducting site assembly and accountability actions.

Note.

IF onsite activities (i.e. Security Event "Adversary Attack") would put people at risk or in Harms way, Do Not conduct this action until the concern is resolved.

NOTIFY site personnel to "Take Cover/Specific Action and await further instructions".

IF this situation does not apply proceed with Assembly and Accountability.

1.

The SM/SED has determined that conditions require the activation of the assembly and accountability siren system and process:

2.

NOTIFY... Nuclear Security (NS) at ext. 8464 or 8495 that:

A.

The assembly and accountability sirens will be activated immediately.

AND B.

NS should implement EPIP-8, Appendix E.

3.

NOTIFY... Radiological Control (RADCON) at ext. 7865 that:

A.

The assembly and accountability sirens will be activated immediately.

AND B.

RADCON should implement EPIP-8,,Appendix F.

Initials Time

4.

MAKE... a public address announcement similar to:

"Attention all plant personnel, the' site assembly and accountability process has been initiated. All personnel report immediately to your assigned assembly areas.",

(REPEAT)

I

5.

ACTIVATE... the assembly and accountability sirens.

PAGE 19 OF 36 Initials Time REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITYAND EVACUATION EPIP APPENDIX D Page2of3 SHIFr MANAGER/SITE-EMERGENC.Y DIRECTOR'- ASSEMBIY '*ANDI ACCOUNTABILTYATOS

6.

WHEN... the Assembly and'Accountability Sirens have completed the 3-minute cycle and silenced.

MAKE... a PA announcement similar to:

"Attention all plant personnel, the site assembly and accountability process has been initiated. All personnel report immediately to your assigned assembly areas and be accounted for.

(REPEAT)

NOTE If at any time during the assembly and accountability process RADCON determines that radiation guidelines for an assembly area(s) have been exceeded, request NS to re-locate affected personnel to another assembly area or evacuate affected personnel off-site.

7.

NOTIFY... Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) Director r

either by the direct ring-down telephone in the TSC or at ext. 751-1614.

,2 OR If the CECC Director can not be reached, notify the Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at ext.

751-1700 that:

A.

The assembly and accountability sirens have been activated.

AND B.

WBN EPIP-8 is currently being implemented for assembly and accountability.

8.

WHEN... Notified by NS that the assembly and accountability process has been completed.

THEN... MAKE a, public'address announcement similar to:

"Attention all plant personnel, the site assembly and accountability process has been completed. All personnel remain in your assigned assembly areas and await further instructions.

(REPEAT)

REVISION 17 PAGE 20 OF 36

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND E PI P -8 EVACUATION APPENDIXD Page 3 of 3 SHIFT.MANAGERtSiTE"*EMERGE.NC.Y, DIRECTOR - ASSEMBLY AND":

SHIFT M-NAGERI, ERG.ACCOUNTABIUTCYý ACTIONS

9. VERIFY if conditions at this time require an order to evacuate all Initials Time non-emergency response personnel from the Owner Controlled Area(OCA).

10.

IF...

Conditions at this time, DO requiire.an order to evacuate.

I all non-emergency response personnel from the OCA.

THEN... Initiate Appendix G of this procedure.

11.

IF...

Conditions at this time, DO NOT require an order to L"

evacuate all non-emergency response personnel from the OCA.

THEN Exit this procedure. Re-enter this procedure at Appendix G when it has been determined by the SM/SED that conditions require an order to evacuate all non-emergency response peirsonnel.

PAGE 21 OF 36 REVISION 17

wBN-PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND I E EVACUATION EPIP-8 APPENDIX E Page 1 of 4

,...NUCLEARSECURITY.-...ASSEMBLY ANU ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS The following appendix shall be utilized by'the TSC Security Manager or if unavailable the Security Shift Supervisor or designee for the purpose of conducting Site Assembly and Accountability actions.

NOTE:

IF a Security Event (i.e. adversary attack) would put people at risk or in Harms way NOTIFY the SM\\SED prior to'commencing assembly and accountability.

IF this does not apply, proceed with accountability operations.

1.

Notified that activation of the assembly and accountability process and

\\

actions has been initiated by the SM/SED or designee.

Initials Time

2.

CONTROL and RESTRICT access to the Protected Area, except for those individuals designated for emergency response, per the Emergency Response Organization Call List or as authorized for emergency response by the SM/SED or TSC Security Manager or OSC Security Advisor.

3.

MAINTAIN Owner Controlled Area (OCA) traffic controls at the OCA I-traffic control point.

4.

NOTIFY... the TSC or RADCON at ext.7865 that, OCA traffic control EI actions are being maintained.

AND REQUEST... TSC or RADCON dispatch personnel to the OCA Emergency Survey Point #15 (if determined by RADCON) that survey conditions requiring vehicle survey, exist.

5.

CONTROL and RESTRICT access to the Owner Controlled Area, II except for those individuals designated for emergency response, per the Emergency Response Organization Call List or as authorized for emergency response by the SM/SED or TSC Security Manager or OSC Security Advisor.

6.

COMPLETE (Appendices B and C) and upon direction from the TSC Security Manager or SM/SED, initiate the calls and Fax the information to the designated locations.

REVISION 17 PAGE 22 OF 36

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND -

P1P-8 EVACUATION'

o.

K APPENDIX E Page 2 of 4 i*N UCLEAR SECURiTY -.ASSEM°BLy AND ACCOUNT.ABILITY ACTIONS.:*:

7.

DISPATCH officer(s) to search areas (as needed) within the OCA outside the Protected Area (see Appendix B & C)..

A.

IF...Visitors, contractors/construction personnel, and other persons in public access areas on or passing within the OCA and not assigned a designated assembly area(s);

THEN... NS will:

Warn and advise individuals of current actions at the station.

Advise individuals on exits routes and request that they immediately exit the OCA.

B.

IF... Visitors, contractors/construction'personnel, and other persons in public access areas on or passing within the OCA are assigned a designated assembly area(s);

THEN... NS will:

Warn and advise individuals of current actions to conduct assembly and accountability.

Advise personnel to report immediately to their designated emergency assembly center.

C.

IF... Employees having emergency response assignments are located THEN.... NS will:,

Warn and advise individuals of current actions to conduct assembly and accountability, Advise personnel to report immediately to their

-designated emergency response center.

D.

IF... Employees not having emergency response assignments EI are located THEN... NS will:

Warn and advise individuals of current actions to conduct assembly and accountability.

Advise personnel to report immediately to a designated assembly area location outside the Protected Area. (See Appendix B and C).

REPORT the results of accountability to the SM/SED within 30 minutes after the assembly and accountability sirens have sounded.

t PAGE 23 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND E I EVACUATION EPIP APPENDIX E Page 3 of 4 NULEEAR SECURIMT

ý ASEMBLY AND ACCUNTABITYACTIONS

9.

UNACCOUNTED FOR INDIVIDUALS r

IF...

Individuals remain unaccounted for, (45) minutes following the activation of the assembly and accountability sirens, THEN... NOTIFY the TSC Security Manager or SM/SED that search teams will be needed to locate the missing individual(s),

AND RADCON will assist search teams (as needed).

10.

TWO PERSON (LINE OF SIGHT) RULE PUBLIC ADDRESS ANNOUNCEMENT El A.

WHEN...Assembly and Accountability has been completed, AND NS has determined that the Two Person (Line of Sight)

Rule is required.

THEN... REQUEST permission from the TSC Security Manager or SM/SED to make the following Public Address Announcement:

Initials Ti-m-e "ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL, THIS IS A SECURITY ALERT ACTION.

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THE TWO MAN RULE HAS BEEN ORDERED."

"ENTRY TO VITAL AREAS NOW REQUIRES CONTINOUS LINE OF SIGHT BETWEEN TWO (2) PERSONNEL."

(REPEAT)

PAGE 24 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN, PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND E PI P-8 I

~

~EVACUATION _IE P8 APPENDIX E Page 4 of 4

[NUCLEAR SECURITY,` --ASSEMBLY.AND ACCOUNTABIUT-.ACTIONS

11.

AUTOMATED ACCOUNTABILITY, SYSTEM FAILURE GUIDELINES In the event the automated accountability system is unable to accomplish its designed function, NS will recommend the following methods to account for onsite personnel to the SM or TSC SED for action.

A.

NOTIFY personnel in the Assembly Area(s) (within the Protected Area) to remain where they.are until the Accountability System can be reactivated.

B.

IF plant conditions require immediate action (i.e., danger to' health or safety), the SED will order all nonessential onsite personnel to exit the protected area and report to the Watts Bar Training Center. Once all nonessential personnel have left the protected'area, a verbal review of the remaining onsite emergency responders will be conducted.

C.

Walk-downs within the protected area will be conducted to ensure all non-essential personnel have left the plant. These actions and search and rescue efforts (if needed) will be coordinated by the TSC Security Manager or SM/SED.

PAGE 25 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY EPIP-8 IEVACUATION EPPI APPENDIX F Pagelofl ii~ii!*ii;!~i:i~~i~i: RADIO LOGICAL CONTROL - ASSEMBLY: AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONSiiiii*iii!!:*ll: il The following Appendix shall be utilized by the TSC Radiological Control Manager or if he is unavailable te Radiological Control Shift Supervisor or designee, for the purpose of conducting a site assembly and accountability actions.

1.

Notified that activation of the assembly and accountability process and actions has been initiated by the SM/SED or designee.-

In-tials Ti 'me

2.

IF... in plant Radiological conditions require additional monitoring,

[

THEN... ESTABLISH a survey routine for all assembly areas, including the Emergency Centers.

3.

IF... Radiological conditions in any assembly area(s) meet or exceed I

the listed guidelines

"* Radiation levels that would result in a radiation dose of 100 mrem in one hour, or

"* airborne radioactivity above 10CFR'20.1201 DAC limits.

THEN... NOTIFY the SM/SED and recommend that the personnel within the affected area be re-located to another assembly area or evacuated from the site.

4.

WHEN... Notified by Nuclear Security that Owner Controlled Area TCP is being maintained.

Initials T i'me THEN... EVALUATE radiological conditions to determine if a RADCON survey checkpoint at the OCA (Emergency Survey Point # 15) should be established.

5.

IF... Radiological conditions require that a RADCON survey

-I checkpoint be established, THEN... DISPATCH RADCON personnel to the OCA (Emergency Survey Point # 15).

AND ESTABLISH a RADCON survey checkpoint.

6.

RADCON personnel will be dispatched by the OSC or SM/SED to i

assist Protected Area search teams (as needed).

REVISION 17 PAGE 26 OF 36

EVACUATION EPIP-8 APPENDIX G Page 1 of4 SHIFT MNAG ERISITE EMERGENCY* DIRECTOR Lm ted: AREA.

.-EVACUAT!ON.AKE.

COVER ACTIONS A.

MAKE a Public Address (PA) announcement similar to the following LI "This is a real emergency." [--

OR

'This-is'a drill." lI "ATTENTION All Site Personnel, conditions in the (area[s] to be evacuated) warrant an evacuation of the area. Leave the (area[s] to be evacuated) immediately and remain clear until further notice."

OR "ATTENTION All Site Personnel, conditions in (area[s] of concern) warrant you to take cover in this area. Take Cover in the (area[s] of concern) immediately and remain there until further notice."

B.

IF necessary, FORM a team composed of Operations and I

Radiological Control (RADCON) personnel to ensure evacuation of high noise areas.

C.

DIRECT Operations/RADCON /Others to SEARCH the F1 evacuated area to ensure all personnel have left the area.

D.

REPORT results to the TSC (if activated).

[I E.

INFORM NS of the situation and direct assistance as needed.

I F.

PERFORM other duties as needed.

El PAGE 27 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION "

EPIP-8 APPENDIX G Page 2 of 4 SHIFT,. MANAGER/SITE'EMERGENCY DIRECTORITE EVACUATION ACTIONS The following appendix shall be utilized by the Shift Manager(SM)/Site Emergency Director(SED) or designee for the purpose of conducting a evacuation of site non-emergency response personnel.

1.

Conditions have been met that require an order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel.

2.

Assembly and accountability has been completed.

3.

NOTIFY the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) Director of the impending evacuation. (5-751-1614) (IF not staffed, NOTIFY the Operations Duty Specialist, 5-751-1700)

4.

CONSIDER first the precautionary evacuation of all non-essential personnel (outside the Protected Area) from the site. These personnel will be assembled in their designated assembly areas. '(Appendix B and C)

Once completed, non-essential personnel within the Protected Area can be evacuated (Appendix A).

5.

PROVIDE any special instructions to assembly area(s) through PA announcements, Emergency Dispatches or NS communications.

Coordination with RADCON may be necessary prior to these announcements.

6.

NOTIFY... Nuclear Security (NS) at ext. 8464 or 8495 that:

A.

An order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel has been issued.

AND B.

NS Should implement EPIP-8, Appendix H.

7.

NOTIFY... Radiological Control at ext.7865 that:

A.

An order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel has been issued, AND B.

RADCON should implement EPIP-8, Appendix I.

PAGE 28 OF 36 Initials Time E]

El El REVISION 17 Note 1: The implementation of a site evacuation should be based on the protective actions which will result in the lowest personal exposure. In a radiological or hazardous material emergency, evacuation should be initiated either before or after the passage of the'release. Evacuation routes should be chosen to lead personnel away from the path of the plume or danger.

Note 2: Based on ongoing emergency activities in the local communities (if activated) discussions with the CECC, Meigs, Rhea, and McMinn Counties, EOC officials may be warranted to identify traffic conditions, road weather conditions, or any other hazards that would effect evacuation.

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EPI P-8 EVACUATION' APPENDIX G K>'

Page 3 of 4 Iý*SHIFT MANAGERISITE EMERGENCY DIRECTORý-ý SITE EVACUATION ACTIONS 8.- -

IN the event of a total plant EVACUATION, determine the need E

for non-essential personnel, and vehicles to pass through a RADCON check point (if deemed necessary) prior to being released from the site.

This point will be set up at Emergency Survey Point # 15

9.

EVACUATION of onsite non-contaminated individuals should take place along normal exit routes away from the site, conditions permitting.

10.

DIRECT NS to provide appropriate personnel to direct traffic on to Route 68.

EI IF plant conditions preclude radiological decontamination, evacuees will be informed of transportation, sheltering, and decontamination arrangements prior to leaving the site. The primary evacuation shelter for onsite "contaminated personnel will be Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), approximately 50 miles south of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN).

11.

IF conditions warrant Support personnel can be sent home or

-I directed/staged to other offsite locations (if necessary). Two possible locations are:

1) Englewood Elementary School - if directing personnel to this school, notify McMinn Co. EMA (day hours, Monday - Friday) at 9-1-423-744-2760/2724;or McMinn Co. 911 Communications (off hour, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ), at 9-1-423-744-2721. Also notify the Tennessee EMA at 9-1-615-741-0001.

2) Roane County High School - if directing personnel to this school, notify

-1 the Roane Co. 911 Dispatch Center at 9-1-865-354-8045 and request Roane Co. EMA be notified., Also notify the Tennessee EMA at 9-1 615-741-0001.

12.

ANNOUNCE Site Evacuation with the following message.

-I REPEAT as needed.

"ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL. ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL. The SED has ordered a site evacuation. All personnel except those with emergency assignments shall exit via your normal entrance and exit location to their home(s) I -

until further notice."

13.

IF an evacuation is ordered, DIRECT Nuclear Security (NS) to notify the Assembly Areas Outside the Protected Area (Appendix B) and the Near site organizations,(Appendix C)of ongoing site actions.

14.

IF site personnel require transportation or sheltering cbordinate arrangements for assistance with the TSC/CECC.

E]

15. ? Conditions permitting, you may recall evacuated people as needed.

I

16.

KEEP the CECC informed of site activities FI PAGE 29 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN I

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION EPIP-8 APPENDIX G (continued)

(Page4 of 4)

- MAP*To ROANE COUNTY HIGH SCHOOLAND ENGLEWOOD ELEMENTARY SCHOOL'--':,

From WBN, take route 68 west to route 27 north.

Follow 27 north and go through the. city of Rockwood. At the 6th traffic light (last light) the road Y's to the right. The road to the right is route

70.

Follow route 70 for 12 miles, to Kingston.

Cross the Clinch River bridge -' and go approximately one mile and you will see Roane County High School on the left.

From WBN, follow 68 east to route 58 south.

Follow 58 south to Decatur. At the traffic light next to the County Court House make a left on to route 30 east. Follow 30 east (10 miles) and go through Athens. Turn left onto route 39 east to Englewood.

Follov 39 to Englewood, cross over railroad tracks and go past the first red light; you will see the Englewood Elementary School one block up on the left.

REVISION 17 PAGE 30 OF 36

WB N PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY-ANDE IP T

EVACUATION APPENDIX H Page 1 of 3

.A.....

.NC E R C RT

.EA U TO ACTON The following appendix shall be utilized by the TSC Security Manager or if unavailable the Security Shift Supervisor or designee for the purpose of conducting a evacuation of site non-emergency response personnel.

1.

Notified that an order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel has been initiated by the SM /SED.

Initials Time

2.

CONTINUE to control and restrict access to the Plant Protected Area E

(PA), except for those individuals designated for emergency response, per the Emergency Response Organization Call List or-as authorized for emergency response by the TSC Security Manager, OSC Security Advisor or SM/SED.

3.

CONTINUE to maintain OCA on-site traffic controls.

0

4.

CONTINUE to control and restrict access to the Owner Controlled El (OCA) Area, except for those individuals designated for emergency response, per the Emergency'Response Organization Call List or as authorized for emergency response by the TSC Security Manager, OSC Security Advisor or SM/SED.

5.

NOTIFY... RADCON at ext. 7865 that, OCA on-site traffic control L

actions are in progress, AND REQUEST RADCON dispatch personnel to the Owner Controlled Area Traffic Control point (if determined by RADCON) that conditions requiring vehicle survey(s) exist.

6.

EVALUATE evacuation route:

="

Initials Time A.

Consult with RADCON information concerning off-site environmental radiological hazards (potential plume pathways).

B.

Consider local weather information to determine if hazardous weather conditions exist.

C.

Consider, all information concerning terrorist activity within a 10 mile radius of the site.

PAGE 31 OF 36 RREVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITYAND EPIP-8 EVACUATION,*E I

APPENDIX H "Page 2 of 3

.*.*:-NUCLEAR.

SECURITY.....:.

EATIO EVACUATION ACTIONS q.........

!..*!*!!i:*i*-

7.

DETERMINE evacuation route based upo0n information obtained in step (6) of this appendix:

8.

VERIFY that all prior listed items-are complete before continuing in this r

action list.

NOTE Brief and advise all individuals in Assembl' Areas Outside the Protected Area and Near Site Organizations areas (Appendix B & C) of:

"* Current actions to conduct an evacuation of all non-emergency response personnel, AND Recommended exits routes, directing all personnel to follow the instructions of local law enforcement officers upon leaving the Owner Controlled Area (OCA).

9.

DISPATCH Security personnel to assist (as needed) and verify in the site evacuation.

Initials Tim CONSIDER first the precautionary evacuation of all non-essential personnel (outside the Protected Area) from the site. These personnel will be assembled in their designated near site assembly areas.-(Appendix B & C)

Once completed, non-essential personnel within the Protected Area can be evacuated (Appendix A)..

10.

NOTIFY the TSC Security Manager or SM/SED upon completion of evacuation of site non-essential personnel.

Initials Time REVISION 17 PAGE 32 OF 36

2 II wBN PERSONNE.L CATOACCOUNTABILITY ANDEPI WBNEVACUATION EPIP8 APPENDIX H (Page 3 of 3)

.}PROTECTED ItTE PER!METER/OWERCONTROLL.ED AREA. MAP PAGE 33 OF 36 REVISION 17

WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND

__[E I

EVACUATION E8 APPENDIX I Page of2 2i RADIOLOGIC~t CONTROL EVACUATION ACTIONS.

The following appendix shall be utilized by the TSC Radiological Control Manager, or if he is unavailable, the Radiological Control Shift Supervisor or designee, for the purpose of conducting a site evacuation.

1.

Notified of order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel has been initiated by the SM /SED.

2.

IF... a radiological survey checkpoint is needed and has not been established at the Owner Controlled Area (OCA), then:

DISPATCH RADCON personnel to the OCA Emergency Survey Point # 15.

AND ESTABLISH a RADCON survey checkpoint.

3.

IF... Radiological concerns merit the spraying down of vehicles prior to site exiting. Notify the TSC or SM/SED to have the Fire Truck dispatched to this location. Hydrant # 0 HYD 026-3108 is near the emergency survey point and adequate water run-off to drainage is available

4.

IF-plant conditions preclude radiological decontamination, evacuees will be informed of transportation, sheltering, and decontamination

.arrangements prior to leaving the site. The primary evacuation shelter for onsite contaminated personnel will be Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN),

approximately 50 miles south of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN).

RADCON personnel from the plant site, SQN, and CECC will respond to SQN to support personnel decontamination activities if there is a need.

Initials Time

-1E Initials Time REVISION 17 PAGE 34 OF 36

WBN, PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND E

EVACUATION E I APPENDIX I (Page 2 of 2)

RADCON ASSEMBLYIACCOUNTABILITYIEVACUATION GUIDELINES DIRECTIONS TO (SQN) SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT SE6UOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT PAGE 35 OF 36 CHA RLESTON REVISION 17

W EVACUATION EPIP-81 APPENDIX J Page 1 of 1 ACCOUNTA LIY

i.

Date:

Facility:

Km REVISION 17 SSN Name (Last, First MI) t I

t i

i A

i i

PAGE 36 OF 36

FILING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT NUMBER fPf/D-1/

REMOVE REVISION INSERT REVISION

/M)

Comments Fileinstr.doc ZýP-7ýp

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING

-PROCEDURES EPIP-11 SECURITY AND ACCESS CONTROL Revision 10 Unit 0 NON-QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY:

F. L Pavlechko (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:

Emergengy Planning APPROVED BY:

Frank L Pavlechko EFFECTIVE DATE: 07/30/02 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

I I

REVISION DEscRIPTION:

Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date -

Affected' 5

2/15/97 3, 5, 6, 7, Editorial non-intent revisions made. SOS revised to SM.

8,11 Records section added. Information note added to Security in Section 3.3. Contingency(s) titles added to Section 3.6.

Owner controlled area ID added to map in Appendix A. JIC map revised.

6 6/30/98 All Non-intent Change. Revised location of LNC.

7 6/14/00 All Non Intent change. Revised title of WBN Communications Specialist. This revision resolves problem identified in WBN PER, 006394.

8 9/25/01 All Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related pg. 7 per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2.

The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.

06/05/02 All 2, 6 Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Non-intent change(s): are based on enhanced Security requirements directed by the NRC. Security actions and Media Contingencies wording enhanced in 3.6 for the disposition of media personnel arriving at the site after a RE=P ememencv situation nr whe~n the.11* ik not nr'tivntpd 10 07/30102 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes 2, 3,4,6-8 indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Intent changes made to the procedure to support the NRC Safeguards Advisory and actions associated with IN 2002-14. (ie) Specified the requirement for a declared emergency in the procedure purpose. The TCP point at Route 68 was moved to its new location. The emergency responder car window placard was eliminated along with the appendix. The appendices were re-designated.

EPIP-8 was referenced in the instructions. New picture provided for appendix A.

SECURITY EPIP-11 WBN AND ACCESS Revision 10 CONTROL Page 2 of ll 9

I

SECURITY EPIP-11 WBN AND ACCESS Revision 10 CONTROL Page 3 of 1l 1.0 PURPOSE2 This Procedure provides guidelines for Nuclear Security (NS) to implement access control during a Declared Radiological Emergency.

This EPIP does not address security problems/contirigencies that may arise during a radiological emergency. These problems shall continue to be handled in accordance with the approved Security Contingency Plan.

'2.0 RESPONSIEBILITES 2 A.

Nuclear Security will implement these Instructions in conjunction with WBN EPIP-8, "Personnel Accountability and Evacuation," or as directed by the Site Emergency Director (SED).

B.

The WBN Emergency Preparedness Manager will establish and maintain an "Emergency Response Organization Call List" comprised of current qualified responders. This list will be provided to Nuclear Security and updated quarterly.

C.

The Site Security Manager shall establish an instruction which delineates specific requirements to be performed by NS during a radiological emergency. This instruction shall address directed requirements for the security force contained in this Procedure.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 Designated Site Areas' A.

The "Protected Area" is the area encompassed by physical barriers (i.e. security fence) which surrounds the plant (Reactor, Auxiliary, Control; Turbine, and Service Buildings, Switchyard, Intake Pumping Station, and Diesel Generator Buildings) through which access is controlled.

(Appendix A - map)

B.

The "Site Perimeter" is the area between the protected area and the outermost fence/buildings surrounding the plant. (Appendix A - map)

C.

The "Owner-Controlled Area" is the area which lies between the site perimeter and the TVA Site boundary. (Appendix A - map)

SECURITY EPIP-11 WBN AND ACCESS Revision 10 CONTROL Page 4 of 11 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.2 Access Control to the Protected Area during Emergencies 1 A.

If directed by the SM/SED, NS will restrict access to the Protected Area during any emergency situation at Watts Bar that has resulted in conditions within the Protected Area which warrant accountability and or evacuation (i.e., Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency.)

B.

As directed by the SM/SED or TSC Security Manager, onsite hazards should be identified to the emergency responder prior to entering the Protected Area using the hazards awareness board in the Access Portal.

C.

Emergency responders whose names appear on the Emergency Response Organization Call List or as authorized by the SED or NS representative in the TSC or OSC Manager will be authorized access.

D.

NRC Personnel have authorized access.

K>

E.

Personnel allowed entry will be responsible for entering into the accountability card readers as soon as possible after entering the protected area.

F.

Fire protection vehicles, radiological control (RADCON) monitoring vans, and other emergency vehicles and personnel will be permitted immediate access upon confirmation with the SED that an onsite emergency does exist and their service has been requested.

3.3 Access to the Owner Controlled/Site Perimeter Area l NS will control access at the OCA Traffic Control Point (Appendix A - map). Access control will be as follows:

A.

GRANT access to those individuals who display a site or other TVA photo ID badge

SECURITY.

EPIP-11 WBN AND ACCESS Revision 10 CONTROL Page 5 of 11 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.3 Access to the Owner Controlled/Site Perimeter Area B.

GRANT access to those individuals whose names are indicated on the Emergency Response Organization Call List and/or other approved list as provided by the SED, TSC Security Manager, or OSC Manager. '

C.

GRANT access to others as verbally approved by the SED or NS representative in the TSC.

D.

-As DIRECTED by the TSC Security Manager/Security Shift Supervisor, onsite hazards should be identified to the emergency responder prior to entering the site.

E.

The following offsite support organizations will be permitted immediate access to the owner controlled area:

"* Fire protection vehicles

"* Ambulances

"* Law enforcement Agencies

"* Explosive Ordinance Detachment (EOD Military)

"* RADCON Vans

"* Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

"* Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

"* INPO and Westinghouse

"* Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA)

NOTE Personnel identification cards, uniforms, vehicle markings or letter of access may be used for identification.

NOTE Appendix B (Radiological Emergency Access Log Sheet) or similar form may be used to account for individuals/vehicles gaining access to the site during a radiological emergency. If emergency vehicles are responding to an immediate/ongoing emergency they should not be delayed but quickly identified and escorted (if security staff are available).

NOTE Unauthorized personnel found in the owner Icontrolled area iAill be reported to the TSC Security Manager for egress instiuctions.

3.4 Egress Control from the Protected Area' A.

Up on hearing the assembly/accountability siren, individuals whose assembly areas are outside of the protected area will be permitted to exit the protected area.

SECURITY EPIP-11 WBN AND ACCESS Revision 10 CONTROL Page 6 of 11 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.4 Egress Control from the Protected Area' B.

Emergency vehicles and personnel, including RADCON monitoring vans, will be allowed "immediate egress from the protected area during an ongoing radiological emergency.

C.

In the event of a Protected Area evacuation, site personnel will receive instructions from the SM or the TSC/SED concerning what actions to take prior to exiting the Protected Area.

Security personnel will follow the instiuctions provided' in EPIP-8 "Personnel Accountability and Evacuation and/or the Physical Security Plan.

3.5 Egress Control from the Site Area and Owner Controlled Area' A.

Egress from the owner controlled area will be authorized only after RADCON completes a survey (if radiological release has occurred) or as granted by the SED through the TSC, NSq Manager.

B.

NS will provide traffic control (if security staff are available).

3.6 Security and Media Contingencies A

This EPIP does not address security problems that may arise during a radiological emergency.

These 'problems shall continue to be handled in accordance with the approved Security Contingency Plan.

B.

Press personnel who respond to WBN during an emergency will be directed to the Joint Information Center (JIC) in Chattanooga. (Appendix C)

C.

If the emergency situation has been terminated or the JIC has not been activated and Press personnel respond to the site, the Owner Controlled Area Security Traffic Control Point will notify the SM or SED. Once approval has been' granted by the Plant Duty Manager and escorts are provided, the Press will be directed to the WBN Local News Center (LNC) which is classroom 19 in the Training Center to await a briefing or additional instructions.

D.

The WBN Communications Specialist should be notified as soon as possible of the situation (i.e., numbers of people, from: TV, radio, etc.).

I I

SECURITY EPIP-11 WBN AND ACCESS Revision 10 CONTROL Page 7 of 11

4.0 REFERENCES

A.

Site Physical Security Plan B.

WBN EPIP-8 Personnel Accountability and Evacuation C.

NP Radiological Emergency Plan (REP)

D.

NUREG 0654 E.

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 20 and 50 F.

ANSI N18.7-1976 5.0 ATrACHMENT A.

Appendix A Owner Controlled, Site Perimeter arid Protected Area Map B.

Appendix B -Radiological Emergency Access Log Sheet C.

Appendix C TVA, JIC Directions 6.0 Records A.

Non-QA Records All records generated during ýhe course of a declared emergency, exercise or drill, will be sent to the EP Manager and stored appropriately.

APPENDIX A (Page 1 of 1)

Owner Controlled/Site Perimeter and Protected Area Map SECURITY EPIP-11 WBN AND ACCESS Revision 10 CONTROL Page 8 of 11 i

APPENDIX B (Page 1 of 1)

RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY ACCESS LOG SHEET Date Name Seton ag#

TmTime Vehcle UT...

approp.)'

ii":"! i."

. i.. :...."....

...'iii'*!

" "IN (if

P.!iiý,~'.ii:i:i~~ i!::*':*i~ii,:.:*

.!ii*

!ii*~~i:i*:.:*ii*i SECURITY EPIP-11 WBN AND ACCESS Revision 10' CONTROL Page 9 of 11 NS Officer

APPENDIX C (Page 1 of 1)

Directions to the TVA Joint Information Center (JIC)

Follow Rt. 68 West to Rt. 27 South. Stay on 27 South to the Martin Luther King-exit. Follow Broad Street to the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex (COC).

The JIC is located in the Missionary Ridge Building.

SECURITY EPIP-1I WBN AND ACCESS Revision 10 CONTROL' Page 10 of 11 I

i

SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of I BR-77080, BF-00006, IEB-0025, NCO-920047022.

2 ANSI N18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01 POI WBN procedures allow emergency ingress and unimpeded egress for any postulated occurrence. Section 3.0 Instructions, Section 3.2 Access Control to the Protected Area during Emergencies, 3.3 Access Control to the Owner Controlled/Site Perimeter Area, 3.4 Egress Control from the Protected Area and 3.5 Egress Control from the Site Area and Owner Controlled Area.

Also see EPIP-8.

EPIPs will contain the following elements SECURITY EPIP-11 WBN AND ACCESS Revision 10 CONTROL Page 11 of 11

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4.0 REFERENCES

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