ML021330363

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) Revision

ML021330363
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/29/2002
From:	Salas P Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
Download: ML021330363 (54)

Text

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-2000 April 29, 2002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos. 50-327 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT -

UNITS 1 AND 2 -

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISION In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the following EPIP:

EPIP EPIP-I Revision 32 Title Emergency Plan Classification Matrix In accordance with NRC RIS 2001-05, only one paper copy of this document is being sent to the NRC Document Control Desk.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please telephone me at (423) 843-7170 or J.

D.

Smith at (423) 843-6672.

Si and Industry Affairs Manager Enclosure A,04; Pinnted on recycled paper

) )

ENCLOSURE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)

UNITS 1 and 2 DOCKET NOS.

50-327 and 50-328 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Revision 32 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY: J. Randy Ford RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:

Emergency Preparedness APPROVED BY:

D. L. Koehl EFFECTIVE DATE:04-16-2002 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE REVISION DESCRIPTION: INTENT REVISION: Revised to incorporate changes from NP-IEP, Appendix B Revision 62. Page 47 revised to incorporate changes in EAL 7.1 and 7.2 to change j0-'yto gamma consistent with NEI guidance and to remove (1131) from EAL 7.2 since ECL includes all identified isotopes. Replaced missing word "unless" from EAL 7.2.U to be consistent with REP Basis. Layout adjustment to page containing EALs 7.1 and 7.2. Page 48 included additional information on Assessment Methods and sources of additional information.

Corrected "INITIATION CONDITIONS" TO "INITIATING CONDITIONS" which is used in the procedure. Revised Figure 4-A to eliminate extraneous information and better define protected area. Changes title of AOP-C.04 to "Shutdown from Aux Control Room".

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 32 Page 2 of 52 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides criteria to the Shift Manager (SM) or Site Emergency Director (SED) to be used in classifying and declaring an emergency based on plant conditions. The responsibility for declaring an emergency, based on the criteria in this procedure, belongs to the SM or SED, the designated Unit Supervisor when acting as the SM, or the TSC SED. This responsibility cannot be delegated.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Developmental Documents A.

10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing Of Production And Utilization Facilities B.

Reg Guide-1.101, Emergency Planning And Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing Numarc Nesp-007, Revision 2, 1/1992 Methodology For Development Of Emergency Action Levels.

C.

Sequoyah Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPS), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPS), Functional Restoration Guidelines (FRG), Technical Instructions (TI), Surveillance Instructions (SI), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are also referenced in Appendix B of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this matrix is detected and declared. The REP is not activated based on a reporting of past conditions. This procedure will be used in conjunction with the Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix B.

If the event is determined to be one of the four emergency classifications then implement one of the following procedures as applicable:

EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event EPIP-3 Alert EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency EPIP-5 General Emergency

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 32 Page 3 of 52 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 3.2 The criteria in SQN EPIP-1 are given for reference: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM or SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at an appropriate classification for a particular set of circumstances. These criteria apply to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The SED must be aware of the affects of simultaneous events on both units.

3.3 If there is a reason to doubt if a given initiating condition has actually occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications provided. Unless a suspected spurious or otherwise false alarm can be substantiated within an acceptable time frame (based on potential severity of the event), the SM or SED is to proceed with actions as required by this procedure until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.4 Classification Determination 3.4.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the respective status tree criteria that will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.3 Declare the highest emergency class based on events that are in progress at the time that the classification is made.

3.4.4 If, during an ongoing event, investigation shows that a higher classification was previously met, then report that, as information only, to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist unless it is a noted exception (i.e. EAL 2.3).

3.4.5 If, following termination of an emergency declaration, investigation shows that a higher classification was met, then report that, as information only, to the ODS and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist.

3.4.6 If conditions have returned to a non-emergency state before any emergency can be classified, then the highest emergency class that was appropriate shall be reported, as information only, to the ODS and NRC and shall not be declared unless it is a noted exception (i.e. EAL 2.3).

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 32 Page 4 of 52 3.4 Classification Determination (Continued) 3.4.7 The NRC shall be notified within one hour of all classifications. Once made and reported, a declaration cannot be canceled or rescinded even if it is later determined to be invalid. If there is reason to doubt that a given condition has occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications and proceed with classification, as required by this procedure, until otherwise proven false.

3.4.8 The State shall be notified by the ODS within 15 minutes of any declaration and notified, for information only, within one hour of any classification that was met but not declared as allowed above. If the State is notified of a declaration that is invalidated before the NRC is notified, terminate the classification, if not already done, and report the declaration to the NRC.

3.4.9 The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the ODS of an emergency declaration is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

4.0 RECORDS 4.1 QA Records None.

4.2 Non-QA Records None.

0

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 32 Page 5 of 52 INDEX SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flami 4.2 ExDlosion 4.4 Toxic Table 4-1 Figure 4-A Table Figur mable Gas Gas or Smoke 4-2 e 4-B 4.5 4.6 4.7 Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 Figure 7-A 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-2 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SON CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 32 Page 6 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 32 Page 7 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs; Suboriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

team or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam jenerator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that

,e CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations !-10%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

MODES 1,2,3,4 EPIP-1 SON Rev 32 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Page 8 of 52

1.

1 ulCa mare 1

1.

RC are Potential LOSS Core Cooling Orange (FR-C.2)

OR Heat Sink Red (RHR SD cooling not in service)

(FR-H.1).

-OR

2. Prima Coolant Activity Level Potential LOSS RCS sample activity is Not Applicable.

greater than 300 jiCVgm dose equivalent Iodine-1 31

-OR

3. Incore TCs Hi Quad Average IGreater than1200 OF on

'X1-94-101 OR 102 1EXOSENSOR).

II Potential LOSS Greater than or equal to 700 OF on XI-94-1 01 or 102 (EXOSENSOR).

-OR

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level

• Potential LOSS N cble.

VALID RVLIS level < 40%

on LI-68-368 or 371 with no RCP running.

-OR

5. Containment Radiation Monitors o

Potential LOSS VALID reading of Greater Not Applicable.

Than:

2.8E + 01 Rem/hr On RM-90-271 and 272.

OR 2.9E + 01 Rem/hr On RM-90-273 and 274.

-OR

s.

Site Emergency Director Judgment ny condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED,

'-i-ndicates loss or potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier I comparable to the conditions listed above.

I 1. Critical Safety Function Status I

Potential LOSS Pressurized Thermal Shock Red (FR-P.1).

OR Heat Sink Red (RHR SD cooling not in service)

(FR-H.1).

-01

2.

RCS LeakageILOCA RCS leak results in subcooling < 40 OF as indicated on XI-94-101 OR 102 (EXOSENSOR).

-OR

3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture o

Potential LOSS SGTR that results in a Not Applicable.

safety injection actuation.

ORti Entry into E-3.

-OR

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level Io Potential LOSS VALID RVLIS level < 40%

Not Applicable.

on LI-68-368 or 371 with no RCP running.

-OR

5.

Site Emergency Director Judgment Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the RCS Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.

LSS

1. Critical Safety Function Status Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1)

Potential LOSS Non isolatable RCS leak exceeding the capacity of one charging pump in the normal charging alignment.

OR RCS Leakage Results in Entry Into E-1.

Not Applicable.

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 32 Page 9 of 52 r-13 Cotain ent arrer

1. Critical Safety Function Status Potential LOSS Not Applicable.

Containment Red (FR-Z.1)

OR Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE (i.e.: core TC's trending up).

-OR

2. Containment PressureH ydrogen Potential LOSS Rapid unexplained pressure Containment hydrogen decrease following initial increases to > 4% by volume increase on Pdl-30-44 or 45 on H21-43-200 or 210.

OR OR Containment pressure or Pressure > 2.81 PSID (Phase sump level not increasing on B) with no containment spray LI-63-178 or 179 with a LOCA operating when required in progress.

(FR-Z.1).

-OR

3. Containment Isolation Status 6L OSS

oniainmenm isolavion, wnen 4equired, is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists.

Ii Potential LOSS Not Applicable.

-OR

4. Containment IBypass PtnilLS Potential LOSS Secondary side release Unexpected VALID increase in outside containment from a area or ventilation RAD RUPTURED S/G that cannot monitors adjacent to be terminated in < 15 minutes containment (with LOCA in (E-2 and E-3).

progress).

OR

> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> secondary side release outside containment from a S/G with a S/G tube leak > T/S limits (AOP-R.01, App A).

-OR

5. Significant Radioactivity in Containment I

Potential LOSS Not Applicable.

VALID Reading of greater than:

3.6 E + 02 Rem/hr on RM-90-271 and RM-90-272.

OR 2.8 E + 02 Rem/hr on RM-90-273 and RM-90-274.

-OR Site Emergency Director Judgment T Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the CNTMT Barrier comparable to the 4

conditions listed above.

INSTRUCTIONS NOTE:

A condition is considered to be MET if, in the judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />). The classification shall be made as soon as this determination is made.

1.

In the matrix to the left, REVIEW the Initiating Conditions in all three barrier columns and CIRCLE the Conditions that are Met.

2.

In each of the three barriers columns, IDENTIFY if any Loss or Potential Loss Initiating Conditions have been Met.

3.

COMPARE the number of barrier Losses and Potential Losses to the Criteria below and make the appropriate declaration.

NOTE: MONITOR the respective status tree criteria if a CSF is listed as an Initiating Condition.

EMERGENCY CLASS CRITERIA GENERAL EMERGENCY LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers.

ALERT Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier.

OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier.

UNUSUAL EVENT LOSS or Potential LOSS of Containment Barrier.

I I

MODES 1,2,3,4 EPIP-1 SQN Rev 32 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Page 10 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK END OF SECTION 1.

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)

"-.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT EPIP-1 Rev 32 Page 11 of 52 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion Table 4-1 Figure 4-A 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-2 Figure 4-B 4.5 4.6 4.7 Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Earthquake Tornado Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 5.5 5.6 River Level High River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS "1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels

.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2

5.1 5.2 5.3

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 32 Page 12 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

team or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam

) jenerator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that

,e CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 210%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VAUD: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 32 Page 13 of 52

2. L ss of Co mncain moae in tiaung i t;onanlon Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and "Radiological Effluents" (Section7) and Continue in This Column.

On either unit an inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4):

1, 1.Loss of > 75% of MCR annunciators and the annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system indications.

2,

2. Loss of Plant Computer.

3. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:

Subcriticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory 4

4. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.

On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of >75% MCR annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system Indications for > 15 minutes with a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or plant 1,

computer unavailable. (land 2 and 3):

1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% MCR annunciators and the annunciator printer for >15 minutes or > 75% of safety 2,

system indications for > 15 minutes.

2. SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is 3,

required (> shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

3. (a or b) 4

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.

OR

b. Loss of plant computer.

On either unit an UNPLANNED loss > 75% MCR annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system indications for > 15 minutes and plant 1,

computer available. (1 and 2 and 3):

1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% of MCR annunciators 2,

and the annunciator printer for > 15 minutes or > 75%

of safety system indicators for > 15 minutes.

2. SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is 3,

required (> shift compliment) to safely operate the unit 4

3 The plant computer is capable of displaying requested data.

Mode I

I A

L L

Initiating I Condition Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

A. UNPLANNED loss of all in-plant communication capability (l and 2 and 3):

1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX phones.

2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones.

3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios.

OR B. UNPLANNED loss of all offsite communication capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and5 and 6):

1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX phones

2. UNPLANNED loss of all radio frequencies

3. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system

4. UNPLANNED loss of all 1-FB-Be1l lines

5. UNPLANNED loss of all NRC ENS and HPN phones

6. UNPLANNED loss of all satellite phones

EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 32 Page 14 of 52 IIIiIlULiI~lUij UiIIILIUIB Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID trip signals and loss of core cooling capability.

(1 and 2):

1. FR-S.1 entered and immediate operator actions did not result in a reactor power of < 5% and decreasing.

2. (a or b)

a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1).

OR

b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H.1)

Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID auto and manual trip signals.

NOTE: Although a mode change may occur before classification this event will still be classified and declared as SAE.

Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID auto trip signal but a manual trip from the Control Room is successful. (1 or2)

1.

Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing following auto trip signal.

2.

Manual trip in the Main Control Room successfully reduces reactor power < 5%.

NOTE: Although a mode change will occur this event will still be classified and declared as an ALERT.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1).

2.4 u[IW[el Clad egrada[on Mode Initiating / Condition



b p Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds 1,

2, 3

eieri to4C ribstul rJuuui BDarn tutatiAx (Sec[on q aria Contnue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to SON Tech. Spec. 3.4.8):

1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a orb):

a.

Dose equivalent Iodine (1-131)

>0.35 j.Ci/gm for > 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or in excess of TIS Figure 3.4-1 with "Tave _ 500 IF.

OR

b.

Specific activity > 100/t pgCi/gm with Tave >_ 500 IF.

1, 2,

EPIP-1 SON SYSTEM DEGRADATION.

Rev 32 Page 15 of 52 i I Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage

> 10 GPM.

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.) > 10 GPM as indicated by (a orb):

a. SI-OPS-068-137.0 results.

OR

b. With RCS temperature and PZR level stable, the VCT level on LI-62-129 or LI-62-130 is dropping at a rate> 10 GPM.

Refer to "Shutdown Systems Degradation" (Section 6.3).

Mode_=

Initiating /;Condition~

-S

-S 1,

2, 3,

4 Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

RCS Identified leakage > 25 GPM.

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)

> 25 GPM as indicated by (a orb):

a. SI-OPS-068-137.0 results.

OR

b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM into PRT, RCDT or CVCS holdup tank (Refer to TI-28).

Refer to "Shutdown Systems Degradation" (Sectfon 6.3).

Mode I

I I

1, 2,

3, 4

EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 32 Page 16 of 52

2.

Tubn Falr Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the main steam system resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and safety injection initiation. (1 and 2):

1. Rapid depressurization of any or all steam generators or the main steam system to < 600 psig on PI-1-2A, 2B or 9A,9B or 20A, 20B or 27A, 27B.

2. Safety injection has initiated or is required.

Mode

-I I

1, 2,

3 I

1, 2,

3 Initiating / Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Turbine failure has generated projectiles that cause visible damage to any area containing safety related equipment

1. Turbine generated PROJECTILES have resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following areas:

Control Building Auxiliary Building Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment ERCW Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs.

Diesel Generator Bldg.

RWST Intake Pumping Station Common Sta. Ser. Xfmr's Condensate Storage Tanks Turbine failure results in casing penetration or main generator seal damage.

1. Turbine failure which results in penetration of the turbine casing or damage to main generator seals.

Refer to "Hazards and SED Judgement" (Section 4.3)



I LA i

it 2,

3 M1LII

%,FrJilUItLI1n

EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 32 Page 17 of 52

EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 32 Page 18 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK END OF SECTION 2.

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 32 Page 19 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT

.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 Figure 7-A RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit 4.5 4.6 4.7 Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-2 SQN 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 3

4

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX SON EPIP-1 Rev 32 Page 20 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculafions, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

'earn or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam

,,_Ženerator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that e CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations _10%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 SON LOSS OF POWER Rev 32 Page 21 of 52 iniltiaing i.,onultiun Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to either unit. (I and 2):

1. Both unit related 6.9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.

2. (a or b)

a. Core Cooling Status Tree Red or Orange Path.

OR

b. Restoration of either a 6.9 KV shutdown board or a 6.9 KV unit board is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the loss.

Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to either unit for > 15 Minutes.

1. Both unit related 6.9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.

Loss of offsite power to either unit with degraded onsite AC power for> 15 minutes. (la and b or2):

la. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.

b. One (1) unit related 6.9 KV shutdown board de energized for > 15 minutes.

OR

2. Any AC power condition lasting > 15 minutes where a single additional failure will result in a unit blackout.

Loss of offsite power to either unit for > 15 minutes.

(1 and 2):

1. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.

2. Both unit related 6.9KV shutdown boards are energized.

3. L ss ofA Shton I Mode I Initiating / Condition I

-NotApplicable.

-I------

5,5 6,

D E

F U

E L

E D

p 5,

6, D

E F

U E

L E

D Not Applicable.

UNPLANNED loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to either unit for > 15 minutes.

1. Both unit related 6.9KV shutdown boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.

Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems"(6.1) and continue in this column.

UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power to either unit for> 15 minutes. (land2):

1. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for

> 15 minutes.

2. One (1) unit related 6.9KV shutdown board de energized for > 15 minutes.

IVIL 1,

2, 3,

4 1,

2, 3,

4 U

1, 2,

3, 4

-U 1

2, 3,

4 v

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and "Loss of Communication" (2.2) and Continue in This Column.

Loss of all vital DC power for > 15 minutes.

1. Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V DC vital battery board buses I and II and III and IV for > 15 minutes.

Also Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1),

"Loss of Communication" (2.2) and, "Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1),

"Loss of Communication" (2.2), and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1).

UNPLANNED loss of a required train of DC power for

> 15 minutes: (1 or 2).

1.

Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V do vital battery board buses I and III for > 15 minutes.

OR

2.

Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V dc vital battery board busses II and IV for > 15 minutes.

I END OF SECTION 3.1 1,

2, 3,

4

-I I

5, 6

I

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 32 Page 23 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation t.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 Figure 4-C 4

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Earthquake Tornado Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 5.5 5.6 River Level High River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 Figure 7-A 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 5.1 5.2 5.3

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 32 Page 24 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

team or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam

,_-enerator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that "Ie CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations >10%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, C0 2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 SON HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 32 Page 25 of 52 initiating i Lronaiuon Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Control Room Evacuation," (4.5) and Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 and 2):

1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1.

2. (a or b)

a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or safety related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE.

OR

b. Control room indication of degraded safety system or component response due to the FIRE.

FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that Is not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of control room notification or verification of control room alarm.

Mvocie

-S



A L

L A

L L

initiating ! toonoitlon Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 and 2).

1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1.

2. (a or b)

a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures or to safety related equipment in the specified area is due to the EXPLOSION.

OR

b. Control room indication of degraded safety system or component response due to the EXPLOSION.

Refer to "Security/ (Section 4.6).

UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure or equipment Refer to "Security" (Section 4.6).

mOue

-S A

L L

A L

L

EPIP-1 SON HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 32 Page 26 of 52 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Containment Diesel Generator Building Unit #2 Containment Intake Pumping Station Auxiliary Building ERCW Pumping Station Control Building CSST's RWST Condensate Storage Tanks Additional Equipment Buildings Figure 4-A SEQUOYAH PROTECTED AREA

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 32 Page 27 of 52 Initiating / Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within a facility structure containing safety related equipment or associated with safe operation of the plant

1. Plant personnel report the average of three (3) readings taken in an -10 ft. Triangular Area is > 25% Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2.

Refer to the MSDS for the LEL.

A. UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY that may affect normal operations.

1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in an -10 ft. Triangular Area is > 25% of the Lower Explosive Umit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B).

OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State officials that a large offsite FLAMMABLE GAS release has occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4-C) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) in concentrations > 25% of Lower Explosive Umit.

(Refer to the MSDS for the LEL).

I Mode IInitiating I Condition p

A L

L

-4 I A

L L

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Release of TOXIC GAS or smoke within a facility structure which prohibits safe operation of systems required to establish or maintain Cold SID.

(1 and2 and 3):

1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS or smoke within any building listed in Table 4-2.

2. (a or b)

a. Plant personnel report severe adverse health reactions due to TOXIC GAS or smoke (i.e.,

burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness).

OR

b. Sampling indication > Permissible Exposure Umit (PEL).

3. Plant personnel unable to perform actions to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.

Refer to the MSDS for the PEL.

A. Safe operations impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS or smoke concentrations within a facility structure listed in Table 4-2.

OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State officials that an offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4 C) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) in concentrations > the Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) causing a site evacuation.

(Refer to the MSDS for the PEL).



A L

L

-4 A

L L

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 32 Page 28 of 52 TABLE 4-2 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS OR SMOKE EALs Unit #1 Containment Diesel Generator Building Unit #2 Containment Intake Pumping Station Auxiliary Building CDWE Building Control Building ERCW Pumping Station Turbine Building Additional Equipment Buildings Figure 4-B SEQUOYAH EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 32 Page 29 of 52 Ul.

i A

L L

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Evacuation of the control room has been initiated and control of all necessary equipment has not been established within 15 minutes of staffing the auxiliary control room. (1 and 2):

1. AOP-C.04" Shutdown from Aux Instrument Room" entered.

2. Control has not been established within 15 minutes of staffing the auxiliary control room and completing transfer of switches on panels Ll1A and L1 B to the AUX position.

Evacuation of the Control Room is Required.

1. AOP-C.04" A

Shutdown from Aux Instrument Room" has been entered.

L L

Not Applicable.

i 11111.11.111!

I %,1UIUlU l Mode Initiating I Condition Security event resulting in loss of control of the plantI

1. Hostile armed force has taken control of the plant or control room or remote shutdown capacity.

A L

L I

Security event has or is occurring which results in actual or likely failures of plant functions needed to protect the public.

1. VITAL AREA, other than the control room, has been penetrated by a hostile armed force.

A L

L Confirmed security event which indicates an actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant (1 or 2 or 3):

A

1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA.

L OR L

2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A).

OR

3. PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) has been penetrated by a hostile armed force.

Confirmed security event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant (1 or2)

1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A).

A OR L

2. Security Shift Supervisor reports any of the events L

listed in Table 4-3.

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 32 Page 30 of 52 MvOae Events are in process or have occurred which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY A

(Figure 4-B)

L L

Events are In process or have occurred which involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public.

Any releases are not expected to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY A

(Figure 4-B)

L L

Events are in process or have occurred which involve an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels.

A L

L Events are in Process or have occurred which Indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety System occurs.

A L

L TABLE 4-3 SECURITY EVENT EXAMPLES

a. SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has occurred or is occurring within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A).

b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION situation that threatens to interrupt plant operations.

c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) and the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A).

d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA which threatens to interrupt normal plant operations (judgement based on behavior of strikers and/or intelligence received).

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 32 Page 31 of 52 Figure 4-C SEQUOYAH ONE MILE RADIUS

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 32 Page 32 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK I END OF SECTION 4.1

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 32 Page 33 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flam 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Table 4-1 Figure 4-A TablE Figur mable Gas Gas or Smoke 4-2 e 4-B 4.5 4.6 4.7 Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 32 Page 34 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initialing conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force. to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

,'AULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

stearn or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

RANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that jne CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations >10%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 SON DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 32 Page 35 of 52

5. Torad Mode Initiating / Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation.

(1 and 2):

1. Panel XA-55-15B alarm window 30 (E-2) plus window 22 (D-1) activated.

A L

2. (a or b)

a. Ground motion sensed by plant personnel.

OR

b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event Earthquake detected by site seismic instruments.

(1 and 2):

1. Panel XA-55-15B alarm window 22 (D-1) activated.

A

2. (a or b)

a. Ground motion sensed by plant personnel.

LOR

b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event Mode I

I A

L L

A L

L Initiating / Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Tornado or high winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE. (1 and 2):

1. Tornado or high winds (sustained >80 m.p.h. > one minute on the plant computer) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1.

2. (a orb)

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE.

OR

b. Control room indications of degraded safety system or component response due to event.

Note: National Weather Service Motristown 1-(423)-586-8400, can provide additional info.

Tornado within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

1.

Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 5-A)

EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 32 Page 36 of 52

-lu

i Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1).

Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1).

Aircraft or PROJECTILE Impacts (strikes) any plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE. (1 and 2):

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has A

impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1.

L

2. (aorb)

a. Confirmed report of VISIBLE DAMAGE.

L OR

b. Control Room indications of degraded safety system or component response due to the event within any structure listed in Table 5-1.

Aircraft crash or projectile impact (strikes) within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

1. Plant personnel report aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 5-A).

A L

L I

TABLE 5-1 Plant Structure Associated With Tornado/High Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment Control Building Intake Pumping Station CDWE Building RWST Additional Equipment Bldgs.

Auxiliary Building Diesel Generator Bldg.

ERCW Pumping Station Turbine Building Common Station Service Transformer's Condensate Storage Tanks

EPIP-1 SON DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 32 Page 37 of 52

'ae iniliaxing i uonuilion Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

River reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning as reported by River Operations.

A L

L River reservoir level Is at Stage I Flood Warning as reported by River Operations.

A L

L Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

River reservoir level is < 670 Feet as reported by River Operations.

A L

L River reservoir level is < 673 Feet as reported by River Operations.

A L

L

EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 32 Page 38 of 52 Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Watercraft strikes the ERCW pumping station resulting In a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). (1 and2):

1. Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck the ERCW pumping station.

2. (a or b)

a. ERCW supply header pressure Train A 1(2)-PI-67-493A is < 15 psig.

OR

b. ERCW supply header pressure Train B 1(2)-PI-67-488A is < 15 psig.

A L

L

EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 32 Page 39 of 52 Figure 5-A SEQUOYAH EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

EPIP-1 SON DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 32 Page 40 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK I END OF SECTION 5

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 32 Page 41 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 1.1 Fire L2 Explosion Table 4-1 Figure 4-A 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-2 Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 Figure 7-A 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-2 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 32 Page 42 of 52 DEFINITIONSIACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs; Suboriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

iAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

• steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

ýRANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that njie CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations Ž10%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, C0 2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 SON SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 32 Page 43 of 52 A

5, 6

I11iLi~livI I %.,IJIuIlIUII Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.

Loss of'water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover active fuel in the reactor vessel.

(1 and 2 and 3):

1. Loss of RHR capability.

2. VALID indication that reactor vessel water level

< el. 695'.

3. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temperature

> 200 'F.

Note: If containment is open refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and continue in this column.

Inability to maintain unit in cold shutdown when required (l and 2):

1. Cold shutdown required by Technical Specs.

2. Inoore TCs (if available) indicate core exit temperature 5,

> 200 'F.

6 Note: ff containment is open refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and continue in this column.

Not Applicable.

I 6.2 Los of Capablit Mode Initiating / Condition 1,

2, 3,

4 YoQ[.IippJiCaLJFe.

Complete loss of function needed to achieve or Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain hot shutdown. (1 and2a or2b):

1. Hot shutdown required.

2a. CSF status tree indicated Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1).

OR 2b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H.1)

(RHR shutdown cooling not in service).

Note: Refer to "Reactor Protection System Failure" (Section 2.3) and Continue in This Column.

Complete loss of function needed to achieve cold shutdown when cold shutdown required by Tech.

1, Specs. (1 and 2 and 3):

1. Cold shutdown required by Tech. Specs.

2,

2. Loss of RHR shutdown cooling capability.

3. Loss of secondary heat sink and main condenser 3,

4 Note: Also refer to "Failure of Rx Protection" (Section 2.3) and Continue in This Column.

Inability to reach required shutdown within Tech.

1, Spec. limits.

1. The unit has not been placed in the required mode within the time prescribed by the LCO action 2,

statement.

3, 4

i

EPIP-1 SON SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 32 Page 44 of 52 Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.

Loss of REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM inventory with inadequate makeup. (1 and 2 and 3):

1. Reactor coolant system is pressurized above atmospheric pressure.

2. Unplanned decrease in RCS or pressurizer level requiring initiation of makeup to the RCS.

3. With reactor coolant system temperature stable, the pressurizer level continues to decrease following initiation of RCS makeup.

I END OF SECTION 6 ivIoue I.

-9

-9 5,

6

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 32 Page 45 of 52

-,INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas r.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 7

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 32 Page 46 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

(Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

--- steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identity an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

'RANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that

.,ne CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations >10%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO 2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 SON RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 32 Page 47 of 52 1 ~ ~~~

7.

Siud flet initiating i %,onuinlon EAB dose, resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity > 1 Rem TEDE or > 5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of release. (1 or 2 or 3):

A

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General Emergency in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within L

that 15 minutes confirms that the criterion is not exceeded.

L OR

2. Field surveys indicate >1 Rem/hr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-06 liCi/cm3 at the EAB (Fig. 7-A)

OR

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >1 Rem TEDE or >5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).

EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity >100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem thyroid CDE for actual or projected duration of release. (1 or2 or 3):

1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Site Area for A

> 15 minutes, unless assessment within that 15 minutes confirms A

that the criterion is not exceeded.

R OR L

2. Field surveys indicate >100 mrem/hr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-07 pRCi/cm 3 at the EAB (Fig. 7-A).

AOR

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >100 mrem TEDE or

>500 mrem thyroid CDE for actual or projected duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit for >15 minutes.

(1 or2 or3 or4)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Alert for >15 A

minutes, unless assessment within that 15 minutes confirms that the L

criterion is not exceeded.

OR L

2. Field surveys indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma at the EAB for >15 minutes (Fig 7-A).

OR

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).

OR

4. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of gaseous radioactivity >15 minutes in duration.

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit for >60 minutes.

(1 or2 or3 or4)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under UE for >60 A

minutes, unless assessment within that 60 minutes confirms that the L

criterion is not exceeded.

OR L

2. Field surveys indicate >0.1 mremlhr gamma at the EAB for >60 minutes (Fig 7-A)

OR

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).

OR

4. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of gaseous radioactivity >60 minutes in duration.

Mode A

L L

-I A

L L

Initiating I Condition Not Applicable.

Not Applicable Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Section 1.2.1.1 Limit for

>15 minutes. (1 or2)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Alert for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion is not exceeded.

OR

2. Sample results indicate an ECL >200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Section 1.2.1.1 Limit for >60 minutes.

(1 or2)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under UE for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion is not exceeded.

OR

2. Sample results indicate an ECL >2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration.

-h I

EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 32 Page 48 of 52 TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS NOTE: The monitor values below, if met or exceeded, indicate the need to perform the required assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the appropriate emergency classification shall be made based on the VALID reading.

GASEOUS MONITORS Units(2)

UE Alert SAE General Emer Site Total Release Limit jtCVs 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31E+09 U-1 Shield Building 1-RI-90-400 (EFF RCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31 E+08 1.31 E+09 LEVEL)

U-2 Shield Building 2-RI-90-400 (EFF aCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31 E+08 1.31 E+09 LEVEL)

Auxiliary Building 0-RM-90-101B Limit cpm 1.03E+05 Offscale(1)

Offscale(*)

Offscale(")

Service Building 0-RM-90-132B Limit cpm 2.62E+06 Offscale" 1 )

Offscale(1)

Offscale(1)

U-1 Main Steam Line Monitors(2) 11Ci/cc 1.49E-01 1.49E+01 3.98E+01 3.98E+02 1-RI-90-421 thru 424 U-2 Main Steam Line Monitors=)

'tCi/cc 1.49E-01 1.49E+01 3.98E+01 3.98E+02 2-RI-90-421 thru 424 U-1 Condenser Vac Exh mR/h 4.1OE+02 4.1OE+04 1.09E+05 1.09E+06 1-RM-90-255 or 256 Limit U-2 Condenser Vac Exh mR/h 4.1OE+02 4.1OE+04 1.09E+05 1.09E+06 2-RM-90-255 or 256 Limit RELEASE DURATION minutes

>60

>15

>15

>15 LIQUID MONITORS Units UE Alert Site Area General Emer Site Total Release Limit gCi/ml 8.33E-04 8.33E-02 N/A N/A RM-90-122-RadWaste cpm 1.95E+05 Offscale(1)

N/A N/A RM-90-120,121-S/G Bldn cpm 1.46E+05 Offscale(1)

N/A N/A RM-90-225-Cond Demin cpm 2.59E+05 Offscale(1 )

N/A N/A RM-90-212-TB Sump cpm 4.1 OE+03 4.1 OE+05 N/A N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes

>60

>15

>15

>15 ASSESSMENT METHODS:

• Airborne Dose Assessment per SQN EPIP-13 "Dose Assessment'

"* ODCM Liquid Release Rate assessment per SON 0-TI-CEM-030.030.0

"* Integrated Airborne Release Rate assessment per SON 0-TI-CEM-030.030.0 (1)

The calculated value is outside of the upper range for this detector. The maximum monitor output which can be read is 1.OE+07 cpm.

(2)

These unit values are based on flow rates through one PORV of 890,000 lb/hr at 1085 psig 600 degrees F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing, (e.g., PORV).

NOTE 1: These EALs are based on the assumption that an emergency release is restricted to one pathway from the plant In all cases, the total site EAL is the limiting value. Therefore, in the case where there are multiple release paths from the plant, it is the total release EAL (obtained from ICS and/or SQN 0-TI-CEM-030-030, "Manual Calculation of Plant Gas, Iodine, and Particulate Release Rates for Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Compliance"TI-30) that will determine whether an emergency classification is warranted.

OTE 2: In the case when there is no CECC dose assessment available, the length and relative magnitude of the release is the key in determining the classification. For example, in the case of the NOUE EAL of 2 times the Tech Spec limit, the classification is based more on the fact that a release above the limit has continued unabated for more than 60 minutes, than on the projected offsite dose.

NOTE 3: See REP Appendix B for basis information.

EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 32 Page 49 of 52 Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 32 Page 50 of 52 Initiating / Con oil Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) or "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Section.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) or "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7 1) and Continue in This Section.

UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the facility that impedes safe operations or establishment or maintenance of cold shutdown.

(1 or 2):

1. VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results exceed 15 mrem/hr in the control room or SAS.

OR

2. (a and b):

a. VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2.

b. Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for safe operation or the ability to establish cold shutdown (See Note Below).

UNPLANNED Increase in radiation levels within the facility.

1. A VAUD area radiation monitor reacing increases by 1000 mrem/hr over the highest reading in the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> excluding the current peak value.

Note: In either the UE or ALERT EAL, the SED must determine the cause of increase in radiation levels and review other initiating conditions for applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 mremnhr in the control room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA).

-I.

-4.

A L

L I

A L

L Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Section.

Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Section.

Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel. (1 and 2):

1. VALID alarm on RM-90-101 or RM-90-102 or RM-90-103 or RM-90-130/131 or RM-90-112.

AND

2. (a orb):

a. Plant personnel report damage to irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods.

OR

b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered in the spent fuel pool or transfer canal.

UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered. (l and 2 and 3):

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal.

2. VALID alarm on RM-90-101 or RM-90-102 or RM%90-103.

3. Fuel remains covered with water.

Mode U

A L

L A

L L

a I

EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 32 Page 51 of 52 Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS Location Meter Monitor No.

Area and Elevation Reading For puiposes of comparing the meter/monitor reading values to this table, it can be assumed that mR is equivalent to mrem.

1,2-RM-90-1 Spent Fuel Pit ARM El. 734.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-3 Waste Packaging ARM El. 706.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-4 Decontamination 1.5E+03 mR/hr Room ARM El. 690.0 0-RM-90-5 SFP Pumps ARM El. 714.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-6 CCS HXS ARM El. 714.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-7 Sample Rm ARM El. 690.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-8 AFW Pumps ARM El. 690.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-9 Waste Cnds Tks ARM El. 669.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-10 CVCS Bd ARM El. 669.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-11 Cntmt Spray and 1.5E+03 mR/hr RHR Pumps Radmon El. 653.0 0-RM-90-102 Spent Fuel Pit 1.5E+03 mR/hr Radmon El. 734.0 0-RM-90-103 Spent Fuel Pit 1.5E+03 mR/hr Radmon El. 734.0 0-RM-90-230 CNDS Demineralizer 1.5E+03 mR/hr ARM El. 685.0 0-RM-90-231 Cnds Demineralizer 1.5E+03 mR/hr ARM El. 706.0 END OF SECTION 7.

I Note:

All of the above monitors have a range of 0.1 to 1 E+4 mrem/hr.

I

EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 32 Page 52 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK