ML021220553
| ML021220553 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/2002 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | David Pinckney Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML021220553 (13) | |
Text
Document Transmittal Form TO
- NRC C/O PINCKNEY, DAVID DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK WASHINGTON, DC 20555 Date :
04/19/2002 Please update your controlled set of documents with the following documents:
Document ID PRCISECG-SECG-TOC-BASISI000 PRCISECG-SECT. 11.3 (BASIS)I000 Revision Status 13 A
4 A
This acknowledgement receipt must be returned to:
Document Management PSEG Nuclear PO Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 MC N04 Your signature below verifies that:
(1) the above documents have been filed and superseded documents have been removed and destroyed or clearly marked as obsolete.
(2) the mailing address and copyholder information are correct or corrections have been identified on this transmittal.
[
Place checkmark here to be removed from controlled distribution ID: SECGO101 Quantity 1
1 Format H
H RecNo 135609 135647 Date:
Signature:
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PSE&G SALEM GENERATING STATION TA EVENT CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TECHNICAL W k
' !L April 19, 2002 COPY 0V CHANGE PAGES FOR REVISION #13 The Table of Contents forms a general guide to the current revision of each section and attachment of the Salem ECG Technical Basis.
The changes that are made in this TOC Revision #13 are shown below.
- 1. Check that your revision packet is complete.
- 2.
Add the revised documents.
- 3.
Remove and recycle the outdated material listed below.
ADD REMOVE Pages Description Rev.
Pages Description Rev.
All TOC 13 All TOC 12 All Section 11.3 04 All Section 11.3 03 1 of 1 S-ECG
PSEG Internal Use On SECTION T.O.C.
i ii 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 ily D
Technical Basis:
I ~JL~.T.O.C6.
CONTROL Pg.Iof24 SALEM ECG TECHNICAL BASIS c o V
TABLE OF CONTENTS/SIGNATURE PAGJ uri-CoO TITLE Table of Contents/Signature Page Introduction and Usage Glossary of Acronyms & Abbreviations Fuel Clad Challenge RCS Challenge Fission Product Barriers (Table) 3.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 3.2 RCS Barrier 3.3 Containment Barrier EC Discretion Failure to Trip Radiological Releases/Occurrences 6.1 Gaseous Effluent Release 6.2 Liquid Effluent Release 6.3 In - Plant Radiation Occurrences 6.4 Irradiated Fuel Event Electrical Power 7.1 Loss of AC Power Capabilities 7.2 Loss of DC Power Capabilities System Malfunctions 8.1 Loss of Heat Removal Capability 8.2 Loss of Overhead Annunciators 8.3 Loss of Communications Capability 8.4 Control Room Evacuation 8.5 Technical Specifications Hazards - Internal/External 9.1 Security Threats 9.2 Fire 9.3 Explosion 9.4 Toxic/Flammable Gases 9.5 Seismic Event 9.6 High Winds 9.7 Flooding 9.8 Turbine Failure/Vehicle Crash/Missile Impact 9.9 River Level REV #
PAGES DATE 13 00 00 01 01 01 02 03 00 03 00 00 00 00 02 00 01 02 00 01 00 02 02 02 02 01 01 02 02 01 4
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SGS
PSEG Internal Use Only SGS EAL Technical Basis T.O.C.
Pg. 2 of 4 PAGES DATE Reserved for future use Licensing is responsible for the Reportable Action Level (Section 11)
Reportable Action Levels (RALs) 11.1 Technical Specifications 11.2 Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 11.3 System Actuation 11.4 Personnel Safety/Overexposure 11.5 Environmental/State Notifications 11.6 After-the-Fact 11.7 Security/Emergency Response Capabilities 11.8 Public Interest 11.9 Accidental Criticality/
Rad Material Shipments - Releases 11.10 Voluntary Notifications 01 02 04 01 01 02 03 01 02 01 9
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01/23/01 Rev. 13 SECTION SALEM ECG TECHNICAL BASIS TABLE OF CONTENTS/SIGNATURE PAGE TITLE REV #
SGS
PSEG Internal Use Only SGS EAL Technical Basis T.O.C.
Pg. 3 of 4 REVISION
SUMMARY
Biennial Review Performed: Yes No X 11.3.3 Technical Basis - added statement that an actuation cannot be considered invalid if it results from an actual system parameter reaching its set point.
Rev. 13 SGS
PSEG Internal Use Only SIGNATURE PAGE Prepared By:
Paul Duke (If Editorial Section/Attachments Revised:
Reviewed By:
Reviewed By:
Reviewed By:
Reviewed By:
Revisions Only, Last Approved Revision)
Section 11.3 (List Non Editorial Only - Section/Attachments) 10C*F50.54q Effectiveness Reviewer Department Manager Manager -
icensing (Reportab Action Level (Section 11)
E1l*Manager 03/29/02 Date Date Date Date ate Reviewed By:
NA Manager - Quality Assurance (If Applicable)
SORC NA Salem Chairman Vice
- Nuclear Operations atL NA Date Effective Date of this Revision:
Date Rev. 13 SGS EAL Technical Basis T.O.C.
Pg. 4 of 4 Date Mtg. No.
SGS
SGS Fp tcchnical Basis 11.0 Reportable Action Levels CONTROL 11.3 System Actuations COPY #
REPORTABLE ACTION LEVEL - 11.3.1 IC ANY EVENT THAT RESULTS OR SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN ECCS DISCHARGE INTO THE RCS AS THE RESULT OF A VALID SIGNAL EXCEPT WHEN THE ACTUATION RESULTS FROM AND IS PART OF A PRE-PLANNED SEQUENCE DURING TESTING OR REACTOR OPERATION
RAL MODE - All BASIS Those events that result in either automatic or manual SI actuation or would have resulted in SI actuation if some component had not failed or an operator action had not been taken are reportable.
For example, while performing a RCS cooldown following a controlled Reactor Shutdown, a Main Steam Line AP SI is inadvertently generated. However, the Charging Pumps fail to start and RCS pressure remains above the SI Pump shutoff head pressure. Although no ECCS discharge to the vessel occurred, the event is reportable.
A valid signal refers to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for SI initiation. Valid actuations also include intentional manual actuations unless the actuation is part of a preplanned test. Excluded from this reporting requirement would be those instances in which instrument drift, spurious signals, human error or other invalid signals caused SI actuation (e.g. jarring a cabinet, an error in the use of jumpers or lifted leads, error in actuation of controls switches, or equipment failures or radio frequency interference).
Page 1 of 2 RAL - 11.3.1 Rev. 04 Valid SI Actuation signal received (or demanded)
AND ANY ECCS Pump start or Accumulator depressurization that results in or should have resulted in, discharge to the RCS AND Actuation is NOT part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis Preplanned actuations are those which are expected to actually occur due to preplanned activities covered by procedures. Such actuations are those for which a procedural step or other appropriate documentation indicates the specific actuation is actually expected to occur. Control room personnel are aware of the specific signal generation before its occurrence or indication in the control room. Manual actuations as directed by abnormal or emergency operating procedures (i.e., not part of a preplanned test or operational evolution) are reportable.
IF the SI Actuation discharges or should have discharged into the RCS as result of an INVALID signal, THEN a report under this RAL is not required.
REFERENCES SGS UFSAR 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) 10 CFR 50.73 NUREG 1022, Rev. 2, section 3.2.6 Page 2 of 2 RAL-11.3.1 Rev. 04
SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 11.0 Reportable Action Levels 11.3 System Actuations REPORTABLE ACTION LEVEL - 11.3.2 IC ACTUATION OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM WHEN CRITICAL EXCEPT PREPLANNED [10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)]
RAL MODE - 1, 2 BASIS An event involving a critical scram is reportable under RAL 11.3.2 unless it resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence. Manual RPS actuation in anticipation of receiving an automatic RPS actuation is reportable.
Preplanned actuations are those which are expected to actually occur due to preplanned activities covered by procedures. Such actuations are those for which a procedural step or other appropriate documentation indicates the specific actuation is actually expected to occur. Control room personnel are aware of the specific signal generation before its occurrence or indication in the control room.
REFERENCES 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 10 CFR 50.73 NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, section 3.2.6 Page 1 of 1 RAL - 11.3.2 Rev. 04 Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when critical, except when the actuation results from and is part of a preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation
SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis 11.0 Reportable Action Levels 11.3 System Actuations REPORTABLE ACTION LEVEL - 11.3.3 IC VALID ACTUATION OF LISTED SYSTEM EXCEPT PREPLANNED
[10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)]
RAL OPERATIONAL CONDITION - All BASIS An eight hour report is required for a valid actuation of any of the systems named in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) unless the actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. Except for critical scrams (RAL 11.3.2), invalid actuations are not reportable by telephone under 10 CFR 50.72.
The system actuation flow chart provides guidance to determine reportability.
Page 1 of 4 RAL - 11.3.3 Rev. 04 Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any system listed in Technical Basis 11.3.3 except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation
Note I Notes 6, 7 Yes (NONREPORTABLE)
Page 2 of 4 RAL - 11.3.3 Rev. 04 SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis SYSTEM ACTUATION FLOW CHART m oneof -
N 10(NONREPORTABLE as i safety tion?
Bs tuation No O
NONREPORTABLE irl?
Notes 2, 3 Notes 4, 5
SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis NOTES
- 1. Systems for which this RAL applies are listed on page 4.
- 2. See Technical Specifications 3/4 3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and 3/4.3.2, ESF Actuation System Instrumentation (signals required for initiation of system safety function).
- 3. An ESF signal actuates equipment to mitigate the consequences of an accident, assure safe shutdown, minimize radioactive releases, etc. Process signals provided to protect equipment or as the result of good engineering judgment for system operating requirements (e.g., low flow starts, low suction pressure pump trips) are not ESF signals. If an actuation signal occurs, but distinction between "ESF" and "Process" cannot be determined immediately, the actuation is considered reportable. Retraction should be considered later, if necessary.
- 4. Valid actuations are those actuations that result from VALID SIGNALS or from intentional manual initiation, unless it is part of a preplanned test. Valid signals are those signals that are initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirement for initiation of the safety function of the system.
An "actuation" is considered valid even if the resultant function (e.g., reactor trip) has already been accomplished as a result of a prior actuation or a plant evolution, such as a routine shutdown.
- 5. Invalid actuations are by definition those that do not meet the criteria for being valid. Invalid actuations can include instrument drift, spurious signals, human error, jarring a cabinet, an error in the use of jumpers or lifted leads, an error in the actuation of switches or controls, equipment failure, or radio frequency interference. Invalid actuations do not include actuations from the sensor by measurement of an actual physical system parameter that was at its setpoint.
- 6. Manual system actuation to mitigate the consequences of an accident, assuring safe shutdown of plant is reportable. Manual actuation as directed by normal operating or test procedures is not reportable. Manual actuations as directed by abnormal or emergency operating procedures (i.e., not part of a preplanned test or operational evolution) are reportable.
- 7. Preplanned actuations are those which are expected to actually occur due to preplanned activities covered by procedures. Such actuations are those for which a procedural step or other appropriate documentation indicates the specific actuation that is actually expected to occur. Control room personnel are aware of the specific signal generation before its occurrence or indication in the control room.
Page 3 of 4 RAL - 11.3.3 Rev. 04
SGS EAL/RALTechnical Basis Applicable Systems and Components NOTE: Numbers in parentheses indicate UFSAR Chapter Reactor Protection System (unless reported under RAL 11.3.2)
Containment Systems (6.2)
Containment Heat Removal (6.2.2)
Containment Isolation System* (6.2.4)
ECCS (6.3)
Residual Heat Removal Safety Injection System Plant Systems Auxiliary Feedwater Emergency AC Electrical Power (8.3)
- Containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple MSIVs REFERENCES SGS UFSAR 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 10 CFR 50.73 NUREG 1022, Rev. 2, section 3.2.6 Page 4 of 4 RAL - 11.3.3 Rev. 04