ML021090228
| ML021090228 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/2002 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| -nr | |
| Download: ML021090228 (23) | |
Text
_1oNuclear Grenation j CP&L A Progress Energy Company J. bGroup Thermo-Lag Resolution Meeting USNRC - NRR Agenda
> Existing Configurations and Resolutions
> ACP Room
> Cable Spread Room
> Fire Tests
> Deviation Submittal 71 3-(D S3/13s/02
AProgress Energy Comfpany Nuleearon SCP&L Existing Configuration
~ Cable Spread Room Running Along Outside Walls At Ceiling Of A CSR Full Height Section On North Wall SSmall Bridge Tunnel In B CSR SFull Height Section Has Doors And Is Accessible By Plant Personnel SSuppression & Detection Outside Of Enclosure SDetection Inside Of Enclosure SExisting Deviation For 1-Hour Enclosure On Raceway 3/I 3/02 3
M='j=b" Nuclearu Group'iencration CP&L A Progress Energy Company ACP Room Seal Wall Between B SWGR And ACP Barrier Including S3-Hour Door And Penetrations SSeparate Fire Area And SSD Analysis SRoom Will Be in Compliance with Regulations 3/13/02) 4
- Nuclear CP&L A Progress Energy Company Generaton Cable Spread Room SQualify Barriers As Raceway Enclosure the Existing Deviation Full Height Portion, Modify For No Personnel Access S1-Hour Passage Through Full Height Section 3/13/02
SNuclear CP&L A Progress Energy Company GroupGeneration Fire Tests
~ Qualify Barriers To GL 86-10, Supplement 1 Criteria Tested Per Enclosure 1,Section V Height Wall Per Enclosure 1,Section IV
~ Most Likely At Omega Point Labs SContractor Test Coordinator STest Plan SConstruction And QA SCoordinate Reports SNRC Witness 3/13/02 6
l CP&L A Progress Energy Company GNruleartion Fire Tests SL Shaped Tunnels SGL 86-10, Supp. 1 Section V SSmall Enclosure - Thermal Challenge SLarger Enclosure - Panel Sizes And Max Spans SFull Height Wall SGL 86-10, Supp 1 Section IV SLarge Panels And Spans SPenetrations - Full Size Sleeved Penetration With Seal Material (Block Out With No Commodities)
STypical To Bound Conduits, Cable Trays, Etc.
3/ 13?/02 7
A Progress Energy Company
- .**io* *CP&L J.44bGroup Path Forward And Approvals
- ACP Modification In Progress Through Site Change Process - No Approvals Required
- NRC Approval for CSR Deviation Extension Planned for May 2002
> Questions, Comments, and Discussion
.31 31/0)2 8
Nuclear~ CP&L Energy Company A Progress
-pn Generation Fire Tests
- 3-Hour Test Of Full Height Wall 86-10, Supp. 1 Section Iv
- Test 3-Hour With Hose Stream Test SSecond Duplicate Test For Hose Stream If Fails During 3-Hour SFull Spans
) Bounding Penetration Configuration 3/13/02 9
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K CP&L Carolina Power & Light Company SERIAL: LAP-83-479 OCT 14 1983 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NOS. I AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-400 AND 50-401 FIRE PROTECTION
Dear Mr. Denton:
Carolina Power & Light Company hereby transmits one original and forty copies of additional information requested by the NRC as part of the safety review of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. This information was requested during the fire protection meetings held September 26-27, 1983 in Bethesda. The enclosures to the letter are delineated in the attached Summary of Enclosures. The attachments include all of the additional information requested on Fire Protection.
We will be providing responses to other requests for additional information shortly.
Yours very truly,
.=fT4AL SiGNED BY M. A. McDUFFIE M. A. McDuffie Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation MAM/pgp (8185NLU)
Enclosures cc: Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC) Mr. Wells Eddleman Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP) Dr. Phyllis Lotchin Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII) Mr. John D. Runkle Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU) Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP) Mr. G. 0. Bright (ASLB)
Mr. R. P. Gruber (NCUC) Dr. J. H. Carpenter (ASLB)
Chapel Hi~l Public Library Mr. J. L. Kelley (ASLB)
Wake County Public Library
,l I avetteville Street e P. 0. Box 1551 9 Raleigh, N. C. 27602
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unless all cable is run in 4-inch or smaller steel conduit or the cables are in fully enclosed raceways internally protected by automatic fire suppression.
There should be no carpeting in the control room.
PROJECT CONFORMANCE: C. POSITION (cont'd)
C.7.b Control Room Fire Area (Cont'd)
As stated in FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.4 all cables entering the control room terminate there. No cables are routed through the control room from one area to another. There are no raised floors in the control room. There is a trench under the HVAC Control which is about 11 feet long x 2 feet vide x 8 inches deep which contains only Train B cable, safety and nonsafety. The fire loading is low, less than 2000 BTU/sq. ft. No suppression system is provided. There are redundant safety related radiation monitoring cables, installed in conduits and in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, located above the suspended ceiling. As stated in the Fire Hazards Analysis, Section 9.5A of the FSAR, the combustible loading in the Control Room is considered negligible. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> occupancy of the Control Room combined with the availability of fire extinguishers and hose stations mitigate the effects of an exposure fire.
The Control Room suspended ceiling is aluminum luminous louver type, egg crate construction. A perforated duct located above the hung ceiling introduces air into the control room. The space above the hung ceiling does not contain any cable tray, only conduits.
Conduits 4 inch and smaller in diameter run through this space. Smoke detectors will be provided on the south side of the Control Room reinforced concrete ceiling, as well as below the hung ceiling. The conduit will be sealed in accordance with NUREG-0800 criteria. Automatic suppression will not be provided, as there is no fire loading in the space between the hung ceiling and the concrete ceiling.
There is no carpeting in the control room.
NRC GUIDELINES: C. POSITION (Cont'd)
C.7.c. Cable Spreading Room The primary fire suppression in the cable spreading room should be an automatic water system such as closed-head sprinklers, open-bead deluge system, or open directional water spray system. Deluge and open spray systems should have provisions for manual operation at a remote station; however, there should be provisions to preclude inadvertent operation.
Location of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray arrangments and possible transient combustibles to ensure adequate water coverage for areas that could present exposure hazards to the cable system. Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with water supplied by the fire suppression system without electrical faulting.
85
Open-head deluge and open directional spray systems should be zoned.
The use of foam is acceptable.
Cable spreading rooms should have:
(1) At least two remote and separate entrances for access by fire brigade personne 1; (2) An aisle separation between tray stacks at least 3 feet wide and 8 fee t high; (3) Hose stations and portable extinguishers installed i- diately outside the room; (4) Area smoke detection; and (5) Continuous line-type heat detectors for cable trays inside the cable spreading room.
Drains to remove firefighting water should be provided. When gas sytems are installed, drains should have adequate seals or the gas extinguishing systems should be sized to compensate for losses through the drains.
A separate cable spreading room should be provided for each redundant division. Cable spreading rooms should not be shared between reactors.
Each cable spreading room should be separated from the others and from other areas of the plant by barriers with a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. If this is not possible, a dedicated system should be provided.
The ventilation system to each cable spreading room should be designed to isolate the area upon actuation of any gas extinguishing system in the area. Separate manually actuated smoke venting that is operable from outside the room should be provided for the cable spreading room.
PROJECT CONFORMANCE: C. POSITION (Cont'd)
C.7.c. Cable Spreading Room The primary fire suppression system in the cable spreading rooms are automatic pre-action sprinkler systems actuated by thermal detection systems employing closed sprinkler heads, installed at the ceiling level.
Cable tray arrangements were considered in the location of sprinkler heads to insure adequate water coverage. Since there are only cables in this room, the Fire Hazards Analysis postulates that transients such as oil, grease, rags or solvents normally associated with equipment maintenance or repair will not be brought into the area. The pre-action valve can be tripped mechanically at the valve or operation of pull stations located inside oroutside the room located at elevation 286' and 305'. Inadvertent operation is precluded by the two step discharge cycle of the pre-action system which requires both the operation of the pre-action valve and fusing of the sprinkler head. Cables are designed to allow wetting down by water from ihe fire protection system. Ionization type smoke detection 86
K is provided for early warning of a fire condition and a visual display of the detectors location, as well as "first actuated" detector is provided at the local control panel.
Foam is not being used.
The cable spreading rooms have:
(1) More than two remote and separate entrances; (2) Aisles to facilitate access in the cable spreading rooms have been provided, however, due to redesign to provide redundant cable spreading rooms, the aisles have been reduced in dimensions.
Depending upon their location, they vary from 3 feet wide by 8 feet high to a minimum of 1-1/2 to 2 feet wide by 5 feet high. A number of access doors exist. A trained fire fighter can access the area with his equipment, provided that he is familiar with the layout through training.
A visual display of smoke detectors is provided at the local control panel. The fire fighter will be cognizant of the location of the fire and will use the proper aisle to facilitate fire attack strategy.
(3) Portable extinguishers located inside and outside the room and hoses located immediately outside each room; (4) Area smoke detection; and (5) Ionization detectors are used to provide early warning of incipient fires and permit early attack by manual means. Thermal detectors located at the ceiling actuate the automatic suppression system. The dual detection system provides supplementary means of fire detection in lieu of solely depending upon line-type temperature detection.
The flow drainage system is designed to handle the design sprinkler discharge. There is no gas system in the cable spreading rooms.
A separate cable spreading room is provided for each redundant division, except Cable Spreading Room IA-Sk, where, as detailed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire, Sketch CAR-SH-SK-668S18, redundant B cables which run in the qable tray CC0078-SB and conduits 16020G-SR2-2, 1602OT-SR4-2, 10988B-SR4-2, 16106E-SR4-1, 10632H-SR4-1, 1602OR-SR2-1.
They will be enclosed in one hour fire resistance rating enclosure due to sprinkler system already present in this fire area. Cable spreading rooms are not shared between reactors. Each cable spreading room is separated from the others and from other areas of the plant by barriers with a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, except as explained above.
There is no gas extinguishing system for the cable spreading rooms, thnerefore, ventilation system isolation is not required. Smoke venting is accomplished using the normal partially recirculating ventilation system, which is capable of once through purge operation.
d 87
NUREG-1038 Safety Evakmution Report related to the operation of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Oocket Nos. STN 50-400 and STN 50-401 Carolina Power and Ught Company North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation November 1983
Control Room The control room complex is separated from all other areas of the plant by 3-hour-rated assemblies. Peripheral rooms in the control room complex are offices. Each room is separated from the control room by 1-hour-fire-rated 3arriers. Smoke detectors that alarm and annunciate in the control room panel are provided in each room.
All cables entering the control room terminate there. No cables are routed through the control room from one area to another. There are no raised floors in the control room. There is a trench under the HVAC control, which is about U. feet x 2 feet x 8 inches. The fire loading is low, less than 2000 Btu/ft 2 .
A suppression system is not provided. There are redundant safety-related radiation monitoring cables installed in conduits above the suspended ceiling.
The control room suspended ceiling is the aluminum luminous louver type, egg crate construction. A perforated duct located above the hung ceiling intro duces air into the control room. The space above the hung ceiling does not contain any cable tray, only conduits.
Smoke detectors will be provided on the south side of the control room rein forced concrete ceiling, as well as below the hung ceiling.
Because of the low fuel loading and the small size of the trench, combined with the installed early warning smoke detection and continuous manning of the control room, the staff finds the installation of conduits in the control room ceiling, the omission of a suppression system in the trench, and the omission of a sprinkler system in the peripheral rooms acceptable deviations from Sec tion C.7.b of BTP CMFB 9.5-1.
Ionization smoke detectors have been installed in the control room, but not inside the individual cabinets and consoles within the control room. The staff will require the applicant to provide cabinet detectors in accordance with Section C.7.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
Cable Spreading Room The cable spreading room is separated from the balance of the plant by 3-hour fire-rated walls and floor/ceiling assemblies. All penetrations through fire rated barriers are fitted with 3-hour-fire-rated dampers and/or 3-hour-fire rated penetration seals.
Separate cable spreading rooms have been provided for each division of redundant safe shutdown system circuits.
There are several redundant train B cables in the train A cable spreading room.
The train B cables are enclosed in a 1-hour-rated barrier. Because a detection and suppression system has been installed in the area, the staff finds this an acceptable deviation from its guidelines.
The primary fire suppression system in the cable spreading rooms is an auto matic pre-action sprinkler system with fusible-type sprinkler heads. Electrical cabling is designed to allow wetting down without electrical faulting.
Shearon Harris SER 9-53
Based on its review, the staff concludes that the fire protection provided f the cable spreading rooms, with the acceptable deviation, meets Section C.7.
of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
Switchgear Rooms The Division A and Division B switchgear rooms are separated from each other and from other plant areas by 3-hour-fire-rated walls and floor/ceiling assemblies.
Automatic fire detection is provided by ionization smoke detectors. Manual protection is provided by standpipe hose stations and portable extinguishers.
Floor drains have been provided in the switchgear rooms.
Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the protection of the switchgear rooms is in accordance with Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and is therefore, acceptable.
Remote Safety-Related Panels Areas remote from the control room that contain safety-related panels are prc vided with detectors that alarm locally and in the control room. Panels pro viding remote shutdown capability are located in the auxiliary control panel room, which is separated from other plant areas by barriers having a fire resistance rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Panels providing remote shutdown in the auxil control panel room are electrically isolated and are connected to redundant transfer panels, each of which is located in a separate fire area. Ionizati(
detectors in the auxiliary control panel room alarm locally and in the contri room. Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations are available in tf area. Redundant safety-related panels required for safe shutdown are sep, Based on its review, the staff concludes the fire protection for remote safe related panels meets Section C.7.f of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
Safety-Related Battery Rooms The battery rooms are separated from each other and from the balance of the plant by 3-hour-fire-rated barriers. Ionization smoke detection systems arf provided in each battery room. Hose stations and portable fire extinguishel are available in the areas for manual fire suppression. The ventilation syý is designed to maintain the hydrogen levels below Z. Loss of ventilation alarms have been provided for each battery room.
Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the protection provided for the battery rooms is in accordance with Section C.7.g and is, therefore acceptable.
Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms Each diesel generator and its day tank are separated by 3-hour-fire-rated t riers. Each diesel fuel oil day tank room is protected by an automatic mul cycle sprinkler system. The system is activated by heat detectors. Addi`
She'aron Harris SER 9-54
early warning detection is provided by ionization smoke detectors and flame detectors.
The day tanks are sized to hold 3000 gallons of diesel fuel instead of the maximum of 1100 gallons recommended by the staff guidelines. Because each 3000-gallon diesel fuel oil day tank is located in a separate enclosure that is designed with walls, floor, and ceiling that have a 3-hour-fire-resistive rating and is sized to contain 110% of the total contents of the tank, the staff finds this an acceptable deviation. The staff concludes that with the acceptable deviation, the protection provided for the diesel generator rooms meets Sec tion C.7.i and is, therefore, acceptable.
Other Plant Areas The applicant's fire hazards analysis addressed other plant areas not specif ically discussed in this report. The staff finds that the fire protection for these areas is in accordance with BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
9.5.1.7 Summary of Deviations from CMEB 9.5-1 The technical requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 and Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1 have been included in BTP CMEB 9.5-1. The following deviations from the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 have been approved:
(1) non-IEEE 383-rated cables for lighting BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section Co5.e and communications systems (2) fixed emergency lighting BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.g (3) 3000-gallon capacity diesel generator BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.i day tanks (4) conduits in the control room ceiling BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.b (5) lack of automatic sprinklers in the BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.b control room peripheral rooms (6) lack of automatic suppression in BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.b control room trench (7) separation of redundant cables in the BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.c switchgear room by 1-hour barriers, sprinklers, and detectors The following are the open fire protection items:
(1) fire doors BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a (2) safe shutdown BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.b (3) alternate shutdown BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.c (4) hydrogen line piping BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.d (5) detection in control room cabinets BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.b Shearon Harris SER
NUREG-1038 Supplement No. 3 Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 Docket No. STN 50-400 Carolina Power and Light Company North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation May 1986
9.5.1.6 Fire Protection of Specific Plant Areas Containment systems are provided in In the SER, the staff stated that automatic sprinkler and over the the electrical cable trays, the electrical penetration areas, charcoal filter housings. In fact, the sprinkler systems are installed over This correction does not the electrical cable trays in the penetration areas.
for containment.
change the staff's evaluation of the fire protection Control Room the control room complex In the SER, the staff stated that peripheral rooms in In fact, are separated from the control room by 1-hour-fire-rated barriers. nor protected by the peripheral rooms are neither separated by a fire barrier in Section C.7.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
an automatic sprinkler system as prescribed The staff was concerned that, in the event of a fire in the cabinet office/kitchen area, into the main terminal and control smoke and hot gases would propagate to install an 1986, the applicants proposed room. By letter dated April 4, The details concerning automatic sprinkler head in the office/kitchen area.
are included in the above referenced letter.
the installation of this sprinkler the effects of a fire will This modification provides reasonable assurance that tfe proposed pro be confined to the office/kitchen area. The staff considers 9.5-1.
BTP CMEB tection an acceptable deviation from Section C.7.b of Safety-Related Battery Rooms fire extinguishers In the SER, the staff stated that hose stations and portable manual fire rooms. In fact, are available in the safety-related battery The location of this fighting equipment is positioned outside these rooms. therefore, acceptable.
guidelines and is, equipment meets staff fire protection 9.5.1.7 Summary of Deviations From CMEB 9.5-1 approved deviations from In Supplement No. 2, the staff listed the previously staff fire protection guidelines. The staff incorrectly identified one devia In fact, the approved de tion (No. 7) as pertaining to the switchgear room.
to the guidelines for 1-hour viation was for the cable spreading room, relative barriers, sprinklers, and detectors.
13 and April 4, 1986, On the basis of its evaluation of the applicants' February are also deviations letters, the staff has concluded that the following acceptable:
as described in (1) fire protection for redundant shutdown systems Section 9.5.1.4 in certain plant locations (2) lack of 8-hour battery-powered lighting units as described in Section 9.5.1.4 areas as described in Sec (3) fire protection for the control room peripheral tion 9.5.1.6 Shearon Harris SSER 3 9-18