ML020280252

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Manual Volume C Revision 2002-01

ML020280252
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	01/22/2002
From:	Mccollum W Duke Energy Corp
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
Download: ML020280252 (37)

Text

Duke S Duke Energy Corporation Oconee Nuclear Station 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 (864) 885-3107 OFFICE W R. McCollum, Jr. (864) 885-3560 FAx Vice President January 22, 2002 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Manual Volume C Revision 2002-01 Please find attached for your use and review copies of the revision to the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan: Volume C Revision 2002-01 January 2002.

This revision is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50-54(q) and does not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan or the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

questions or concerns pertaining to this revision please call Mike Thorne, S.Any Emergency Planning Manager at 864-885-3210.

By copy of this letter, two copies of this revision are being provided to the NRC, Region II, Atlanta, Georgia.

Very ours, W. .*.,lum, Jr.

VP, Oconee Nuclear Site xc: (w/2 copies of attachments)

Mr. Luis Reyes, Regional Administrator, Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 24T23 Atlanta, GA 30303 w/copy of attachments Mr. Steven Baggett Rockville, Maryland (w/o Attachments, Oconee Nuclear Station)

NRC Resident Inspector M. D. Thorne, Manager, Emergency Planning

January 22, 2002 OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE INTRASITE LETTER

SUBJECT:

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume C, Revision 2002-01 Please make the following changes to the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume C by following the below instructions.

REMOVE ADD Cover Sheet - Rev. 2001-12 Cover Sheet Rev. 2002-01 Table of Contents, Page 1 & 2 Table of Contents, Page 1 &2 RP/0/B/1000/001 - 05/14/01 RP/0/B/1000/001 - 01/15/02 Human Resources Procedure Human Resources Procedure 04/26/00 01/07/02

DUKE POWER EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES VOLUME C APPROVED:

W. W. Foster, Manager Safety Assurance Date Approved 01/22/02 Effective Date VOLUME C REVISION 2002-01 JANUARY 2002

VOLUME C TABLE OF CONTENTS HP/O/B/1009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections 05/19/00 HP/0/B/1009/020 Estimating Food Chain Doses Under Post Accident 10/09/98 Conditions HP/0/B/1009/021 Source Term Assessment Of A Gaseous Release From 12/01/97 Non-Routine Release Points HP/0/B/1009/022 On Shift Off-Site Dose Projections 10/08/01 RP/0/BI 1000/001 Emergency Classification 01/15/02 I

RP/O/B/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure 11105101 RP/0/B/1000/003 A ERDS Operation 12/03/98 RP/0/B/1000/007 Security Event 11/05/01 RP/0/B/1000/009 Procedure For Site Assembly 11/15/01 RP/0/B/1000/010 Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site 04/24/01 Personnel RP/0/B/1000/015 A Offsite Communications From The Control Room 12/11/01 RP/0/B/1000/015 B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center 12/11/01 RP/0/B/1000/015 C Offsite Communications From The Emergency Operations 12/11/01 Facility RP/0/B/1000/016 Medical Response 01/30/01 RP/0/B/1000/017 Spill Response 11/30100 RP/0/B/1000/018 Core Damage Assessment 09/30/97 RP/0/B/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure 12/05/01 RP/0/B/1000/020 Emergency Operations Facility Director Procedure 12/05/01 RP/0/B/1000/021 Operations Interface (EOF) 04/30/01 RP/0/B/1000/022 Procedure For Site Fire Damage Assessment And Repair 09/18/01 RP/0/B/1000/024 Protective Action Recommendations 11/10/99 RP/0/B/1000/028 Communications & Community Relations World Of 02/17/97 Energy Emergency Response Plan Revision 2002-01 January 2002 I

VOLUME C TABLE OF CONTENTS RP/O/B/ 1000/029 Fire Brigade Response 11/07/01 RP/0/B/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan 06/12/00 SR/O/B/2000/001 Standard Procedure For Public Affairs Response To The 03/23/00 Emergency Operations Facility Business Business Management Emergency Plan 03/21/01 Management SSG Functional SSG Emergency Response Plan - ONS Specific 03/01/01 Area Directive 102 NSC - 110 Nuclear Supply Chain - SCO Emergency Response Plan 04/02/01 Engineering Engineering Emergency Response Plan 09/12/01 Directive 5.1 Human Resources Procedure ONS Human Resources Emergency Plan 01/07/02 I

Radiation Protection Off-Site Dose Assessment And Data Evaluation 04/06/99 Manual Section 11.3 Radiation Protection Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions 11/26/01 Manual Section 11.7 Safety Assurance Safety Assurance Emergency Response Organization 11/28/94 Directive 6.1 Safety Assurance Emergency Contingency Plan 03/27/00 Directive 6.2 Training Division Training Division Emergency Response Guide DTG-007 12/17/01 Revision 2002-01 January, 2002 2

Duke Power Company (1)ID No. RP!O/B/1000/01

-iNW6NV&ATioN PROCEDURE PROCESS RECORD Revision No. 011 J ONLY

-I'REPARATION (2) Station OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION (3) Procedure Title Emergency Classification (4) Prepared By DoniceKelley (Signature) --.

DtrhA,, 1/c0L* ,--, Date 01/09/02 (5) Requires NSD 228 Applicability Determination? U Z Yes (New procedure or revision with major changes)

El No (Revision with minor changes) nI No (To incorporate previously approved changes)

(6) Reviewed By ýýQ 1A (QR) Date OZ Cross-Disciplinary Revo By (QR)NA " Date I/h f 2_

Reactivity Mgmt Review By (QR)NAA)_Date 6i 2-A Mgmt Involvement Review By (Ops Supt) NA Date (7) Additional Reviews Reviewed By Date Reviewed By Date (8) Temporary Approval (if necessary)

By (OSM/QR) Date

".. By (QR) Date (9) Approved By 2 ) c Date o PERFORMANCE (Comparewith control copy every 14 calendardays while work is being performed.)

(10) Compared with Control Copy Date Compared with Control Copy Date Compared with Control Copy Date (11) Date(s) Performed Work Order Number (WO#)

COMPLETION (12) Procedure Completion Verification:

o Unit 0 El Unit 1 El Unit 2 El Unit 3 Procedure performed on what unit?

El Yes Dl NA Check lists and/or blanks initialed, signed, dated, or filled in NA, as appropriate?

Dl Yes El NA Required enclosures attached?

El Yes El NA Data sheets attached, completed, dated, and signed?

"El Yes El NA Charts, graphs, etc. attached, dated, identified, and marked?

"El Yes El NA Procedure requirements met?

Verified By Date

3) Procedure Completion Approved Date "714) Remarks (Attach additionalpages)

Procedure No.

Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Site RPIOJB/Io001001 Revision No.

011 Emergency Classification Electronic Reference No.

Reference Use OXOO2WOS

RPIO/B/1000/O01 Page 2 of 5 Emergency Classification NOTE: This procedure is an implementing procedure to the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency plan and must be forwarded to Emergency Planning within three (3) working days of approval.

1. Symptoms 1.1 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.

1.2 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and their corresponding Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

1.3 This procedure provides reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events.

1.4 The following guidance is to be used by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director in assessing emergency conditions:

1.4.1 The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director shall review all applicable initiating events to ensure proper classification.

1.4.2 The BASIS Document (Volume A, Section D of the Emergency Plan) is available for review if any questions arise over proper classification.

1.4.3 IF An event occurs on more than one unit concurrently, THEN The event with the higher classification will be classified on the Emergency Notification Form.

A. Information relating to the problem(s) on the other unit(s) will be captured on the Emergency Notification Form as shown in RP/O/B/1000/015A, (Offsite Communications From The Control Room),

RP/O/B/1000/015B, (Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center) or RP/OBII1000/O15C, (Offsite Communications From The Emergency Operations Facility).

1.4.4 IF An event occurs, AND A lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the Classification can be made, THEN The classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time the event occurred.

RP/O/BIl 000/001 Page 3 of 5 1.4.5 The Fission Product Barrier Matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at Hot Shutdown or higher.

A. An event that is recognized at Cold Shutdown or lower shall not be classified using the Fission Product Barrier Matrix.

1. Reference should be made to the additional enclosures that provide Emergency Action Levels for specific events (e.g., Severe Weather, Fire,Security).

1.5 IF A transient event should occur, THEN Review the following guidance:

1.5.1 IF An Emergency Action Level (EAL) identifies a specific duration AND The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded, (i.e.;

condition cannot be reasonably corrected before the duration elapses),

THEN Classify the event.

1.5.2 IF A plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is corrected before the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN The event is NOT classified by that EAL.

A. Review lower severity EALs for possible applicability in these cases.

NOTE: Reporting under 10CFR50.72 may be required for the following step. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a follow up evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

1.5.3 IF A plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is not recognized at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g.; as a result of routine log or record review)

AND The condition no longer exists, THEN An emergency shall NOT be declared.

RP/O/B/1000/001 Page 4 of 5 1.5.4 IF An emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been corrected prior to declaration and notification, THEN The Emergency Coordinator must consider the potential that the initiating condition (e.g.; Failure of Reactor Protection System) may have caused plant damage that warrants augmenting the on shift personnel through activation of the Emergency Response Organization.

A. IF An Unusual Event condition exists, THEN Make the classification as required.

1. The event may be terminated in the same notification or as a separate termination notification.

B. IF An Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency condition exists, THEN Make the classification as required, AND Activate the Emergency Response Organization.

1.6 Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director assessment determines that the Emergency Action Levels for the Initiating Condition have been exceeded.

2. Immediate Actions 2.1 Determine the operating mode that existed at the time the event occurred prior to any protection system or operator action initiated in response to the event.

2.2 IF The unit is at Hot Shutdown or higher AND The condition/event affects fission product barriers, THEN GO TO Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix).

2.2.1 Review the criteria listed in Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix) and make the determination if the event should be classified.

RP/0/B/1000/001 Page 5 of 5 2.3 Review the listing of enclosures to determine if the event is applicable to one of the categories shown.

2.3.1 IF One or more categories are applicable to the event, 2.3.2 THEN Refer to the associated enclosures.

2.3.3 Review the EALs and determine if the event should be classified.

A. IF An EAL is applicable to the event, THEN Classify the event as required.

2.4 IF The condition requires an emergency classification, THEN GO TO RP/0/B/1000/002, (Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure) Subsequent Actions.

2.5 Continue to review the emergency conditions to assure the current classification continues to be applicable.

3. Enclosures Enclosures Page Number

"*-x 4.1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix 6 4.2 System Malfunctions 7 4.3 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluents 9 4.4 Loss Of Shutdown Functions 11 4.5 Loss of Power 13 4.6 Fires/Explosions And Security Actions 14 4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety 15 4.8 Radiation Monitor Readings For Emergency Classification 18 4.9 Unexpected/Unplanned Increase In Area Monitor Readings 19 4.10 Definitions 20 4.11 Operating Modes Defined In Improved Technical Specifications 23 "4.12 Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 24

( Enc( .e 4.1 RP/0/B3/ ,001 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Page 1 of 1 DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION USING THE TABLE BELOW: CIRCLE EALS CHOSEN. ADD POINTS TO CLASSIFY. (SEE NOTERT .0 ,W*

RCS BARRIERS (BD 5-7) FUEL CLAD BARRIERS (BID89) CONTAINMENT BARRIERS (BD 10-12)

Potential Loss (4 Points) Loss (5 Points) Potential Loss (4 Points) Loss (5 Points) Potential Loss (1 Point) Loss (3 Points)

RCS Leakrate > Makeup capacity RCS Leak rate > available makeup Average of the 5 highest Average of the 5 highest CETC CETC > 12000 F > 15 minutes Rapid unexplained containment of one HPI pump in normal capacity as indicated by a loss of CETC > 1200' F OR pressure decrease after increase makeup mode (approx. 160 gpm) subcooling > 7000 F CETC >7000 F > 15 minutes with OR with Letdown isolated. a valid RVLS reading 0" containment pressure or sump level not consistent with LOCA SGTR > Makeup capacity of one Valid RVLS reading of 0" Coolant activity > 300 gCi/ml DEI RB pressure Ž_59 psig Failure of secondary side of SG HPI pump in normal makeup OR results in a direct opening to the mode (approx. 160 gpm) with RB pressure _>10 psig and no environment with P/S leakage > 10 Letdown isolated. NOTE: RVLS is NOT RBCU or RBS gpm in the same SO Entry into the PTS (Pressurized IRIA 57/58 reading >_1.0 R/hr valid if one or more Hours Since SD RIA57/58 R/hr Hours Since SD RIA57/58 - R/hr Failure of secondary side of SG Thermal Shock) Operation RCPs are running OR if results in a direct opening to the 2 RIA 57 reading Ž 1.6 R LPI pump(s) are 0 - < 0.5 > 300/150 0 - < 0.5 > 1800/860 environment with P/S leakage > 10 2 RIA 58 reading> 1.0 R./hr running. gpm in the other SG 2 RIA 58 reading > 1.0 R/hr AND 0.5 - < 2.0 > 80/40 0.5 - < 2.0 >400/195 Feeding SO with secondary side 3RIA 57/58 reading _1.0 R/hr failure from the affected unit 2.0 - 8.0 > 32/16 2.0- 8.0 >280/130 HPI Forced Cooling RCS pressure spike _ 2750 psig Hydrogen concentration > 9% Containment isolation is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment Director judgment Director judgment judgment Director judgment Director judgment UNUSUAL EVENT (1-3 Total Points) ALERT'(4-6 Total Points) SITE AREA EMERGENCY (7-10 Total Points) GENERAL EMERGENCY (11-13 Total Points)

OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4

• Loss of any two barriers

• Any potential loss of Containment

• Any potential loss or loss of the Fuel Clad Loss of any two barriers and potential loss of the

• Loss of one barrier and potential loss of either third barrier

+ Any loss of containment

• Any potential loss or loss of the RCS RCS or Fuel Clad Barriers Loss of all three barriers Potential loss of both the RCS and Fuel Clad Barriers INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1,2,3,4 NOTIFY 1,2,3,4 .NOTIFY 1,2,3,4 NOTIFY 1,2,3,4 NOTE: An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss threshold is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgment and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

En e 4.2 '001

( Aunctions RP/0/B/(

Page I od UNUSUAL EVENT ] ALERT [ SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. RCS LEAKAGE (BD 14) 1. UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL 1. INABILITY TO MONITOR A SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION/ SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT IN OPERATING MODE: 1,2, 3,4 INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM PROGRESS (BD 21)

(BD 19)

A. Unidentified leakage > 10 gpm OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A. I Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following B. Pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm A. 1 Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes:

C. Identified leakage _>25 gpm annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes:

Units 1 & 3 Units 1 & 3 1 SA1-9, 14-16, and 18

1. UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL 1 SA1-9, 14-16, and 18 3 SA1-9, 14-16, and 18 SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION/

INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM 3 SA1-9, 14-16, and 18 FOR > 15 MINUTES (BD 15) Unit 2 Unit 2 2 SA1-9, 14-16 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 2 SA1-9, 14-16 AND AND A.] Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes: A.2 A significant transientis in progress A.2 Loss of annunciators /indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift Units 1 & 3 complement) to safely operate the unit AND 1 SAI-9, 14-16, and 18 3 SA1-9, 14-16, and 18 AND A.3 Loss of the OAC and ALL PAM indications Unit 2 A.3 Significant plant transient in progress AND 2 SA1-9, 14-16 AND OR A.4 Inability to directly monitor any one of the following functions:

A.2 Loss of annunciators or indicators requires A.4 Loss of the OAC and ALL PAM additional personnel (beyond normal shift indications 1. Subcriticality complement) to safely operate the unit 2. Core Cooling

3. Heat Sink

3. INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED 4. RCS Integrity SHUTDOWN WITHIN LIMITS (BD 16) 5. Containment Integrity

6. RCS Inventory OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 A. Required operating mode not reached within TS LCO action statement time (CONTINUED) (END) (END)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4

(!Ence e 4.2 RP/O/B/( '001

( Systems( unctions Page 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

4. UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ONSITE OR OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS (BD 17)

OPERATING MODE: All A. Loss of all onsite communications capability (ROLM system, PA system, Pager system, Onsite Radio system) affecting ability to perform Routine operations B. Loss of all onsite communications capability (Selective Signaling, NRC ETS lines, Offsite Radio System, AT&T line) affecting ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

5. FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION (BD 18)

OPERATING MODE: All:

A. DEI - >5ýLCi/ml (END)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1,2,3,4

Enc 'e 4.3 RP/0/]B/[ o001

( Page 1 Abnormal Rad LeNi. .adiological Effluent UNUJSUAL EVENT AERT, AL. [ T GENERAL EMERGENCY 1 ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF 1. ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF 1. BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTING FROM I1. BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTING FROM GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY ACTUAL/IMMINENT RELEASE OF ACTUAL/ IMMINENT RELEASE OF TO THE ENVIRONMENT THAT TO THE ENVIRONMENT THAT GASEOUS ACTIVITY (BD 32) GASEOUS ACTIVITY (BD 36)

EXCEEDS TWO TIMES THE SLC EXCEEDS 200 TIMES RADIOLOGICAL LIMITS FOR 60 MINUTES OR LONGER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR 15 OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All (BD 23) MINUTES OR LONGER (BD 28)

A. Valid reading on RIA 46 of _ 2.98E+05 cpm A. Valid reading on RIA 46 of > 2.98E+06 cpm OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All for >15 minutes (See Note 3) for >15 minutes (See Note 2)

A. Valid indication on RIA 46 of_Ž 2.98E+04 cpm A. Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA 33 B. Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on B. Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on of ->4.06E+06 cpm for > 60 minutes for >15 minutes (See Note 1) Enclosure 4.8 (See Note 2) Enclosure 4.8 (See Note 3)

(See Note 1)

B.1 RIA 33 HIGH Alarm C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at B. Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA 45 the site boundary of:

the site boundary of:

of _>1.33E+06 cpm for > 60 minutes AND (See Note 1) C. I > 1000 mRem TEDE

> 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem CDE adult B.2 Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 thyroid C. Liquid effluent being released exceeds two times the level of SLC 16.11.1 for > 15 minutes OR times SLC 16.11.1 for > 60 minutes as as determined by Chemistry Procedure D. Field survey results indicate site boundary dose C.2 _>5000 mRem CDE adult thyroid determined by Chemistry Procedure rates exceeding >100 mRad/hr expected to C. Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 D. Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two continue for more than one hour D. Field survey results indicate site boundary dose times the level of SLC 16.11.2 for >15 minutes times SLC 16.11.2 for > 60 minutes as rates exceeding Ž1000 mRad/hr expected to as determined by RP Procedure OR determined by RP Procedure continue for more than one hour

2. RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE D.1 Analyses of field survey samples indicate adult OR NOTE 1: If monitor reading is sustained MATERIAL OR INCREASES IN thyroid dose commitment of _>500 mRem for the time period indicated in the EAL RADIATION LEVELS THAT IMPEDES 7 CDE (3.84 E" gCi/ml) for one hour of D.1 Analyses of field survey samples indicate adult AND the required assessments (procedure OPERATION OF SYSTEMS REQUIRED inhalation thyroid dose commitment of Ž5000 mRem calculations) cannot be completed within TO MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATION OR this period, declaration must be made on the CDE for one hour of inhalation TO ESTABLISH OR MAINTAIN COLD valid Radiation Monitor reading. SHUTDOWN (BD 30) NOTE 2: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the OPERATING MODE: All valid radiation monitor reading should be NOTE 3: If actual Dose Assessment cannot used for emergency classification. be completed within 15 minutes, then the A. Valid radiation reading > 15 mRad/hr in CR, valid radiation monitor reading should be CAS, or, Radwaste CR used for emergency classification.

B. Unplannedlunexpected valid area monitor readings exceed limits stated in Enclosure 4.9 (CONTINUED) (END)

(CONTINUED) tCANIT!T1*T'L T*'

INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2, 3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4 NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 Assumptions used for calculation of vent monitors RIA 45 & 46:

I Average annual meteorology (1.672 F-6 sec/rm), semi.elevated

2. Vent flow rate 65,000 efin (average daily flow rate)

3. No credit is taken for vent filtration

4. One hour release duration for Unusual Event, 15 minute duration for Alert, Site Area Emergency, GeneralEmergency

5. General Emergency PAGs are I rem TEDE and 5 rem CDE; Site Area Emergency determination is based on 10% of the General Emergency PAGs

6. Calculations for monitor readings are based on whole body dose

7. Standard ODCM guidance together with NUMARC guidance indicates that effluent releases are based on Technical Specification releases

Ene( e 4.3 '001

. Abnormal Rad Le& *.adiological Effluent Page 2o UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT STE AREA EMERGENY SI GENERAL EMRGENCY 2 UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN PLANT 2. MAJOR DAMAGE TO IRRADIATED 2. LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE RADIATION OR AIRBORNE FUEL OR LOSS OF WATER LEVEL REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR CONCENTRATION (BD 25) THAT HAS OR WILL RESULT IN THE WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE UNCOVERING OF IRRADIATED FUEL REACTOR VESSEL (BD 35)

OPERATING MODE: All OUTSIDE THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 31) OPERATING MODE: 5,6 A. LT 5 reading 14" and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage WITH fuel in the OPERATING MODE: All A. I Failure of heat sink causes loss of Cold core Shutdown condition A. Valid RIA 3,6, 41, OR 49 HIGH Alarm B. Uncontrolledwater level decrease in the SFP AND and fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuel B. HIGH Alarm for portable area monitors on the assemblies remaining covered by water main bridge or SFP bridge A.2 LT 5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS makeup C. I R/hr radiation reading at one foot away from C Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel a damaged storage cask located at the ISFSI uncovered B.1 Failure of heat sink causes loss of Cold Shutdown condition D. Valid area monitor readings exceeds limits D. Operators determine water level drop in either stated in Enclosure 4.9. the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed AND makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered B.2 Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS (END) makeup (END)

NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.4., (Loss of Shutdown Functions). High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.

(END)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3,_4 NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4 NOTIFY 1, Z, 394

( EncC -ze 4.4 RP/B/JI A001 Loss of Shutdown Functions Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ]ALERT

1. FAILURE OF RIPS TO COMPLETE OR

[ 1.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OR 1.

GENERAL EMERGENCY FAILURE OF RIPS TO COMPLEIE INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 39) INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 42) AUTOMATIC SCRAM AND MANUAL SCRAM NOT SUCCESSFUL WITH OPERATING MODE: 1, 2 INDICATION OF CORE DAMAGE OPERATING MODE 1, 2,3 (BD 45)

A.1 Valid reactor trip signal received or required A.1 Valid reactor trip signal received or required WITHOUT automatic scram OPERATING MODE: 1, 2 WITHOUT automatic scram AND A.A Valid Rx trip signal received or required AND WITHOUT automatic scram A. 1.1 DSS has inserted Control Rod Groups 5,6,7 A.2 DSS has NOT inserted Control Rod Groups 5, 6, 7 AND OR A. 1.2 Manual trip from the Control Room is AND A.2 Manual trip from the Control Room was NOT successful and reactor power is less successful in reducing reactor power to < 5%

than 5% and decreasing and decreasing A.3 Manual trip from the Control Room was NOT

2. INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PLANT IN successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing AND COLD SHUTDOWN (BD 41)

2. COMPLETE LOSS OF FUNCTION A.3 Average of the 5 highest CETCs >1200' F on OPERATING MODE: 5,6 NEEDED TO ACHIEVE OR MAINTAIN ICCM HOT SHUTDOWN (BD 43)

A. 1 Loss of LPI and/or LPSW AND OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 A.2 Inability to maintain RCS temperature A. Average of the 5 highest CETCs Ž>12000 F below 200' F as indicated by either of the shown on ICCM (END) following:

B. Unable to maintain reactor subcritical A.2.1 RCS temperature at the LPI Pump Suction C. SSF feeding SG per EOP OR A.2.2 Average of the 5 highest CETCs as (CONTINUED) indicated by ICCM display OR A.2.3 Visual observation (END)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4 NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4 NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4

( Enc( .e 4.4 RPaOeB/of ,001 Loss of Shutdown Functions Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT A ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

3. LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 44)

OPERATING MODE: 5,6 A. 1 Failure of heat sink causes loss of Cold Shutdown conditions AND A.2 LT-5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS Makeup B. 1 Failure of heat sink causes loss of Cold Shutdown conditions AND B.2 Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS makeup (END)

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4

EEnc( .,e 4.5 RP/O0B/i, A01 Loss of Power Page 1 of 1 UNUSUAL EVENT [ ALERTI SITE AREA EMERGENCY GEN L EMERGENCY

1. LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER TO 1. LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND 1. LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND 1. PROLONGED LOSS O1F ALL OUFkSIT, ESSENTIAL BUSSES FOR GREATER LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO POWER AND ONSITE AC POWER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 47) ESSENTIAL BUSSES (BD 49) ESSENTIAL BUSSES (BD 51) (BD 54)

OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: 5,6 OPERATING MODE: 1,2, 3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2, 3,4 Defueled A, I Loss of all offsite AC power to both the Red A.I MFB I and 2 de-energized A.1 MFB I and 2 de-energized and Yellow Busses for > 15 minutes A. 1 MFB 1 and 2 de-energized AND AND AND AND A.2 Failure to restore power to at least one MFB A.2 SSF fails to maintain Hot Shutdown A.2 Failure to restore power to at least one MFB within 15 minutes from the time of loss of A.2 Unit auxiliaries are being supplied from within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both both offsite and onsite AC power AND Keowee or CT5 offsite and onsite AC power A.3 At least one of the following conditions exist:

2. AC POWER CAPABILITY TO 2. LOSS OF ALL VITAL DC POWER

2. UNPLANNED LOSS OF REQUIRED DC ESSENTIAL BUSSES REDUCED TO A (BD 52)

POWER FOR GREATER THAN 15 A.3.1 Restoration of power to at least one MINUTES (BD 48) SINGLE SOURCE FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 50) MFB within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOT likely OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 OR OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A. 1 Unplannedloss of vital DC power to required DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less than A.3.2 Indications of continuing A. 1 Unplanned loss of vital DC power to required A. AC power capability has been degraded to a 110 VDC degradation of core cooling based DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less single power source for > 15 minutes due to the on Fission Product Barrier than 110 VDC loss of all but one of: AND monitoring AND Unit Normal Transformer A.2 Failure to restore power to at least one required (END)

Unit SU Transformer DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss A.2 Failure to restore power to at least one required Another Unit SU Transformer DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss CT4 (END)

CT5 (END)

(END)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4 NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4 NOTIFY 1, 2, 3, 4 NOTIFY 1, 2, 3,4

( En e 4.6 Security Actions RP/O/B/I Page 1 o\

'001 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. FIRES/EXPLOSIONS WITHIN THE FIRE/EXPLOSION AFFECTING 1. SECURITY EVENT IN A PLANT VITAL 1. SECURITY EVENT RESULTING IN LOSS PLANT (BD 57) OPERABILITY OF PLANT SAFETY AREA (BD 61) OF ABILITY TO REACH AND SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN (BD 62)

ESTABLISH/MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All SHUTDOWN (BD 59) OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All NOTE: RP/O/B/1000/007, (Security Event), NOTE: RP/O/B/IO00/007, (Security Event),

NOTE: Within the plant means shall be used in conjunction with all security shall be used in conjunction with all Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, related emergency classifications security related emergency classifications NOTE: Only one train of a system needs to Reactor Building, Keowee Hydro.

be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

A. Fire within the plant not extinguished within A. Intrusion into any of the following plant areas A., Loss of physical control of the control room 15 minutes of Control Room notification or A.1 Fire/explosions by a hostile force: due to security event verification of a Control Room alarm Reactor Building AND Auxiliary Building B. Loss of physical control of the Aux Shutdown B. Unanticipated explosion within the plant A. 1.1 Affected safety-related system parameter Keowee Hydro panel and the SSF due to a Security Event resulting in visible damage to permanent indications show degraded performance structures/equipment OR B. Bomb detonated in any of the following areas: (END)

"* Keowee Hydro

2. CONFIRMED SECURITY THREAT A.1.2 Plant personnel report visible damage to "* Keowee Dam INDICATES POTENTIAL permanent structures or equipment "* ISFSI DEGRADATION IN THE LEVEL OF required for safe shutdown "* Reactor Building SAFETY OF PLANT (BD 58) "* Auxiliary Building 2 SECURITY EVENT IN A PLANT "* SSF OPERATING MODE: All PROTECTED AREA (BD 60)

(END)

OPERATING MODE: All NOTE: RP/O/B/1000/007, (Security Event), shall be used in conjunction with all NOTE: RP/O/B/1000/007, (Security Event),

security related emergency classifications. shall be used in conjunction with all security related emergency classifications.

A. Discovery of bomb within plant protectedarea and outside security vital areas A. Intrusion into plant protected area by a hostile B. HostagelExtortionsituation force C. Violent civil disturbance within the owner B. Bomb discovered in an area containing safety controlled area related equipment D. Credible Security threat to the site (END) (END)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY. SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 1 NOTIFY 1, 2, 3,4

( Natural Disasters, Hazards and ,.

En e 4.7 Conditions Affecting Plant Safety RPIO/Bff Page 1 1001 1.

UNUSUAL EVENT NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE 1.

ALERT, NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE 1.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION AND IGENERAL EME!RGIENCY OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE PLANT PLANT CONTROL CANNOT BE DECLARATION OF GENERAL PROTECTED AREA (BD 64) VITAL AREA (BD 69) ESTABLISHED (BD 75) EMERGENCY (BD 78)

OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All A. Tremor felt and seismic trigger actuates (0.05g)

A.I Control Room evacuation has been initiated A. I Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director A. Tremor felt and valid alarm on the strong B.1 Tornado, high winds, missiles resulting from turbine failure, vehicle crashes, or other judgment indicates:

motion accelerograph AND catastrophic event A.1.1 Actual/imminent substantial core B Tornado striking within ProtectedArea AND A.2 Control of the plant cannot be established from degradation with potential for loss of Boundary the Aux Shutdown Panel or the SSF within 15 containment NOTE: Only one train of a safety-related system minutes needs to be affected or damaged in order to C. Vehicle crash into plant structures/systems OR satisfy these conditions.

within the ProtectedArea Boundary 2. KEOWEE HYDRO DAM FAILURE (BD 76) A.1.2 Potential for uncontrolled D. Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration radionuclide releases that would or damage to turbine or generator seals B. I.1 Visible damage to permanent structures or equipment required for OPERATING MODE: All result in a dose projection at the site boundary greater than 1000 mRem safe shutdown of the unit A. Imminent/actual dam failure includes any of TEDE or 5000 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid OR (CONTINUED) the following:

B..2 Affected safety system parameter "* Keowee Hydro Dam

"* Little River Dam (END) indications show degraded performance "* DikesA, B,C, orD

"* Intake Canal Dike

2. RELEASE OF TOXIC/FLAMMABLE GASES JEOPARDIZING SYSTEMS 3. OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SAFE DECLARATION OF SITE AREA OPERATION OR ESTABLISH EMERGENCY (BD 77)

MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN (BD 71)

OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All A. Report/detection of toxic gases in concentrations that will be life-threatening to A. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director plant personnel judgment B. Report/detection of flammable gases in (END) concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant:

"* Reactor Building

", Auxiliary Building

"* Turbine Building

"* Control Room (CONTINUED)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4

( Enc( 4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and K- _Conditions Affecting Plant Safety RP/a/B/(

Rae2o_

1901 2.

UNUSUAL NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE VENT 3.

ALERT TURBINE BUILDING FLOOD (BD 72) rE AREA EMERGENCY [ GENERAL EMERGENCY, PHENOMENA AFFECTING KEOWEE HYDRO (BD 66)

OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All A. Turbine Building flood requiring use of A. Reservoir elevation _>807 feet with all spillway AP/1,2,3/A/1700/10, (UncontrolledFlooding gates open and the lake elevation continues to Of Turbine Building) rise

4. CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION HAS B. Seepage readings increase or decrease greatly BEEN INITIATED (BD 73) or seepage water is carrying a significant amount of soil particles OPERATING MODE: All C New area of seepage or wetness, with large A. 1 Evacuation of Control Room amounts of seepage water observed on dam, dam toe, or the abutments AND ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

D. Slide or other movement of the dam or AND abutments which could develop into a failure A. 1.1 Plant control IS established from the Aux E. Developing failure involving the powerhouse or shutdown Panel or the SSF appurtenant structures and the operator OR believes the safety of the structure is questionable A.1.2 Plant control IS BEING established from the Aux Shutdown Panel or SSF

3. RELEASE OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES DEEMED DETRIMENTAL TO 5. OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT SAFE OPERATION OF THE PLANT CLASSIFICATION OF AN ALERT (BD 67) (BD 74)

OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All A. Report/detection of toxic or flammable gases A.1 Emergency Coordinator judgment indicates that could enter within the site area boundary that:

in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant A. 1.1 Plant safety may be degraded B. Report by local, county, state officials for AND potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event A. 1.2 Increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted (END)

(CONTINUED)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2, 3,4 NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4

Encr "4.7 o01

(. Natural Disasters, Hazards and OM- - Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 3 o.

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4 OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH WARRANT DECLARATION OF AN UNUSUAL EVENT (BD 68)

OPERATING MODE; All A. Emergency Coordinator determines potential degradation of level of safety has occurred (END)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

SEE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY NOTIFY 1, 2,3,4

I, EncQ _e 4.8 Rp/0/BA/ J01 Radiation Monitor Readings for Emergency Classification Page 1 of 1 NOTE: IF Actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes.

THEN The valid monitor reading should be used for Emergency Classification.

All RIA values are considered GREATER THAN or EQUAL TO HOURS SINCE RIA 57 R/hr IA 58 R/hr*

REACTOR TRIPPED Site Area Emergency General Emergency Site Area Emergency I General Emergency 0.0 - < 0.5 5.9E+003 5.9E+004 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 0.5 - < 1.0 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 1.1E+003 1.1E+004 1.0 - < 1.5 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.6E+002 8.6E+003 1.5 - < 2.0 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.5E+002 8.5E+003 2.0 - < 2.5 1.4E+003 1.4E+004 6.3E+002 6.3E+003 2.5 - < 3.0 1.2E+003 1.2E+004 5.7E+002 5.7E+003 3.0 - < 3.5 1.1E+003 1.1E+004 5.2E+002 5.2E+003 3.5 - < 4.0 1.OE+003 1.OE+004 4.8E+002 4.8E+003 4.0 - < 8.0 1.OE+003 1.OE+004 4.4E+002 4.4E+003

• RIA 58 is partially shielded Assumptions used for calculation of high range in-containment monitors RIA 57 and 58:

1. Average annual meteorology (7.308 E"6 sec/m 3)

2. Design basis leakage (5.6 E6 ml/hr)

3. One hour release duration

4. General Emergency PAGs are 1 rem TEDE and 5 rem CDE; Site Area Emergency determination is based on 10% of the General Emergency PAGs

5. Calculations for monitor readings are based on CDE because thyroid dose is limiting

6. No credit is taken for filtration

7. LOCA conditions are limiting and provide the more conservative reading

( Enc. e 4.9 RP/O/B/( J01 Unexpected/Unplanned Increase In Area Monitor Readings Page 1 of 1 NOTE: This Initiating Condition is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g.; incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.).

UNITS 1, 2,3 MONITOR NUMBER UNUSUAL EVENT 1000x ALERT NORMAL LEVELS mRADJHR mRADJHR RIA 7, Hot Machine Shop Elevation 796 150 >5000 RIA 8, Hot Chemistry Lab Elevation 796 4200 Ž5000 RIA 10, Primary Sample Hood Elevation 796 830 Ž5000 RIA 11, Change Room Elevation 796 210 Ž> 5000 RIA 12, Chem Mix Tank Elevation 783 800 Ž5000 RIA 13, Waste Disposal Sink Elevation 771 650 > 5000 RIA 15, HPI Room Elevation 758 NOTE* > 5000 NOTE: RIA 15 normal readings are approximately 9 mRad/hr on a daily basis. Applying 1000x normal readings would put this monitor greater than 5000 mRad/hr just for an UnusualEvent. For this reason, an Unusual Event will NOT be declared for a reading less than 5000 mRad/hr.

Enclosure 4.10 RP/0/B/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 1 of 3

1. List of Definitions and Acronyms NOTE: Definitions are italicized throughout procedure for easy recognition.

1.1 ALERT - Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

1.2 BOMB - A fused explosive device 1.3 CONDITION A - Failure is Imminent or Has Occurred - A failure at the dam has occurred or is about to occur and minutes to days may be allowed to respond dependent upon the proximity to the dam.

1.4 CONDITION B - Potentially Hazardous Situation is Developing - A situation where failure may develop, but preplanned actions taken during certain events (such as major floods, earthquakes, evidence of piping) may prevent or mitigate failure.

1.5 CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A group of ten (10) or more people violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

1.6 CREDIBLE THREAT - The determination of what is a credible threat to the site will be the responsibility of Security Manager/designee in consultation with the OSM. The determination of "credible" is made through use of information found in the Oconee Nuclear Station Safeguards Contingency Plan and Security implementing procedures.

1.7 EXPLOSION - A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components. A sudden failure of a pressurized pipe/line could fit this definition. This definition includes MS line rupture and FW line ruptures.

1.8 EXTORTION - An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

1.9 FIRE - Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke, such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment, do NOT constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

1.10 GENERAL EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels outside the Exclusion Area Boundary.

Enclosure 4.10 RP/O/B/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 2 of 3 1.11 HOSTAGE - A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure demands will be met by the station.

1.12 INTRUSIONAINTRUDER - Suspected hostile individual present in a ProtectedArea without authorization.

1.13 INABILITY TO DIRECTLY MONITOR - Operational Aid Computer data points are unavailable or gauges/panel indications are NOT readily available to the operator.

1.14 LOSS OF POWER - Emergency Action Levels (EALs) apply to the ability of electrical energy to perform its intended function, reach its intended equipment. Ex. - If both MFBs, are energized but all 4160v switchgear is not available, the electrical energy can not reach the motors intended. The result to the plant is the same as if both MFBs were de-energized.

1.15 PROTECTED AREA - Encompasses all Owner Controlled Areas within the security perimeter fence.

1.16 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAKAGE - RCS Operational Leakage as defined in the Technical Specification Basis B 3.4.13.

1.17 RUPTURED (As relates to Steam Generator) - Existence of Primary to Secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

1.18 SABOTAGE - Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

1.19 SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS AREA - Any area within the Protectedarea which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

1.20 SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT - An unplanned event involving one or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine runback>25% thermal reactor power (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load (3) Reactor Trip (4) Safety Injection System Activation 1.21 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels outside the Exclusion Area Boundary.

1.22 SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT (SLC) -Chapter 16 of the FSAR

Enclosure 4.10 RP/O/B/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 3 of 3 1.23 SITE BOUNDARY - That area, including the ProtectedArea, in which DPC has the authority to control all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property (1 mile radius from the center of Unit 2).

1.24 TOXIC GAS - A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.; Chlorine).

1.25 UNCONTROLLED - Event is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff.

1.26 UNPLANNED - An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

1.27 UNUSUAL EVENT - Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

1.28 VALID - An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by: (1) an instrument channel check; or, (2) indications on related or redundant instrumentation; or, (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt related to the instrument's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit with this definition is the need for timely assessment.

1.29 VIOLENT - Force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

1.30 VISIBLE DAMAGE -Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

Example damage: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture.

Enclosure 4.11 RP/O/B/IO00/O01 Operating Modes Defined In Improved Page 1 of 1 Technical Specifications MODES REACTIVITY  % RATED AVERAGE CONDITION THERMAL REACTOR COOLANT MODE TITLE POWER (a) TEMPERATURE

(&ef) (OF) 1 Power Operation >0.99 >5 NA 2 Startup >0.99 <5 NA 3 Hot Standby <0.99 NA >250 4 Hot Shutdown (b) < 0.99 NA 250 > T > 200 5 Cold Shutdown (b) < 0.99 NA < 200 6 Refueling (c) NA NA NA (a) Excluding decay heat.

(b) All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.

(c) One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned.

Enclosure 4.12 RP/OB/I1000/001 Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 Page 1 of 2

1. Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 - Fission Product Barrier Matrix 1.1 If the unit was at Hot S/D or above, (Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4) and one or more fission product barriers have been affected, refer to Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix) and review the criteria listed to determine if the event should be classified.

1.1.1 For each Fission Product Barrier, review the associated EALs to determine if there is a Loss or Potential Loss of that barrier. Circle any that apply.

NOTE: An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss thresholds is imminent (i.e. within 1-3 hours). In this situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

1.2 Three possible outcomes exist for each barrier. No challenge, potential loss, or loss.

Use the worst case for each barrier and the classification table at the bottom of the page to determine appropriate classification.

1.3 The numbers in parentheses out beside the label for each column can be used to assist in determining the classification. If no EAL is met for a given barrier, that barrier will have 0 points. The points for the columns are as follows:

Barrier Failure Points RCS Potential Loss 4 Loss 5 Fuel Clad Potential Loss 4 Loss 5 Containment Potential Loss 1 Loss 3 1.3.1 To determine the classification, add the highest point value for each barrier to determine a total for all barriers. Compare this total point value with the numbers in parentheses beside each classification to see which one applies.

1.3.2 Finally as a verification of your decision, look below the Emergency Classification you selected. The loss and/or potential loss EALs selected for each barrier should be described by one of the bullet statements.

Enclosure 4.12 RP/O/B/1000/001 Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 Page 2 of 2 EXAMPLE: Failure to properly isolate a VB' MS Line Rupture outside containment, results in extremely severe overcooling.

PTS entry conditions were satisfied.

Stresses on the '1' S/G resulted in failure of multiple S/G tubes.

RCS leakage through the S/G exceeds available makeup capacity as indicated by loss of subcooling margin.

Barrier EAL Failure Points RCS SGTR > Makeup capacity of one HPI pump in Potential Loss 4 normal makeup mode with letdown isolated Entry into PTS operating range Potential Loss 4 RCS leak rate > available makeup capacity as Loss 5 indicated by a loss of subcooling Fuel Clad No EALs met and no justification for No 0 classification on judgment Challenge Containment Failure of secondary side of SG results in a Loss 3 direct opening to the environment RCS 5 + Fuel 0 + Containment 3 = Total 8 A. Even though two Potential Loss EALs and one Loss EAL are met for the RCS barrier, credit is only taken for the worst case (highest point value) EAL, so the points from this barrier equal 5.

B. No EAL is satisfied for the Fuel Clad Barrier so the points for this barrier equal 0.

C. One Loss EAL is met for the Containment Barrier so the points for this barrier equal 3.

D. When the total points are calculated the result is 8, therefore the classification would be a Site Area Emergency.

E. Look in the box below "Site Area Emergency". You have identified a loss of two barriers. This agrees with one of the bullet statements.

The classification is correct.

-INFORMATION ONLY ONS Human Resources Procedure Approved:

Approval Date: I -

ONS Human Resources Emergency Plan 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to delineate the role that the Oconee HR Group fulfills in support of the ONS Emergency Plan.

NOTE: The Emergency Preparedness Section must review revisions to this procedure and receive a control copy within seven (7) working days of approval.

2.0 APPLICABILITY This procedure applies to the Oconee Human Resources (OHR) Group (i.e., Core HR, Medical) and applicable vendor/contract personnel.

3.0 DESCRIPTION

This procedure broadly defines the role of the Oconee Human Resource (OHR) Group during an emergency/drill. Each HR section shall develop a mechanism to fulfill requirements identified by this procedure (e.g., training/guidelines/procedure).

Additional implementation guidance may be included as part of other documents (e.g.,

Response Procedures, Site Directives).

The guidance in this procedure shall not prevent any member of the HR group from taking actions deemed necessary to contend with urgent circumstances.

I

4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 ACCOUNTABILITY of PERSONNEL All HR personnel shall assemble at their designated assembly location.

Core HR personnel who are inside the protected area during a site assembly and whose designated assembly point is inside the protected area, should:

1. proceed to designated assembly point,

2. swipe security badge at the nearest security badge card reader (badge reader locations can be found in NSD-1 14),

3. notify designated site assembly contact person within 10 minutes, and

4. remain at designated assembly location and await further instructions.

Core HR personnel who are inside the protected area during a site assembly and whose designated assembly point is outside the protected area, should:

1. exit the protected area,

2. proceed to the HR Manager's office,

3. notify designated site assembly contact person within 10 minutes,

4. remain in the HR Manager's office and await further instructions.

Core HR personnel (non-ERO) who are outside the protected area during a site assembly and whose designated assembly point is inside the protected area, should:

1. notify designated site assembly contact person within 10 minutes,

2. remain where they are and await further instructions.

(Note: ERO personnel will respond according to their ERO responsibilities.)

Core HR personnel who are outside the protected area during a site assembly and whose designated assembly point is outside the protected area, should:

1. proceed to designated site assembly point

2. notify designated site assembly contact person within 10 minutes, and

3. remain at designated assembly location and await further instructions.

Personnel shall remain at their assembly locations until released by the Emergency Coordinator/designee. In the event special instructions are necessary (e.g., site evacuation), information will be provided through the TSC/supervisory process at assembly locations.

2

4.1.1 Site Assembly - Normal Work Hours (Monday - Thursday)

Designated site assembly contacts (reference Enclosure 5.1) shall be responsible for ensuring that their section accountability status is reported per the following:

1) Medical personnel should report accountability to Core HR Site Assembly Contact within 10 minutes.

2) Core HR Site Assembly Contact should report accountability for both Core HR and Medical to extension 5050 within 15 minutes. Site assembly contact is responsible for following the instructions given on the phone mail message when extension 5050 is called.

4.1.2 Site Assembly - Backshifts, Weekends, and Holidays If present, the supervisor/designee shall report accountability status for their employees to extension 5050 within 15 minutes, and await further instructions.

If a supervisor/designee is not present, each individual is responsible for calling extension 5050 to report their accountability status.

Site assembly contacts are responsible for following the instructions given on the phone mail message when extension 5050 is called.

4.2 TECHNICAL/OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC/OSC) 4.2.1 Locations a.. Primary 0 TSC: Unit 1&2 Control Room

• OSC: Unit 3 Control Room

b. Alternate

"* TSC: Oconee Office Building Room 316

"* OSC: Oconee Office Building Room 316A 4.2.2 Staffing 4.2.2.1 Technical Support Center No routine staffing requirements exist for Oconee Human Resource (OHR) personnel in the Technical Support Center.

However, circumstances may dictate that OHR personnel fulfill certain roles/duties within the TSC (as required by the Emergency Coordinator/designee).

3

4.2.3 Notification of Activation

a. Normal Work Hours Notification of TSC/OSC/EOF activation will normally occur over the site public address system. Designated TSC/OSC/EOF personnel shall respond as required.

b. Off-Normal Work Hours During backshift, weekends, and holidays TSC/OSC/EOF response personnel shall be notified as described in their applicable section procedures and guidelines. Fitness for Duty (FFD) considerations are applicable for TSC/OSC/EOF call-outs.

4.3 CONTROL of SITE INGRESS/EGRESS During a Site Assembly/Event, Security personnel shall be responsible for:

1. controlling site owner controlled area access via electronic/mechanical access control systems or by posting of security personnel, and

2. assisting in the orderly evacuation of personnel from the site as necessary.

4.4 SITE EVACUATION or RELOCATION The position of Human Resource Group Evacuation Coordinator is fulfilled by designated OHR Managers as listed in Enclosure 5.1. The Oconee HR Manager will oversee the following actions once an evacuation is announced over the PA System:

(1) determine essential personnel who should remain on-site, (2) provide continuous (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) coverage for essential functions, (3) convey preliminary evacuation instructions to each OHR Section Manager/Assembly Point Contact; and (4) coordinate evacuation/relocation of OHR personnel.

Evacuation/relocation instructions will be provided to assembly point contacts by the OHR Group Evacuation Coordinator. Evacuation instructions may also be provided to site personnel: (1) over the Site public address system by the Emergency Coordinator/designee; and (2) on-line using the "Evacuation Plan"

(

icon (shown below) located in the Oconee Information Library".

4 Evacuation Plan icon is located in the Oconee Information Library 4

4.5 DRILL TEAM SCENARIO TEAM REPRESENTATIVES As needed, support from Human Resource Personnel may be necessary to assist in scenario development/drills.

5.0 ENCLOSURES .1 - "OHR Site Assembly Contacts and Group Evacuation Coordinators" 5

.1 OHR Site Assembly Contacts and Group Evacuation Coordinators "SITEASSEMBLY SECTION CONTACTS Core Human Resources (HR) ....... Human Resource Personnel Medical Personnel

• Primary Contact...............Gail Porter (4135)

• Alternate Contact.............Donna Hellams (3366)

(Note: This person is responsible for reporting both Core HR and Medical accountability to extension 5050.)

" HR GROUP EVACUATION COORDINATORS

• Primary Contact ........... Gail Porter (4135)

• Alternate Contact ......... Don Kams (4070) 6