L-96-227, Forwards LER 96-S01 Re Tampering W/Key Switches on Hot Shutdown Control Panels
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19-04-1996 02:22PM St Lucie R m osnt CW tee 1 407 461 4622 P.02
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i L-96-227 10 CFR 73.71 a
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.U. 5. Ntaclear Regulatory commission l
Attn:
Document control Dost j
Neshington, D. C. 20555 I
Re:
St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 j
Docket Mos. 50-335 and 50-389 amportable Event:
96-501 l
Date of Rwant: August 14, 1996 T -- = ins with Kev swi& '
an the Hat Rht*'r. Pr.tsc1 Or=1m I
i The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to e
the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 to provide notification of the l
subject event.
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i Very truly yours, 1
4 M
. A. Stall Vice President et. Lucie Plant 1
l JAS/REN i
Attachment i
i oss stewart D.
Ebneter, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II i
Senior Resident Incpector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant i
i 3-IsA1 yA Y
@lleoC I 9 Of$ 7 hp.p.
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16-04-1996 02:22PM St Luc 1e Resident Office 1 407 461 4622 P.03
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05000335 10F 5 l Tassesdne weih ser sweeshoe en the Het Shutdown Cenwel Penale p
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x no massamer quasi es iese seasse,i.e. aseseemsessy 1s asWe.seemed evpewanen eneel ate Oss Anguet 14,1998 et 1115, while senducting the engineered esfoty foetures actuoden ESFAS) m. aher functional
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east en Unit 2. meineensnee was unstdo se operate the two key owleshes, looseed en the het shutdown i
eengelpenst
, whleh tesak istostion octuoten (SSAS) shannels A and B, due se to elue in th
- hoyhoses, of the Ltdt 1 rewooled shot the key ownsen for power esoresad resef V1404 1
esuld be Bode unlee were opereeing et fun power et the time of We deoevery. At the plant d
e hosed en senter.n s
1 en unuouse tw,ent was desiered at 1848 _. ilvesten. In with stunt knetesnontine i en doenerosten of the Alert.
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and Wie sh were rosessed to operette esseus by on August 14,1936.
i Th. eeuse of ihe event wee vet en inesidues = indMeusie w+m unenwied necem a ve effected enses immeered wie Was hoy toeke by insoning glue into the keyholes.
Cassesake Aselenes 11 Securety controsed looks were weaked down and deternuned as he funeelenei. 21 A shook of the elesereres hosewere wee performed. 3) Osereelene ver6 fled that looked valves were in me proper positten and that Wup leolung were funcetonal. 4) Vissel inspostions and weeulowns of me control neem and sient were eendusend to leek for any adselenet twees of temperine. 5) The freeaancy of rendem enoustty potrels wee ineressed end 1
D heing sistneelnad in vleel areas of N W A Meterical W of sient discrement eenedens and work reeueste i
asse perforsnad op decennine of ear inssenses of traperb g could be idenedied. 7) An enelnessing evolusehen wee postensued es doessenine Wie imseet of me leek esmpering en a fe operegion of the plant. 90pensesnel eheeks of
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sossey compenones wese esmessend on hoch units. 9) A review of wisi eres essees le being eendested es seduas end levate af e.ssess 10p argfer tempering have b,sedo e.rporated into plant meterialinspeeden y ii, g,,
en ins igtigy,,,,,
w inee, pere.e i-es, se,in m c.co,ses on sit,is
I 10-04-1996 82:23PM St Lucte Resteent Ofhce 1 407 461 4622 P.04 s
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u.=sises seemans,e eens LICStesSE EVEttT RB3mf (LER) g taxy coerWUATt0N m
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$TLUCEUINT1 080335 2 0F 5 vuurarmeegasseme w mese==raweearasechassas nn namenennel er Taas sweerr
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e On July 28,1990, shoe wee essoovered in the lock core of en entry deer into the Unit 2 eentrol element
$$ue seeshenien contrei system (CEDMCSHENS:AA) room. The second entry door into the CEDMCS i
analeswo is pomosend and this pediocht had bosn almuarty vendensed. The CEDhtCS room is a nonsofety I
febted enclosure that provides en air conditioning boundary and is located intemet to the cobis spreadin0 foem. This desovery prompted an inspection of scourity contro8ed pacNocks and entry locks for both snits.
Seht adsdenet sedlocks and one addigiuol door lock were found to have been giusd. The fr$/ANPS and plant soeudty were notified. The eserch was --;^-f:f to include a check by operations of locked valves famotunne shoes in the containmarn building, annuius, or high radiation eroes). No operatione emnerseed leeks were found to have been tempered with. The search did not include key lock switches of the type dessvered on August 1d, beesume it was beoeveel et the time that the problem was condned to the security doors and pedocks identified. Secunty officer petrois were increased in affected areas from July i
28,1996 on. The effected teoks did not adversely impact the abiEty to operate the plant or to comply with Was Pleyelsel Security Plen. Therefore, the event was evolueted as not reportable at Wie time of discovery.
/, The PNC reesdent was irefonned of the actsons Desng talten end the reportet duty conclussen.
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ar e m T =_--+-g Oss August 14,1998 et 1115, while conducting the engineered asfety features actuation (ESFASHEllS:JE) l menehty functional eurweillance test on Unit 2. rneintenance was unable to operate the two key switches which Moest esfoty iniestion actuation (SAASHEllS:50) channels A and B. The key switches are located on Wie het shutdown sentret panel (HSCP) which is used to shutdown the reester from outside the sentrol
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i enese if a fire or other event renders the control room uninhabitable. The key could not be inserted into the l
owetenes due to the presence of geue in the iteyhotos. It was suspected that the swhches had been demorotely tempered with, and based on this suspicion, e dedeion was made to inspect the Unit 1 HSCP for sinder tampering. l
- f:7 of the Unit 1 HSCP roveoled that the key switch for power operated relief weeve ePORYNSles:AS) V1404 could not be operated. The key switch appeared to have toen tempered with j
in the emme menner as the Unit 2 key switches. Seth units were operating at full power at the time of the eseovery. At 1334 a "Soounty Alert" was desiered. bened on annier menessment dirmenian. In neoordenes
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with plant emergency implementing procedures, an Unueuel Event woe deelsted at 1345 beesd on destereelon of the Security Alert. The NftC wee notified of the declaration of the Unuowel Event pursuant to 10CPROO.72. l.oesi Iow enforcement and the local F91 office were also notified. The inopoetion of i
seguipament was estended to se key locked swkches inesde and outende of the Unit I and 2 control rooms.
i No addeiensi anome5es were detected at that time. The Secunty Alert was terminated at 1718 efter
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estotlishing aestional fue time posto in designoted vital aroes. The unusual Event was terminated at 1730.
4 The looks were repieced and the switches were restored to operable status by 2200 on August 14,1996.
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,On August 15,1800 thp adesionel full time poets were repieced by incrossed random potrees.
l The ensite amourity force consists of correrect personnel. Florida Power and Light Corporate Security took 1j the imod rois for irtvestlesdee of the event sided by plant oeraennel and the FBI. The FBI has seemed any i
sative investigation, however Wiey continue to monitor the Corporeta Security irweetestion. A j
esaurley heenne was estabEshed and a cash awant was offered for infeemetion loodine to the arroet
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' 10-04-1996 02:24PM St Lucie Resident Of01ce 1 407 461 4622 P.05 i
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LSM TEXT CGii~wiUATION
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ST LUCE UNIT 1 06000336 3
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j vuuram ar,.,se.4 see suuhase.odevasecAnnassas nn nagpanynnat op Tsar svuarr scansanuam i
l and convlotion of those responeitde. A press rolenes was prepared and a news conference held with local i
I needs on August 14,1998.
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e.Auss of Tus swsarf I
The oeuse of the event was that en individual or individuals with uneecorted eccess to the effected areas i
tempered with the key locks by inserting glue into the keyholes. The security inn: ';;^':. to identify the Indvidual or individuals responeline is ongoing.
Aaaatv ana a s Tsas sumarr l
The NRC was notified of the decieration of the Unusual Event pursuant to 10CPRSO.72. This event is aies reportelde under 10CPR73.71 as a ' confirmed tempering of suspicious origin witn safety or secunty p
equipment."
An e ;* :r'.ii evaluation was performed to assess the significance of the lock tempenne on safe operation a
of the plant. The evaluation addresses the SIAS inock switches on the Unit 2 HSCP and the PORV switch on the Unit i HSCP dieoovered on $/14/96 as wou as the earner pedlock and door entry lock tampering on 7/26/98. The potentialimpact on asch of these areas is summarimod below.
I 34AE alack Laskema an the unir 2 Wscp The purpose of the SIAS tdock key switche on the HSCP is to allow the operators to block channel <
A and S SIAS during a pasnt cooldown from oetaide the control room. Blocking SIAS is necessary when pressuriser pressure drops below the technu.! soecifice6m limit of 1736 pois. If SIAS tdock could not be performed at the HSCP, the cooldown wouse be delayed until either the key switches were repaired or manuel operator actions to block SIAS were completed. Note that the Unit 1 HSCP does not have this SLAS tdock function and the plant con be safety shutdown without this cepetusty.
Daisyin0 the coeldown for the ahort ported of time required to repair the switches would not adversely effect este shutdown of the unit.
sonV Actuanian Rwitchi qq the und 1 MScp The PORV key switch is provided on the HSCP to aNow operation of the PORV to control pressure during cooldown. The PORVs are not required for overpressure protection, since this protection is e
afforded by the pressuriser code safety valves. Operation of the PORV is a backup :nethod of pressure control in the event that sumliery sprey is not availotne. The pnmary and preferred method of pressure control is with auxdiary aprey. If the plant had to be cooled down from the HSCP, and musiBary aprey was unevelletdo and the PORV key lock switch was ' operable due to temperint, then m
the cooldown would have had to have been delayed untN the switch could be repaired. Deleying the oostdown for the short period of time required to repair the switch would not adversely effect safe ehutdown of the unit.
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10-04-1996 02:25PM St Lucie Resident OHice 1 407 461 4622 P.06
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LICSMSEE BYENT ItEPCEtf (1230 TEXT terMTION r_
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The feRowing key locks /podocks were discovered inoperalde on July 26,1998: (1) The Unit 2 i
CSDMCS room acones door locks, (2) the Unit 2 *S* vital switchgear room aseses hotehes to the l
19.5' elevealen, (3) the Unit 2 SAS computer room south ecomes deer, (4) the 1 A and 18 EDG room l
east roll up gerego doors, (5) 1 A EDG smart door modules, (6) Unit 2 DC power panel 254 and 255
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aooses doors. With the exception of the Unit 2 power panel access doors, these locks and pedocks j
are enourity locks for eroes of the plant that do not require entry for sofe operation of the plant. The l
Unit 2 DC power pensis 254 and 255 contain control power for the atmospheric dump volve (ADV) block volves. These pensis would nood to be eccessed to secure power to the ADV tdoek volves in the event that the plant had to be shutdown with the control room inaccessilde. The inoperable looks would deley access until the locks could be removed or untN local fuese sould be puSed as an 1
alternate means of scouring the ADV block valves. In either event, the short deley in doenergining the ADY bleek valves would not adversely impact shutdown of the plant.
e nmaseTa s A eTanseg e
1.
Security controlled locks were walked down and determined to be functional.
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A ched of the electronic security hardware was performed. No anomalies were detected.
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3.
Operations vertfled that locked volves were in the proper position and that the locking devices were l
functional.
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Stand down meetings were held with plant personnel on August 14,1996, informing them of the tamperine event.
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Visualinspections and walkdowns of the control room and plant were conducted to look for any addtional types of tampenn9. No additional evulence of tempenne was detected.
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The t ;mi of random security patrois was increased and is being maintained in vital areas of the l
plant. This action will continue until escured by the St. Lucie plant Vice President.
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7.
A histortool review of plant discrepent conditions and work requests was performed to identify any l
eddtionalinstances of tampering. A number of relief valves were identified in May and June of ISOS as having had their lead seals demoged or missing. It was indeterminate as to whether these a
j anels were damaged by dobberate act or by accident. No other evidonos of ts;:ts with plant
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equipment was identified, other then those discussed above.
8.
An ^,' --is evaluation was performed to determine the impact of the the specific lock tempering j r.
on safe operation of the plant.
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Operational checks of asfety components were conducted on both units. These checks included:
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instrument response annunciotor response, valve lineups, and stand-by 6;-.a.; operational i
cheeks.
anseuses smaa men
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t' 10-04-1996 02:25PM St Lucie Resid2nt OHico
,1 4rl 461 4622 P.07
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LICSBMEE EVENT MMMT (IAR) l A-TWtf W M_'_*. TION l
VEaa soeusmat asweses ST LUCE UNITS 142 05000835 8 0F 5 901 98 00 i
l 1EET Nmere esos As susucos, ame assummer espise af Asse h 3ee47 11M i
i NW 10.
A #eview of vital area access was conducted to reduce and validate the levels of access.
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Inspections for tempenng have twen incorporated into plant meterialinspection activities.
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12.
System engineering watulowns wis incorporate inspectione for tempering.
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Corperste security is investigatin0 the tempenng incident.
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Remote shutdown rooms have been locked with iveek away' locks.
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Additional enourity survedience equipenent is being och under the site esowity plan.
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