L-80-174, Forwards Safe Shutdown Evaluations for Auxiliary Bldg Hallway & Cable Spreading Room in Response to NRC 791029 Request for Fire Protection Info.Reactivity Control Sys Assures Safe Subcritical Core Conditions After Reactor Trip
| ML17339B099 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1980 |
| From: | Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-80-174, NUDOCS 8006130254 | |
| Download: ML17339B099 (23) | |
Text
REGULATORY
<FORMATION DISTRIBUTION S M (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:8006130254 DOC ~ DATE! 80/06/09 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET FACIL:50 250 Turkey Point Planti Unit 3g Florida Power and Light C
05000250 50 251 Turkey Point Plantq Unit 4i Florida Power a'nd Light-C 05000251 AUTH'AME AUTHOR AFFILIATION UHRIGg R, E, Florida Power.,8 Light Co, REC IP ~ f<AME RECIPIENT AFF HALI ATION EISENHUTiD ~ G ~
Division of L'icensing II SUBJECT; Forwards safe shutdown evaluations for auxiliary bldg hallway L cable spreading room in response to NRC 791029 request for fire protection info.,Reactivity control sys assures safe subcritical. core cond)tions'fter reactor. trip.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
A006S COPIES RECEIVEDSLTR ~ENCL.
SIZE:. 2. I TITLE: Fire Protection Information (After--Issuance of OP ~ L~ic;),
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REC'IP IENT ID CODE/NAME ACTION!
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INTERNAL: 01 09 I 14 PLANT SYS BR 20 MURANAKAgR EXTERNAL; 03 LPDR 22 ACRS COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1 16 16 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME'2 NRC PDR 12 AUXIL SYS BR 19 HAMBACH OELD 04 NSIC COPIES LTTR =ENCL 1
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.O. BOX 629100, MIAMI,FL 33162 tvw%X FLORIDA POWER 8 LIGHTCOMPANY June 9, 1980 L-80-174 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissi,on Washington, D.
C.
20555
Dear Mr. Eisenhut:
Re:
Turkey Point Units 3
& 4 Docket Nos. 50-250
& 50-251 Fire Protection The attached information regarding safe shutdown capability is submitted in response to an October 29, 1979 letter from Mr. A. Schwencer of your staff.
Very truly yours, Robert E. Uhri g Vice President Advanced Systems
& Technology REU/MAS/cph cc:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Region II Harold F. Reis, Esquire 80ge>~O PEOPLE... SERVING PEOPLE
SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATIONS FOR THE AUXILIARYBUILDING HALLWAY AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM Recent NRC correspondence has requested a demonstration of safe shutdown assuming loss of cable function in the Auxiliary Building Hallway or the Cable Spreading Room and provide what is called a "task/manpower" evalua-tion to demonstrate that it can be accomplished.
This evaluation was conducted in the following manner:
A.
Determine the time restraints wherein operator action is required based on safe shutdown plant parameters.
B.
Determine ifit is possible to control plant parameters assuming loss of cable function.
C.
Determine if the task or control methods of item B and the operator or manpower time restraints of item A are appropriate to assure safe shutdown.
Therefore, if it is'estimated that it would take an operator some 4 or 5 minutes to pexform a control function and he has,
- say, 8-10 hours to complete it, no further evaluation was required.
Also, current plant emergency procedures were used during this evaluation.
These procedures have been reviewed and appxoved in accordance with the license and are demonstrated/performed on a regular basis.
Reactivit Control Fox Maintainin Hot Safe Conditions'he reactivity control system assures safe subcritical core conditions following reactor trip and during all phases of unit heatup and cooldown operations.
The reactivity control system consists of two independent reactivity control subsystems; the xod cluster control (RCC) assemblies and boric acid injection via the charging system.
The RCC assemblies are divid-ed into two categories comp'xising contro1 and shutdown rod groups.
Follow'ng an,equilibxium xenon full power trip with the reactor coolant system (RCS) maintained at hot conditions, excess shutdown/sub-cxitical margins for full RCC insertion at beginning and end of cycle are:
t 3 Unit 4
~BOG POST TRIP EXCESS SHUTDOWN
-4.20/ h k/k
-3.74%
a, k/k EEOC POST TRIP EXCESS SHUTDOHN
-4.07%
A k/k
-3.56% 6 k/k
'>Unit 3 6
4 are for seventh and sixth cycles respectively.
2of19 The xeactivity worth associated with complete decay of pretrip full power equilibrium Xenon is +2.57 and +2.60% I k/k for Unit 3 and 4 respectively.
Thexefoxe, the minimum available subcritical margin fox BOC and ROC are
-1.63%
b, k/k and -1.57% 6 k/k for Unit 3 and -1.14%
A k/k and -0.96%
A k/k fox Unit 4.
Hence post trip subcritical conditions for maintaining long term RCS hot conditions are assured via full RCC insertion and is independent of off-site power availability.
Boron addition via the charging pumps is available from two independent boric acid solution sources.
The primary boron injection flow path to the charging pumps is established from the discharge of one of the boric acid transfer pumps, each of which can be aligned to take suction from any of the three boric acid storage tanks containing a minimum of 20,000 ppm boron solution.
The secondary or backup boric acid addition source is the chaxging pump direct gravity feed line from the refueling water storage tank (RHST),
which contains a minimum of 1950 ppm boron solution.
In addition, system provisions exist for aligning either unit's RWST to 'the suction of either unit's charging pumps by equalizing heads in the tanks using the SI suction header.
Two independent boration paths are available from the discharge of any one of the three available chaxging pumps.
Flow to the loop "A" cold leg and/or the loop "C" hot leg is available in addition to charging flow to the reactor coolant pump seals.
As indicated above, the boxon addition portion of the reactivity control system is no t required in order to maintain the unit in the hot condition and its function, therefoxe, is not required following loss of off-site power.
Steam Generator Heat Removal For lhintainin Hot Safe Conditions Following reactor trip or a:unit runback, steam generator heat removal is accomplished by the condensate/main feedwater system throttled back to the steam generator no load condition with steam relief to the condenser via four turbine bypass valves.
One train, i.e.,
one condensate pump and one main feedwater pump is sufficient to meet steam generator heat removal requirements.
Condenser hotwell makeup can be obtained from the condensate storage tank which is supplied from the water treatment plant.
Steam generator heat removal under hot RCS conditions can be accommodated for a prolonged period 0f time ~
3 of 19 In the event that turbine bypass, condenser vacuum or condensate/feedwater pump capabilities are unavailable, steam generator heat removal is main-tained by the auxiliary feedwater system with steam relief via the three atmospheric dump valves (located upstream of their respective main steam isolation valves).
Auxiliary feedwater is provided by three turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
- pumps, each with a nominal pumping capacity of 600 gpm.
Any single turbine driven pump is capable of supplying the post trip require-ments of either unit.
One turbine driven pump is also capable of supplying the auxiliary feedwater requirements of both units 19.2 minutes following full power trip of both units.
Steam supply to the auxiliary feedwater pump turbines is provided via motor operated valves on each of the Unit 3 or 4 steam generators upstream of their respective main steam isolation valves (HSIV's)..
Steam flow from any one of the six steam generator supply valves is sufficient to provide rated auxiliary feedwater pump flow for both units.
In addition, a manual cross tie to the Units 3 and 4 main steam header (downstream of the l4SIV's) and a manual cross tie to the fossil Unit 1 and 2 desuperheated steam header are available to supply the auxiliary feedwater pump turbines.
The auxilia'ry feedwater pumps are normally aligned to take suction from the Unit 3 and 4 condensate storage tanks and discharge to the Unit 3 and 4
If additional Unit 3 or Unit 4 condensate storage tank inventory is desired, it can be provided from the water treatment plant or the primary water storage tank.
The availability of makeup allows the unit(s) to be maintained at hot conditions for a prolonged period of time.
In the event that loss of off-site power occurs with the unit(s) at hot shutdown or the unit(s) trips because of loss of off-site power, all auxiliary steam supply valves and pump discharge valves operate automatically and receive their control and power form the DC and vital AC buses.
A single failure of either DC or vital AC bus will not prevent the auxiliary feedwater system from meeting its design flow requirements.
Following a loss of off-site power the water inventory from the condensate storage tanks is the only immediately available source to the auxiliary feedwater
- system, Each condensate storage tank has a design capacity of 250,000 gallons.
The minimum allowable inventory in a condensate storage
4 of 19 tank associated with an operating unit is 185,000 gallons, which is sufficient for 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> at hot conditions and subsequent cooldown'o the residual heat removal operating window, or 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> at hot RCS conditions.
Approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after the loss of off-site power the water treatment system can be loaded on the vital bus as pex procedural steps provided in the "Blackout Operation" Emergency Pxocedure for Units 3 and 4.
This will allow up to 200 gpm makeup to each condensate storage tank whereas only 125 gpm per unit is required to maintain steam generator level after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
Operation in this manner will allow the unit(s) to be maintained in the "blackout" hot condition until off-site power is restored.
In -addition, a
primary water pump may be loaded on the vital bus, which would allow the unit(s) primary water storage tank (a design capacity of 160,000 gallons each) to be pumped to either or both condensate stoxage tanks.
Pressurizer Heater Control for Haintainin Hot Safe Conditions Following reactor trip pressurizer heater capability is required in order to maintain the unit at approximately 2200 psig pressure, which is normally associated with hot RCS conditions.
Loss of total pressurizer heater function is not considered a likely event since the two heater backup groups are powered by train A and train B 480 V load centers.
While it is preferred to have pressurizer heater capability to maintain RCS pressure in the post trip condition, it is not a safety requirement nor is it required following loss of off-site power.
RCS pressure can be allowed to drift slowly downward until diesel generator loads are sufficient-ly low to allow the "A" backup group to be energized.
(If both diesel generators have started and are operating properly, sufficient load capability exists to reload the backup group immediately).
If it were postulated that pressurizer heater function cannot be reestablished, this would not preclude RCS cooldown to RHR levels following the addition of adequate boron solution to accommodate RCS cooldown.
ComDonent Coolin for Haintainin Hot Safe Conditions The component cooling water (CCW) system has three 100% pumps and three 50%
heat ezchangers and is normally operated with one pump and two CCW heat ezchangers in service during full power opexation.
Two of the pumps axe powered by train "A" and one by train "B".4160 V switchgeax.
In addition,
5 of 19 there is a normally isolated 8 inch 4 component cooling water systems.
crossover line between the Unit 3 and This cross tie between units can provide sufficient heat removal capability to maintain a unit at hot shutdown until its normal CCH flow is xeestablished.
Following a loss of off-site power at least one CCN pump and one intake cooling water pump per unit will be loaded on the diesels, which assures required CGi~ flow to post trip compo-nents.
Availability of the 8 inch CGP cross tie between units is not affected by loss of off-site power.
Electrical Power Su 1
For Maintainin Hot Safe Conditions Following reactor trip, normal off-site power is provided by the Unit 3 and 4 start up transformexs via the 240 kv switchyard.
The loss of power to the Unit 3 startup transformer results in the loss of the Unit 3 "B" train 4160 V switchgear only since the "A" train has an alternate feed from the Unit 4 startup transformer, which could be made available to service Unit 3 "A" train requirements.
Under these conditions both diesel generators would start.
The diesels can supply the vital portions of the Unit 3 "A" and/ox "B" trains. If the Unit 4 startup transformer is lost, the consequences are the same.
Hence a loss of one of the startup transformers would not preclude maintaining both units at hot conditions for a prolonged period of time.
A total loss of off-site power caused by grid upset or loss of transmission lines could result in interruption of off-site power to Turkey Point station.
Transmission/grid difficulties of this nature occurring coincident with an event such as a design basis fire is unlikely.
- However, assuming total loss of off-site power, Turkey Point Unit 3 and 4 diesel generators would start, and pick up train "A" and "B" vital loads for both units.
Units 3 and 4
are also designed to accommodate the starting failure of one diesel generator and still maintain safe hot conditions.
As indicated earliex the water treatment system can be loaded onto the vital bus which will allow Units 3 and 4 to be maintained at the "blackout" hot condition until off-site P
power is restored to the 240 kv switchyard.
r In addition to the above electxical provisions and those normally followed by the system load dispatchers, there are two other on-site methods available for restoring power to the 240 kv switchyard.
The Tuxkey Point 1 and 2 oil fired units have the design capability for black startup following
6 of 19 a total loss of off-site power.
As required, fossil Unit 1 and 2 2500 KM "Black Start" diesels (five available) can be started following the loss of off-site power.
Unit 1 and 2 auxiliary loads are carried by the black start diesels as required to support sequential restart of the units.
lollowing Unit 1 and/or 2 staxtup, the associated main generator can be aligned to restore power to the nuclear Unit 3 and 4 240 kv switchyard.
The, second on-site method for restoring power to the Unit 3 and 4 240 kv switchyard is conducted using the five Unit 1 and 2 black start diesels, which can accept load in one minute in the dead-line mode and in ten minutes in the normal ox peaking mode.
The black start diesels can be alignd to energize the Unit 1 and 2 240 kv switchyard via the Unit 1 and 2 startup transforaer.
(The Unit 1 and 2 switchyard is normally aligned to the Unit 3 and 4 switchyard.)
Thus plant opexations personnel can make available to the nuclear units fossil unit power sources.
7 of'9 Reactivit Control Function Re uired for Cold Conditions As indicated earlier, sufficient subcritical margin is obtained for both BOC and HOC core conditions from the full RCC portion of the reactivity control system to maintain the unit(s) in the hot condition indefinitely.
Prior to initiating cooldown, the RCS is borated to a boron concentration level that assures sufficient subcritical margin when the unit ultimately reaches cold conditions.
Conservative values of Unit 3 and 4 post trip reactor coolant boron concentra-tions 'for BOC and EOC would be around 810 ppm and 50 ppm respectively.
Conservative values for the required RCS boron concentrations to assure sufficient subcritical margin at cold RCS conditions would be approximately 1162 ppm and 691 ppm at BOC and EOC respectively.
Boration of the reactor coolant system (as discussed earlier), prior to RCS cooldown is provided by the charging system in conjunction with letdown to the chemical volume and control system (CVCS) in-order to maintain pressurizer level.
Normal letdown flow from the reactor coolant system is 60 gpm. It is routed through the regenerative heat exchanger, one letdown orifice and through the non-regenerative heat exchanger to the volume control tank (VCT) or holdup tanks.
Maximum letdown capability via this path is 120 gpm and is achieved by placing another letdown orifice into service.,
If CCW is out of service to the non-regenerative heat exchanger letdown is diverted directly to the VCT or if there is a high level in the VCT, flow is diverted to the holdup tanks.
Charging flow to the regenerative heat exchanger is balanced with RCS letdown flow in order to achieve the proper temperature drop prior to going through the letdown orifice(s). If letdown via this path were required under emergency conditions and charging flow was not available to the regenerative heat exchanger, the letdown line out-side of containment could be isolated causing letdown flow to be relieved to the pressurizer relief tank via the letdown line safety valve.
A second normally available letdown path of 9 gpm is from the reactor coolant pump seal water return line to the VCT via the seal water heat exchanger.
An additional 15 gpm excess letdown line is also available for letdown flow, which is directed through the excess letdown heat exchanger to the seal water return line. If CCN is unavailable to the seal water and excess letdown heat
8 of 19 exchanger, excess letdown could be diverted to the reactor coolant drain'ank and seal water return or bypass flow could be relieved to the pressurizer relief tank via the seal water return line safety valve.
All letdown line flow paths require instrument air for the requiredvalving operations.
However, since the unit(s) can be maintained in a safe hot condition for extended periods, sufficient time exists for reestablishing the instrument air system or to execute manual operations to restore necessary letdown line flow.
The compressor(s) may be loaded on the diesels.
The times required to borate the RCS prior to initiating cooldown have been analyzed the various charging and letdown path combinations:
BOC CONDITIONS HOURS)
EOC CONDITIONS HOURS 2 BTP's, 2 CP's 2 Orifices
CP Balanced for ex-cess letdown and RCP sealwater re turn 2 CP's from RUST, 2 Orifices to PRT 1
CP from RWST 1 Orifice to PRT 1
CP from RWST Balanced for ex-cess letdown and sealwater return
- 0. 13 0.26 0.64 2.6 5.1 12.8
- 0. 23 0.45 2.9 5.7 14.2 Key:
CP = charging pump BTP = boric acid transfer pump RWST = refueling water storage tank PRT pressurizer relief tank Since long term hot conditions can be maintained for either unit, sufficient time is available for even the worst case boration conditions.
The operator has an alternate means to borate prior to initiation of cool-dew.
~ He may elect to maintain hot RCS temperature and allow RCS pressure to fall to approximately 1300 psig and then inject the 20,000 ppm boron
9 of 19 solution contents of the boron injection tank (BIT) using the safety injection system.
Fox this method of boration, RCS pressure would normally be reduced by turning off the pressurizer heaters.
He also has the option of allowing the pressurizer to vent to the pressurizer relief tank.
All equipment necessary to achieve the above mentioned boration combinations can be powered by the unit vital buses thus, their availability is not af-fected by loss of off-site power.
1hderator Shrink 5iake-U Re uired Durin Cooldown Following proper boration of the reactor coolant system to required cold shutdown concentrations, the chaxging system also provides reactor coolant system makeup to accomodate RCS shrink during cooldown.
Two independent sources of makeup water axe available to the suction of the three charging pumps.
The normally used water source is obtained from the primary water storage tank via the primary water pumps.
The second independent source is the RUST gravity feed line. If the unit wexe in'he station blackout condition, the makeup source from the RUST would be used since the primary water system pumps are powered from a non-vital power source.
A third source of RCS makeup water for both units can be made available fxom the spent fuel pools via the spent fuel pool cooling pumps.
Spent fuel cooling pump discharge can be aligned to the CVCS letdown return line upstream of the volume control tank divert valve or to the downstream side of the reactor coolant filter.
Either of these two flow paths can provide makeup water to the volume control tank.
With a spent fuel pool capacity of approximately 7800 gal/ft, less than 4 feet of spent fuel pool inventoxy from a pool is required to accommodate moderator shrinkage for its unit.
This minor reduction in spent fuel pool inventory will have no appreciable affect on spent fuel cooling or shielding requirements.
If it were postulated that none of the three charging pumps are available, safety injection (SI) via the boron injection tank (BIT) can be used to provide precooldown boration and reactor makeup.
As, discussed
- above, the RCS pressure would be reduced to approximately 1300 psig and SI flow through the BIT would provide adequate cold shutdown concentration boration.
Following proper boration, RCS cooldown using secondary steam generator heat removal is initiated with the SI system providing RCS makeup as needed to accommodate RCS shrinkage.
The SI pump(s) is powered by a vital bus(es) and
10 of 19 its operation therefore is unaffected by loss of off-site power.
Steam Generator Heat Removal For Unit Cooldown As discussed earlier, steam generator heat removal during RCS cooldown will be conducted with t'e condensate/main feedwater system.
In the event of condensate/main feedwater system malfunction or if off-site power is not available, steam generator heat removal during RCS cooldown will be provided by the auxiliary feedwater system with steam relief via the atmospheric dump valves.
Steam generator heat removal is secured following servicing of the residual'eat removal system.
Com onent Coolin Re uirements For Cold Conditions The heat load on the CQC and intake cooling water (IQ<) systems during RCS cooldown is approximately the same as that required to maintain hot condi-tions Thus the minimum required components and CCM unit cross tie capabili-ties discussed earlier are also applicable during this.phase of RCS cooldown.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) For Haintainin Cold Conditions Following RCS cooldown and depressurization using steam generator heat
- removal, the residual heat removal system can be placed in service at 350'F with RCS pressure at or below 600 psig (normally placed in service about 450 psig, system designed for 600 psig).
RHR heat removal capability is dependent upon available
- RHR, CCH and IGC equipment.
The following equipment combinations and heat removal capabilities are sufficient to match core decay heat within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after shutdown.
2 IGPP's, 2 CG<P's 3 CC!KX's, 2 RHRP's 1 ICMP, 1 CG<P 2 CGBIX's, 2 RHRP's 1 IGK, 1 CGA' CQGiX's, 1
RHRP HEAT RElfOVAL RATE (Btu/hr) 3.4 x 10 8 2.1 x 10 8 1.8 x 10 8 KEY:
IQK's = ICN pumps
.CGA's. =.
CQ< pumps CCHX's =
CCH heat exchangers BHRHX's =
RHR heat exchangers RHRP's
= RHR pumps
llof 19
~
0 All equipment necessary to achieve the above RHR heat removal combinations is powered by the unit vital buses and is therefore available under loss of off-site power conditions.
After placing the RHR system into service, the op-erator can elect to continue the RCS cooldown to cold refueling conditions or maintain the RCS at any desired temperature below 3SO'F.
Auxiliary Buildin~liallva The normal shutdown cable functions in the Auxiliary Building Hallway are shown in Table 1.
Loss of these cable functions would require various off-normal operator actions in order to maintain safe plant conditions.
Sufficient control room personnel are immediately available to perform the required hot shutdown and boration actions in a timely manner.
A summary of necessary actions follows:
Maintain Hot Shutdown Conditions A.-
Dispatch one member of control room staff to the Unit 3 Load Center Room and place Unit 3 charging pump switches in remote.
B.
Dispatch a second member of control room staff to the Unit 3 charging pump room, via outside entrance from Boric Acid Storage Tank Room, and establish manual charging pump control.
C.
From control room, verify that a sufficient number of auxiliary feedwater steam supply valves are open.
D.
From the control room, start an additional Unit 4 component cooling water pump and verify Unit 3 component cooling water pump operation.
F.
Use the 4C steam generator level to infer and maintain level in the 4A and 4B steam generators.
12 of 19 Boration of Reactor Coolant S stem A.
Xn the event that all four Boric acid transfer pumps are in operable, initiate boration using the refueling water storage tank source as discussed earlier.
As already indicated, the units can be maintained in the hot shutdown mode for days if desired.
This would allow sufficient time to repair some or most ot the damaged circuits listed in Table 1.
At a minimum; (1) one control room level channel from the 4A and 48 steam generators should be repaired or duplicated outside the control room and (2) residuel heat removal pump control circuits should be repaired or bypassed at the 4160V switchgear before cooldown of the reactor coolant system begins.
Reactor coolant system cooldown should proceed using 'currently established plant procedures with the assistance of Table 1.
As procedures call for the positioning of valves that may not be operable, control room personnel can be dispatched to make the valve adjustments manually.
Valve operation in support of entering into the residual heat removal mode would be conducted in the same manner.
Once the units are on residual heat removal cooling, reactor coolant system temperatures can be maintained at these levels or the uni.ts could be cooled down to cold re-fueling conditions.
In conclusion, the Units can be brought to the safe shutdown condition even assuming loss of all shutdown related cables in the Auxiliary Building Hallway.
Cable Soreadin Room The normal shutdown cable functions in the Cable Spreading Room are shown in Table 2. It is noted that these functions are limited to control and instrument cables only and that pump motor power cables, valve motor power
- cables, etc.
are located outside of the Cable Spreading Room.
Loss of function of these in'strument and control cables would require plant staff to leave the II control room and maintain the units in the hot safe conditions from various
13 of 19 locations throughou he plant. Since control cable nage in the spreading room could affect the power operation of important equipment such as cooling water pumps, heaters, etc., it would also be necessary to isolate the important shutdown circuits fxom the remote control locations.
Positioning of contxol room personnel for performing circuit isolation and control of important equipment is shown in Table 3.
Following completion of the switching and operator positioning at the xemote locations, important/required hot shutdown functions can be performed.
In the event that remote pressurizer level and steam generator level instrumentation is lost it may be necessary to start the safety injection pumps from the 4160V switchgear.
Hith the safety injection pumps aligned to the reactor coolant
- system, increased auxiliary feedwater/steam dump generator cooling would allow the pressurizer to fill. Mith the reactor coolant system in the solid condition (at or near the shutoff head pressure of the safety injection pumps) and steam generator heat removal established, the units can be maintained in this condition for a prolonged period of time. It is also noted that the filling of the pressurizex and make-up for reactor coolant system shrinkage also provides requixed shutdown boration since the safety injection pumps flow through the boron.
injection tank.
Cooldown to the residual heat removal mode would not be conducted until (as a
minimum);
(1) at least one level and pressure channel of remote instrumentation for the pressurizer and steam generatoxs is repaired or duplicated, (2) noxmal reactox coolant system volume control via the charging and chemical volume and control system is re-established and (3) residual heat xemoval pump control circuits should be repaired ox bypassed at the 4160V switchgear.
Reactor coolant system cooldown should proceed using currently established plant procedures with the assistance of Tables 2 and 3.
As procedures call for positioning of inoperable valves, personnel can be dispatched to make valve adjustments manually.
Once on residual heat removal cooling, reactor coolant
13 of l9
) ocation throughouhe plant.
Since control cahlJOamage in the spreading room could affect the power operation of important equipment such as cooling water pumps, heaters, etc., it would also be necessary to isolate the important shutdown circuits from the remote control locations.
Positioning of control room personnel for performing circuit isolation and control of important equipment is shown in Table 3.
Pollowing completion of the switching and operator positioning at the remote locations, important/required hot shutdown functions can be performed.
In the event that remote pressurizer level and steam generator level instrumentation is lost it may be necessary to start the safety injection pumps from the 4160V switchgear.
4'ith the safety injection pumps aligned to the reactor coolant
- system, increased auxiliary feedwater/steam dump generator cooling would allow the pressurizer to fill. With the reactor coolant system in the solid condition (at or near the shutoff head pressure of the safety injection pumps) and steam generator heat removal established, the units can be maintained in this condition for a prolonged period of time. It is also noted that the filling of the pressurizer and make-up for reactor coolant system shrinkage also provides xequired shutdown boration since the safety injection pumps flow through the boron.
injection tank.
Cooldown to the residual heat removal mode would not be conducted until (as a
minimum);
(1) at least one level and pressure channel of remote instrumentation for the pressurizer and steam generators is repaired or duplicated, (2) normal reactor coolant system volume control via the charging and chemical volume and control system is re-established and (3) residual heat xemoval pump control circuits should be repaired or bypassed at'he 4160V switchgear.
Reactor coolant system cooldown should proceed using currently established plant procedures with the assistance of Tables 2 and 3.
As procedures call for positioning of inoperable valves, personnel can be dispatched to make valve adjustments manually.
Once on residual heat removal cooling, reactor coolant
~
~
system conditions can be maintained or cooldown to refueling conditions can be conducted.
Xn conclusion, sufficient capability exists to bring the units to safe shutdown conditions in the event that Cable Spreading Room cables are damaged.
15 of 19 TABLE 1 SHUTDOWN% RELATED CABLE PUNCTIOtlS IN THE AUXILIARYHALLWAY AT THE 18'LEVATION (c)
(c)
(p)
(p)
(p)
(p)
(p)
(G)
(p)
(p)
(p)
(p)
(p)
(p)
(p)
(I)
=-
(I)
(p)
(p)
(p)
~ Charging pumps 3A, 3B
& 3C Component cooling water pump 4C Boric acid transfer pumps 3A, 3B, 4A & 4B Auxiliary feedwater pump, steam supply valves (NOV-3-1405, MOV-4-1405)
Boric acid injection stop valves (MOV-3-350, MOV-4-350)
Volume control tank isolation valve (NOV-3-115C, NOV-4-115C)
Auxiliary/Radwaste building exhaust and supply fans 3A, 3B, 3A-V10, 3B-Vl1 RHR pumps 3A, 3B, 4A & 4B Accumulator s top valves (MOV-3-865C, MOV-4-865A)
Cold leg safety injection valves (NOV-3-843A, NOV-3-843B,'IOV-4-843A)
I'eedwater isolation valves (MOV-3-1408, NOV-4-1408)
Residual heat exchanger cooling water isolation valves (NOV-3-749A, MOV-3-749B, NOV-4-749A)
Refueling water stop valve (MOV-3-862A)
RHR to RCS isolation valves (MOV-3-744A, NOV-4-744A)
RCS to RHR isolation valves (MOV-3-751, NOV-4-751)
Component cooling water flow 3A, 3B, 4A & 4B Steam generator level 4A & 4B Boric acid storage tank heaters A, B
& C Boric acid heat tracing transformers A & B Unit 3
& 4 emergency lighting panels (C) = Presence of control cable function (P)
= Presence of power cable function (I) = Presence of instrument cable function h
16 of 19 TABLE. 2 SfIUTDOMN RELATED CABLE FUNCTIONS IN THE CABLE SPREADING ROOM (c)
(c)
(c)
(c)
Charging pumps 3A, 3B, 3C, 4A, 4B
& 4C-Component cooling water pumps 3A, 38, 3C, 4A, 4B
& 4C Intake cooling water pumps 3A, 3B, 3C, 4A, 4B
& 4C Boric acid transfer pumps 3A, 3B, 4A & 4B (C)
Boric acid injection stop valves (HOV-3-350, MOV-4-350)
(c)
(c)
(C)
(c)
(c)
(C)
(c)
(c)
(c)
(c)
(c)
(c)
(c)
(C)
(c)
(C)
(I)
(I)
Volume control tank isolation valves (MOV-3-115C, HOV-4-115C)
Auxiliary/Radwaste buildings exhaust and supply fans 3A, 3B 3A-V10
& 3B-Vll Pressurizer heater control groups 3A & 4A and backup groups 3A, 3B, 4A & 4B RHR Pumps 3A, 3B, 4A & 4B Accumulator stop valves (HOV-3-865A, NOV-3-865B, MOV-3-865C, HOV-4-865A, MOV-4-865B & MOV-4-865C)
Cold leg SI (YDV-3-843A, HOV-3-843B, MOV-4-843A & MOV-4-843B)
Hain steam isolation valves (POV-3-2604, POV-3-2605, POV-3-2606, POV-4-2604, POV-4-2605
& POV-4-2606)
Peedwater isolation valves (MOV-3-1407, MOV-3-1408, MOV-3-1409, HOV-4-1407, MOV-4-1408
& MOV-4-1409)
RHR heat exchanger cooling water isolation valves (HOV-3-749A, HOV-3-749B, HOV 4 749A
& HOV 4 749B)
Refueling water storage tank stop valves (MOV-3-862A, NOV-3-862B, HOV-4-862A, MOV-4-862B)
RHR to RCS isolation valves (MOV-3-744A, YiOV-3-744B, MOV-4-744A
& MOV-4-744B)
RCS to BHR isolation (MOV-3-750, MOV-4-750, MOV-3-751, MOV-4-751)
Auxiliary feedwater pump steam supply valves (HOV-3-1403, MOV-3-1404, MOV-3-1405, MOV-4-1403, MOV-4 1404, NOV 4-1405)
Unit 3
& 4 auxiliary feedwater auto start and backup circuits
'uxiliary feedwater pump steam pressure controllers (SV-3706, SV-3707)
Auxiliary feedwater control and backup valves, 3A, 3B, 3C, 4A, 4B &4C RCS pressure (PI-3-403, PI-4-403)
RCS temperature (hot let 3A, 3B, 3C, 4A, 4B, 4C; cold leg 3A, 3B, 3C, 4A, 4B, 4C)
0 TABLE 2 (cont)
(I)
Steam generator pressure and level 3A, 38, 3C, 4A, 48, 4C of 19 (I)
(c)
(G)
Unit 3
& 4 pressurizer level 480 V load centers 3A, 38, 3C, 3D, 4A, 48, 4C
& 4C feeder breakers Diesel generator breakers (generators 83
& 4; buses 3A, 4A, 38
& 48)
(C) = Presence of control cable function (P)
= Presence of power cable function (I) = Presence of instrument cable function
18 of 19 TABLE 3 EXAMPLE OF PLANT STAFF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CONTROL AND MAINTAIN HOT CONDITIONS'ROM REMOTE PLANT LOCATIONS (1)
Nuclear Contxol Center 0 erator (1 of 3)
Place Isolation Switches In Remote At The Followin Locations:
4160 Volt 4A Switch eax Room Location 480V Load Center 4A Bus tie to switchgear 4B Component cooling water pump 4A 480V Load Center 4C Intake cooling water pump 4A Emergency diesel generator A
Isolation switch on "A" sequencer panel 4160 Volt 4B Switch ear Room Location 480V Load Centex 4B Component cooling pump 4B 480V Load Center 4D Intake cooling watex pump 4B Intake cooling water pump 4C Emergency diesel generator B
Bus tie to 4A switchgear Isolation switch on "B" sequencer panel Load Center Room Location Unit 4 (south wall)
Charging pumps 4A, 4B, 4C MCC 4A North End Location
'ormal containment cooler 4C Place contxol switch on fast Cable S readin Room Location Isolation switch, Isolation switch, Isolation switch, Isolation switch, generator
//3 lockout relay Unit 3 startup trarisformer lockout generator
//4 lockout relay Unit 4 startup transformer lockout relay relay DC Switch ear Room Location Isolation switch, DC emergency bearing oil pump Unit on 125V DC panel A
Isolation switch, DC emergency bearing oil pump Unit on 125V DC panel B
3 4,
~Note that while it is perfered to isolate these lockout relays it is not absolutely essential since the equipment xequixed for shutdown can be powered from the emergency diesel generators.
TABLE 3 (cont)
(2)
Nuclear Hatch En ineer Place Isolation Switches In Remote At The Followin Locations:
4160 Volt 3A Switch ear Room Location 480V Load Center 3A Bus tie to switchgear 38 Component cooling wate r pump 3A 480V Load Center 4C Component cooling pump 3C Intake cooling water pump 3A
~ Emergency diesel genexator A
Isolation switch on "A" sequencer panel 4160 Volt 38 Switch ear Room Location 480V Load Center 38 Component cooling pump 38 480V Load Center 3D Intake cooling water pump 38 Intake cooling water pump 3C Emergency diesel generator 8
Bus tie to 3A switchgear Isolation switch on "8" sequencer panel Load Center'Room Location Unit 3 (south wall)
Charging pumps 3A, 38, 3C IfCC 4A North End Location Normal containment cooler 3A Place control switch on fast Emer enc Diesel Generator Building Diesel generator A control panel Diesel generator 8 control panel (3)
Nuclear Turbine 0 erator Proceed to the Unit 3 auxiliary feedwater control station.and maintain Unit 3 steam generator levels (4)
Nuclear Control Center 0 erator (1 of 3)
Proceed to the Unit 4 auxiliary feedwa'ter contxol stati'on and maintain Unit 4 steam generator levels (5)
Nuclear Control Center 0 erator
'(1 of 3)
Proceed to Unit 4 charging pump room and maintain pressurizer level as required and perform boxation of RCS as directed (6)
Nuclear 0 eratox Proceed to Unit 3 charging pump xoom and maintain pressurizer level as required and perform boration of RCS as directed
FLORIDA POWER 8I LIGHT COMPANY INTER-OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE TO R.
E. Uhrig LOCATION DATE Power. Resources June 6, 1980 FRQM A ~
D ~
Schmi dt sUBJEGT:
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 8I 4 FIRE PROTECTION/SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY COPIES TO R. J. Acosta S.
G. Brain J.
N. Burford D.
W.
Haase D.
W. Jones H.
N. Paduano/910.9TP G. A. Patrissi C. 0.
Woody H.
E. Yaeger/J.
K. Hays PRN-LI-80-227 The subject information is attached for your review and forwarding to the NRC.
A. D. Schmidt HAS/cph Attachment PEOPLE... SERVING PEOPLE FORM 100S REV. 1/7S