L-76-277, Proposed Amendment to Facility Operating License DPR-67. Proposed Change Concerns Technical Specification Concerning an Unfavorable Power Distribution Which Has Led to a Delay in Power Ascension Testing

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Proposed Amendment to Facility Operating License DPR-67. Proposed Change Concerns Technical Specification Concerning an Unfavorable Power Distribution Which Has Led to a Delay in Power Ascension Testing
ML18096B511
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/30/1976
From: Robert E. Uhrig
Florida Power & Light Co
To: Stello V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-76-277
Download: ML18096B511 (10)


Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAT OMMISSI ON DOCKET NUMBER

[NRC FoRM 195 50-335 I2 76)

II FILE NUMBER

. NRC DISTRIBUTION FoR -PART 50 DOC!(ET MATERIAL TO: FROM: DATE OF DOCUMENT I Plorida Power & Light Company 7/30/76 Mr R. D. Silver Miami, Florida DATE RECEIVED Mr. Robert E. Uhrig 7/30/76 PfJ.ETTE R OTOR IZED PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED OORIGINAL PKU N C LASS I F I E D one signed copy JRCDE Y DESCRIPTION ENCLOSURE Ltr. notorized 7/30/76 w/attached. ~

~ .re meeting on 7/29/76 ' ~ .regarding amdt to ol/

change to tech spec, ~ concerning, an unfavorabl power distribution withi'n the Unit 1 reactor core which has led to a delay in power ascension testing.

ACKNOWLEDGED PLANT NAbfE: DO NOT REVIOVE St Lucie 81 SAFETY FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 8 2 76 RJL ASSIGNED AD: ASSI NED BRANCH CHIEF: Ziemann AD'RO PROJECT 1fANAGER: - fANA v LXC 'SSTo: ggs INTERNAL D IST RI BUTION REQ* FIL ~

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f Lot!if~4 ~VS-"R 5 'GHT CGA>PAN'f Ju1y 30, 1976 L-76-277 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Nr. Victor Stello; Director

".3 cgQ Division of Operating Reactors t'jIff U. S. Nuclear Regula ory Ccmrais.sion Rashington DC 20553 Dear r b! . S tello:

Re: St. I ucie Docket mo.30-335 Unit l Proposed Amendment to I. t Xn accordance wi th l0 CF 8 50. 30, Plor ida Power 6 bligh t Company submits here".zi th three (3) signed or iginals arxd forty (40) copies of a request to a:remend Facility Operating License DPR-67 ~

Our z cjiuest is the result of an unfavorable mwer'istribution within the St. tucie Ur>it 1 reactor core whit:h has led to a Our plan for resolving this problem dela>'n go<ver ascension testing,

@as discussed in a meeting with our staf f or) ~uly 29, l976 ~

The plea inclxrdcs the rerooval of severa3. =uel elements follow~ed TV inspections of the reac+or vessel internals. This will necessit;-a".0 stopping he shutdown cooling water flow whenever the TV carreea is in "hc core. However, Technical Specification

>.9 8 req4ires "hat; at least one shutdown cooling 3.oop shal3. bc

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in operation. Therefore, Me reqves t that arx interim license.

amendeant, be granted to waive this ~equi."ernent during the TV inspec" J.ons and to permit. ooeration revie'unfed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> without shutdown coolina flaw. A safety evaluation supporting our pro-posal is attached.

The proposed amends.ent has been and the conc3.usion.

reached that it does not invoke.ve a significant hazards consider-,

ation, therefore, prenoticinq pursuant to 10 Cr. R 2.105 should not be requirec'..

Very truly yogrs, tgIIIfgl8'tg@ Dock8't P(8 Rober t. E. Uh rig Vice President REU x HAS: tg Attacbmen cc: Normal C. Y>osclev 0 act P,. Newman, Esaui r e

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SA" FTY EVAI UATXQ!4 FOR E 277 An exception is requ~~ ed to Technical Speci fica tion 3.9.8 for the pu=pose of reacto- vessel inspection J.n the ref online triode f Joe to the This specification requires 3090 gyre shutdo~:n cooling:

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reac"or vessel at all tirres 'n the refueling mede.

The upcoming core inspection program requires securing of shut--

down cooling flow to the reactor vessel for a fog hour period i

to permit. nspec' Qn 0 C the lo~)'er reactor vessc l This poses no hazard to the health and sa.fety of by r ceo t e means the Public for the fol loving reasons:

1. The shutdowns, cooling sys em remains ope able initiation an demand. for jrrmedia"e 2- The 14Q'i" RCS temperature limit in the refueling mode remain in ef feat,. The present de ay heat load due to a burnup of 800 Y<ND/NTU is much less than the decay heat loading due to a full core cycle bu.nup of 12,806 Nkli3fNTU.
3. The 3QQC gpss flo~ requirement is basr d upon the box'on dilution accident as analyzed in Chapter 15 of the FSAR ~

This accident contains the following assvnptions as a basis:

a ~ All CM's are removed from the coro.

b. Boron dilution is effected via ',ull low from three charge.zg pusaps.atmaximmn fla~'nject in'rimary di lution Mate." into the reactor vessel for a period of l.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
c. ho shutdown cooling flow is present in the core The boron dilution acciden t assumes candi t.ions tooer severe than the conditions which vill be present. during the upcosning controlled evolu ion 'ox core inspection. Al3. CEAS's vill be present in the fuel bundles and not removed fz'oso the core, thus giving at least 5b shutdo~> margin assuming no credit for boron concentra ion in the cooXan". The CVCS flow path bets'een primary dilution w"ate" and the charging pumps he maintained locJ:ed closed under ac'.mSnistra.t,ive control vill dvx'kng this core inspection, thu - eliminating the, dilution mechanism assumed in the accident analysis.

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STATE 0F PLQRXDA ssi CQK;STY OF DADE Rot)ere E i Uter" 0 bf Snip first col)" swoL'n) Bogoecs 858 sa$ 8 p

That he is a Vice President o Florioa Power E Light Company'<

the iicensee vere'n; That, he has exccut 8 the aforegoing document; t ha" the st.ate-taercts made in this ski~ docker.t are tme an@ correct to the bes~ oL>> his 3cnovledqe, inZoanaeion, ano he1ie~, and that he is author" @ed, to execu"e he document on behal f of san@

Licensee.

Robert E. Uhrig Subscribers and sworn o be~ore me this HC3 clay o~

NOTARY MBK XC, i.n aiba or -he County o Da e, 8 ate ok Florida

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