IR 05000553/1979015

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IE Insp Repts 50-553/79-15 & 50-554/79-14 on 791009-12.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Insp Findings,General Insp of Const Status,Review of QA Manual & Licensee Identified Items
ML19253C626
Person / Time
Site: Phipps Bend  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/1979
From: Cantrell F, Wright R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19253C624 List:
References
50-553-79-15, 50-554-79-14, NUDOCS 7912060594
Download: ML19253C626 (5)


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UNITED STATES

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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-553/79-15 and 50-554/79-14 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee Facility Name: Phipps Bend Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-553 and 50-554 License Nos. CPPR-162 and CPPR-163 Inspection at Phipps Bend Site near Kingsport, Tennessee Inspector:

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R. W. Wright f

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Approved by:

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~ Da te' Sigr(ed SUMMARY Inspection on October 9-12, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 33 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings; construction status; issue and control of welding material; review of QA Manual - SCS; and the handling of licensee identified items (LII).

Results Of the five areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • W. P. Kelleghan, Project Manager
  • G. i'adewitz, Construction Engineer
  • J. C. Cofield, Assistant Construction Engineer, P.E.
  • G. V. Hogg, Materials and Civil QC Unit Supervisor
  • D. E. Hitchcock, Site QA
    • J. J. Ritts, Engineer, MEB-NLS, Knoxville J. M. Cromec, Civil Engineering Unit Supervisor, P.E.

J. Houch, Storage Records Clerk, DCU W. Mullins, Preventive Maintenance QC Inspector T. V. Abbatiello, Assistant Construction Engineer, QC J. A. Crittenden, Electrical QC Unit Supervisor M. M. Mishoe, Electrical QC Inspector Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included construc-tion craftsmen, technicians, QC engineers, and office personnel.

Other Organizations

  • Attended exit interview
    • Participated in exit interview by telephone 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 12, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above. The licensee was advised that no new items of noncompliance or deviations were identified by the inspector.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.

(Closed) Infraction 553-554/79-03-01; Failure To Follow Procedures For Safety Related Contracts. RII Report No. 553-554/79-11 discusses the licensee's procedural changes and other actions taken to prevent recurrence.

The RII inspector conducted telephone discussions with the lead auditor for ENDES QA Audit No. 79V40 which was implemented on September 12-13, 1979, concerning his findings pertaining to the recent TVA audit of Southern Calibration and Service (SCS) activities. The auditor stated his review was conducted in accordance with ANSI 45.2 requirements and SCS QA Manual commitments. Although minor discrepancies in documentation were discovered, the auditor had no qualms concerning the technical expertise or quality assurance programs as executed by SCS. In addition, the RII inspector examined Certificates of Calibration by SCS that were prepared for the subject deficient contracts. These Certificates state that all work was done in accordance with ASIM Specification E4, and 1506 030

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identifies calibration apparatus used with documentation that this apparatus was in calibration with the National Standard Test Laboratory. This item is closed, b.

(Closed) Deficiency 553/79-11-03, Improper Handling and Storage of Cad-weld Materials. RII received TVA's letter of response dated September 11, 1979, on the sub. ject matter. Construction and inspection personnel were informed of this deficiency and the civil QC inspectors were retrained on August 30, 1979, in the need for proper handling and storing of Cadweld materials in accordance with PBN SOP-10 and RIS fx PM procedure C-401. The punctured and wet Cadweld cartridge identified was removed from the Unit I reactor and disposed of per PBN S0P-10. The three Cadweld sleeves were discarded due to rust damage. A visual inspection conducted of both units during this inspection did not reveal any similar discrepancies. This item is closed.

c.

(Closed) Infraction 553-554/79-03-03, Preventive Maintenance (PM)

Implementation.

TVA's letter of response dated April 13, 1979, has been reviewed by the RII inspector and the corrective action specified therein has been found implemented by the licensee.

Discussions conducted with the Materials Services Unit Supervisor and PM inspectors revealed all equipment for which required preventive maintenance had not been performed was placed in a nonconforming status. Required maintenance items were identified, preventive maintenance cards were prepared and maintenance operations were executed. Current PM documen-tation for the RHR pump motors, RHR heat exchangers and diesel generators identified in the subject noncompliance were examined and found satis-factory. Additional manpower has been assigned to the PM unit.

In addition, a craft coordinator has been established to ensure craft personnel understand the importance of PM and to insure PM functions are performed within the required frequency. This item is closed.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Independent Inspection Effort The inspector conducted a general inspection of construction status a.

and work activities underway in the containment, auxiliary and fuel building areas for both units.

Other areas in which a general

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construction inspection was conducted included the intake pumping station, the cooling tower and spray pond areas, and the CCW pumping station. Activities observed included welding of support steel and containment vessel sidewall plates, preparation for concrete placements, material handling and housekeeping controls.

b.

The inspector observed the issue and control of welding material at Rod Control Center No. 3 to determine the adequacy of weld material storage / segregation, oven temperatures, issue records, and control of 1506 031

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unused weld material.

The above activities were inspected to the requirements established by Construction Engineering Procedure CEP 8.03, " Control cf Welding Material".

Within the above areas of independent inspection no deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

6.

Review of QA Manual - Southern Calibration and Service (SCS)

The SCS QA Program is applicable to the calibration of physcial test machines used in the construction of nuclear power stations. SCS has been engaged by TVA to calibrate some laboratory materials testing apparatus at the Phipps Bend Site. Review of SCS QA manual revealed it contained QA plans and procedures to include: organizational structure and responsibilities; description of the SCS QA Program, including indoctrination and training of personnel; instructions and procedures for verification of testing machines by elastic proving rings (ASTM E-4 Specification); controls for measuring /

test equipment and the handling of QA records; means for corrective action; and an annual audit of the SCS QA program for proper effectiveness and implementation.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

7.

Licensee Identified Items (LII)

Prior to the inspection, the licensee identified several items which were considered potentially reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). The items are as follows:

a.

(Closed) Item 553-554/78-08-02, Personnel Airlock Components Procured To Non-safety Class 2 Requirements.

The licensee has i, md two interim reports dated November 2, 1978, and February 15, 1H9, respec-tively, and a final report on this matter dated August 16, 1979. TVA discovered that their vendor's design and fabrication of certain pneumatic components of the inflatable seals of the personnel access airlocks did not meet ASME Section III, Class 2 requirements as specified in GESSAR Section 3.2.3.2, tables 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

The licensee has directed the vendor by letter dated March 29, 1979, to proceed to redesign and fabricate the pneumatic systems on the personnel airlocks incorporating the above proper ASME requirements.

The redesign is being reviewed and the documentation received with the fabricated airlocks will be reviewed by TVA to ensure all desi'gn requirements were met. RII has no further questions regarding this matter at this time.

b.

(0 pen) Item 553-554/79-06-02, Lower Than Required Factor of Safety For Actual Design of Welded Anchorages.

RII has received two interim reports on this matter, dated May 24, 1979, and August 13, 1979. The licensee's last report indicated that TVA has completed its testing program and data is presently being evaluated. The licensee anticipates transmitting a final report on the subject to the NRC on or before December 21, 1979.

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c.

(Closed) Item 553-554/79-11-01, Faulty Welding by Lakeside Bridge and Steel on the Drywell Vent Structure and Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)

Pedestal. RII received TVA's final report on this item dated October 1, 1979. All segments of the RPV pedestal for Unit 1 are now onsite.

The remaining four lower segments were receipt inspected August 16, 1979. None of the RPV pedestal for PBNP Unit 2 is onsite. The RII inspector examined the Receiving Inspection Checklist and TVA's Check-list and Shipping Release documentation for the recently received lower RPV segments, and found statements to the effect that "all buttering and/or weld repair has been radiographed acceptable".

Further discussions with Phipps Bend's (MEB-NLS) representative who contacted TVA's QEB resident materials inspector at the ver.ders shop verified that the statement meant 100 percent RT had been accomplished as required. The Phipps Bend site has not discerned any buttering of edges of the girthweld area (circumferential weld which joins the ring girder to the shell section) and therefore does not anticipate any of the cracking problems the Hartsville site experienced due to copper contami-nation caused by use of copper backup bars. RII has no further questions regarding this matter at this t.ime.

d.

(Closed) Item 553-554/79-11-02, Defective Auxiliary Switch in Emergency Service Water (ESW) Switchgear.

RII received the licensee's final report on this matter dated August 16, 1979. GE - Switchboard Division (GE-SBD) corrected the worn die so that all SB-12 auxiliary switches made on or after July 1, 1979, do not contain this defect. Licensee in52stigations revealed that no ESW breakers had been shipped to the PBNP.

Consequently, GE-SBD will have acceptable replacement switches installed prior to any switchgear shipments to PBNP. TVA did however identify 16 suspect SB-12 auxiliary switches in eight breakers and eight breaker compartments (one each) for the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system supplied by GE and fabricated by Morrison-Knudson Company for ure at the PBNP. This HPCS switchgear was shipped prior to July 1, 1979, and will be reequipped with replacement SB-12 auxiliary switches to be supplied by GE-SBD. These replacement switches are to be installed by February 29, 1980. Controls to insure this auxiliary switch substitu-ion is accomplished will be tracked by TVA QCIR 11225. TVA investigations have found no other suspect switchgear in their safety related systems.

RII has no further questions regarding this matter at this time.

e.

(0 pen) Item 553/79-15--01 - 554/79-14-01, High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator Control Switchgear Wiring Discrepancies. On August 2, 1979, TVA notified RII that site personnel performed a wiring check on two sets of HPCS diesel generator switchgear. They found the subject switchgear contained evidence of poor workmanship such as a wire pulled out of a terminal, inadequate terminations, loose and broken soldering joints and cables with considerable wear or several strands of the conductor cut.

TVA has submitted an interim report dated August 29, 1979 stating that they are still investigating this matter and expect to submit a final report on or before Decem*.ar 14, 1979.

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TVA has placed the subject diesel generator control switchgear for both units in a hold status (QCIR 11221) until satisfactory corrective action can be decided upon and implemented.

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(0 pen) Item 553/79-15-02 - 554/79-14-02, Nelson Studs for Embedments in Reactor Building Beyond Specification Tolerance.

TVA initially notified RII of the subject deficiency on August 31, 1979.

TVA's first interim report dated October 1, 1979, states that a testing program is being initiated to determine the effect of bending of the studs on the capability of the embedment to perform as designed. The results of the test program are to be used to develop final criteria y

on the bending of the studs. During the interim period, installation tolerances on studs will be controlled for all STRIDE construction by paragraph 6.4 to TVA's STRIDE Specification 300-06, Rev. 5, ECNI. The licent.ee anticipates sending -enother report to the NRC on this matter by June 1,1980.

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