IR 05000508/1980015

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IE Insp Repts 50-508/80-15 & 50-509/80-15 on 801118-21. Noncompliance Noted:Piping Had Offset Twice Max Allowable & Listed Documented Procedures Did Not Include Appropriate Requirements of Specs
ML19350E400
Person / Time
Site: Satsop
Issue date: 01/08/1981
From: Dodds R, Haist D, Hernandez G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML19350E394 List:
References
50-508-80-15, 50-509-80-15, NUDOCS 8106220520
Download: ML19350E400 (12)


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3. ?'UCLL\\R REGULiTORY COMMISSIC:I 0FFICC OF I!:SPECTIO:: A!iD E!; FORCE!E!iT

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REGIOt V l

50-508/80-15 Rep;rt tio.

5n-904/30 15 Docket !To.

En-Ena A EQ-3 E License !!o. cppR-154 A 155 Safeguards Group Licensee:

Washington Public Power Supply System P. O. Box 968 Richland,liashington 99352 WNP-3 and WflP-5 Fccility : Tame:

MMP-3 and WNP-5 Site (Satsop)

Inspection et:

November 18 - 21, 1980 Inspection conducted:

Inspectors:

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D. P. H31st, Reactor Inspector

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H Gy. Hernandez, Pegctor Inspector D.!ce~signeo e

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Date Signed

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Approved Ey:

srstcm and Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel

~h, licensee has directed Ebasco to provide the demineralized water vmn WQ cn antisiphon device or double isolation valves with n '. doff between than to prevent the backflow of potentially contaminated uatar. Tha licensee operations department will establish aaministrative control; cn the cenineralized water system to prevent contamination.

There is no potential for cross connection between the potable and denineralizcd water systcms. This circular will remain open pending verification of the licensees actions.

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Circular 30-16 - Coerational Deficiencies in Rosemount Model 510 DU Trio Units and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters The licensee has determined that no 510 DU trip units or Rosemount 1152 transmitters have been specified for use on WP-3/5. This circular is closed.

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Circular 80-10 - 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Changes to Raciinactive Waste Treatment Systems This circular has been forwarded to the licensee's operaticns department for consideration. This circular will remain open pending establishment of the licensee's provisions for preparation of 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations.

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Circular 80-21 - Reaulation of Refueling Crews This circular has been formrded to the licensee's operations department and will be addressed in fuel ranipulation and refueling procedures.

This circular will renain open pending verification of these actions.

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Circular 80-23 - Potential Defects in Beloit Power Systems Emergency benerators The licensee has determined that the WNP-3/5 facility will not be purchasing Beloit Power Systems generators with frame sizes 5 or 6.

This circular is therefore not aoplicable and is closed.

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Enfnty Related Structures (Structural Steel & Suocorts II) - Peter Kiewit Sons a.

Observation of Work and Ucrk Activities Three major equipment components located outside of Containment

!!c. 3 were examineo to verify wnether work in progress and Completed work was ceing accomplisneo in accordance with NRC requirements and SAR commitments. The components examined were:

(1) Letdcun tieac Exchanger, S/M-2371 Q 'inlume Control Tonk, S/U-001

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(3) Mitrogen Aecycle Tank, S/M-N2321.20 Tha inspector round that unile these components are not yet installed in final location, the components are being maintained in accordance ii-3 hter Kicuit Sens in-placa storage requirements.

"o items of ncncompliance or deviations from I;RC or industry standards

. ara found with the Volt. e Control and liitrogen Recycle Tanks, however, wald defects on the attachment welds similar to those identified during the i:RC inspection from August 29 to September 26, 1980 (see MRC Inspecticn Report !!o. 80-C9) were found on the Letdown Heat Exchanger.

These tanks v;ere fabricated by Richmond Engineering Company (RECO)

of Pichmond, Virginia and supplied by Combustion Engineering to the licensee.

Discussions with licensee personnel indicated that the Project Quality Assurance ffanager had requested on l'over.ber 4,1980 (reference:

Inter Office Memorandum l'o. QA-35-80-632) a re-inspection of all pressure vessels furnished by Combustion Engineering. An attached list to this memo included the Unit 3 Letdown Heat Exchanger as cr.e of the pieces of equipment to be re-inspected.

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Since it appeared that the licensee's program is cognizant of, and has taken steps to resolve this problem, the inspector has no further questions on this atter, b.

Reviou of Ouality Records The pertinent work and quality records associated with the three ajor ecuioment comoonents listed above were reviewed to determine

'tihether these records met established procedures and whether these records reflect work accomplishment consistent with NRC requirements and SAR commitments. The following quality records which included raterial, installation and inspection records were reviewed:

R2 cords recuireo list

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t5terial rece1ving inscection report

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!bterial receiveo recort

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Document ceticiency notices

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Cartificate of compliance

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Mill test certification and analysis

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Veld material certification and analysis

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Radiograpnic reacer

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Hydrostatic test reports

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/,s-cuilt drawings

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hnufacturers icentification plan

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IMnufacturing inspection plan

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"o items of noncorupiiance or deviations were identified.

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Stai Structures und Supaarts

.lorrison Knudsen Observation of 1lorf. and Work Activities The inspector examined welding activities in the liorrison-Knudsen onsite fabrication shop for compliance with applicable codes and standards.

The folicwing aspects of the work were examined: identification of welders, documentation, welder qualification, in-process and completed welds, and centrol of weld filler material.

Discussions with the contractor personnel disclosed that arbed plates supplied by Fought and Ccmpany Incorporated of Tigard, Cregon had been received onsite with Nelson studs uhich did not meet the requirements of AWS D1.1.

The studs not meeting code requiren.unts fell into two basic categories (a) undersize fillet welds and (b) otger weld defects including lack of fusion, undercut, cracks, and lack of 360 flash.

In February 1980 a generic nonconformance recort (NCR No.11581) was written and on May 1,1980 the recommended disposition allowed those studs with undersized fillet welds to be accepted as-is based on satisfactory results of tensile tests, in which all studs

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met or exceeded the required tensile capacity. All other studs were to be repaired or returned to the vendor. Since the tensila test included all types of weld defects and not one stud had failed to meet the mininum tensile strength required by AWS, the nonconfornance disposition also allowed that those plates already installed be left as-is and used for the purpose intended.

The insnector concluded that the contractor and the licensee had taken appropriate action in accordance with the quality assurance program and appeared to have properly evaluated the problem under the reportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

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F/AC Duct Succort Connection #nalysis Curing the course of an inspection on October 21-24, 1980 the inspector was given a calculation titled " Connection Analysis for Beam Connections Using Single Side Angles." This calculation was prepared by the HVAC contractor, Wallace/ Superior in supcort of an internal nonconformance report disposition. The nonconformance reporting procedures of this contractor are the suoject of a previous notice of violation.

(Ref.

IE Inspection Report 60-508/80-12).

The inspector reviewed this " Connection Analysis" and found the following deficiencies: (1) the analysis was performed on a turbine building duct support and included no dynamic load factor to account for seismic loading on reactor cuxiliary building supports; (2) the AISC load capacities were nisinterpreted as tha capacity per clip when in fact they represent the capacity per double clip; (3) the allowable load per clip angle was inccrrectly calculated; and (4) the actual load per clip angle was never compar:d to the allcwable lead per clip angle to determine acceptability.

These deficiencies render this calculation void and demonstrate a lack of unterst nding on tha part of the perscn performing this analysis of the AISC Panual of Steel Construction and its application.

On Octo'er 24, 1980 Ebasco prepared calculations of the seismic duct t

supports in the reactor auxiliary building to check acequacy of the one-sided clip connections. Ebasco concluded that the one-sided clip angle connections are unacceptable for seismic connections. A nonconformance report has been issued to upgrade the four seismic supports in the reactor auxiliary building by adding additional clips.

Licensee representatives stated that Hallace/ Superior is not allcwed to perforn design calculations on safety related structures and that changes to the Hallace/ Superior nonconformance reporting system will prevent repetition of this situation. Since there were only four (4) quality class 1 supoorts installed at the time the contractor's nonconformance reporting system was revised and the licensee has taken action to correct these supports, the inspector had no further questions at this time.

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Safety Related Structures (Structural Steel and Supports) - J. A. Jones -

Contract l'c. 265 Review cf Qualit's Assurance Implementing Procedures The inspector examined the following J. A. Jones quality assurance implementing procedures to ascertain whether quality assurance olans, instructions and precedures for scocific safety related activities have been established and whether these documents conform to PSAR comitments, industry standards, and design specifications:

Procedure flo.

Title PDP-N-700 Project Ouality Assurance Programs and Crganization P0P-fi-701 Cuality Assurance Directives and Instructions PGP-N-702 Personnel Training, Qualification, and Certification FCP-N-703 i'onconfomance Reporting FOP-4-704 Calibration and Control of Measurement and Test Equipment

PCP-N-705 Eubcontractor Surveillance POP-U-705 source Inspection

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POP-M-707 Site Inspection and Test POP-il-700 Quality Assurance Audits The inspector identified the folicwing omissions from the procedures reviewed:

(1) P.ocedure fio. PCP-ii-703, Nonconfomance Reporting, does not incorporate the provisiens of the controlling specification No. 3240-265, section 2A, paragraph 14.6.4.2 which requires the contractor, for contractor-dispositioned nonconfomance reports, to submit the original completed nonconformance report with applicable supporting engineering and inspection documentation to the Engineer's Quality Assurance Site Supervisor. This procedure also does not incorporate the requirements cf specification paragraph 14.6.6 which requires, for flRB reviewed nonconformnces, that the Engineer witness the re-inspection, detemine its acceptability and sign off the nonconformance report after prior

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These om.ss ans have centractor inspection and approval.

reflectM in the practices of the contractor. The supporting concrete inspection reports and final placement inspection records were not transmitted with nonconformance report flos. 2907 and 2910 dated

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fiay 5, 1980 and l'ay 9, 1980, respectively. These supporting documents were later transmitted through routine documentation channels.

Administrative site procedure no. ASP-0A-7-3, Rev. 2 which prescribes owner / engineer handling of nonconform nce reports requires, in paragraoh 3.3.31, cuality assurance verification of implementation of narconformance disposition where reouired. This owner / engineer procedure does not reflect the contract specification requirement that, for tiRB reviewed nonconformances, the engineer witness the re-inspection, determine its acceptability, and sign off the nonconformance 1980 were reviewed by the NRB (Nonconformance Review Board)p report.

flonconformance report nos. 2910 and 2930, dated Se There

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is no evidence that the engineer witnessed the reinspection as required

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by the centrollino contract specification.

The failure of contractor procccures to incorporate specification recuirements is an apparent itam of noncompilance (50-508, 509/80-15/01).

The failure of contractor procedures to adequately incorporate scacification requirements (Ref. IE Inspection Report Item No.

EO-509/79-08/02-Contract No. 213) and the requirements of administrative site crocedures (Ref. IE Inspecuan Report Item No. 50-508/79-08/01-

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C:n:ract no. 251) have been the suoject of repeated inspection

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findinos and have been discussed with the WPPSS nanagement during presentacion of the i;RC Regional Evaluation of Licensee Performance

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'JP-3/5 for the cppraisai period of August,1979 - August,1980.

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(2) Proceaure do. PGP-ii-705, Source inspection was approved for use tith an unresolvad comment by the Engineer concerning the characteristics to c 2 i.upacted and the method of surveillance to be used. The licensee is investigating this cmission to determine if the cement uas uithdrawn.

This item is unresolvcd.

(50-508,509/80-15/03)

The inspector also noted that Procedure No. P0P-l!-707, Site Inspection wi Tast, allcws the OV supervisor to review inspection reports for completeness and validity prior to adding the report number and logging the report into the system. This practice has been the source of numerous allegations by QC inspectors at another WFPSS facility that inspection findings were voided improperly.

The policy for documenting and voiding of inspection documents will be examined during a subsequent inspection.

(50-508,509/80-15/02)

10. !bnaceront,wting The inspectors met with the licensee and engineer management denoted in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on November 21, 1980.

The inspectors discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.

The inspector expressed concern that the lessons being learned at the UliP-2 facility with regard to allowing the QC supervisor to decide the validity of inspection findings prior to logging the inspection report into the system, have not been implemented at the WNP-3/5 facilities.

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The licensee acknowledged this concern.

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