IR 05000508/1980002
| ML19305E533 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1980 |
| From: | Dodds R, Kirsch D, Wagner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19305E526 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-508-80-02, 50-508-80-2, 50-509-80-02, 50-509-80-2, NUDOCS 8005200028 | |
| Download: ML19305E533 (9) | |
Text
8005200028
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- 2j OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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50-508/80-02
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Report No.
50-509/80-02
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License No.50-508 & 50-509 Priority CPPR-154 & 155 Category
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Licensee:
Washington Public Pow. Supply System 9}
P. O. Box 468 yg Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
WNP-3 and WNP-5
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Inspection at:
WNP-3 and WNP-5 Site (Satsop)
Inspection cond cted:
March 6 - 9 and 18 - 19, 1980
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Inspectors:
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D. F. Kirsch, Reactor Inspector Date Signed
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Date Signed fd. Wagpr. Reactor Inspector
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9;;p di Date Signed Approved by:
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- R. T. Dodds, Chief, Engineering Support Section
/ Date Signed Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch
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Summary:
Inspection during period of March 6 - 9 and 18 - 19,1980 7.-@
(Report Nos. 50-508/80-02 and 50-509/80-02)
Areas inspected:
Routine, announced inspection by regional-based inspectors of construction activities including licensee action on previous inspection
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findings; licensee action on 50.55(e) items; and containment structural steel
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post weld heat treatment procedure review, work observation and record review.
The inspection involved 72 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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IE:V Form 219 (ik 3::Ed
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DETAILS
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1.
Individuals contacted a.
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
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W. J. Talbott, Division Manager J. C. Lockhart, QA Manager R. A. Davis, Senior Project Quality Engineer b.
Ebasco Services, Inc. (Ebasco)
A. M. Cutrona, Deputy QA Manager R. E. Jurbala, Lead Project Quality Engineer C. M. McClaskey, Lead Project Quality Engineer W. J. Lear, Level III NDE Examiner T. F. Tully, Lead Project Quality Engineer c.
Chicago Bridge and Iron (CBI)_
J. W. Cain, Project Welding and QA Superintendent P. Van Niel, District Welding Manager R. Long, Project Manager
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d.
Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory (PTL)
J. Adachi, Site Manager D. Butman, Laboratory Supervisor 2.
Plant Tour
The inspectors conducted extensive tours of the Uni' 3 and 5 plants to observe completed work and work in progress for obvious deviations or noncompliance with PSAR commitments and regulatory requirements.
Particular attention was given to the activities of safety related component storage conditions, structural steel welding and high strength bolting, and concrete reinforcing steel and embed installation.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items a.
(Closed)(508/79-10-05) Infraction:
Failure to control weld filler metal as required by procedures The licensee's response to the item of noncompliance was submitted by letter no. G03-80-91 dated January 18, 1980.
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i The inspector examined the licensee's corrective actions and'
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observed that the corrective actions were as stated. The J
' documentation of increased licensee surveillance in the area
of weld filler metal control examined showed that no addi-
tional instances of uncontrolled filler metal had been observed.
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The inspector's observations during the plant tour did not identify any further instt.nces of weld filler metal control
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discrepancies.
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(Closed)(509/79-08-01) Infraction:
Failure to properly l
prepare weld surface prior to welding
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i The licensee's response to the item of noncompliance was
submitted by letter no. G03-80-91 dated January 18, 1980.
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The inspector examined the licensee's corrective actions and
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observed that the corrective actions appeared to be accomplished l
as stated. The licensee increased surveillance frequency in
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this area and examination of surveillance documentation did i
not identify any further discrepancies in this area.
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4.
Licensee Action on 50.55(e) Reportable Deficiencies
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LC1.osed)(508/79-10-03) Construction Deficiency: Omission
of~ reinforcing steel in fuel handling building wall
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l The licensee submitted a final report concerning this deficiency on
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January 31, 1980 by letter No. G03-80-199.
The inspector examined the licensee's report as required by IE inspection procedure guidance and examined the licensee's corrective actions and found them to be
as specified by the final report. The licensee noted that a letter of instruction would be issued specifying the MK contract management's
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review responsibilities for the concrete preplacement check-off i
list and further stated that a training session would be held to
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review the corrective actions to preclude recurrence. This item is
closed.
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5.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Followup Items
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(Closed)(508/80-01-02) Followup Item:
CBI magnetic
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particle inspection form did not indicate inspection results
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The licensee stated that an examination of CBI magnetic
particle nondestructive examination documentation had been conducted during surveillance activities.
The licensee's surveillances indicated that the instance noted by the NRC had been an isolated occurrence since other MT report form did have inspection results included. The inspector had no
.further questions.
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(Closed)(508/80-01-03) Followup Item: Magnetic particle -
l NDE report forms are preprinted with inspection results
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The licensee stated that an evaluation of the practice of preprinting MT report forms had been conducted and concluded the CBI personnel were sufficiently knowledgeable to comply with the requirement that the preprinted result be crossed out and the actual result written in if the examination indicated an unacceptable condition. The inspector had no further questions.
c.
(Closed)(508/80-01-01) Followup Item:
Containment vessel post-weld heat treatment procedures The inspectors examined the following documents and procedures for compliance with PSAR, QA program and ASME code requirements.
(1) PSAR Deviation Request Nos. 020 and 021 WP specifying more recent ASME code applicabilities and minor changes in PWHT accomplishment specifics.
(2) CBI Procedure Nos. HT-ll, Revision 9, and HT-ll '.nstructions, Revision 2, for the accomplishment of post weld-post form heat treatment of Class MC vessels.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, d.
(Closed)(508/78-07-01) Unresolved Item:
Fineness modules test results for fine aggregate exceeded specified values The inspector examined recent fineness modules test results and found them to be in compliance with specified requirements.
It appears that the instance noted was an isolated case. The documentation of the test in question could not be located
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readily and the isolated case of the original question appears to have negligible safety significance.
This item is closed.
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(Closed)(508/78-07-02) Followup Items:
PTL laboratory cleanliness The inspector examined the PTL laboratory work areas and test equipment storage area cleanliness conditions.
The areas were clean and orderly. This item is closed.
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(Closed)(508/78-07-03) Unresolved Item:
pTL calibration program for laboratory standards and test equipment The inspector examined the PTL calibration program for standards and test equipment and observed that the program had been in effect since November 13, 1978 and appeared satisfactory.
The calibration documentation and recall system was compared to the calibration stickers on about 15 pieces of laboratory equipment and appeared to be consistent in all respects.
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The inspector observed two flo. 200 sieves in the test equipment storage area which had deformed screens. The seives were imediately removed from service. This item is closed.
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(0 pen)(508/80-02-01) Followup Item: Calibration check of gradation seives The inspector previously examined the PTL program to assure calibration / verification of aggregate gradation seives and had concerns which were documented in IE Inspection Report flos.
50-508/79-04 and 79-05. The item involved the method used to verify seive characteristics (primarily seive openings).
This item was closed in IE Inspection Report 50-508/79-06 based upon the licensee's comitment to provide a functional check procedure requiring periodic verification of seive openings.
On fiarch 18, 1980, the licensee informed the inspector that their subsequent evaluation of the requirements regarding this matter resulted in a system of control different from that documented in IE Inspection Report flo. 50-508/79-06.
The revised method was described in a letter to the regional office, dated March 24, 1980.
The controls specified by the letter will be examined during a future inspection.
The requirements for control and calibration / verification of aggregate gradation seives are currently under review by IE:HQ and the Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation.
This item is open pending ccmpletion of the flRC review.
(508/80-02-01)
6.
Licensee Response to IE Bulletins and Circulars a.
Bulletin 79-03:
Longitudinal weld defects in stainless steel pipe spools The licensee response letter no. G03-79-1283, dated July 10, 1979,
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observed that regenerative heat exchangers for the gas strippers
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incorporate ASME 312-TP304L pipe manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Company.
The response indicated that a program was being developed for one time examination of the longitudinal welds to establish compliance with ASME Section III l
and appeared responsive to the bulletin required actions.
This bulletin is closed.
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b.
Bulletin 79-04:
Incorrect weights for swinq check valves manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation The licensee response letter, dated May 25, 1979, indicated that a review of contractors supplying valves for WilP-3/5 was performed and concluded that there were no Velan valves being supplied for WilP-3/5. This bulletin is close *
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Bulletin 79-07:
Seismic stress analysis of safety related piping The licensee's response to the bulletin was submitted by letter Nos. G03-79-1083 and G03-79-1455, dated June 12, 1979, and Augu.st 2, 1979, respectively. The licensee's review established that the bulletin identified methods for seismic
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analysis of safety-related piping were not used for either the balance-of-plant or nuclear steam supply systems and appeared responsive to the bulletin specified actions.
This bulletin is closed.
d.
Bulletin 79-11:
Faulty overcurrent trip device in circuit breakers for engineered safety systems The licensee response letter, dated August 6,1979, indicated that Westinghouse DB-50 and 08-75 circuit breakers are not used on WNP-3/5. The response further identified that the Westinghouse DS-416 solid state circuit breakers, used on the 480 volt power centers, were not subject to the bulletin identified deficiency common to the DB-50 and DB-75 circ;1t breakers. This bulletin is closed.
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Bulletin 79-25:
Potential failure of emergency diesel generator field exciter transformer The licensee reponse letter, dated November 8, 1979, indicated that the WNP-3/5 diesel generators are not connected in the manner described by the bulletin and further indicated that while a schedule for completion of a sustained full load operation test for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> was yet to be determined, such a test would be conducted prior to fuel load.
This bulletin is closed.
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f.
Bulletin 79-25:
Failures of Westinghouse BFD relays Tn safety-related systems-I The licensee response letter, dated January 28, 1980, identified that the WNP-3/5 specification for control boards and panels does not specify Westinghouse type BFD relays.
The response also stated that the A/E had informed all concerned contractors that the subject relays were not permitted for safety related control systems and that substitutions of presently specified relays with this type would not be accepted.
This bulletin is closed.
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Bulletin 79-28:
Possible malfunction of NAMC0 Model EA180 limit switches at elevated temperatures The licensee response letter, dated February 7,1980, identified that the subject limit switch model had been specified for use at WNP-3/5 and that all concerned contractors and subcontractors would be informed of the bulletin subject matter with the request that they identify any limit switches which fall in the category identified by the bulletin.
If any of the limit switches included in the category were identified, the top gasket would be replaced per the manufacturer's instruction.
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Ebasco had so notified the affected subcontractors of the bulletin contents and requested their response.
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examined the responses of two subcontractors and the controls applied to assure monitoring of subcontractor responses.
The inspector had no further questions.
This bulletin is closed.
h.
Bulletin-80-03:
Loss of charcoal from standard type II, 2 inch tray absorber cells The licensee response letter no. G03-80-432, dated March 3, 1980, stated that the charcoal absorber units for WNP-3/5 are of an all welded construction supplied by CTI Nuclear and that the bulletin identified problem did not apply to the units being used on the WNP-3/5 project. This bulletin is closed.
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Circular 79-04:
Loose locking nut on limitorque valve operators The circular was received by licensee management and a review for applicability was performed.
The A/E had notified all applicable subcontractors by letter of August 2,1979 of the circular identified problem and the required corrective actions.
This circular is closesi.
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Circular 79-10:
Pipe fittings manufactured from unacceptable ma terial The circular was received by licensee management and a review for applicability was performed.
The licensee's review con-cluded that the particular lot number identified by the circular as unacceptable was not included in any WNP-3/5 pipe fittings.
This circular is closed.
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Circular 70-13:
Replacement of diesel fire pump starting contactors The circular was received by licensee management and a review for applicability was performed.
The licensee's review con-cluded that the circular desired switch was installed.
This circular is closed.
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Circular 79-17:
Contact problem in SB-12 switches on GE metalclad breakers The circular was received by licensee management and a review for applicability was performed.
The licensee's review concluded that no SB-12 switches had been purchased.
This circular is closed.
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Steel Structures and Supports - Weld Heat Treatment
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Observation'of Work and Work Activities
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The inspectors examined the conduct of Unit 3 containment vessel PWHT activities for compliance with procedural, PSAR
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and ASME code specified requirements.
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The containment vessel had been instrumented with dual thermo-l couples (one a spare) at each temperature monitoring location.
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Thermocouple locations had been chosen to assure monitoring of
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the hottest and coldest temperatures and temperature variations.
Strip chart recorders had been calibrated and sufficient
spares were on hand. The inspectors examined docums station verifying strip chart recorder calibration and thermocouple accuracy certification.
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The licensee and CBI held and documented training sessions for i
those personnel involved in the activities to assure familiarity
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with duties and responsibilities. The licensee and CBI had
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developed and utilized checklists to be used by contractor and
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licensee QA personnel assigned to surveillance functions. The j
checklists were examined and appeared satisfactory.
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The inspectors toured the vessel and selectively examined I
insulation placement, preparations for dimensional stability
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and thermal expansion, burner locations, and precautions i
precluding direct flame impingement.
i The PWHT.heatup and cooldown rates, final temperature and
holding times were specified and consistent with applicable ASME code requirements.
Observation of the inprocess heatup,
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hold time and cooldown verified compliance with these code i
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specified requirements.
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j No itens of noncompliance or deviations were identified.-
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Review of quality records I
The inspector examined the cumulative stress-relief records l
for the PWHT of the Unit 3 containment vessel.
No items of j
noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Spent Fuel Pool Wall Design
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The licensee reported by telecon on January 29, 1980,- that the temperature gradients were understated in the original design for
,certain spent fuel pool walls and that this was.being evaluated for
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10CFR50.55(e) applicability.
The licensee report submitted by
latter No. G03-80-412 on March 3,1980, stated that the design was
not considered to be' reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).
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The inspector discussed circumstances surrounding the telecon report with licensee representatives.
The licensee engineering department, upon review of Fuel Handling Building Design Change DCN-CH-75, questioned the original design adequacy and requested research to determine 10CFR50.55(e) applicability.
The design change specifies the inclusion of extra reinforcing steel in certain fuel pool walls.
The present design is based upon a more limiting set of thermal conditions than those specified in the PSAR. The licensee stated that the more limiting conditions would be included in the FSAR, presently scheduled to be submitted about July,1981.
The licensee's engineering personnel conducted a technical audit of structural design performed by Ebasco during the week of February 18, 1980 and concluded that sufficient conservatism had been introduced in the inclusion of wall temperature stress to provide reasonable assurance of original design adequacy.
In order to obtain extra conservation, additional reinforcing steel was to be added to certain fuel pool walls. The inspector had no further questions.
9.
QA Audits The inspector examined QA audit activities for compliance with procedure and QA program requirements.
The examination included the audit schedule, auditor qualification documentation and a sample of five QA audits performed in the last four mor.ths.
The audits appeared comprehensive and had been conducted using preplanned checklists. Audit findings had been clearly identified and corrected in accordance with licensee procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations 'were identified.
10.
Exit Interview The inspector discussed the inspection scope and findings with Mr. J. C. Lockhart on March 9,1980 and with Messrs. W. J. Talbott, J. C. Lockhart and R. A. Davis on March 19, 1980.
The inspector emphasized the importance of compliance with commitments made to the NRC and prompt notification of the regional office if licensee evaluation indicates that a previous commitment is no i
longer valid (see paragraph 5.g.).
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