IR 05000456/1993004
| ML20035G903 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1993 |
| From: | Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035G898 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-93-04, 50-456-93-4, 50-457-93-04, 50-457-93-4, NUDOCS 9304300163 | |
| Download: ML20035G903 (9) | |
Text
-
--
.
.
I
'
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
REGION III
!
Reports No. 50-456/93004(DRP); 50-457/93004(DRP)
!
!
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72; NPF-77 i
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company i
Opus West III
1400 Opus Place
!
Downers Grove, IL 60515 l
Facility Name:
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 l
r Inspection At:
Braicwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois
.l Inspection Conducted: March 2 through April 13, 1993 Inspectors:
S. G. Du Pont J. R. Roton i
C. E. Brown g
j M 'M I
Approved By:
M. Farbe, Chief
'r' U S l
'
Reactor Projects Section lA Date
!
Inspection Summarv l
Inspection from March 2 throuah April 13. 1993 (Reports No. 50-456/93004(DRP):
f 50-457/93004(DRP)1
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident
inspectors of licensee action on event reports operational safety i
verification, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance
!
observation, and report review.
j Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
?
P Unit 2 refueling outage was conducted during this inspection period
without any noted difficulties or problems (Paragraph 3).
,
A non-cited violation pertaining to an error on a Westinghouse wiring
!
diagram is discussed in Paragraph 2.
The safety significance of the error is minimal by affecting only the testability of the containment isolation logic and not the ability to actuate containment isolation.
i Braidwood took quick and effective corrective actions associated with
the Byron fuel reload alignment problem (paragraph 3).
!
,
!
9304300163 930423 PDR ADOCK 05000456 l
G PDR i
!
.
- -,
,
-
.
l t
!
DETAILS i
l
'
l.
Persons Contacted
'
Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
i i
i S. Berg, Vice Prasident
!
,
l R. Flessner, Executive Assistant
!
'
- K. L. Kofron, Station Manager R. Stols, Services Director
'
A. Haeger, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor l
G. R. Masters, Engineering and Construction Manager
- D. E. Cooper, Operations Manager i
- G. E. Groth, Maintenance Superintendent i
R. Byers, Assistant Superintendent Work Planning l
- D. Miller, Technical Services Superintendent l
G. Pliml, Quality Verification Manager
G. Vanderheyden, System Engineering Supervisor i
S. Roth, Security Supervisor
[
K. G. Bartes, Quality Verification Superintendent
- J. Lewand, Regulatory Assurance
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on April 13, 1993.
'
i The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees.
i i
2.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
i LERs were reviewed and closed based on the following criteria:
-
Reportability requirements were met.
- Immediate corrective actions were accomplished.
- Corrective actions to prevent recurrence has been or will be
initiated per technical specifications.
One non-cited violation was identified.
(Closed) 456/93003: The licensee discovered that an individual circuit in the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) was connected to the wrong terminal board.
The error prevented the testing of the Containment Isolation Phase "B" as required by Technical Specification 4.3.2.1.
The wiring error prevented testing of the containment isolation function, but did not affect actuation. Because of this, the safety significance was reduced and did not change the previously calculated accident analysis.
-
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted l
t Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
'
S. Berg, Vice President R. Flessner, Executive Assistant
- K. L. Kofron, Station Manager
R. Stols, Services Director
!
A. Haeger, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor G. R. Masters, Engineering and Construction Manager
- D. E. Cooper, Operations Manager
,
- G. E. Groth, Maintenance Superintendent R. Byers, Assistant Superintendent Work Planning
- D. Miller, Technical Services Superintendent G. Plim1, Quality Verification Manager G. Vanderheyden, System Engineering Supervisor S. Roth, Security Supervisor K. G. Bartes, Quality Verification Superintendent
- J. Lewand, Regulatory Assurance
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on April 13, 1993.
,
The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees.
2.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
LERs were reviewed and closed based on the following criteria:
Reportability requirements were met.
- Immediate corrective actions were accomplished.
- Corrective actions to prevent recurrence has been or will be
initiated per technical specifications.
One non-cited violation was identified.
(Closed) 456/93003: The licensee discovered that an individual circuit in the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) was connected to the wrong terminal board.
The error prevented the testing of the Containment Isolation Phase "B" as required by Technical Specification 4.3.2.1.
The wiring error prevented testing of the containment isolation i
function, but did not affect actuation. Because of this, the safety
significance was reduced and did not change the previously calculated
-
accident analysis.
,
s
--
- -
--
.
.
Discovery of the wiring error was the result of communications between the Byron and Braidwood system engineers. Byron discovered the wiring error while replacing a failed switch. The Braidwood engineers independently verified the field wiring and found the same error.
The licensee took immediate actions by entering Technical Specification 3.0.3 while correcting the wiring error. The licensee also evaluated the testing surveillance and discovered that the surveillance could not detect the error.
Since both the containment spray and containment isolation circuits use the same inputs and the same logic, the results of the test would be the same for both.
The licensee identified that the root cause of the error was a preservice design deficiency on the Westinghouse wiring list drawing.
The plant controlled wiring diagrams did not reflect the deficiency.
Initially, Westinghouse inaccurately determined that the deficiency pertained to only Braidwood and Byron. The inspectors contacted several other Westinghouse 4-loop Pressurized Water Reactors and discovered several others with similar deficiencies.
The failure to periodically test the Phase
"B" Containment Isolation circuit is a violation of Technical Specification 4.3.2.1.
This is considered to be a non-cited violation because 1)the licensee identified the violation; 2) took immediate and effective corrective actions, and 3) the criteria contained within 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, for using inspector's discretion in not issuing a Notice of Violation were met.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (60705. 60710. 71707)
The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Unit 1 entered the inspection period at normal operating power without any significant events. Unit 2 began a scheduled refueling outage on March 5, 1993.
The following activities were observed, evaluated, or reviewed:
Unit 1 operation.
- Unit 2 refueling 'ctivities.
- Daily activities.
- Byron fuel reload misalignment.
- Braidwood Unit 2 core verification.
- The inspector observed good safe operation of Unit I throughout the period. The operations staff maintained good awareness of Unit I during periods of increased refueling outage activities on Unit 2.
The
,
.
l
reorganization of the control room staff (mid-1992) remains effective and was the significant contributor to the staff's effectiveness during i
this period.
The inspector observed several of the refueling activities on Unit 2.
The inspector observed the removal of fuel from the vessel to the spent
fuel pool and subsequently the refueling of the vessel.
The inspector observed these activities from both the control room, locally at the
fuel pool, and within the containment. The licensee's staff performed
!
these activities efficiently and without difficulties.
!
Routinely, the inspectors observed the licensee's daily activities.
[
These included log keeping, access control of the control room, and
.,
activities control. During previous inspections, the inspectors noted
!
periodic improvements in the quality and quantity of the control room operator logs. During this inspection, the logs were observed in detail
by the inspectors. Although the logs continue to improve, these improvements are not generic to all operators. The quality of logs appears to be dependent upon the individual operator maintaining the
log.
The following example was noted during this inspection:
l The inspector noted that the Unit 2 Safety Injection (SI) pumps i
were started and stopped shortly thereafter on one shift. The operator noted the starting and stopping time of the SI pump in the logs but did not indicate the purpose or evolution requiring the starting or stopping of'the pumps. The operator also did not
'
indicate that a problem was encountered. The inspector asked several members of the control room staff why the SI pumps were started and quickly stopped. None of those interviewed could explain the circumstances associated with the SI pumps log
'
entries.
Since the shift personnel interviewed had not been on duty the day of the pump starts and had not individually relieved
that particular operator, the log entry was not sufficient to
!
enable them to respond to the inspector's questions. However,
'l further review of the log revealed entries pertaining to
!
subsequent SI pump starts and stops. These entries noted the
,
procedure and evolution requiring the starting and stopping of the SI pumps. ' Evaluating the subsequent shift logs and the outage schedule, it was concluded that the pump starts were ' required to refill the SI accumulators after refueling the core.
This example indicates both the weakness and strength of the control
room logs.
One log entry only met the minimum requirement of noting the starting and stopping of major equipment.
However, this.was insufficient to meet the requirement of providing information and status i
to subsequent operators. The second log entry contained enough detail to allow the evaluation of the previous log entry.
-t i
,
,
-
.
On March 3,1993, while testing control rod assemblies, Byron discovered
!
excessive drag due to a reload misalignment.
The vessel upper internals
were removed and an inspection revealed that three fuel assemblies had
received some damage to the top nozzles.
The upper internals also had i
eleven pins that were damaged.
The cause of the damage was determined i
to be from a severe misalignment of the fuel assemblies, caused by j
accumulation of tolerances, during the recent core reload.
Braidwood was notified of the event and sent several members of their i
staff to assist at Byron. Since Braidwood was scheduled to reload their
!
core in April, the Braidwood staff was interested in the root cause and
!
corrective actions. Additionally, Braidwood sent a new fuel assembly to l
assist Byron in replacing the damaged assemblies.
-
Braidwood engineering staff quickly developed and implemented corrective actions based on the results of the Byron evaluation process. A special
procedure (SPP 93-004) was developed to perform a visual alignment check i
of the Braidwood Unit 2 fuel assemblies following reload. Acceptance
!
criteria were established by site and corporate engineering to ensure adequate alignment. These acceptance criteria were based on the t
'
evaluated gaps in alignment discovered at Byron.
The procedure was completed on April 6,1993. All assembles met the j
acceptance criteria and subsequent control rod drag testing confirmed the fuel alignment.
l s
i The inspectors independently evaluated the alignment using a proportional video recording of the core and independently calculating i
,
the assemblies' alignment. The inspectors' evaluation agreed with the
'
licensee's engineering staff.
'
The inspectors also independently verified the core reload. The reload was completed per the required procedures. The inspector verified, by
>
reviewing the video documentation and observance of the reload, that the reload was in agreement with the engineering approved reload analysis.
l 4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
!
Routinely, station maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed by the inspectors to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance i'
with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specifications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
'
The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:
i Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators
Control of Unit 2 ECCS Train A
!
,
i
i
...a
!
i
.
The inspectors observed the performance of the scheduled 18-month maintenance on the Unit 2A and 2B Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG).
,
,
The inspector verified that the activities were scheduled, controlled,
'
l and accomplished per approved procedures.
The licensee identified two cylinders (Numbers 1 and 10 on the left side of the engine) with indications of cylinder friction surface wear on the
l 2A EDG.
Both cylinders lining and pistons were replaced and sent
!
offsite for evaluation. An apparent root cause was not evident.
.
Previous operating history did not indicate problems with lubricating oil, frequent cold starts, or engine overheating. The manufacturer r
representative verified proper connecting rod alignment.
l
'
During the replacement of the cylinders, the licensee discovered that the timing of the left cam shaft was retarded by about three degrees.
The licensee determined that this occurred during construction. The
.
manufacturer representative (Cooper-Bessemer) was aware of the timing i
l deviation. Cooper-Bessemer's engineering explained that, per the diesel i
manual, the cam shaft is a coarse timing with the final timing being conducted by shimming individual fuel pumps.
This allows obtaining peak firing pressures within the design limits.
The inspectors evaluated this issue for impact to safety and concluded
t that the engines could perform their intended safety function. This was based on pre-operational data, design specifications, and a review of i
the diesel instruction manual. However, the impact on configuration control appears to be significant. The licensee was not aware that the timing was retarded in response to Cooper-Bessemer's evaluation to limit i
!
or restrict the firing pressure of the engines.
Cooper-Bessemer's evaluation revealed that restricting the firing pressure improved reliability. As a practice, the Cooper-Bessemer's representative would adjust the timing.
,
'
The licensee recognized that it was not appropriate that their procedures did not accurately present the criteria for timing of the cam shaft as recommended by Cooper-Bessemer.
The licensee is currently revising their procedure. This is an Unresolved Inspection finding (50-457/930n4-01(DRP)); 50-457/93004-01(DRP)) pending review of the revised procedure.
The inspector observed the activities associated with the Unit 2 Essential Core Cooling System (ECCS) Train A Outage.
Industry wide lessons-learned have revealed that the lack of control of residual heat
,
removal components during refueling outages are a common cause among
'
several shutdown risk events. The inspector observed that the status of protected components, the level of risk, and status of outage activities were readily available to all site personnel. The inspector also observed that activities were restricted around the protected ECCS train
'
(Train B) during the Train A outage. These activities appeared to be sufficient in preventing the loss of residual heat removal capability during reduced capacity situations.
.
i
'I
.
.
.
.
-
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed several of the surveillance testing required by
-
technical specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures. The inspector independently verified that test instrumentation was calibrated, that test results conformed with technical specificatiens and procedure requirements, and the results were reviewed.
No violations or deficiencies were identified during the testing.
6.
Report Review During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for March 1993. The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
,
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Violations for Which A " Notice of Violation" Will Not Be Issued The NRC uses the Notice of Violation as a standard method for formalizing the existence of a violation of a legally binding requirement. However, because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensee's initiatives for self-identification and correction of problems, the NRC will not generally issue a Notice of Violation for a violation that meets the tests of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.A.
These tests are:
1) the violation was identified by the licensee; 2)
the violation wculd be categorized as Severity Level IV or V; 3) the violation will be corrected, including measures to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time period; and 4) it was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation. A violation of regulatory requirements identified during this inspection for which a Notice of Violation will not be issued is discussed in Paragraph 2.
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. An Unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.
9.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on April 13, 1993. The inspectors summarized the scope and
-:l
,.
,
i results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this
,
inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection i
could be considered proprietary in nature.
,
f i
i
,
8