IR 05000456/1993016
| ML20045J129 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1993 |
| From: | Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045J109 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-93-16, 50-457-93-16, NUDOCS 9307230080 | |
| Download: ML20045J129 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION Ill Reports No. 50-456/93016(DRP); 50-457/93016(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72: NPF-77 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West III 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted: May 26 through July 9, 1993 Inspectors:
S. G. Du Pont J. R. Roton C. H. Brown H. Peterson M. Kunowski E. Duncan Approved By:
93 M.J. Fart [g, Chief I
Cate Rea.ctor Pfojects Section lA Inspection Summary
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inspection from May 26 throuah July 9.1993 (Reports No. 50-456/93016(DRP):
50-457/93016(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee event report review; operational safety verification; monthly maintenance observation; conthly surveillance observation; report review and meetings.
Results: No violations were identified.
Pre-task briefings were observed to be a significant contributor to
successful completion of infrequent evolutions without errors or complications (Paragraph 5).
A non-cited violation is discussed in Paragraph 2 pertaining to the
April 19, 1993, Licensee Event Report on inoperable Nuclear Instruments.
9307230080 930715 PDP ADOCK 05000456
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Several inspection activities are ongoing pertaining to. concerns with
the control room turnover process (Paragraph 2), seismic analysis of Unit 2 station batteries (Paragraph 5), and the ability of the service water system to meet fire protection demands in the turbine building (Paragraph 5).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco)
S. Berg, Vice President R. Flessner, Executive Assistant
- K. L. Kofron, Station Manager R. Stols, Services Director-A. Haeger, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor G. R. Masters, Engineering and Construction Manager D. E. Cooper, Operations Manager
- G. E. Groth, Maintenance Superintendent R. Byers, Assistant Superintendent Work Planning
- D. Miller, Technical Services Superintendent G. Plim1, Quality Verification Manager G. Vanderheyden, System Engineering Supervisor S. Roth, Security Supervisor
- K. G. Bartes, Quality Verification Superintendent J. Lewand, Regulatory Assurance
- W. B. McCue, Operating Engineer
- P. Zolan, Compliance Supervisor
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on July 9, 1993.
The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees.
2.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
LERs were reviewed and closed based on the following criteria:
Reportability requirements were met.
- Immediate corrective actions were accomplished.
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Corrective actions to prevent recurrence has been or will be i
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initiated per technical specifications.
(Closed) 457/92003: On April 19, 1993, the Source Range Nuclear Instruments (NIs) were inadvertently inoperable while required by Technical Specifications (TS). The Source-Range Instruments were-
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initially taken out-of-service and'the unit entered the appropriate Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) as required by TS in preparation of switching breaker lineups in the switchyard. This activity required taking the NIs out-of-service because the generated electrical noise could inadvertently,cause instrument trips.
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Two licensed Nuclear Station Operators (NS0s) performed the out-of-service.
The first NSO blocked the NI reactor trip and alarms while the second blocked the boron dilution prevention function. However, communications between the NS0s did not indicate-that the reactor trip function was defeated.
After the switchyard activity was completed, the second NSO returned the alarm and boron dilution functions back to normal, but failed to identify that the NI reactor trip function was defeated. The NIs were declared operable and the LC0 was exited.
This error was subsequently detected and corrected during the oncoming shift walkdown after the shift turnover.
The licensee also took actions to suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and verified that the dilution paths were isolated.
The inspector's review of the event revealed that the licensee took proper corrective actions, identified the root cause of the event, it was not willful, and reported the event.
10 CFR 2, Appendix C, VII.B.(2) allows exercise of discretion to encourage licensee's self-identification and correction of problems that would normally be a Severity Level IV or V violation.
Since the licensee met the required criteria, this is considered to be a non-cited violation.
In additio'n, an Inspection Follow-up Item (IFI) (50-457/93012-01(DRP))
is being issued pertaining to the turnover process at Braidwood. This IFI is open until further inspection of the effectiveness of the turnover process is completed by the inspector.
Previous concerns on the effectiveness of the licensee's turnover process were identified by the inspector. One of these concerns _ pertained to the practice of-the oncoming shift walking down of the panels and systems after completing the verbal turnover with the offgoing shift. Although this practice did not contribute to the event, it is a concern that LCOs could be exceeded before adverse lineups are detected by the panel walkdown.
One non-cited violation was identified.
3.
Audits and Appraisals (IP 83750)
The inspector reviewed field monitoring reports which record the results of quality assurance surveillances of field activities and included a representative sample of typical radiation protection activities. A comprehensive, performance-based audit of the radiation protection program (Audit No. 20-93-11) conducted by an offsite team was also reviewed. This audit appeared thorough and examined work practices and performance during outage activities, radiation work permits, radiation surveys, training, liquid and gaseous effluent activities, and procedure adequacy, implementation, and adherence. With the exception of two licensee identified findings (incorrect information in the semi-annual effluent report and unauthorized work) and an unresolved item
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(inadequate guidance for completing the semi-annual report), the audit found the station has -implemented an effective radiation protection program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation.
The following activities were observed and evaluated:
The inspector observed the activities associated with cross-
connecting the service water system to the fire protection system.
The licensee's preparations included a detailed pre-task briefing that discussed the expected and potential unexpected system responses. This briefing significantly contributed to the completion of the activity without errors or complications.
After the service water was cross-connected, the licensee _ observed that the fire protection header pressure in the turbine building decreased to about 60 psig.
This reduction in header pressure is considered to be an Inspection Follow-up Item (50-457/93012-02(DRP)) until further information can be obtained to determine the ability of the fire protection system to combat fires in the upper elevations of the turbine building while cross-connected to-service water.
While touring the Unit 2 battery rooms, inspectors found that the
room doors were blocked cpen and temporary fans were installed for room cooling.
However, the inspectors were unable to find an evaluation of the effect on the batteries seismic design.
Additionally, the fans were not documented as a temporary alteration.
The inspection of these two concerns is ongoing and will be completed in a subsequent inspection. These concerns are considered to be an Unresolved Inspection Finding (50-457/93012-03(DRP)).
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Routinely, station maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed by the inspectors to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance
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with approved procedures,. regulatory guides and industry codes or-standards, and in conformance with technical specifications, t
The following items were also considered during.this review:-approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; and activities were-accomplished by qualified personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
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The inspectors observed portions of several of the surveillance testing
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pertaining to reactor protection during the inspection period. -The
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inspectors verified that the testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures,.that test instrumentation.was calibrated, that results conformed with technical specifications and procedure l
requirements and were reviewed, and that any deficiencies identified f
during the testing were properly resolved.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Report Review During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's
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Monthly Performance Report for May 1993. The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of TechnicalL Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Reports for May and June 1993.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Xiolations for Which A " Notice of Violation" Will Not Be Issued The NRC uses the Notice of Violation as a standard method for formalizing the existence of a violation of a legally binding
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requirement. However, because the NRC wants to-encourage and support licensee's initiatives for self-identification and correction of
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problems, the NRC will not generally issue a Notice of Violation for_ a i
violation that meets the tests of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section VII.B.(2). These tests are:
1) the violation was identified by the licensee; 2) the violation would be categorized as Severity Level IV or V; 3) the violation will be corrected, including measures to prevent
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recurrence, within a reasonable time period; and 4) it was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation. A violation of regulatory requirements identified during this inspection for which a Notice of Violation will not be issued is discussed in Paragraph 2.
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Insnection Follow-up Items
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Inspection Follow-up Items are matters which have-been discussed with
the licensee, which will be reviewed by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or.both. - Open Inspection
follow-up Items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2 and 4.
10.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in-order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or
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deviations. An Unresolved Item disclosed during the inspection is-
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discussed in Paragraph 4.
11.
Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in
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Paragraph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on July 9, 1993. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content-of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection.
could be considered prc ietary in nature.
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