IR 05000397/2003003

IR 05000397-03-003, on 03/03-07/2003, Columbia Generating Station, Ti 2515/148, Verification of Compliance with Interim Compensatory Measures Order

ML031060476
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	04/14/2003
From:	Troy Pruett Plant Support Branch Region IV
To:	Parrish J Energy Northwest
References
IR-03-003
Download: ML031060476 (8)

Text

ril 14, 2003

SUBJECT:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION NRC SAFEGUARDS INSPECTION OF COMPLIANCE WITH ORDER INSPECTION REPORT 50-397/03-03

Dear Mr. Parish:

On March 7, 2003, the NRC completed an inspection at your Columbia Generating Station.

The enclosed report documents the inspection findings that were discussed on March 7, 2003, with you and other members of your staff. Additionally, on April 3, 2003, the inspectors conducted a final exit meeting with Mr. Steve Scammon, Resource Protection Manager, and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with an Order issued on February 25, 2002, which required your site to implement specific measures related to the security of your facility. The inspection utilized Temporary Instruction 2515/148, Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Interim Compensatory Measures, to verify implementation of the Order as clarified in your responses dated March 18, and September 6, 2002. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

The material enclosed herewith contains Safeguards Information as defined by 10 CFR 73.21 and its disclosure to unauthorized individuals is prohibited by Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Therefore, the material will not be placed in the Public Document Room.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of DOCUMENT CONTAINS ENCLOSURE(S) CONTAIN(S) UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED

Energy Northwest -2- DOCUMENT CONTAINS SAFEGUARD INFORMATION NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

//RA//

Troy W. Pruett, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket: 50-397 License: NPF-21

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 50-397/03-03

REGION IV==

Dockets: 50-397 Licenses: NPF-21 Report No.: 50-397/03-03 Licensee: Energy Northwest Facility: Columbia Generating Station Location: Richland, Washington Dates: March 3 - 7, 2003 Inspectors: Gregory A. Pick, Senior Physical Security Inspector Frank L. Brush, Senior Resident Inspector Gilbert L. Guerra, Resident Inspector Accompanying James Buchanon, Reactor Inspector Personnel:

Approved By: Troy W. Pruett, Chief, Plant Support Branch Attachment: Supplemental Information DOCUMENT CONTAINS ENCLOSURE(S) CONTAIN(S) UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED

DOCUMENT CONTAINS SAFEGUARD INFORMATION SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000397-03-03, Energy Northwest; 03/03 - 07/2003; Columbia Generating Station; TI 2515/148, Verification of Compliance With Interim Compensatory Measures Order.

The inspection was conducted by one senior physical security inspector, one senior resident inspector, and one resident inspector.

Cornerstone: Physical Security

• On February 25, 2002, the NRC imposed by Order, Interim Compensatory Measures to enhance physical security. The inspectors determined that, overall, the licensee appropriately incorporated the Interim Compensatory Measures into the site protective strategy and access authorization program; developed and implemented relevant procedures; ensured that the emergency plan could be implemented; and established and effectively coordinated interface agreements with offsite organizations.

• The inspectors identified an unresolved item for failure to analyze the effects of the vehicle bomb on security monitoring equipment and two security structures, as required by Item B.2.(a).1 of the Order. This item remains open pending review by the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (Section III.A.2).

• The inspectors identified an unresolved item because the licensee may have failed to train appropriate personnel on hostage and duress situations, as required by Item B.3.e of the Order. This item remains open pending review by the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (Section IV.E.2).

• The inspectors identified an unresolved item for failure to maintain owner controlled area patrols random and continuous as required by Item B.4.e of the Order. This item remains open pending review by the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (Section V.E.2).

• The inspectors identified an unresolved item regarding availability of supplementary equipment, as required by Item B.4.f of the Order. This item remains open pending review by the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (Section V.F.2).

• The inspectors identified an unresolved item regarding an evaluation of hazardous material as specified in Item B.5.c of the Order. This item remains open pending review by the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (Section VI.C.2).

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• The inspectors identified an unresolved item for failure to control generic use of passwords as required by Item B.5.f of the Order. This item remains open pending review by the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (Section VI.F.2).

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