IR 05000373/2017010
| ML18004A772 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 01/04/2018 |
| From: | Robert Daley NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2017010 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML18004A772 (17) | |
Text
January 4, 2018
SUBJECT:
LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2017010; 05000374/2017010
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On December 1, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Triennial Fire Protection Inspection at your LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on December 1, 2017, with Mr. W. Trafton, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, one NRC-identified finding of very-low safety significance was identified. The finding involved violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very-low safety significance, and because the issue was entered into your Corrective Action Program, the NRC is treating the issues as Non-Cited Violation in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance of the Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC resident inspector at the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Robert C. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18 Enclosure:
IR 05000373/2017010; 05000374/2017010 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV
SUMMARY
Inspection Report 05000373/2017010; 05000374/2017010; 10/30/2017-12/01/2017, LaSalle
County Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.
This report covers a 2-week announced Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III based engineering inspectors. One finding was identified by the inspectors. The finding was considered Non-Cited Violation of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects were determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross Cutting Areas. Findings for which the Significance Determination Process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG 1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6, dated July 201
NRC-Identified
and Self-Revealed Findings Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and associated Non-Cited Violation of License Condition 2.C.15 for Unit 2, for the licensees failure to ensure all fire rated assemblies (i.e., fire doors) were operable. Specifically, during a plant walk down, the inspectors found Fire Door 282 inoperable. The lower pin of the stationary part of the double door was not engaged, because the pin was broken.
The licensee entered the issue into their Corrective Action Program and as an immediate action, declared the door inoperable, established hourly fire watch, and subsequently installed a new pin.
The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that the issue screened as having very-low safety significance (Green) by answering Yes to Question 1.4.3.A of IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1 based on no combustible within 10 feet of Door 282 on the 5A4 side and one pin should still provide sufficient defense-in-depth for several hours before buckling or moving out of the frame. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Procedure Adherence component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedural guidance to thoroughly verify that fire doors were pinned when challenging the doors.
[H.8] (Section 1R05.2.b)
Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
1R05 Fire Protection
The purpose of the Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection was to conduct a design-based, plant specific, risk-informed, onsite inspection of the licensees Fire Protection Programs defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The Fire Protection Program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by:
preventing fires from starting;
rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur;
providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe-shutdown of the reactor plant; and
taking reasonable actions to mitigate postulated events that could potentially cause loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires.
The inspectors evaluation focused on the design, operational status, and material condition of the reactor plants Fire Protection Program, post-fire safe shut-down (SSD)systems, and B.5.b mitigating strategies. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had implemented a Fire Protection Program that:
- (1) provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant;
- (2) provided adequate fire detection and suppression capability;
- (3) maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition;
- (4) established adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features;
- (5) ensured that procedures, equipment, fire barriers and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to safely shut down the plant was ensured;
- (6) included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve SSD; and
- (7) identified fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered into the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution Program.
In addition, the inspectors review and assessment focused on the licensees post-fire SSD systems for selected risk-significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire SSD capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire SSD success path was available. The inspectors review and assessment also focused on the licensees B.5.b-related license conditions and the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50.54 (hh)(2). Inspector emphasis was to ensure that the licensee could maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities utilizing the B.5.b mitigating strategies following a loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires. Documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.
The fire areas and B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below and in Section 1R05.13. The fire areas selected constituted three inspection samples and the B.5.b mitigating strategies selected constituted two inspection sample, respectively, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05T.
Fire Area Description 4C1 Control Room 2I3 Unit 1 RHR Pump B&C Cubicle Room 4E4-2 Unit 2 Division 2 Essential Switchgear Room
.1 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, SSD analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that SSD capabilities were properly protected.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the Fire Protection Program and/or post-fire SSD analysis and procedures.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire-rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Safety Evaluation Reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and National Fire Protection Association standards to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.
The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.
b. Findings
Failure to Ensure Fire Door Was Engaged and Pinned
Introduction:
The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green)and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of License Condition 2.C.15 for Unit 2, for the licensees failure to ensure all fire rated assemblies (i.e., fire doors) were operable.
Specifically, during a plant walk down, the inspectors found Fire Door 282 inoperable.
The lower pin of the stationary part of the double door was not engaged, the pin was broken.
Description:
During a plant walk down, the inspector traversed through Fire Door 282, which was a double door separating U2 749 foot common area and the Reactor Protection System Motor Generator Set room in Unit 2 Auxiliary Buildings. When verifying that the fire door was latched closed, the inspector identified the lower pin was not engaged. The licensees staff confirmed that the lower pin was broken and missing.
As a result, operations staff declared the fire door inoperable, and the issue was entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Action Request 04075059, NRC Identified - Door 282 Broken Floor Pin, dated November 15, 2017. Although the inactive door was latched to the top door frame, there was a small sway on the door even without the door pin extended into the bottom door frame. The licensees staff re-latched the lower pin and the door was declared operable.
The licensee's Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), which contained the administrative controls for the Fire Protection Program as specified by the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, stated that fire barriers are used to prevent the spread of a fire and to limit the damage from a fire. The TRM also defined a fire resistant door as a fire rated assembly which shall be operable at all times and specified a daily surveillance requirement to verify the position of each closed fire door. The licensees Daily Fire Door Surveillance Procedure, LOS-FP-D1, Fire Protection Door Daily Surveillance, instructed operators to verify the position of each closed fire door listed in an attachment of the procedure by ensuring the stationary door is pinned (both upper and lower pins) in position by challenging the door. In addition, the licensees Fire Door Surveillance Procedure, LMS-ZZ-03, Inspection of Fire Doors Separating Safety Related Fire Areas, instructed operators to verify top/bottom flush bolts/pins are engaging on inactive leaf, every 184 days.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees work order for the Surveillance Procedure, LMS-ZZ-03 and on October 24, 2017, Fire Door 282 was checked off as passed. The licensee informed the inspectors that the failure of door hardware does periodically occur and it is not known when this pin may have failed. However, the licensee's Daily Fire Door Surveillance Procedure required operators to challenge the fire door to verify the fire door is indeed pinned. During the daily surveillance, the licensee failed to identify Fire Door 282 was inoperable. The inspectors determined that the broken lower pin did not ensure that the fire door would remain closed and latched during a fire in either fire areas and could result in fire propagation between the two adjacent fire areas.
Analysis:
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to ensure that all fire doors were operable was contrary to TRM 3.7.o and was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, during a plant walkdown, the inspectors identified that Fire Door 282 had a broken lower pin.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more-than-minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to identify that the stationary pins were extended into the door frame resulted in an inoperable fire door. The fire door was required to be operable at all times to ensure that a fire in one area would not propagate to another fire area.
In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Table 2 the inspectors determined the finding affected the Mitigation Systems cornerstone. The finding degraded fire protection defense-in-depth strategies, and the inspectors determined, using Table 3, that it could be evaluated using Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. The finding was determined to affect the element of fire confinement per Step 1.4 of IMC 0609, Appendix F. The inspectors assigned a Moderate A degradation rating in accordance with Table A2.2 in Attachment 2 of Appendix F because the improper installed fire door hardware other than the latch mechanism (one bin was broke). The Fire Door 282 was installed between Fire Area 4D4 (Reactor Protection System Motor GeneratorSet) and Fire Area 5A4 (Cable Area Turbine Building). Combustible loading calculation showed that 4D4 had a fire severity of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 27 minutes and 5A4 had a fire severity of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 41 minutes.
No combustible within 10 feet of the double door 282 on the 5A4 fire area side. The inspectors determined that the as-found condition of Fire Door 282 with one of the two pins not latched would still have provided a defense-in-depth rating based on the doors ability to not buckle or move out of the frame until several hours of the onset of the fire.
Although, the fire severity level for Fire Area 5A4 was greater than 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, the inspectors determined that the issue screened as having very-low safety significance (Green) per answering Yes to Question 1.4.3.A of IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1 based on no combustible within 10 feet of Door 282 on the 5A4 side and one pin would still have provided defense-in-depth rating for several hours before it could buckle or move out of the frame.
This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Procedure Adherence component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedural guidance to thoroughly verify that fire doors were pinned when challenging the doors. [H.8]
Enforcement:
License Condition 2.C.15 of the LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Operating Licenses, required, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for LaSalle County Station, and as approved in NUREG-0519, Safety Evaluation Report, dated March 1981 through Supplement No. 8 and all associated amendments. In TRM 3.7.o, Fire Rated Assemblies, required that all fire rated assemblies shall be operable at all times.
Contrary to the above, on November 15, 2017, the inspector found a fire rated door required by the TRM 3.7.o inoperable. Specifically, the inspectors found the lower pin on the stationary part of the double door 282 was not engaged. The lower pin was broken. Door 282 was a fire door that was required to be operable at all times per TRM 3.7.o. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as Action Request 04075059 and as an immediate action, the licensee declared the door inoperable, established an hourly fire watch, and subsequently installed a new pin. Because this violation was of very-low safety significance and it was entered into the licensees CAP, this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
(NCV 05000374/2017010-01, Failure to Ensure Fire Door Was Engaged and Pinned)
.3 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation, such as, NRC Safety Evaluation Reports, deviations from NRC regulations, and National Fire Protection Association standards to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments. The inspectors reviewed fire brigade drill records and walked down pre-fire plans for select areas.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
.4 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees systems required to achieve alternative SSD to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.
The inspectors conducted selected area walk downs to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate SSD procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate SSD procedure. The review also looked at operator training as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
.6 Circuit Analyses
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that the licensee performed a post-fire SSD analysis for the selected fire areas and the analysis appropriately identified the structures, systems, and components important to achieving and maintaining SSD. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee's analysis ensured that necessary electrical circuits were properly protected and that circuits that could adversely impact SSD due to hot shorts, shorts to ground, or other failures were identified, evaluated, and dispositioned to ensure spurious actuations would not prevent SSD.
The inspectors' review considered fire and cable attributes, potential undesirable consequences, and common power supply/bus concerns. Specific items included the credibility of the fire threat, cable insulation attributes, cable failure modes, and actuations resulting in flow diversion or loss of coolant events.
The inspectors also reviewed cable raceway drawings for a sample of components required for post-fire SSD to verify that cables were routed as described in the cable routing matrices.
The inspectors reviewed circuit breaker coordination studies to ensure equipment needed to conduct post-fire SSD activities would not be impacted due to a lack of coordination. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of circuit breaker maintenance records to verify that circuit breakers for components required for post-fire SSD were properly maintained in accordance with procedural requirements.
The inspectors verified for cables that are important to SSD, but not part of the success path, and that do not meet the separation/protection requirements of Section III.G.2 of 10 CRF Part 50, Appendix R, that the circuit analysis considered the cable failure modes. In addition, the inspectors have verified that the licensee has either:
- (1) determined that there is not a credible fire scenario (through fire modeling),
- (2) implemented feasible and reliable manual actions to assure SSD capability, or
- (3) performed a circuit fault analysis demonstrating no potential impact on SSD capability exists.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.7 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative SSD functions and fire brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order.
The inspectors reviewed the electrical power supplies and cable routing for these systems to verify that either the telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.8 Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a plant walk down of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative SSD functions.
As part of the walk downs, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations. The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walk down and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.9 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
For the three fire areas that were selected, the licensee did not credit any repairs in order to achieve cold shutdown. Therefore, no reviews were performed by the inspectors for this procedure section.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
.10 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire SSD equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing SSD functions or capabilities).
The inspectors also conducted a review of the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.11 Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed changes to the approved Fire Protection Program to verify that the changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the Fire Protection Program and/or post-fire SSD analysis and procedures.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.12 Control of Transient Combustibles and Ignition Sources
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. A sample of hot work and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed. The inspectors performed plant walk downs to verify that transient combustibles and ignition sources were being implemented in accordance with the administrative controls.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.13 B.5.b Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing selected mitigating strategies. This review ensured that the licensee continued to meet the requirements of their B.5.b-related license conditions, and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) by determining that:
procedures were being maintained and adequate;
equipment was properly staged, maintained, and tested;
station personnel were knowledgeable and could implement the procedures; and
additionally, inspectors reviewed the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b-related equipment.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees B.5.b-related license conditions and evaluated selected mitigating strategies to ensure they remain feasible in light of operator training, maintenance/testing of necessary equipment and any plant modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed previous inspection reports for commitments made by the licensee to correct deficiencies identified during performance of Temporary Instruction 2515/171 or subsequent performances of these inspections.
The B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below. The offsite and onsite communications, notifications/emergency response organization activation, initial operational response actions and damage assessment activities identified in Table A.3-1 of Nuclear Energy Institute 06-12, B.5.b Phase II and III Submittal Guidance, Revision 2, are evaluated each time due to the mitigation strategies scenario selected.
NEI 06-12, Revision 2, Section Licensee Strategy (Table)2.3.2 Spent Fuel Pool External Spray 3.4.1 Manual Operation of RCIC
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees CAP procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the Fire Protection Program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the CAP. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. W. Trafton, and other members of the licensee staff on December 1, 2017. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- W. Trafton, Site Vice President
- H. Vinyard, Plant Manager
- J. Kowalski, Maintenance Director
- J. Keenan, Engineering Director
- J. Ward, Work Control Director
- J. Stovall, Operations Director
- G. Ford, Regulatory Assurance Manager
- D. Murray, Regulatory Assurance
- R. Dudley, Operation Planner
- J. Sipek, Program Engineering
- N. Plumey, Plant Engineering Manager
- T. Parent, System Engineering
- W. Collins, Fire Marshall
- C. Pragman, Component Engineering
- T. Granlund, Operation Support Manager
- D. Warren, Operation Field Supervisor
- S. Froisland, System Engineering
- C. Lanphierd, Maintenance Supervisor
- S. Desai, Design Engineering
- D. Mearhoff, Program Engineering
- J. Van Fleet, Operations Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- R. Ruiz, Senior Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened, Closed and
Discussed
- 05000374/2017010-01 NCV Failure To Ensure Fire Door Was Engaged And Pinned (Section 1R05.2.B)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CAP Corrective Action Program CFR Code of Federal Regulations IMC Inspection Manual Chapter NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission SSD Safe Shutdown TRM Technical Requirements Manual