IR 05000344/1979010

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IE Insp Rept 50-344/79-10 on 790501-31 .No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Maint,Physical Security Surveillance Testing Calibr Review & Audit & Radiological Protection Operations
ML19225C398
Person / Time
Site: Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date: 06/19/1979
From: Sternberg D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML19225C399 List:
References
50-344-79-10, NUDOCS 7907300233
Download: ML19225C398 (8)


Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

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REGION V

50-344/79-10 R a ort No.

IlPF-l Safeguards croup 50-344 License No.

Docket No.

Portland General Electric Company

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Licensee:

121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name:

Trojan Inspection at:

_ Rainier, Oregon Inspection co u ed:

Jtay 1-31,1979

/h

[h!74 TMkg Inspectors:

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M.~H. Malmros, Reactor Jhspector'

/ Da t'e S I F,ned Date Signed G!/'!eSigned Dat 7C

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Mf' N Approved By:

D. M. Sternoerg, Chief, Reactor Project Section l Date Sifned

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Reactor Operations and fluclear Support Branch Surmary:

Inspection on May 1-31, 1979 (Report 'lo. 50-344/79-101 Areas inspected:

Routine inspections by the Resident Inspector of pl:nt operations, maintenance, physical security, surveillance testing, calibration, review and audit, radiological protection operations, IE Bulletin and Licensee Event Report followup. The inspection involved 105 inspector-hours by one llRC Resident Inspector.

Resul ts:

flo items of noncompliance or dev'.fons were identified.

427 280 RV Form 219 (2)

790730cu3

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DETAILS _

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Persons Contacted

  • B. D. Withers, Plant Superintendent
  • F. H. Lamoureaux, Assistant Plant Superintendent R. P. Barkhurst, Operations Supervisor D. L. Bennett, Instrument and Control Supervisor C. J. Fleming, Administrative Supervisor D. F. Kielblock, Training Supervisor W. S. Orser, Engineering Supervisor J. C. Perry, Administrative Engineer L. W. Quinn, Chemistry Supervisor J. D. Reid, Quality Assurance Supervisor (Acting)

C. A. Olmstead, Maintenance Supervisor T. D. Walt, Radiation Protection Supervisor Tl a inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee ei..ployees during the course of the inspection. These included shif; supervisors, reactor and auxil y operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.

  • Derotes those attending the exit interviews.

2.

P_lant Operations a.

Facility Logs and Operating Records The inspector examined the log entries contained in the control room log and the shif t supervisor's log for facility operations performed during May, 1979. The log entries were found to have been made consistent with the requirements of the facility administrative orders and to accurately reflect the operational status of the facility.

Facility logs were reviewed bv appli-cable staff members and operating erders issued by the operatio supervisor did not conflict with the intent of the technical specification requirements. Sufficient information was contained in the control room log and the shif t supervisor's log to identify potential problems and to verify compliance with the technical specification's report requirements and limiting conditions for operation.

b.

Facility Tour and Observation of Operations Tours of the facility were made by the inspector in the control building, reactor auxiliary building, containment building, fuel building, intake structure, and the turbine 427 29;

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building.

During the tours, assessments of equipment and plant conditions were made with the following observations:

(1)

Instrumentation for monitoring the status of the plant was operating.

(2)

Radia tion controls were properly establishec.

(3)

Piping systems did not show any signs of excessive vibration or leakage.

(4)

Detailed system alfgnment and operability of the auxiliary feedwater syscem was verified by the inspector.

(5)

Control room observations verifieo that the facility manning was proper and discussions with shift supervisors and control operators revealed that they were cognizant of the effect of annunciated alarms on plant operations.

Shift turnovers were found to be performed in accordance with the administrative orders and good watchstanding practices.

(6)

Routine sampling of the refueling water storage tank for boroa and sodium was observed by the inspector.

The liquid samples were analyzed consistent with facility procedures.

(7) On May 9,1979, the licensee informed the inspector that a facility operator had written an internal feedback memorandum to licensee management which described watch-standing deficiencies and lax supervision of shift crew watchstandars. At the request of the flRC, the individual who wrote the memorandum contacted the f;RC Resident Inspector by telephc and discussed in detail his concerns regarding watchstanding practices.

It was the individual's personal concern that certain watchstanding practices should be corrected to preclude the development of situations that might lead to unsafe or inefficient operation of the facility.

fione of the watchstanding deficiencies discussed were violations of f1RC requirements.

The inspector discussed watchstanding practices with licensee management and found that the licensee has met with personnel responsible for the supervision of shift watchstanders and has defined, based on these meetings, a uniform set of watchstanding standards.

To preclude poor watchstanding practices, these standards are to be enforced by shif t supervision cod practiced by individual watch-standers.

flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

427 282

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3.

Physical Protection _

Based on discussions with licensee representatives, observations, and examination of facility procedures, the inspector verified

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that the measures employed for the physical protection of the facility were consistent with the requirements of the physical security plan, applicable administrative orders, and regulatory requirements. Specific aspects of physical protection examined by the inspector included the following:

a.

Protected area and vital area barriers were verified to be properly closed and locked.

b.

Personnel provided access to the protected and vital areas were properly authorized, identified and badged.

Personnel, vehicles, and packages were searched as required by the physical security plan.

c.

Escorts were provided for personnel and vehicles when required inside the protected area.

d.

The security organization for each shift was found to be properly organized and manned.

e.

Shift turnover, shift routines, and communications were accomplished in accordance with the rcquirements of the physical security plan and applicable administrative orders.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4.

IE Bulletin Followup IE Bulletin 79-02:

The inspector has observed portions of the onsite test program which is being performed by the licensee to verify the adequacy of the installation of pipe support base plates using concrete expansion anchor bolts.

Observations made by the inspector have included the following:

a.

Work procedures havn 'een prepared and approved which specify the acceptance criterja and methods for testing the installed concrete expansion anchor bolts, b.

Anchor bolts selected for testing are representative of the various size anchor bolts used, actual anchorage conditions, and each safety-related piping system.

c.

Torque wrenches used in the test program were found to be in a current state of calibration.

d.

Deficient anchorages when identified are documented using nonconformance tags as required by the licensee's quality assurance program.

427 283

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e.

Nonconforming anchor bolts are dispositioned in accordance with the quality assurance program.

f.

Records of all tests perfo ~aed, nonconformances, and non-conformance dispositon approvals are being maintained.

g.

In accordance with the criteria specified in the bulletin, all pipe support base plates appear to be flexible members for analytical purposes.

h.

A complete report of the results of the anchor bolt test program will be submitted by the licensee to the NRC as re-quired in the bulletin.

IE Bulletin 79-06A: The licensee's response and corrective action taken in response to the areas of concern expressed in the bulletin have been examined by the inspector.

Specific areas examined by the inspector and resultant findings are as follows:

a.

All procedure changes described in the licensee's response to the bulletin have been implemented.

b.

Each operator has read and been briefed on the procedure changes.

c.

Facility procedures have been revised to require the prompt reporting of serious events and unexpacted reactor conditions to the NRC.

The dedicated phone line with the NRC has been installed and satisfactorily tested.

d.

The inspector has reviewed the valve / breaker / switch alignment procedures for all safety systems against currect P&ID's and single line diagrams and found that the alignment procedures adequately align the systems for the performance of safety functions.

e.

Facility administrative controls and procedures specify that safety-related systems components, or structures be verified operable upon being returne1 to service following maintenance, testing or extended outages.

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f.

The most recent surveillance test results on each safety system were examined by the inspector and verified to have met the test acceptance criteria.

g.

Surveillance procedures for the testing of pressurizer pressure channels have appropriate deviations prepared to preclude the inadvertent actuation of the safety injection system due to the tripped condition of the pressurizer leve' bistables.

427 294

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The licensee does not utilize an independent verification of valve / breaker / switch alignment during the performance of such alignments.

i.

The licensee has never had to initiate the safety injection system to maintain pressurizer level during routine operational transients.

j.

Reactor coolant pumps are secured following an actuation of the safety injection system due to the isolction of component cooling water to the pumps as a result of the containment isolation signal which is actuated by the safety injection signal.

k.

Operators have been provided reactor coolant system pressure-temperature curves which are to be used for maintaining a 50 degree thernal margin between core exit temperatures and saturation temperatures corresponding to the system pressure.

1.

The licensee does not have procedures which specify the methods for feeding dry steam generators.

m.

Facility tagging practices on control panels do not obscure status indicators, meters or alarms.

fio items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5.

flaintenance Ilaintenance operations on the main steam isolation valves, circu-lating water pump motors, and the emergency diesel generators were witnessed by the inspector and verified to have been performed in accordance with established procedures and technical specification requirements.

During the examination of maintenance activities related to the above components or systems, the inspector made the following observations:

a.

f taintenance requests had been properly prepared to provide the required administrative approval prior to initiating the work.

b.

The maintenanca was performed by qualified members of the maintenance organization.

c.

System taggirg operations and plant status controls properly indicated the performance of the maintenance activities.

d.

Applicable limitino conditions for operation as specified in the technical specifications were met during the above maintenance.

!!o items of noncompliance or deviatioi. were identified.

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6.

Surveillance Testing The inspector observed the surveillance testing of the diesel fuel ril system, emergency diesel generators, tendon wires (tensile strength test), and containment penetrations for determination of local leakage rates. Observations made by the inspector included the following:

a.

The test prerequisites were met.

b.

Applicable limiting conditions for operation were met.

c.

The requirements of the test procedure were adhered to by the personnel performing the test.

d.

The test was performed by qualified personnel.

e.

The test results were reviewed by the licensee and found to be within the acceptance criteria specified in the technical specifications.

The preparational and pressurization phases of the containment inteorated leak rate test were observed my the inspector.

Based on an e, eination of facility procedure, PET-5-1, observation of instrument calibration and functional testing, and independer.t checks on system valve positions, the inspector verified that the initial phase of the containment integrated leak rate test was perform 2d in accordance with regulatory requirements.

The test results from testing performed with the containment at pressure will be examined during subsequent NRC inspections.

No iterr; of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7.

Calibrition The licensee's program for the calibration o e..nt instrumentation was exat ined by the inspector.

The inspector directly observed the calibrat.7n of instrumentation in the reactor protection system, seismic maitoring system, and the steam generator system.

Ob-servations made by the inspector included the following:

a.

The calibrations were performed by properly qualified personnel.

b.

The calibrations were performed in accordance with approved facility procedures.

c.

Test equipment used during the calibration of instruments in the above systems was verified to be in a proper calibration status when used.

427 286

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d.

Records o test equipment calibration show that the calibration accuracy is traceable to the flational Bureau of Standards.

fio items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8.

Review and Audit The inspector directly observed portions of internal audit flo. T-11, which was performed by the licensee's quality assurance organization during the week of May 21, 1979.

The audit was ver "ied to nave been performed in accnrdance with the licensee's quality assurance program and quality assurance procedures.

The following observations were made by the inspector:

a.

The auditors held preaudit and postaudit conferences as required by the quality assurance program.

b.

The audit team was properly organized with each member of the audit team qualifiec 's an auditor in accordance with the auditor training and qualification requirements of the quality assurance program.

c.

Checklists were used by each audit ir applicable to the activity auJted which specified appropriate regulatory requirements, technical spe

"ication requirements, or regulatory guide commitments a:,

basis for evalating the specific safety-related activity being audited.

flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9.

Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The circumstances _qd corrective action described in LER llos. 79-03, 79-04, 79-05, and 79-06 were examined by the inspector.

The inspector found that each LER had been properly reviewed by the licensee and reported to the t'RC wi'hin the proper reporting interval.

Corrective action for each event reported was as follows:

a.

LER 79-03:

The main steam isolation valve's stuffing boxes were inspected and repacked during the recent maintenance outage. The packing follower was machined, based on recom-mendations from the valve supplier, to preclude packing binding in the stuffing box and to provide more clearance between the follower and the valve shaft.

b.

LER 79-04:

Administrative Order, A0-3-14, " Safety-Related Equipment Outages" has been implemented by the licensee.

This procedure includes the requirement that the redundant train be checked for operability prior to removing a train from service.

427 287

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c.

LER 79-05:

The failed fitting on the hydraulic actuator for the feedwater isolation valve was repaired.

Similar fittings on the other feedwater isolation valves were inspected and found to have been properly made up.

The proper techniques for making up high pressure hydraulic fittings were reviewed by maintenance personnel.

d.

LER 79-06:

The cracked fuel line fitting on the emergency feedwater pumo diesel has been replaced with a fitting mal.

from schedule 80 material which should provide additional strength.

Request for Design Change (RDC) fio.79-043 has been initiated by the licensee to redesign the fuel line supports to eliminate vibrations which may have contributed to the cracking of the fuel line fitting. The completion of the RDC will be examined by the inspector during srbsequent inspections.

(79-10-01)

Ito items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10.

Radiation Protection Operations During tours of the control building, auxiliary building, fuel building, and containment structure, the inspector verified that portable radiation survey instruments, area monitors, process radiation monitors, and friskers were operable and in a current state of calibration. The instruments were checked for proper labeling of calibration status and performance of routine functional checks. As applicable, instruments with internal batteries were verified to contain batteries in a proper state of charge.

fio items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11.

Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) on May 11, 18, 25, and June 1, 1979.

During these meetings, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.

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427 pgg