IR 05000344/1979019
| ML19270H828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1979 |
| From: | Johnston G, Malmros M, Sternberg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19270H825 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-79-19, NUDOCS 8001040021 | |
| Download: ML19270H828 (7) | |
Text
.
.
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEME!C
REGION V
50-344/79-19 Report No.
50-344 License No.
NPF-1 Safeguards croup Docket No.
Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name:
Trojan 9"
'
Inspection at:
October 1-31, 1979 Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
M.Malmros,ReacgorInspector Date Signed
.
$,
h Il !15 !?'l G. Johns n, Reactor Inspector Da(e Signbd X
Date Signed
.D
%2
h O ~7 0 Approv.ed By:
.
D. M. Sternberg, Chief, Reactor Project Section 1,
' Dat'e Si'gned Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch summary:
Inspection on October 1-31, 1979 (Report No. 50-344/79-19)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspections of physical security, maintenance, plant operations, organization and administration, surveillance, emergency planning and follow-up on licensee event reports and IE Bulletins.
The inspection in-volved 120 inspector-hours by the NRC Resident Inspector and one regionally based inspector.
Resul ts:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
RV Forr 719 (7)
1683 313 so oion
,
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- C. P. Yundt, General Manager
- F. fi. Lamoureaux, Assistant General Manager R. P. Barkhurst, Operations Supervisor D. L. Bennett, Instrument & Control Supervisor C. J. Fleming, Administrative Supervisor D. F. Kielblock, Training Supervisor W. S. Orser, Engineering Supervisor J. C. Perry, Administrative Engineer M. A. Bell, Chemistry Supervisor J. D. Reid, Quality Assurance Supervisor (Acting)
C. A. Olmstead, Maintenance Supervisor T. D. Walt, Radiation Protection Supervisor The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interviews.
2.
Physical Protection Based on discussions with licensee representatives, observations, and examinations of facility proceduras, the inspector verified that the measures employed for the physical protection of the facility were con-sistent with the requirements of the physical security plan, applicable administrative orders, and regulatory requirements.
Specific aspects of physical protection examined by the following:
a.
Protected area and vital area barriers were verified to be prnperly closed and locked.
b.
Personnel provided access to the protected and vital areas were properly authorized, identified and badged.
Personnel, vehicles, and packages were searched as required by the physical security pl a n.
c.
Escorts were provided for personnel and vehicles when required inside the protected area.
d.
The security organization for each shift was found to be properly organized and manned.
1683 M4
.
-2-e.
Shift turnover, shift routines, and communications were accomplished in accordance with the requirements of the physical security plan and applicable administrative orders.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Plant Operations a.
Facility Logs and Operatino Records The inspector examined t'he log entries contained in the control room log and the shift supervisor's log for facility operations performed during October 1979.
The log entries were found to have been made consistent with the requirements of the facility administrative orders and to accurately reflect the operational status of the facility.
Facility logs were reviewed by applicable staff members and operating orders issued by the operations supervisor did not conflict with the intent of the technical specification requirements.
Sufficient infor-mation was contained in the control room log and the shift supervisor's 109 to identify potential problems and to verify compliance with techni-cal specification reporting requirements and limiting conditions for opera tion.
b.
Facility Tour and Observation of Operations Tours of the facility were made by the inspector in the control building, reactor auxiliary building, fuel building, intake structure, and the tur-bine building.
During the tours, assessments of equipment and plant conditions were made with the following observations:
(1)
Instrumentation for monitoring the status of the plant was operating.
(2) Radiation controls were properly established.
(3)
Piping systems did not show any signs of excessive vibration or leakage.
(4) Detailed system alignment and operability of the hydrogen vent monitoring system and the containment purge / exhaust system were verified by the inspector.
(5) Control room observations verified that the facility manning was proper and discussions with shift supervisors and control operators revealed that they were cognizant of the effect of annunciated alarms on plant operations.
Shift turnovers were found to be per-formed in accordance with the administrative orders and good watch-standing practices.
1683 315
.
-3-(6) Radiochemical analyses to determine the primary to secondary leakage rate and measure the percent fuel defects were examined by the inspector.
Analysis results indicated that the primary to secondary leakage rate and percent fuel defect were within the technical specification limits.
(7) The facility was placed in a cold shutdown condition for the performance of steam generator maintenance on October 12, 1979.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Maintenance activities associated with the steam generators and radiac instruments were examined by the inspector. These activities were examined to verify conformance to established procedures and technical specification requirements. Observations by the inspector, during the examination of these activities, were as follows:
a.
Steam generator maintenance was performed in accordance with approved procedures to determine the cause of primary to secondary leakage experienced during plant operation.
b.
Steam generator tubes which contain defects that caused the primary to secondary leakage have been identified by the licensee. These tubes and any suspect tubes will be explosively plugged during the current maintenance outage. A complete report of steam generator inspection results and maintenance will be prepared by the licensee and submitted to the NRC.
c.
The maintenance activities were performed by qualified members of the licensee maintenance organization and steam generator repair specialists from the steam generator supplier.
d.
System tagging operations and plant status controls properly indicated the performance of maintenance activities.
e.
Applicable limiting conditions for operation as specified in the technical specifications were met during the above maintenance activities.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testing The inspector observed the inspection of pipe support and restraints which was accomplished in accordance with criteria established IE Bulletin Nos. 79-02 and 79-14, the Technical Specifications and the Final Safety 1683 316
..
-4-Analysis Report. The test results from testing performed to measure the moderator temperature coefficient were examined by the inspector.
For the inspections / tests which were performed, the following items were verified:
a.
The inspection / test prerequisites were met.
b.
Applicable limiting conditions for operation were met.
c.
The requirements of the inspection / test procedure were adhered to by the personnel performing. the test and inspections.
d.
The tests / inspections were performed by qualified personnel.
e.
The moderator temperature coefficient test results were reviewed by the licensee and found to be within the acceptance criteria specified in the technical specifications.
The results of the pipe support sur-veillance inspections are discussed in Paragraph 7 of this report.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Emergency Planning Operations The annual drill to test the adequacy of the radiological emergency response plan was held on October 25, 1979. The drill simulated an unisolatable release of radioactivity from the containment following a simulated ejected control rod accident. Observations made by the inspector included the following:
a.
The control room personnel that participated in the drill complied with the appropriate emergency procedures for a loss of coolant accident resulting from an ejected centrol rod.
b.
Calculations were performed by facility personnel to identify the offsite effect of the release of radioactivity from the containment.
c.
Information regarding the projected offsite doses was communicated to the emergency control center where facility personnel coordinated off-site activities with local officials.
d.
A critique of the emergency drill was held on November 26, 1979. During the critique, problems associated with communications, interfaces with local officials, and information processing were described and corrective action planning was initiated.
e.
The licensee plans to include the experience gained from the emergency drill in the revisions to the radiological emergency response plan which is being rewritten to conform with the recent criteria established by the emergency planning task force.
See IE Inspection Report No. 50-344/79-21 for detailed results of emergency planning and drill inspection.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
1683 317
.
..
,
-5-7.
IE Bulletin Follow-up IE Bulletin 79-02 (0 pen): Analyses performed to verify the adequacy of concrete anchor bolting used for the attachment of pipe supports and restraints to facility walls has revealed several deficient pipe supports and restraints which require modification prior to the resumption of faci-lity operations.
In some cases the pipe supports were adequately attached to facility walls, however, the piping loads when transmitted to the wall itsel f, jeopardized the integrity of the wall. All pipe supports are being modified to meet the criteria described in IE Bulletin No. 79-02. Add' tion-ally, the pipe support modifications are being designed to address the loading potential on the support walls. The licensee has submitted a Li-censee Event Report which describes in detail the circumstances and correc-tive action needed to bring the pipe supports and restraints into compliance with the design criteria specified in the Final Safety Analyses Report.
The item of noncompliance regarding the pipe support and restraint design was identified by the licensee.
No deviations were identified.
8.
Organization and Administration
.
The personnel qualification levels of the recently appointed General Manager were reviewed by the inspector. The inspector found that qualification and experience levels met or exceeded the levels described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Regulatory Guide No.1.8, " Personnel Selection and Train-ing" and ANSI N18.1-1971, " Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel."
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Follow-up The circumstances and corrective action described in LER No. 79-14 and Special Report dated October 24, 1979, were examined by the inspector. The inspector found that the LER and the Special Report had been properly reviewed by the licensee and reported to the NRC within the proper reporting interval.
Corrective action for each event was as follows:
a.
LER 79-14 (Closed):
Cracks in the seams of the containment purge exhaust ductwork were repaired and spot welded with stiffeners to prevent further cracking. A request for design change has been initiated to identify the the underlying cause of the problem.
b.
Special Report of October 24, 1979 (Closed):
The causes of the two pH spikes were investigated and no apparent cause was identified.
Facility personnel have been informed of the incident and advised as to the proper methods for disposing of any potentially hazardous chemicals.
The pH spikes (Item b. above) exceeded the Environmental Technical Specification limit of 9.0 for a total time of three minutes.
No deviations were identified.
1683 MB
,.
,
.
-6-10.
Review of Containment Integrated Leak Rate aest (CILRT) Report The inspector reviewed and discussed the results of the CILRT with the licensee's Test Director. Results of the test showed a calculated leak rate less than the Technical Specification requirements of 0.075 weight percent per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
However, calculation of the Upper Confidence Limit exceeded the Technical Specification number. An independent calculation by the inspector showed results, through a mass plot technique, that met Technical Specification requirements.
These results showed a leak rate of 0.0624 weight percent per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. At the 95 percent Upper Confidence Limit, the leak rate was 0.0734 weight percent per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The technique used by the licensee for the calculation of the leak rate of the containment building was the total time technique prescribod in ANSI N45.4-1972.
This technique accentuates the Upper Confidence Limit if there is any scattering of data. The reason for this is that it does a calcula-tion by linear least squares fit of the leak rates from a common starting point. The calculation has no correction for time dependency; therefore, data scattering early on gives the short time duration data points excess-ive weight. The mass plot calculation used by the inspector is a linear least squares fit of the mass versus time.
The slope of the mass plot line thus represents the leak rate of the contairment building with no point receiving more weight than the other. The total time calculation, which makes no correction for the time dependent nature of the values it gener-ates, will therefore give results not as representative.
The majority of scattering of data came from the dew cell measurements.
The apparent cause of this scattering was deduced during the performance of the test to be the positioning of the dew cells beneath the containment fan coolers.
The downblast of these units is considerable, and would cause the readings to fluctuate.
This has been a problem previously recognized at other facilities.
At the conclusion of the test, and before depressurizing, the Test Director had the fan ccolers shut off. The respor.se the dew cells had after shutting down the fan coolers was a considerable reduction of the fluctuation of the dew cell readings. This indicated a solution to the problem would be to move the dew cells or change the air circulation.
The licensee's Test Direc-tor stated that a change will be made to the CILRT procedure to incorporate these findings.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on October 5, 19, 26, and 31, 1979.
During these meetings, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
}bbb