IR 05000336/1979005
| ML19270G242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1979 |
| From: | Caphton D, Graham P, Higgins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19270G243 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-336-79-05, 50-336-79-5, NUDOCS 7906050183 | |
| Download: ML19270G242 (9) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-336/79-05 Docket No.
50-336 License No.
DPR-65 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Inspection at:
Waterford, Connecticut Inspection condu.'ted:
March 6-9,J979 Inspectors:
/
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J. Cf! ig in~s, Reactor Inspector
'date signed I
- 1dtb>
fn, 4l4l19 P. D. Gr'aham, Reactor Inspector date signed Approved by:
b N
D. L. Capnt6n, Chlef, Nuclear Support
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data signed Section No.1, RO&NS Branch Insoection Summary:
Insoection on Marc, 6-9.1979 (Recort No. 50-336/79-05)
Areas inspected:
toutine unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of previous inspection items, refueling preparations, the containment inte-grated leak rate test procedure, pipe supports and restraints and outage related maintenance.
The inspection involved 58 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC regional based inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
7 90605 0 / L3 Q
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The below listed technical and supervisory level personnel were contacted.
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company J. Crockett, Engineer
- E. Farrell, Unit 2 Superintendent J. Harris, S/U Engineer J. Keenan, Refueling Coordinator - Engineering J. Kelley, Operations Supervisor
- J. Opeka, Station Superintendent R. Place, Maintenance Supervisor S. Scace, Engineering Supervisor R. Stratman, Engineer W. Strong, Refueling Coordinator, Operations S. Sudigala, Acting Reactor Engineer NRC
- J. Shedlosky, Resident Inspector The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees during the inspection.
They included members of the engineering, operating, maintenance and quality assurance staffs.
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Previous Inspection Items Update (Closed) Unresolved item (336/77-31-07): The inspector reviewed the installation and retest procedures associated with J.0. R-70339, Pressurizer Spray Valve Replacement.
Both procedures were properly documented and approved prior to accomplishment.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved item (336/77-31-08): The inspector reviewed the retest procedure associated with J.0. R-70341, Charging Pump Suction Stabilizer.
The licensee used Engineering Form, 2-ENG-110, Pressure Test Following Weld Repairs, to conduct and document the retest.
This form had been properly approved prior to accomplishment. This item is close.
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(Closed) Unresolved item (336/78-11-01): The licensee modified the local leak rate test panel to include an in-line thermometer and two levels.
The leak rate test procedures (SP 2605C and D) were also revised to require leveling of the panel, recording of test temperatures, and correction of test results for temperature.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved item (336/78-18-01): SP 2602C, Revision 2, has requirements for a reactor coolant system leak check at 2250 psia in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.4.10.c and a reactor coolant. system hydrostatic test at 2260 psia, 532 F in accordance with TS 4.4.10.b and Article IS-500 of Section XI (1971 edition through Summer 71 Addenda) of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
The inspector reviewed the calculations used to determine the minimum hydrostatic test pressure of 2260 psia.
The licensee's representatis stated that Procedure SP 2606C and the requirements of the 1971 Edition of Section XI are to be used for the test at the completion of the current refueling outage.
This item is closed.
(0 pen) Unresolved item (336/76-14-03): The inspector reviewed Revision 5 to OPS Form 2605A-1 dated January 31, 1979.
This ensures that valves 2RW154 and 2RW232 are torqued shut to 60 ft. lbs after use, thus making the leak rate tests in the reverse direction conservative.
The test data for the remaining two valves in question (2LRR43.1 and 2GRll.1) is receiving further NRC review.
This item remains open pending the results of that review.
(0 pen) Unresolycd item (336/77-11-04): This item rddressed the fact that the licensee does not perform a verification of the piston setting of installed safety-related snubbers.
The issue was forwarded to the Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation (flRR) for resolution.
NRR has determined that verification of piston settings to insure operability is an essential element of the visual inspection of snubbers per the Technical Specifications.
The inspector informed the licensee of this interpretation of the Technical Specifications.
The licensee's representative stated that evaluation of this position would be required prior to any commitment being made.
This item is unresolved.
(0 pen) Unresolved item (336/77-08-04): The licensee is in the process of completing his review of this item.
Final actions will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
This item remains ope.
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s 3.
Refueling Preparations a.
New Fuel Receipt end Inspection The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure pertaining to new fuel assembly and CEA receipt and inspection with respect to the requirements contained in ANSI 18.7-1976 and ANSI N45.2.2-1972.
New fuel receipt and inspection records for 72 new fuel assemblies were reviewed for conformance with plant procedures.
The inspector verified that the new fuel inspector had received the required qualification by the licensee.
Minor discrepancies noted on the fuel inspection record; were discussed with the licensee.
All discrepancies had been satisfactorily dispositioned by the licensee.
No inadequacies were noted in this review.
b.
Documents Reviewed The inspector reviewed the following documents to verify that the licensee had approved and technically acceptable procedures for the forthcoming refueling.
Letter from Counsil (NNECo) to Reid (NRC) dated February 12,
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1979, Millstone 2 " Proposed License Amendment, Power Uprating"
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Procedure for CEA Guide Tube Repair of C-E Fuel Assemblies as Modified for Use at Millstone 2," Procedure No. 00000-ESS-107 dated February 13, 1979 OP 2209A, Revision 3, dated March 7, 1979, " Refueling Operations"
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OP 2303, Revision 6, dated February 9,1979, " Fuel Handling
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Sys tem"
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RE21008, Revision 1, dated January 4, 1979, " Refueling Worklist Administrative Control" Emergency Procedure 2520, Revision 0, dated June 8,1977,
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" Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containment"
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Technical Specification 3/4.9, " Refueling Operations" SP 2614A, Revision 1, dated February 20, 1979, " Refueling
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Periodic Checks"
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SP 26148, Revision 0, dated January 24, 1975, " Penetration
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Isolation Verification"
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SP 2838, Revision 0, dated February 28,1977, " Reactor Coolant System and Refueling Canal Analysis for Boron" With the exception of the below items, the inspector had no further questions on the procedures reviewed.
c.
Prerequisite Verification The licensee's procedures did not contain ary provision for reverifying prerequisites after an interruption in fuel handling as required by paragraph 5.3.4.5 of ANSI N18.7. This item is unresolved (366/79-05-01),
d.
Containment Evacuation Emergency Procedure 2520 specifies actuating the containment audible alarm and evacuating personnel in the event of a fuel assembly drop.
During the time of fuel movement containment integrity is required and the licensee normally maintains the airlock door interlocks in place to assure that only one door is opened at a time.
The inspector questioned what methods would be used in the event of a required evacuation of containment to ensure all personnel are expeditiously evacuated.
The licensee's representative stated that this issue would be re-viewed prior to fuel movement.
This item will receive further inspector review and is designated for followup as (Itcm No.
336/79-05-02).
4.
Pipe Supports and Restraints a.
Documents Reviewed The inspector reviewed the following documents relating to the licensee's snubber inspection and testing program.
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Letter from Counsil to Reid dated January 8,1979, " Proposed Revisions to Technical Specifications"
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Procedure 2733-A, Revision 2, dated September 7,1977,
" Hydraulic Snubber Inspection"
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Procedure 2733-B, Revision 1, dated October 24, 1977,
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" Hydraulic Snubber Functional Test" Procedure 2721-I, Revision 2, dated July 14, 1978,
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" Hydraulic Snubber Overhaul and Installation" Completed Visual Inspection Results from January 1978
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to January 1979.
The procedures and results were reviewed to verify compliance with regulatory requirements. With the exception of the below item and the items addressed in paragraph 2 the inspector had no further questions in this area.
b.
Variation of Snubber Lock-up Rices with Temperature The inspector discussed with the licensee's representative the ITT Grinell studies which demonstrate how snubber lock-up and bleed rates increase as snubber operating temperatures increase above the temperature at which the snubber was tested and set.
The licensee is currently evaluating their snubber functional test acceptance criteria in light of this variation.
Prelim-inary licensee projections are that very minimal changes to limits if any will result since snubber operational temperatures are relatively low and plant practice has been to set lock-up and bleed rates at 8 ipm and 4 ipm respectively, which is well below the maximum acceptable lock-up and bleed rates.
The inspector had no additional questions at this time.
5.
Contairment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) Procedure a.
General
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The inspector reviewed a draft version of the CILRT procedure
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SP 2605B, Revisicn 0, " Containment Leak Rate Test - Type A" for cor.formance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (App J), ANSI fl45.4, Millstone 2 Technical Specifications, the Bechtel Corporation Topical Report for CILRT's BN-TOP-1 (BN-TOP-1), and current NRC positions.
The licensee intends to perform the CILRT at Pa (54 psig) at the end of the current refueling outage.
Test duration will be determined by the criteria in BN-TOP-1 and will be a minimum of six hours. With the exception of the below items, collectively designated as open item (336/79-05-03), the inspector had no further questions on the draft procedure at this tim.
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b.
Containment Inspection Step 4.5 of the procedure specifies a containment inspection as required by Section V.A of App J, but does not give any specific guidance as to what areas to inspect or what to use as acceptance criteria.
c.
Volume Change The procedure contained no provision for measuring final con-tainment sump levels or for conservatively adjusting leakage rates for sump level, pressurizer level or reactor vessel level changes that could change the containment free volume and possibly mask CILRT leakage.
d.
Acceptance Criteria Section V.B.3 of App J specifies the requirement for analysis and interpretation of CILRT results.
The inspector informed the licensee of the NRC position on the acceptance criteria for the CILRT.
The measured leak rate at the 95% upper confidence level plus any required additions / corrections must be less than 0.75 La.
Corrections or additions include lines found leaking during the test and isolated per step 6.11 of the procedure, systems in operation or water-filled during the CILRT but not in operation post-LOCA (e.g. RBCCW), and conservative volume corrections.
e.
Psychrometer Step 7.2.2 of the procedure utilizes a sling psychrometer to check the humidity instrumentatica whereas ANSI N45.4 specifies an Assman or aspiration type psychrometer.
f.
Monitoring of Depressurization The procedure currently callr for depressurization of containment through a line which has nc irovision for continuous monitoring of activity and flow as required by Appendix B Technical Specification 2.4.2.3. A.
g.
BN-TOP-1 The procedure did not contain the following two requirements of BN-T0P-1:
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(1) A plot of containment air temperature as required by paragraph 2.2.B; and, (2) An acceptance criteria specifying that the extrapolated value of the calculated leak rate must be less than 0.75 La.
h.
Pressurization Valve Lineup The valve lineups specified for pressurization and depressurization contained inconsistencies and did not provide a vent path outside the containment isolation valve (CIV) during the CILRT.
i.
Draining The procedure contained no provisions for assuring that lines inside, outside and between CIV's are drained of water in accordance with paragraph III.A.l.d of App J.
j.
Test Pressure The procedure currently does not verify that containment pressure is at least Pa at the start of the test, after stabilization is completed.
6.
Outaae Maintenance Review The inspector reviewed the licensee's maintenance program in preparation for the forthcoming outage. The followinc administrative procedures were reviewed:
ACP-QA-2.02, Performing Category I Work, Revision 12, December 15,
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1978.
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ACP-QA-2.02A, Installation Inspection, Revision 4, August 8,1978.
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ACP-QA-2.02B, P.etests, Revision 1, December 14, 1978.
ACP-QA-2.03, Performing Non-Category I Work, Revision 3,
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February 1, 1979.
The above procedures were reviewed for the following aspects:
a.
The administrative system used for removing a system from service and returning it to servic.
b.
Hold points for inspection and QA signoff.
c.
Post maintenance inspection.
d.
Tagging and valve lineup requirements.
e.
Provisions for assuring that LC0 requirements of the Technical Specifications were satisfied during the repair work.
f.
Provisions for the control of housekeeping during the maintenance effort.
g.
Maintenance deficiency reporting.
The inspector selected two safety-related maintenance items scheouled for the outage and reviewed the items for conformance with applicable licensee procedures.
The inspector noted no inadequacies in the above review.
7.
Plant Tour During the course of the inspection the inspectors toured various portions of the Millstone 2 facility and observed plant operations in progress.
Areas toured included the control room, the Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings, the Containment Enclosure Building, piping penetration areas and the electrical penetration area. Selected parameters on the control room panels were observed and compared with acceptable limits. The general condition of the outside of the containment building including the containment dome was observed.
The inspectors also witnessed Type B leak rate testing of electrical per.2trations in progress.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Unresolved Items Items about which more information is reqaired to determine accept-ability are considered unresolved.
Part. graphs 2 and 3.c of this report contain unresolved items.
9.
Exit Interview At the inspection's end the inspectors held a meeting (see Detail 1 for attendees) to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
The unresolved items were identified.