IR 05000331/1982002
| ML20053F037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1982 |
| From: | Clardy L, Streeter J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053F030 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-331-82-02, 50-331-82-2, NUDOCS 8206100330 | |
| Download: ML20053F037 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Report No. 50-331/82-01(DPRP)
i Docket No. 50-331 License No. DPR-49 Licensee:
Iowa Electric Light and Power Company
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Security Building, P. O. Box 357 l
Cedar Rapids, IA 52406 Facility Name: Duane Arnold Energy Center
Inspection At: Palo, IA.
Inspection Conducted:
February 1-March 31, 1982 Inspector 2Y 1 vrm Approved By:
J.
treeter, Acting Chief
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Projects Section 2C Inspection Summcry
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Inspection on February 1 - March 31, 1982 (Report No. 50-331/82-02(DPkP))
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of Operational Safety Verification; Maintenance Observation; Surveillance Observation; IE-l Circular F ilowup; Procuremant; Licensee Event Report Followup; Followup on GE Sers :e Letter; Preparation for Refueling; Independe.nt Inspection;
and Followup on Previously Identified Items. The inspection involved a total of 193 inspector-hours on site by one NRC inspector including 12 inspector-hours on site during off-shifts.
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Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- D. Mineck, Chief Engineer
- E. Matthews, Manager Quality Assurance P. Ward, Manager Design Engineers D. Wilson, Assistant Chief. Engineer - Rad Protection / Security J. Vinquist, Assistant Chief Engineer - Technical Support B. tork, Assistant Chief Engineer - Operations D. Teply, Operations Supervisor C. Mick, Assistant Operations Supervisor J. VanSickel, Technical Engineer K. Yeung, Radiation Protection Engineer L. Voss, Assistant Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
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R. McCracken, Quality Control Supervisor i
In addition, the inspector interviewed several other licensee per-sonnel including shift supervising engineers, control room operators, engineering personnel, administrative personnel, and contractor personnel (representing the licensee).
- Denotes those contacted at the exit interviews.
2.
Operational Safety Verification
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The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable loga and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of February and March.
The inspector verified the oper-ability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of
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the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance j
requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
l The inspector by observation and lirect interview verified that i
the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the j
inspection period, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the RHR and HPCI systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requircments established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations wcre identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation-m
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w Station maintenance activities of safety relcted systems and com-ponents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they i
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guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were.
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures.and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
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control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials ushd. wore properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention' controls were implemented.
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s k'ork requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety related equipment A
maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed /reviewe~d:
RHR snubber repairs HPCI snubber repairs
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Following completion of maintenance on the RHR and HPCI systems, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service'
properly.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were-identified.
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l 4.
Monthly Surveillance Observatica
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The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the standby gas treatment and testing on the Standby Gas Treatment and Residual Heat Removal System and verified that testing
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was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test in-
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strumentation was calibrated, that limitit.; conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components
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were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical speci-fications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficien-cies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of testing on the APRMs.
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FL No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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5.
Procurement
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a The inspector reviewed procurement and storage activities to ascertain whether 'the purchase of compone.nts, materials and supplies used for
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safotycrelated. functions, is in conformance with the licensee's
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approVad,QA program and implementing procedures; non-conforming items
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are segregated and marked accordingly; applicable preventive main-tenance is performed; housekeeping and environmental requirements
are met; and,_ limited shelf-life items are controlled.
The following components were inspected:
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New fusi
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CRD bicck svent valves
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0xygen/ hydrogen analyzer sparc parts
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'.No ltems'of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Receipt of New Fuel The inspector verified prior to receipt of new fuel that technically s
adequate, approved procedures were available covering the receipt,
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inspection' and storage of new fuel; observed receipt inspections
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and storage of new fuel elements and verified these activities were performed in accordance with the licensee's procedures; and, followed up resolutions of deficiencies as found during new fuel inspections.
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Also the inspector witnessed portions of quality control inspector
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trainings on receipt, storage, and channeling of new fuel.
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No it' ems. of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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7.
Licenseo-Event Reports Followup
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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and reviev of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine thatJreportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to pre-
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vent.recu,rrence' bad been accomplished in accordance with technical
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specifications.
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82-001/03-0
_. Closed The Main Steam Leak Detection Switch Contacts were replaced with gold contacts to reduce
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s drift problems. The remaining transmitter
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contacts will also be replaced.
82-002/03-0 Closed RCIC differential pressure switches were
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i recalibrated and tested. A design review /
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i change is in progress to replace Barton 238A p
switches due to recurring drift problems.
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k 82-003/03-0 Closed
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82-004/03-0 Closed 82-005/03-0 Closed
82-006/03-0
"Josed The "B" oxygen analyzer was inoperable while
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the "A" analyzer was being installed.
J Existing procedures did not address the use
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of the bypass flow regulator. This resulted
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in a low flow condition. The vendor techni-cal representative was contacted and the problem was corrected. Operating procedures have been changed.
82-008/03-0 Closed These LERs covered numerous snubber / hanger
82-013/01-0 Closed failures on the RHR system. See Paragraph
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82-014/03-0 Closed lla of this report.
82-010/03-0 Closed 82-011/03-0 Closed
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82-012/03-0 Closed The "C" Leakage Control System was inoperable when bypass valve 8403C would not close. An auxiliary switch on the motor coil was replaced and the valve tested satisfactorily.
'82-015/01-0 Closed
"B" RHR SW MOV 1947 was inoperable due to the valve operator stem nut being broken off due
to normal wear. The nut was replaced and the j
valve tested satisfactorily. The corresponding
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"A" system valve was checked for similar wear -
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and no problems were identified.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Followup on Previously Identified Noncompliance, Unresolved and Open Items The inspector reviewed the following items to verify that the 11-censee's response and actions taken were in accordance with require-ments, technical specifications, approved procedures, and accepted
' industry standards. The inspector also verified that the response and actions were done in a timely manner and were in accordance with licensee commitments.
(Closed) OII 78-06-01: MSIV Stem Leakoff Connections. The inspector verified the licensee has blanked off the connections.
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(Closed)-0II 78-06-02: MSIV Retesting. The inspector verified that the licensee does a local leak rate test (LLRT) whenever an MSIV is disassembled and repacked.
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(Closed) OII 78-06-03:
LLRT Instrument Calibration Records. The inspector reviewed calibration records for LLRT instruments and veri-fled calibrations were performed.
(Closed) OII 78-09-02: CRD Hydraulic Control Unit Level Switches.
This item was previously inspected (Inspection Report 50-331/79-16)
with satisfactory results.
(Closed) OII 78-09-03: HPCI Inoperability. This item was inspected previously (Inspection Report 50-331/79-16) with satisfactory results.
(Closed) OII 78-09-04: RWCU MOV 2700 Failure. The licensee readjusted the valve limit switches during the subsequent outage. The valve was tested and has operated satisfactorily.
(Closed) OII 78-12-01:
Procedures on Non-Approved Suppliers. The inspector verified that the licensee has an adequate approved procedure for obtaining parts through non-approved suppliers in accordance with their QA Manual.
(Closed) OII 79-24-02: Warehouse Storage. The. inspector verified that the warehouse meets level B storage requirements, and that limited life and safety related items are being stored in accordance with requirements.
(Closed) Noncompliance (81-21-01, 81-26-01): Valve Lineups. The inspector verified that the licensee has revised the procedure on performance of valve lineups.
Included are specific instructions stating how the lineup sheet is to be filled out for various con-ditions, what to do if valves are out of position, or if valves are tagged for maintenance, and actions to take for final signoff and system verification.
No items of noncompliance or deviatlans were identified.
9.
IE Circular Followup For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applic-able to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
(Closed) IEC 78-09: Arcing of GE Size 2 Contactors. The inspector verified that the licensee does not have the referenced contactors.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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10.
Followup on General Electric Service Information Letters a.
Modification of Vertical Lift Metal-Clad Switchgear Short Circuit
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The licensee's engineering department is still evaluating the letter for applicability and actions. The inspector will review j
this item upon completion.
OII 50-331/82-01-01).
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High'Drywell Temperature Effect on Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation (SIL 299):
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Item 1.
The inspector verified that the licensee has modified the. triple low water level setpoint.
Item 2.
The inspector verified that operators have been trained on results, indications, and actions for reference
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1eg flashing, and that precautions concerning reference
leg flashing have been placed in procedures.
Item 3.
The inspector verified the licensee has provided
alternate indication for Reactor Water Level instru-
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mentation. The licensee has not modified the level l
indication below the vessel lower level tap, as suggested by G.E. The inspector has no further
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concerns in this area.
l No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Independent Inspection l'
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On February 19, 1982, the licensee identified a failed snubber on the "A" RHR System. Subsequent walkdowns of the "A" RHR
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System identified 19 additional snubbers / hangers and pipe damage which showed indications of piping movement. The licensee i
declared "A" LPCI/RHR inoperable, entered a 7 day Limiting Condition for'0peration action statement, and isolated the "B"
RHR System from the "A". side. The licensee also began an ex-tensive testing and evaluation program to-determine the cause t
i and extent of'the damage.
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l On February 20, 1982, one "B" RHR System snubber was found with i
evidence of rotation.
Since both RHR Systems had been declared i
inoperable the licensee began a power reduction and replaced i
the snubber with a tested snubber. The licensee then terminated
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the power reduction. A subsequent engineering evaluation l
determined tha@ the snubber had not caused any damage and that j
the system had not been' inoperable.
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After repairs to the "A" RHR System, it was hydrotested satis-factorily and five high stress welds were dye penetrant tested.
i The damaged pipe (approximate identation 5/8 inch depth, cir-
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cumference 7 inches) was welded flush, ultrasonically and dye penetrar.t tested satisfactorily. Testing indicated that water hammer had caused the pipe movement. The water hammer was a
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result of the RHR keep-fill system not performing its function.
The licensee has taken temporary procedural and opeiational actions which should prevent water hammer from recurring. When perma-nent repairs are made the inspector will review them. This is an open item (50-331/82-01-01).
The inspector observed and reviewed the licensee's evaluations, testing, and corrective maintenence. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Approximately three weeks prior to the event, a contractor was performing portions of an evaluation associated with the Mark I torus modifications and took pictures in the torus area. He identified one hanger that was twisted about 45 degress and informed a HP technician of this. The HP then gave the picture of the subject hanger to the on-duty shift supervisor. The shift supervisor took no action at this time and assumed that the appropriate management personnel were aware of the problem.
The hanger in question was on the "A" side RHR. Licensee manage-ment did not know of this until February 19, 1982. The licensee promptly informed the NRC.
The licensee took immediate corrective and disciplinary action against the shift supervisor.
In addition, personnel were reinstructed on prompt reporting and corrective actions of identified items. The inspector has expressed concern to the licensee about the lack of management attention on the part of the shift supervisor.
It does not appear that this problem is widespread among operations personnel.
b.
HPCI Spring Can Hanger Damage The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions on repair to HPCI hanger EB3-14-H-8.
On June 21, 1979, during an evaluation of concrete expansion bolts for pipe support, the licensee identi-fled a damaged spring can hanger for HPCI. The licensee wrote Material Action Occurrence Report (MAOR)79-061 on this item.
In addition, two more hangers were found to be nonconforming and MACRs79-090 and 79-114 were written in July 1979.
These items were included for repair as part of Design Change Request (DCR) 867. This DCR was subsequently closed without
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the work being performed. The work was not performed on this DCR because it was identified as not being within the DCR's i
scope on April 29, 1980.
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In December 1981, a review of outstanding MADRs was performed during an effort to discontinue the use of MAORs. All MAORs were to become nonconformance reports. The nonconformance reports written on MA0R 79-090 and 79-114 were corrected and presented no safety problem. However, MA0R 79-061 was not corrected until February 25, 1982. At this time the licensee
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determined by onsite review that the safety margin of the hanger was degraded by 50%. A subsequent evaluation by Bechtel determined that the hanger had performed its design function and would continue to do so, even unde. a:cident conditions. The evaluation also determined there wculd be no adverse pipe loading if the hanger were completely removed.
The licensee moved the hanger to a new location as corrective and reviewed all MAORs to ensure they had been properly performed.
The inspector discussed the weaknesses of the system with the licensee. The licensee has taken positive corrective actions to eliminate the weaknesses discussed. The inspector has no further concerns at this time, but will continue to monitor this area.
c.
Hold Points During the inspection period the licensee's quality control department ascertained that certain hold points were bypassed by contractors on Design Change Request 932.
The hold points in question were for weld inspections. Licensee management immediately stopped all safety related design change work until the problem was rectified.
In addition, all safety-related design change requests in progress were reviewed to ensure all hold points and quality inspection items were performed satisfactorily.
Design Change Request 932 was completed and reinspected to ensure compliance with requirements.
Contractor personnel were retrained on quality requirements and reprimanded by licensee management.
Also a full time resident Quality Assurance Engineer has been assigned to review and oversee safety-related design changes performed by contractors.
d.
Licensee Tracking of Items The inspestor discussed with the licensee a need for prioritizing and tracking of items to be performed. Areas discussed included NRC commitments, LER commitments, Design Change Request, Document Change Forms, and and Nonconformance Reports.
Improvement of the system is needed to ensure that all items are completed in a timely and effective manner.
In addition, improvements in the system will help eliminate items from being overlooked such as was the case involving MAOR 79-061 (Paragraph 11.b).
The licensee has instituted a computer tracking method to keep up with many commitments, and the quality control department is tracking all of its commitments at this time.
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Maintenance Group The inspector reviewad the licensee's newly instituted mainten-ance planning group. The group will plan, schedule and control plant work including ordering of equipment.
In the past this was performed by the appropriate department supervisors. The planning group should reduce the amount of down time of plant and equipment while allowing more work to be performed and the department supervisors to more closely observe maintenance.
The licensee has also instituted a daily and weekly maintenance planning session to ensure all work is supported and does not interfere with safe operation.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the inspection period and on April 1, 1982, to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
In each case the scope and findings of the individual areas were summarized.
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