IR 05000331/1980003
| ML19323C863 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1980 |
| From: | Christianson W, Little W, Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323C858 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-331-80-03, 50-331-80-3, NUDOCS 8005190329 | |
| Download: ML19323C863 (7) | |
Text
80051g03f7
-
O U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
.
Report No. 50-331/80-03 Docket No. 50-331 License No. DPR-49 Licensee:
Iowa Electric Light and Power Company Security Building, P. O. Box 357 Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52406 Facility Name: Duane Arnold Energy Center Inspection At: Duane Arnold Energy Center Palo, Iowa Inspection Conducted: February 19-22, 1980
,
,
,' fight.,
Inspectors:
.
.
'
'/
',
/
d AT.
ristianso gh)
I
.
/
.
/'
'
Approved By:
/ Li f
f /f' d
,
Reactor Projects Section 1-2
/
/
Inspection Summary Inspection on February 19-22, 1980 (Report No. 50-331/80-03)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of:
Pre-refueling activities; Refueling activities; General Employee Training; Requalifi-cation Training; and LER followup. The inspection involved 53 inspector-hours (including 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> off-shift) onsite by two NRC inspectors.
!
Results: Of the areas inspected three items of noncompliance (Infraction-failure to conduct fire brigrade training; Deficiency inade-quate procedure; Infraction-failure to conduct monthly fire extinguisher inspections) were identified.
.
w
_ _ _ _
.
DETAILS
.
1.
Persons Contacted
- B. York, Assistant Chief Engineer Operations
~
D. Wilson, Assistant Chief Engineer Technical
-
- D. Teply, Operations Supervisor
- R. McCracken, Quality Control Supervisor
- J. VanSickel, Technical Engineer
- D. Rockhill, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor R. Anderson, Training Coordinator The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees including:
Shift Supervising Engineers; Nuclear Station Operators; Onsite Engineering Personnel; and General Station Personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following licensee event reports to ascertain whether the licensee's review, corrective actions, and report on the event and associated conditions, were adequate and in conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications and licensee procedures and controls.
a.
Inoffice Review (1)
(Closed) LER 331/79-30 (2)
(Closed) LER 331/79-31 (3)
(Closed) LER 331/79-32 (4)
(Closed) LER 331/79-34 (5)
(Closed) LER 331/79-35 (6)
(Closed) LER 331/79-36 (7)
(Closed) LEh 331/79-38 A design review c: s been initiated relative to LER 331/79-30.
Results of the review will be inspec*.ed during a subsequent inspec-tioi3 (331/80-03 J1).
b.
Onsite Review The following IIR's, were selected for onsite review. The review consicted of discussions with licensee personnel direct observation and review of records.
-
1) (Closed) LER 331/79-33, Refer to IR # 331/79-32 2) (Closed) LER 331/79-37 No items of noncompliance were identified.
-2-
!
.
0 3.
Training The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure ACP 1401.5, " Plant Indoctrination and Training Program," the Training Programs Administrative Manual and the Operator Qualification and Requali-fication Program Manual, and the correspondir.g training records.
-
The training program was reviewed to ascertain whether the overall training activities for new employees and the retraining of non-licensed personnel were in conformance with Technical Specification requirements and commitments in the FSAR. The inspectors verified that formal training and retraining programs have been established for new employees, temporary or service personnel, non-licensed /
licensed personnel, technicians and craft personnel; that the formal training program for the personnel listed above covers administra-tive controls and procedures, radiological health and safety, indus-trial safety, controlled access and security procedures, emergency plan, and quality assurance; that the retraining program for technic-ians and craf t personnel includes on-the-job training, formal tech-nical training; that responsibilities have been assigned to assure that training program requirements have been met; and that all female employees are provided instructions concerning prenatal radiation exposure.
Ammendment 43 to license DPR-49 added the requirement of quarterly fire brigade training to Section 6.4.2 of the Techncial Specification.
Contrary to the above the licensee did not conduct formal fire brigade training from July 1978 to June 1979.
This item is considered to be an infraction. (331/80-03-02).
No other items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training The requalification program was reviewed to ascertain whether the licensed operator requalification training program is effective and in conformance with Regulatcry requirements. The inspectors veri-fied that an operator requalification training program has been established and includes preplanned lectures, attendance documen-tation and ide.ntification of specific training aids to be used in lieu of an instructor; the on-the-job training requirements have been specified to include control manipulations, discussion / review of changes in facility design, procedures, and license; and that records of licensed individuals are maintained to include completed course and yearly examinations, documentation of manipulations,
-
documentation of required simulations of emergency and abnormal conditions, results of supervisory evaluations of examinations,
'
i-3-
___
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
results of supervisory evaluations and observation of manipulations e
and simulations identified above, documentation of individual study, and documentation of accelerated requalification training.
The inspectors reviewed the records of licensed Senior Reactor Operators and licensed Reactor Operators to verify that the,
licensee's approved requalification training program was being
-
properly implemented.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Preparation for a Refueling Outage The inspector verified that approved procedures were available for new fuel receipt and inspection and for fuel transfer and core verification.
In addition, the inspector verified that new fuel and fuel channels were received and inspected in accordance with the licensee's procedures. A licensee representative stated that neither fuel sipping operations, irradiated fuel inspections, nor fuel reconstitution would be performed during this refueling outage.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Pre-Fuel Handling Activities The inspector verified that surveillance testing had been completed on Technical Specification requirements, refueling machine opera-tion, refueling interlocks, crane testing, refueling deck radiation monitors, and communication systems.
The inspector verified by record review, that the surveillance procedures for IRM trips; SRM trips, secondary containment demon-stration; refueling interlocks, SRM daily response check, and refuel mode required scrams were completed.
In addition the inspector reviewed the reactor building overhead crane preventative mainten-ance procedure, the refueling deck area radiation monitoring surveil-lance procedures and verified that communications between the refuel-ing bridge and the control room had been checked.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Fuel Handling Activities The inspector verified by direct observations that core monitoring during refueling operations was in accordance with Technical Specifications, that containment integrity during refueling opera-tions was in accordance with the Technical Specifications, that fuel bundle removal was in accordance with established procedures, i-4-
!
l
.
that fuel accountability methods were in accordance with established o
procedures, that core internals were stored to protect against damage, that housekeeping was proper, that vessel level was in accordance with the Technical Specifications, that the reactor mode switch position was as required by the Technical Specifications, and that control blade checks were scheduled to be performed in accord-ance with approved procedures. The inspector also observed 'that the individual directing fuel handling activities held a senior operating
-
license and was present directly supervising activities, and that a licensed reactor operator was present in the control room and in constant direct communication with a member of the fuel handling crew when work was being performed that could affect the reactivity of the core.
The inspector also verified that operations personnel stationed on the refueling bridge had prior fuel handling experience.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Independent Inspection While conducting a general walk through of the facility the inspec-tors noted two items which were brought to the attention of plant management:
a.
The inspector noted at approximately 3:00p.m. on February 20, 1980, during an independent valve lineup check on the Standby Liquid Control System, that valve V-26-11, manual isolation valve on the air sparger inlet, was not locked in its closed position. Further investigation indicated that STP 44C001 " Standby Liquid Control System Boron Concentration" had been performed earlier on the same day and had been preceded by air sparging of the SBLC tank between 8:05a.m. and 9:44a.m.
A review of Operating Instruction #53, for the Standby Liquid Control System, indicated that valve V-26-11 was to be locked closed. Techneial Specification 6.8 states in part that
" Detailed written procedures involving nuclear safety, includ-ing applicable check-off sheets.
. shall be prepared.
"
.
..
Contrary to the above STP44C001 does not include any statement relating to valve V-26-11 which would preclude the valve from being left unlocked.
This item is considered a deficiency.
(331/80-03-03).
When the above item was brought to managements attention the valve was immediately locked in the closed position.
-5-
..
.
_
e b.
Technical Specification Section 6.8.1 states in part," Detailed e
written procedures involving nuclear safety... shall be prepared.
. all procedures shall be adhered to."
Included
.
in Section 6.8.1 is " Fire Protection Plan Implementation".
The DAEC Fire Plan approved on January 19, 1977, requires inspection procedure IP-013/IE-3, Revision 1, dated
_
February 23, 1979 to be performed. This inspection procedure includes both monthly inspections and annual servicing re-
-
quirements for all fire extinguishers.
An effort was made to review the inspections, however no records of the monthly inspections could be located, the annual inspection for 1979 was reviewed. Further review indicated that in 1977 the monthly inspection requirement was put on the Mini-MAR System to be performed by the operations department.
Discussions with operations revealed that they were unaware of their responsibility in this area.
Contrary to the requirements of the Technical Specification and the Fire Plan, the required monthly inspections of fire exting-uishers were not performed. This resulted in the inspectors identifying three, out of approximately eight extinguishers inspected, which had service tags which were out of date.
This item is considered an infraction (331/80-03-04).
The three extinguishers with expired tags were replaced with up-to-date extinguishers when the licensee's management was made aware of the situation. The licensee further indicated that all fire extinguishers in the plant are to be serviced during the present refueling outage, c.
On February 19, 1980 while the inspectors were in the control room a 4160 volt feeder breaker to a 480 volt switch gear tripped. This resulted in the following events: Power loss to all Area Radiation Monitors (ARM's); AC power lost to the uninterruptable power MG set; Power loss to half of the con-tainment isolation logic; and Power loss to half of the APRM's and LPRM's.
The loss of power to the ARM's resulted in all the local alarms being actuated. This radalted in an evacuation of the refueling floor and partial evacuation of the reactor building although no formal evacuation was initiated.
Immediate surveys by
'
inplace health physics personnel indicated there was no actual
.
increase in radiation levels.
-
The loss of AC power to the uninterruptable power M.G. set resulted in it automatically transfering to its backup-6-
__ -
.
D.C. power supply.
Personnel in the area indicated that the
M.G. set was sparking and arcing. The unit was removed from service and the alternate AC power supply was connected to the bus. Subsequent investigation revealed that the M.G. set was operating normally and that no corrective action is required.
The loss of power to half of the containment isolation logic circuits resulted in one isolation valve in the Reactor Water
-
Cleanup Systen and the RHR Shutdown Cooling System closing which is the appropriate action. Once power was restored these valves were reopened and the systems returned to operation.
Loss of power to one of the two APRM channels would normally have resulted in only a half scram. However, APRM
"B",
in the unaffected channel, utilizes LPRM inputs from both channels (as far as initial power supply), therefore, APRM "B" lost half of its inputs.
In addition, APRM "B" also had five unaffected LPRM's bypassed. This combination resulted in a trip of APRM
"B" on too few inputs (i.e., 50%).
The trip on APRM "B" combined with the APRM channel A trip resulted on a full scram.
After the scram, it was noted that nine of the twelve control rods which had been fully withdrawn and valved out, after unloading their respective fuel cells, had also been inserted.
Investigation by the licensee revealed that the three control rods which had not inserted had their cooling water supply valved out.
It was further determined that cooling water flow diversion upon scraming was responsible for the other nine drives being inserted.
Since the nine control rods had been inserted in an unsupported manner the licensee has committed to a 100% visual (underwater T.V. camera) inspection of those nine control rods and associ-ated fuel support pieces prior to reloading those fuel cells.
(331/80-03-05).
9.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on both February 21, 1980 (D. Wilson only) and February 22, 1980 (all others e9:ept D. Wilson). The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
j-7-
1 4