IR 05000284/1997201
| ML20211J461 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Idaho State University |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1997 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211J454 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-284-97-201, NUDOCS 9710080129 | |
| Download: ML20211J461 (15) | |
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Docket No: 50 284 *
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License No: R-110 l
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f Report No: 50 284/97 201 J ,
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l Licensee: Idaho State University i
Facility: Idaho State University Reactor Laboratory :
Location: Pocatello,ID 83209 f
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Dates: September 2 5,1997 t
inspector: C. H. Bassett Senior Radiation Specialist
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Approved by: Seymour H. Weiss, Director .
Non Power Reactor and Decom nissioning Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management '
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ,
Enclosure 9710000129 971001 PDR ADOCK 05000284
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Idaho State University Report No: 50-284/97 201 This routine, announced inspection included onsite review of variouW taspects of the licensee's organization and staffing; operations and procedures; maintenance and procedures; requahfication training; sutveillances; experiments; radiation controls and procedures; environmental protection; design char'90, audit, and review; emergency preparedness; and physical secunty protection as they related to the Aerojet General Nuclear AGN 201 research reacto Qtganization and Staffina e The Reactor Administrator and Reactor Supervisor met the requiremel.ts specified in the TS. The licensee had sufficient staffing to operate the reactor as required by the T Ooerations e The licensee was maintaining the operating togs and records and was responsive to problems identified. The licensee's response to the latest problem involving Safety Rod No. 2 and the planned corrective actions appeared to be acceptabl Procedures e The licensee had procedures that had been reviewed and approved as required. One Non-Cited Violation was noted for failure to follow procedure for recording the results of radiological surveys in the HP log as well as in the campus survey lo Reaualification Trainina e An acceptable training and requalification program was being conducted and records were being maintained. For those operators not currently meeting the requirements of the requalification program, a schedule had been established to bring everyone current by the end of the yea Surveillance and Limitina Qonditions for Ooeration
- The licensee was maintaining documentation of the required surveillances which were being performed at the required frequencies. One Non-Cited Violation was noted foi failure to maintain the low-level set point of Nuclear Instrument Channel #2 at the required point. An inspector Follow up item was established to follow the development and implementation of a form for calculating and recording rod worths and the shut down margi Enclosure
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2-Exoerimenig e Those experiments reviewed had been conducted in accordance with properly reviewed 3 and approved procoo'ures and the results had been acceptably documented. The material produced was controlled as prescribed by procedur .
Badiation Protection Proaram e The licensee's radiation protection program was being implemented acceptably. Of those
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monitored personnel who had received any exposure, it was noted that they had receiv'd ,
exposures well below the limits stipulated in 10 CFR 20. Generally the exposures were less than detectabl Design Changes e No design changes had been made at the facility since the last inspection that warranted a
, change to the TS. The licensee was following the regulatory guidance regarding i unreviewed safety questions.
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Committees. Audits. and Raylang i
e The Reactor Safety Committee meetings were held and audits were conducted as required by TS. Problems noted were addressed and corrective actions taken.
- Emergency PregatedD911 i
e The licensee was maintaining their emergency plan and procedures in a state of ,
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operational readiness.
<. Maintenance Loos and Records I
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! the associab r.locumentatio Physical SeGMIity e The licensee had implemented and was maintaining an acceptable physical security
' program and material control and accounting program.
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REPORT DETAILS 4 e
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_1.0 Organization and Staffing a.- Insoectiot Scooe (40750)
, The inspector reviewed the licensee's Technical Specifications (TS) and Safety
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Analysis Report (SAR) related to c,iganization and staffing at the facility and compared the requirements to_ current conditions, b. Observation and Findinas j The inspector reviewed the qualificaticns of the individuals who were functioning in the -
positions as Reactor Administrator and Reactor Supervisor. The individuals met the requirements specified in ANSI /ANS-15.4-1977, "American National Standard for the Selection and Training of Personnel for Research Reactors," dated 1977, for the respective positions as required by the licensee's T The inspector determined that the licensee's organization and minimum shift staff,ng composition for operation, including on call personnel, were consistent with the requiremerits of the TS. An individual had been hired to fill the position of Reactor Supervisor earlier in the year. However, the person has not been able to become a qualified reactor operator due to operational problems with the reactor just prior to his initial qualification examination. Once the problems with the reactor have been corrected, the licensee anticipates that the person will be able to become qualified and function in the capacity of the Reactor Supervisor _ as originally planne c. Conclusion The Reactor Administrator and Reactor Supervisor met the requirements specified in
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the TS. The licensee had sufficient staffing to operate the reactor as required by the
TS. Once operational problems with the reactor are corrected, the person hired to be the Reactor Supervisor will be able to take the examination in order to become a qualified reactor operator and assume all the responsibilities of the reactor supervisor positio .0 Operations Logs and Records a.- Insoection Scooe (40750)
The inspector reviewed the reactor operations logs and records and the licensee's response to problems noted to determine compliance with the TS and license condition ,
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b. Observations and Findinos Because the reactor was not operational during the inspection, the inspector could not observe reactor startup or normal operations. However, the inspector did review the operations logs and records related to the reactor laboratory. The logs indicated that the required number of personnel were on hand during reactor operation. The logs also documented problems,if any occurred, and the handling of experiments. The logs had been reviewed as require The inspector also noted that the licensee had recently had a problem with one of the reactor safety rod dashpots. The inspector reviewed the licensee's description of the event, the immediate response to the event, and the corrective actions taken. A description of the licensee's reactor components and the event is given b4...
The licensee's reactor is an AGN 201 self-contained, graphite-moderated training reactor with a maximum thermal power output of 5 watts. It consists of two basic units, the reactor unit and the control console. The reactor unit is composed of a central sealed cylindrical core can containing the nuclear fuel material enclosed in a 20-centimeter (cm) thick graphite reflector. The graphite reflector is 2nclosed in a 10-cm thick lead shield, which is enclosed by a 55-cm thick water shield. The AGN-201 research reactor has four active control elements or rods containing the same nuciaar fuel material as the reactor core. The control elements are inserted vertically upward into the reactor core from the bottom of the reactor unit to increase reactivity. Three of the four control elements, two safety rods (Safety Rod [SR) N and SR No. 2) and a course control rod (CCR) are identical and have the same reactivity worth. A fourth control element, the fine control rod (FCR) is smaller and has about one-fourth of the reactivity of each of the larger control elements. All the large control rods are electromagnetically coupled to a drive carriage which moves vertically along a lead screw connected by a chain linkage to a revetsible DC moto A control element or rod assembly is comprised of the capsule, which provides the primary fission-product barrier, four fuel disks, one graphite reflector disk at the bottom, a ferrous compression spring, and the extension tube or shaft. The capsule portion of the control rod is fabricated from aluminum tubing with a flat cap welded on the end. The open end of the capsule is threaded and screws onto an extension shaft. An O-ring allows the capsule to be hermetically sealed when the capsule is tightly screwed onto the extension shaft. Within the capsule, the fuelis held against the distal end cap by a spring. The control rod assembly is connected to the armature plate by means of a threaded joint thus forming the complete contiol rod drive assembly. The assembly is suspended from the bottom of the reactor tank by threaded studs below the sealed core can and is covered by the control element access cover which serves as a secondary barrier against the release of fission product The AGN reactor is brought to operating power by inserting, in sequence, the two safety rods, which must be latched, or " cocked," into their fully inserted positions before the coarse ar d fine control rods may be driven. After the course and fine l
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3-control rods are inserted to the desired level, the reactor can be operated at a steady power level as necessary until the operation is to be terminated. Normal shut down of the reactor is accomplished by scramming the safety and coarse control rods. This usually occurs by pmssing the manual scram button on the reactor control console which deenergizes the electromagnets and causes the three scrammable control elements to be ejected rapidly from the core tc their safe positions,. Ejection occurs within 120 milliseconds (ms) under the combined action of gravity and spring loading giving an initial acceleration of approximately five times the force exerted by Oravity (5 g). Each scrammable control rod is equipped with a shock-absorbing dashpot to gradally decelerate the rod during the last 10 cm of trave On June 3,1997, two members of the reactor operating staff, a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) ....d an SRO trainee, were operating the AGN 201 research reactor during e toutine after-hours training run. The purpose of the operation was: 1)to provide supplemental operating experience for the SRO trainee, who was preparing for an NRC SRO examination, and 2) to provide an opportunity for the SRO to meet quarterly requalification operating requirements by supervising the activities of the trainee, in addition the CCR had been removed from the reactor two days before as part of a training activity for the SRO trainee, and operators had been asked to verify that the CCR was reinstalled properly and was operating correctly in order to complete the control rod maintenance procedur During the first two hours of the run, the ope'ators verified that the CCR was installed correctly and was operational. They had successfully taken the reactor to a power level of 4 watts (W), eighty percent (80%) of the maximum licensed power. Reactor power was stabilized at 4 W at 8:41 p.m. The operators maintained the power at 4 W for approximately two minutes and then reduced the power to 0.1 W to provide the trainee with additional experience in reactivity manipulation. At 8:53 p.m. the operators reduced power further to observe the power level at which the low-level trip would actuate on Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) Channel No.1. The low-level scram occurred at 8:58 The SRO then attempted to restart the reactor nt 8:59 p.m. and intended to take the reactor power to 1 W on a positive period of approximately 25 seconds. During power ascen3 ion, however, the operator made a switching error on NI Channel No. 3, switching to a more sensitive power range rather than to a higher scale. This induced a high-level scram at 9:05 p.m. The operator then attempted a second restart. As Safety Rod No. 2 (SR 2) approached its fully inserted position, it dropped unexpectedly, disengaging from the electromagnet. After scramming the reactor to drive the safety rod carriages down to engage the control elements, another attempt was made to restart the reactor. This again resulted in SR-2 disengaging from the electromagnet as it reached its fully inserted position. As this happened, both operators noticed an abnormal sound, which was thought to be louder than usua After scramming SR-1, a radiological survey was made of the area and the SRO entered the pedestal area to investigate the cause for the disengagement of SR- Exposure levels under the reactor were normal, i.e., less than 0.1 millirem per hour
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(mr/hr). The SRO removed the control rod a: cess cover and unscrewed the dashpo Examination of the dashpot internals through the transparent covering indicated that the graphite piton had disintegrated thereby rendering the dashpot useless. The SRO then notified the Reactor Administrator and Acting Reactor Supervisor of the failure of the dashpo On July 3,1997, the control rod and dashpot were examined in detail. The various components from SR 2 were packaged to prevent dispersal of radioactive materia The fuel disks from SR-2 were sealed in a polyethylene package and stored in the designated storage location. All other control roos were removed from the reactor, surveyed, and inspected for signs of possible abnormal degradation around the end cap of the fuel capsule. All capsules were found in good condition and contamination surveys indicated no evidence of leakage of fuel material or fission-product radionuclide Further examination of SR-2 indicated that the end cap had come off the aluminum capsule housing the fuel material and a small portion of the fuel material was expose This constituted a failure of the primary fission-product barrier. Following discovery of the cladding failure, reactor facility personnel, with assistance from the ISU Technical ;
Safety Office, perfomed surveys for contamination, radiation fields, and airborne activity. Areas surveyed included those beneath the reactor, the general vicinity of the reactor, affected components, and the reactor laboratory room. Contamination surveys of the affected components indicated low levels of contamination (the maximum net contamination levels detected were approximately one hundred counts
' per minute (cpm) above background). Analysis of the filter media from the air particulate sampler showed no indication of airbome rz dioactive particulates beyond the expected short-lived radon progeny. (Subsequent airborne monitoring five weeks later indicated the same levels of radon present.) Additionally, all personnel present at the time of the initial dashpot failure and during the later removal of SR-2 underwent in-vivo counting of the thyroid gland for determination of any iodine-131 (1-131) uptak Results from the thyroid counting did not show any positive indication of any of the personnel surveyed. On July 21,1997, the licensee issued a written report regarding the reportable occurrence at the facility. On August 14,1997, an update to the initial report was issue Following the event, the licensee formed an Intemalincident Assessment Committee (llAC) to determine the cause and assess the consequences of the event. The llAC concluded that the failure of the SR-2 capsule was caused by the failure of the dashpot mounted beneath the control rod. Because the dashpot serves to decelerate the control rod following ejection from the core, without the dampening action of the dashpot, the abrupt and unattenuated impact of SR-2 against the steel frame of the drive assembly was sufficient to fracture the weld joining the end cap to the capsule tube. The llAC also concluded that the radiological consequences of the event were negligible and had no adverse impact on the health and safety of facility personnel, the public, cr the environmen , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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l-5-After the completion of the initial corrective actions, the licennee developed a recovery plan to assure the reactor was repaired so that the facility could resume normal operations. It was decided to contact another facility with a decommissioned AGN-201 reactor and acquire salvaged units from that facility. An application for an
, amendment to the operating license was also submitted to the NRC which would allow -
the facility to possess the additional fissile material and enable the transfer of salvaged control elements from another facilit During the period of this inspection, the licensee had submitted a comprehensive report to the Reactor Safety Committee (RSC) and contacted Oregon State University ,
to obtain equipment from the decommissioning of that AGN reactor. Once the required repairs have been completed, the licensee will submit a final recovery report to the RSC and request approval to resume reactor operation The licensee has plans on taking future actions as well. All c:asting dashpots will be replaced with new units. Future annualinspections of the control elements will be performed with particular emphasis on the end region of the capsule for any evidence of weld cracking or other signs of deterioration. The dashpots will be inspected for evidence of excessive wear of the seal or excessive play in the piston which might indicate impending fai!ure. The licensee also plans to modify the safety rod drive logic circuits to allow the safety rods to be manually withdrawn at the conclusion of reactor operation instead of scramming the reactor. This modification will reduce the number of scram cycles on the scrammable control elements. The completion of these actions will be tracked by the NRC as an inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection of the facility (IFl 50-284/97-01-01)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions regarding the failure of the SR#2 dashpot and the corrective actions taken to date. The actions appeared to be acceptable to protect the health and safety of the employees and the publi c. Conclusion The licensee was maintaining the operating logs and records adequately and was responsive to problems identified. The licensee's response to the latest problem involving Safety Rod No. 2 and the planned corrective actions appeared to be acceptabl .0 Procedures a. Insoection Scoce (40750)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's written procedures for operating and maintaining the reactor, performing surveillance activities, and conducting experiments to determine compliance with the requirements of TS 6.5 and _
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-6-b. Qbservations and Findings The inspector verified that the administrative, operations, maintenance, and surveillance procedures were consistent with the TS, license requirements, and licensee commitments and that the procedures contained sufficient information for the t:3er to perform the required functio The procedures used by the licensed operators and other reactor personnel had been reviewed and approved in accordance with the requirements of the licensee's administrative control rules, were current, and were being acceptably implemente However, it was noted that Surveillance Procedure No. 4 (SP#4), SP#5, and SP#6 were not being followed completely as written. These procedures required that licensee personnel perform certai,1 radiological surveys during the surveillance evolutions specified and that the results of the surveys be recorded in the health physics (HP) log and in the campus survey log. A review of the HP log indicated that the results were generally being recorded as required but there were no surveys being recorded in the campus survey log as required by the procedures. The licensee was informed that this was a violation of TS 6.6 which requires the licensee to have procedures covering, among others functions, surveillance, testing, and calibration of instruments, components, and systems. Nonetheless, because the surveys were being recorded in the HP log and simply not duplicated in the campus survey log, it was concluded that this fai!ure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section IV of the NEG Enforcement Poliev (NCV 50-284/97-201-02)
c. Conclusion
, The licensee had procedures that had been reviewed and approved as required. One Non Cited Violation was noted for failure to follow procedure for recording the results of radiological surveyc in both the HP log and the campus survey lo .0 Requalification Training a. Insoection Scoce (40750)
- The inspec, tor reviewed the reactor operators requalification training program to determine compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR 19.12 and 10 CFR 55.59, b. Observations and Findings The inspector determined that the licensee's last b;ennial written exam was acceptable. The requalification records for licensed operators were being maintained as required in the " Reactor Operator Requalification Program for the Idaho State University Reactor," Revision (Rev.) 2, dated August 17,199 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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.7 l The inspector reviewed the records of two specific SROs and noted that only one is 1 currently qualified and certified by the licensee. (An operator is considered by the licensee to be cenified to operate the reactor if the operator has complied with the stipulation of operating the reactor for more than four hours per quarter.) The other operator lacked two of the required lectures and had not operated the reactor for the required four hours during the quarter, it was noted that each operator had had the required biennial physical examinatio In reviewing the current status of licensed operators with the licensee, the inspector noted that the licensee has devoloped a schedule that will ensure tbpt all operators meet the requirements of the requalification program by the end of the yea c. Conclusion An acceptable training and requalification program was being conducted and records ware being maintained. For those operators not currently meeting the requirements of the requalification program, a schedule had been established to bring everyone current by the end of the yea .0 Surveillance and Limiting Conditions for Operations a. Insoection Scooe (40750)
The inspector reviewed the documentation of selected limiting conditions of operation and surveillances to determine compliance with the requirements of TS 3.0 and TS b. Observations and Findincs The inspector reviewed the documentation of a licensee-identified violation of TS 3.2.d. On March 10,1995, while perfo# ming a surveillance on Ni Channel #2, the low-level set point was discovered-to be set at a value of 1.9E-13 amps. This value was noted to be less than that specified in TS 3.2.d which stipulates that the low-level set point for NI Channel #2 must be equal to 3.0E-13 amps and thus produce a scram of the reactor at levels less than 3.0E-13 amps. The cause of the problem was determined to be due to instrument drift. In response to the problem the licensee
- mmediately set the low-level set point for Ni Channel #2 at 3.0E-13 amps to meet the p limiting conditions of operation for the reactor. The licensee was informed that this licensee-identified and corrected violation was being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Poliev (NCV 50-284/97-201-03).
The inspector also reviewed documentation which indicated that the licensee was performing the surveillances as required by procedure and at the required frequencies as specified in the TS. However, one surveillance specified in TS 4.1.b required the licensee to calculate the total excess reactivity and shut down margin for the reactor on an annual basis. When the inspector reviewed the records for this surveillance, it
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, was noted that no specific documentation could be found which indicated that the shut I
down margin had been calculated during 1994. The licensec had issued the annual report for 1994 that included a specific amount for the shut down margin which indicated that a calculation had been performed at some point. The licensee thought that it had been done as part of the Nuclear Reactor Laboratory class and that the calculations were probably recorded in a lab notebook and/or in a student's laboratory report. The licensee also indicated that a previous F,eactor Supervisor had been given the assignment of organizing all the facility files. This was done but many documents or duplicate documents were shuffled in the process. Because the actual calculations could not be located, the licensee indicated that documentation procedures would be modified so that a form is produced on which rod worths are recorded and the shut down margin is explicitly calculated and recorded. The development of this form will be tracked by the NRC and will be an Inspector Follow-up Item (IFl 50-284/97-201-04),
c. Qpnclusion The licensee was maintaining documentation of the required surveillances which were being performed at the required frequencies. One Non-Cited Violation was noted for failure to maintain the low-level set point of NI Channel #2 at the required point. An Inspector Follow-up Item was established to follow the development and implementation of a form for calculating and recording rod worths and the shut down margi .0 Experiments a. Inspection Scope (40750)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's program to control and conduct experiments performed in the reactor to determine compliance with the requirements in TS b. Observations and Findings The inspector determined that no new experiments had been identified since the last inspection. A review of selected past experiments indicated that none of the experiments represented an unreviewed safety question. The licensee had identified hazards that could be associated with the experiments and had accounted for and controlled irradiated items as required. The experiments and procedures had been reviewed and approved as required. The contml of material produced from the experiments was acceptable and the material was being handled in accordance with the licensee's " Idaho State University Reactor Isotope Production and Disposition Log," Rev. O, dated April 26,199 c. Conclusion
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! -9-Those experiments reviewed had been conducted in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures and the results had been acceptably documented. The material produced was controlled as prescribed by procedur .0 Radiation Control a. Insoection Scoce (4075Q)
The inspector reviewed the radiation protection program and records and interviewed support personnel to determine compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR 20 and TS 3.4 and b. Observation and Findinas The periodic radiological surveys, contamination checks, and radiation postings had been completed in accordance with the regulatory requirements, the " Idaho State University Radiation Safety Policy Manual," Rev. 2, dated September 1994, and the licensee's procedures, The inspector reviewed the calibration of selected survey and monitoring equipmen Calibrations are required annually by Technical Specifications. Calibration of all the instruments reviewed had been completed in the June to August 1997 time fram The calibrations appeared to be acceptable,
- Contamination control protective clothing was being used in accordance with the
- licensee's Radiation Safety Manual and procedures. The inspector noted that portable
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survey instrumer,tation was available in the reactor room as required and licensee personnel were qualified to use the instruments. The inspector also noted that the reactor laboratory was posted as required well, instructions had been provided to those working around radioactive material to include special instructions regarding radiation exposure received by declared pregnant women and the potential doses to the embryo / fetus. The principles of as low as reasonably achievable (Al. ARA) were being implemente Personnel monitoring was provided to all persons working in the reactor laborator The highest exposures for any one person in 1995 was reported to be 30 millirem (mr)
to the extremities and 10 mr to the whole body. In 1996, the highest exposures for an individual had been recorded as being 20 mr to the extremities and 20 mr whole bod To date in 1997, the highest exposures recorded for one person had been 70 mr to the extremities and 10 mr to the whole bod It was noted that no measurable radioactive effluents have been released as a result of the operation of the reacto c. Conclusion j
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-10-The licensee's radiation protection program was being irrplemented acceptably. Of those monitored personnel who had received any exposu.e, it was noted that they had j received exposures well below the limits stipulated in 10 CFR 20. Generally the l exposures were less than detectabl '
8.0 Design Changes a. Insoection Scoce (40750)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for developing and implementing design changes to determine compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.59 and TS b. Observations and Findings Through interviews with licensee personnel and review of licensee documentation, the inspector noted that no design changes had been made since the last inspection. The licensee affirmed that such changt,3, the operation of any modified equipment, and procedures related to any modified systems would be reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and the TS. One modification had been made to the reactor " Glory Hole" and the related shielding but it was deemed not to require a change in the facility TS or to be an unreviewed safety question. An anticipated upgrade to the reactor console was being considered by the RSC but it was thought not to constitute an unreviewed safety question. The licensee was informed that the upgrade and the results of the RSC review of the console modifications would be followed by the NRC as an inspector Follow-up item and reviewed during a subsequent inspection (IFl 50-284/97-201-01-05).
c. Conclusion No desi0n changes had been made at the facility since the last inspection that warranted a change to the TS. The licensee was following the regulatory guidance regarding unreviewed safety question .0 Committees, Audits, and Reviews a. Inspection Scope (40750)
The inspector reviewed the RSC meeting minutes, audits, and reviews to determine compliance with the requirements in TS 6.4 and b. Observations and Findings The RSC meeting minutes indicated that the meetings were being held at the required frequency and that the topics specified by TS were being considered and reviewed. It was also noted that attendance at the meeting was more than adequate with all of the committee members being present at many of the meetings. The RSC had completed
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-11-various audits since the last inspection and the audits appeared to be acceptabl When problems were found, the corrective actions taken in response to the noted problems appeared to be acceptable. Annual HP audits were completed by the Radiation Safety Officer as require c. Conclusion RSC meetings were held and audits were conducted as required by TS. Problems noted were addressed and corrective actions take .0 Emergency Planning a. Inspection Scops 30750)
The inspector reviewed the emergency plan and procedures, the licensee's emergency drills, and inventoried a storage locker to determine compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) and (r).
b. Observations and Findinos The inspector noted that procedures required by the emergency plan were current and readily available to users as required by the plan. The licensee had conducted response training and had held exercises and drills in December 1994, December 1995, and January 1997 which involved the Pocatello fire and police departments and Campus Public Safet The inspector verified that current notification rosters were maintained by and available to the Reactor Administrator and Campus Public Safety. Radiation detection and personnel monitoring equipment, as well as other emergency supplies, were maintained and inventoried as require Letters of Agreement had been updated and were being maintained with the Bannock Regional Medical Center, Idaho State Police, and the Pocatello City Attorney (for the city fire and police departments).
c. Conclusion The licensee was maintaining their emergency plan and procedures in a state of operational readines .0 Maintenance Logs and Records --
a. Inspection Scope (40750)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's maintenance logs and records to determine compliance with the requirements in TS 6. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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1 b. Observations and Findings The inspector determined that ma:.'tenance logc and records were being maintained as required. No significant problems were identified expect the one detailed in Paragraph 2 above. Maintenance had been performed consistent with the TS and the associated procedure c. Corclusion The licensee had implemented adequate maintenance program and was maintaining the associated documentation as require .0 Physical Safeguards and Security a. Insoection Scooe (81401. 81402. 81403. 81431. 81810. 85102)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's physical safeguards and security program and the material control and accounting program to determine compliance with the requirements in the facility operating license and 10 CFR 50.54(p).
b. Observations and Findinos The inspector reviewed the implementation of the licensee's " Physical Security Plan for Lillibridge Lab Idaho State University," Rev. 3, dated February 23,1990. The inspector verified that the site and facilities were as described in the Physical Security Plan except for two minor discrepancies that were to be corrected by the license These minor discrepancies did not affect the effectiveness of the S6 -ity Pla Keys to access doors were held and controlled only by persons designated in the Security Plan. The facility was patrolled by Campus Public 3afety personnel as require The inspector verified that there had been no safeguards events since the last inspectio Material was stored only in controlled access areas. Continued normal reactor operation assured no change in the core fuel loading. The licensee performed the semiannualinventories as required. The amount of material possessed by the licen see did not exceed the amount authorize _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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13-The Mspector determined that the licensee had prepared, maintained, and implemented an acceptable program to control and account for special nuclear material. During the period since the last inspection, no matedal transactions had occurred. Although two Nuclear Material Transaction Reports (NRC/ DOE Form 741) had been filed, these dealt with administrative matters such as correcting a discrepancy that had been noted in a previous report. The inspector reviewed the Material Balance Reports (NRC/ DOE Form 742) that the licensee had prepared since the last inspection. The reports had been completed as require c. Conclusion The licensee hau implemented and was maintaining an acceptable physical security program and material control and accounting progra .0 Follow-up on Previously identified items a. Insoection Scoce (92701. 92702)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions taken in response to a previously identified Deviation and a previous Non-Cited Violatio b. Observation and Findings (1) (Closed) DEV 50-284/91-01-04 - During a previous inspection in December 1991, it was noted that the licensee agreed to establish Letters of Agreement with emergency support organizations. During a subsequent inspection in August 1993lit was determined that the licensee had not established the Letters of Agreement with the local police department, fire department, and medical center as had been indicated in 1991 and a deviation was cite During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the various Letters of Agreement that had been established and verified that they were in effect and had been updated as indicated in Paragraph 10 above. This item is considered close (2) (Closed) NCV 50-284/94-01-01 - During a previous inspection in July 1994, it was noted the licensee had not completed a channel test of the seismic displacement interlock within the time frame specified in the TS. This was noted as a Non-Cited Violatio During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the surveillance requirements for the seismic displacement interlock and the documentation of the completion on the required tests. The inspector verified that the tests were being performed as required and at the required frequency. This item is considered close ___ ___ _ d
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14-t l c. Conclusion l
The open items were close .0 Exit Meeting Summary The inspection scope and results were summarized on September 5,1997, with licensee representatives. The inspector discussed the findings for each area reviewe The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the meterial provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee J. Bennion, Reactor Administrator
- T. Gansauge, Reactor Supervisor-in training T. Gesell, Radiation Safety Officer J. Kunze, Dean, College of Engineering
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INSPECTION PROCEDUREC USED IP 40750: Class ll Non-Power Reactors IP. 92701: Follow-up on inspector identified items IP 92702: Follow-up on ltoms of Noncompliance or Deviatio IP 81401: Plans, Procedures, and Reviews IP 81402: Reports of Safeguards Events IP 81431: Fixed Site Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic 6 Significance IP 81810: Protection of Safeguards Information IP 85102: Material Control and Accounting - Reactors ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Open 50-284/97-201-01 IFl Follow-up on the licensee's actions to replace all the dashpots, perform aggressive inspection of the control rods annually, and modify the safety rod drive logic circuits to allow manual scramming of the reacto /97-201-04 IFl Follow-up on the development and implementation of a form used to calculate and record rod worths and the shut down margi _
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-15-50-284/97 201-05 IFl Follow up on the Reactor Safety Committee's review of an anticipated upgrade to the reactor console and on the modification itsel Closed 50-284/91-01-04 DEV Failure te establish Letters of Agreement with support agencies as committe /94-01 91 NCV Failure to perform a channel test of the seismic displacement interlock within the time frame specified in the T /97 201-02 NCV Failure to follow procedure by recording radiological surveys in the HP log but not in the campus survey lo /97 201-03 NCV Failure to maintain the low-level set point for Ni Channel #2 at 3.0E 13 amps as require LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA As low as reasonably achievable AGN Aerojet General Nuclear (research reactor)
ANSI American National Standards Institute ANS - American Nuclear Society CCR Course Control Rod CFR Code of Federal Regulations epm Counts per minute DEV Deviation FCR Fine Control Rod IFl Inspector Follow-up item IIAC Internalincident Assessment Committee IP inspection Procedure ,
HP Health physics '
mr/hr Millirem per hour NCV Non-Cited Violation NI Nuclear Instrumentation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission RSC Reactor Safety Committee SR Safety Rod SRO Senior Reactor Operator VIO Violation