IR 05000280/2006002
| ML061140311 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/2006 |
| From: | Landis K NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | Christian D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR-06-002 | |
| Download: ML061140311 (18) | |
Text
April 24, 2006
SUBJECT:
SURRY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
05000280/2006002 AND 05000281/2006002
Dear Mr. Christian:
On March 31, 2006, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 19, 2006, with Mr.
Jernigan and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. No findings of significance were identified by the NRC.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kerry D. Landis, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37
Enclosure:
NRC Integrated Inspection Report 5000280,281/2006002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37 Report Nos.:
05000280/2006002, 05000281/2006002 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility:
Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Location:
5850 Hog Island Road Surry, VA 23883 Dates:
January 1 - March 31, 2006 Inspectors:
N. Garrett, Senior Resident Inspector D. Arnett, Resident Inspector Approved by: K. Landis, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000280/2006-02, IR 05000281/2006-02; 01/01/2006 - 3/31/2006; Surry Power Station
Units 1 & 2; Routine Integrated Report.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,
White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 was operated at or near rated power for the report period except a downpower to 75% on March 18 due to high vibrations on the 1A heater drain pump. The 1A heater drain pump was secured, the 1B heater drain pump was started, and Unit 1 was returned to 100% power on the same day.
Unit 2 was operated at or near rated power for the report period except a downpower to 70%
power on January 6, when rod K-14 dropped to 206 steps during a rod exercise surveillance test. On January 8, rod K-14 was recovered and Unit 2 was returned to 100% power.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
==1R04 Equipment Alignment
==
.1 Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following four systems to verify correct system alignment. The inspectors checked for correct valve and electrical power alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the corrective action system to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and properly resolved.
- Unit 1 charging (CH) pumps 1-CH-P-1B and 1-CH-P-1C while 1-CH-P-1A was tagged out for maintenance
- Unit 2 CH pumps 2-CH-P-1B and 2-CH-P-1C while 2-CH-P-1A was tagged out for maintenance
- Unit 1 low head safety injection pump 1-SI-P-1A while 1-SI-P-1B was tagged out for maintenance
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R05 Fire Protection
==
.1 Fire Area Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the following ten areas to assess the adequacy of the fire protection program implementation. The inspectors checked for the control of transient combustibles and the condition of the fire detection and fire suppression systems (using SPS Appendix R Report,) in the following areas:
- Unit 1 emergency switchgear room
- Unit 2 emergency switchgear room
- Number 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG)
- Auxiliary building 45 foot level
- Unit 1 normal switchgear room
- Unit 2 normal switchgear room
- Unit 2 safeguards building
- Auxiliary building 2 foot level
- Auxiliary building 13 foot level
- Auxiliary building 27 foot level
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Fire Brigade Drill
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed four fire brigade drills to evaluate the readiness of the licensees personnel to fight fires. Specific aspects evaluated were: verification of the number of dedicated members with no ancillary duties; use of protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus; procedure use; fire hose deployment and reach; approach into the fire area; effectiveness of communications among the fire brigade members and the control room; sufficiency of fire fighting equipment brought to the fire scene; verification of checking for fire victims and propagation into other plant areas; pre-fire plan utilization and proper drill objectives met; and the drill objectives and acceptance criteria were adequate.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) of Non-Seismic External Events and Fires for analyzed internal floods. Walkdowns were performed in the turbine building to review compliance with procedures for internal flooding. In addition, the inspectors walked down various expansion joint shields and flood and spill control devices. The inspectors compared observed equipment condition and documented system deficiencies to determine system readiness for flood prevention. The inspectors reviewed completed preventive maintenance and surveillance records for the turbine building sump pumps, station and turbine building flood detection equipment, and floor drain backflow preventers. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors evaluated the condition of the Unit 1 component cooling (CC) heat exchanger, 1-CC-E-1A. The inspectors discussed the heat exchanger performance monitoring program and historical heat exchanger performance with engineering personnel. The inspectors reviewed the results of surveillance procedure 1-OSP-SW-002, Rev 16, Measurement of Macrofouling Blockage of Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 1-CC-E-1A following cleaning. The inspectors observed the condition of the 1A heat exchanger before and after the performance of tube scraping performed under Maintenance Work Order (WO) 610995-01.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during an initial licensing simulator training session to determine whether the operators:
- were familiar with and could successfully implement the procedures associated with recognizing and recovering from an uncontrolled depressurization of a steam generator resulting in a loss of heat sink;
- recognized the high-risk actions in those procedures; and,
- were familiar with related industry operating experiences.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
==
For the two equipment issues described in the plant issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the licensees effectiveness of the corresponding preventive and corrective maintenance. For each item selected below, the inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem. Inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the system, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with system engineers. Inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), VPAP 0815, Maintenance Rule Program, and the Surry Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria Matrix.
- S-2006-0075, Computer enhanced rod position indicator (CERPI) needing adjustment for better alignment, and
- S-2006-0134, Emergency service water pump 1A, 1-SW-P-1A, low margin to Alert
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy, accuracy, and completeness of six plant risk assessments performed prior to changes in plant configuration for maintenance activities or in response to emergent conditions. When applicable, inspectors assessed if the licensee entered the appropriate risk category in accordance with plant procedures. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed:
- Plan of the Day (POD) for the week January 7 - 13, for schedule changes and risk impact including Unit 2 dropped rod K-14, failure of the Unit 1 anticipated transient without a scram mitigation system (AMSAC), and service water piping repairs in mechanical equipment room (MER) number 3.
- POD for the week January 21 - 27, for schedule changes and risk impact including early removal of 1-VS-E-4A, main control room air conditioner, from service for maintenance
- POD for the week February 6 - 11, for schedule changes and risk impact including maintenance on 2-FW-P-3B, auxiliary feedwater (AFW) motor driven pump, number 1 EDG and emergent repair of the Unit 2 1C charging pump, 2-CH-P-1C
- POD for the week February 19 - 24, for schedule changes and risk impact including Unit 1 & 2 turbine driven AFW pump and Unit 1 1B charging pump, 1-CH-P-1B, maintenance
- POD for the week March 26 - 31, for schedule changes and risk impact including number 2 EDG work and component cooling heat exchanger emergent work
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R14 Operator Performance During Nonroutine Evolutions and Events
a. Inspection scope
==
For the non-routine event described below, the inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, and strip charts to determine what occurred and how the operators responded, and to verify if the response was in accordance with plant procedures:
- Step drop of Unit 2 rod K-14 to 206 steps
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the seven operability evaluations to ensure that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The operability evaluations were described in the plant issues listed below:
- S-2005-4910, Pressurizer spray control modules not configured in accordance with design specifications
- S-2005-5470, 1-VS-E-4D condenser tubesheet noted pitting erosion
- S-2006-0319, Oil leak on charging pump 1-CH-P-1A
- S-2006-0422, Boric acid tank temperature control not seismically controlled
- S-2006-0591, 1-SW-P-1B throttle lever came disconnected during start
- S-2006-0824, Two through wall leaks on valve 1-FC-41, fuel pit cooler 1B outlet
- S-2006-0878, NDE surface exams were not performed as required on Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pipe supports
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed six post maintenance test procedures and activities associated with the repair or replacement of the following components to determine whether the procedures and test activities were adequate to verify operability and functional capability following maintenance:
- WO 720533-01, Replace hand switch 1-SI-CS-PC495TB
- WO 734147-01, Repair oil leak on charging pump, 1-CH-P-1A, and install new low speed shaft and gear
- WO 609436-01, 18 month preventative maintenance (PM) of low head safety injection pump motor operated valve 1-SI-MOV-1864B
- WO 736148-01, Repair of throttle lever ball on emergency service water pump 1-SW-P-1B
- WO 737779-01, Number 1 emergency diesel generator 18 month PM
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
For the five surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedure and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable:
- 1-PT-8.1, Reactor Protection System Logic (For Normal Operation)
- 0-OPT-EG-001, Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Start Exercise Test
- 2-ST-FW-001, Evaluation of Auxiliary Feedwater System Vibration In-service Test
- 2-OPT-FW-003, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2-FW-P-2 Reactor coolant Leak Test
- 1-OPT-RC-10.0, Reactor Coolant Leakage - Computer Calculated
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the announced emergency response training drill conducted on January 4, 2006, to assess the licensees performance in emergency classification, off-site notification, and protective action recommendations. The drill included emergency response actions taken by the management team in the Technical Support Center (TSC). This drill evaluation is included in the Emergency Response Performance Indicator statistics.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Daily Review of Plant Issues
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing hard copies of each plant issue, attending daily screening meetings, and accessing the licensees computerized database.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the failure to properly implement the design change package for the 1A emergency service water (ESW) pump, 1-SW-P-1A, which occurred on July 30, 2005. This issue was documented in the corrective action program as Plant Issue S-2005-3730. The review was performed to ensure the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the plant issue against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as delineated in Station Administrative Procedure VPAP-1601, Corrective Action, and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of regulatory significance were identified. The licensee performed a root cause analysis for the July 30, 2005 failure to properly implement the design change package (DCP) for the 1A emergency service water (ESW) pump. The DCP installed a starter motor with an external, coupled lubricating oil (LO) pump and the associated circuitry to control the pump. The system is designed to use the starter motor to power the LO pump for pre-lubrication of the ESW pump diesel engine prior to starting. The starter motor then functions as a normal starter to start the diesel engine. The licensee installed the starter/pump and the required wiring modifications. During the post-modification testing, the starter motor continuously cycled on and off. The licensee performed troubleshooting on the circuit and determined the lubricating oil pressure switch failed and a control wire which should have been removed during the modification installation was still connected. The licensee determined that the still connected control wire in conjunction with low lubricating oil pressure, an overspeed condition, or a high water temperature condition would supply power to the starter motor resulting in continuous operation of the starter motor. The failed lubricating oil pressure switch suppled the input signal to continuously power the starter motor. This problem was discovered prior to the completion of return to service testing. The licensee had a similar problem in December 2004, when the same DCP was installed on the 1B ESW pump, 1-SW-P-1B. This pump failed to start during a normal surveillance test following the modification. The licensee determined that a number of wires had not been removed during the DCP implementation. As a result of not removing all of the wires, the starter motor remained energized during the return to service pump run and failed during by continuous operation. The licensee entered this event into the corrective action system as Plant Issue S-2004-4621, performed a root cause analysis, and began to implement corrective actions.
The licensee performed a thorough root cause analysis and determined the root causes of the July 2005 event were:
1) Inadequate/untimely corrective actions from the previous significant event documented in Plant Issue S-2004-4621, 2) Inadequate/untimely resolution of corrective actions to prevent recurrence and a failure to prevent further work on the DCP until corrective actions were complete, and 3) Ineffective transfer of DCP required actions to specific step-by-step instructions similar to the specified corrective actions from the previous plant issue.
The licensee has implemented corrective actions to prevent recurrence of these problems.
The failure to determine adequate corrective actions to prevent recurrence of a significant condition adverse to quality is a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI Corrective Actions. This non-cited violation is minor because the failure of the emergency water pump, 1-SW-P-1A, occurred prior to the return of the pump to service.
There are no prior operability issues with this pump because the failure that occurred resulted from the installation of a modification. The pump outage time was within the allowed limiting condition for operability time allowed by technical specifications. In accordance with Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, this violation is of minor significance and is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
.1
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 19, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.
Jernigan and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
.2 Annual Assessment Meeting Summary
On April 19, 2006, the NRC Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 5 met with Virginia Electric and Power Company to discuss the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the Surry Power Station annual assessment of safety performance for the period of January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2005. The major topics addressed were the NRCs assessment program and the results of the Surry Power Station assessment. Attendees included Surry site management and members of site staff.
This meeting was open to the public. The presentation material used for the discussion is available from the NRCs document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML061110085. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- M. Adams, Director, Nuclear Station Safety and Licensing
- M. Crist, Manager, Operations
- B. Garber, Supervisor, Licensing
- J. Grau, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- T. Huber, Manager, Engineering
- D. Jernigan, Site Vice President
- L. Jones, Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry
- C. Luffman, Manager, Protection Services
- R. Simmons, Manager, Outage and Planning
- K. Sloane, Director, Nuclear Station Operations and Maintenance
- B. Stanley, Manager, Maintenance
- M. Wilson, Manager, Training
NRC
- L. Plisco, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II
- K. Landis, Chief, Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Closed
None
Discussed
None