IR 05000280/1996004
| ML18153A454 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1996 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Stansberry W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153A453 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-96-04, 50-280-96-4, 50-281-96-04, 50-281-96-4, NUDOCS 9605200264 | |
| Download: ML18153A454 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 Report Nos.:
50-280/96-04 and 50-281/96-04 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 April 8-12, 1996 Inspector Approved SUMMARY Scope:
D~,1~~ned
~* j jl, This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of the Physical Security Program of Power Reactor Specific areas evaluated were protected area detection equipment; vital access control of packages, personnel and vehicles; and alarm stations and communication Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie Protected area detection equipment was found to be maintained and operating as required by the Physical Security Plan (PSP) and appropriate procedure Vital area access controls were found to be meeting regulatory and PSP commitment Alarm stations and security communications were found to be a strength in the licensee's security progra Two open items were closed (Paragraph 3.0).
9605200264 960509 PDR ADOCK 05000280 Q
- Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- D. Christian, Station Manager, Virginia Power-Surry Power Station (VPSPS).
- A. Fletcher, Engineering, VPSP *8. Garber, Licensing, VPSP *D. Hayes, Supervisor, Dominion Services, VPSP *C. Luffman, Security Manager, VPSP *R. Savage, Supervisor, Security Operations, VPSP *8. Shriver, Assistant Station Manager, VPSP *8. Stanley, Nuclear Oversight, VPSP Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, security force members, technicians, and administrative personne U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- W. Poertner, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.0 Physical Security Program for ~ower Reactor (81700) Protected Area Detection Equipment Based on the commitments in Chapter 4 of the PSP, the inspector evaluated the licensee's intrusion detection systems to verify that they were functionally effective and met licensee commitment This evaluation was also to ensure that there were no vulnerabilities that could be exploited to avoid detectio The licensee had installed intrusion detection systems that could detect attempted penetrations through the isolation zone, a~d attempts to gain unauthorized access to the protected are Systems had a redundancy and diversity to assure maintenance of the system's capabilitie The licensee segmented the intrusion detection systems into enough alarm zones to provide adequate coverage of the protected area perimeter barrier and isolation zone Observation of the licensee's 7-day test of 27 protected area alarm zones verified alarm operability. Tests of the intrusion detection systems were accomplished by the method of walking through the detection zon These systems communicated alarm conditions to response force personnel though the alarm stations, allowing for response to assess and correct the conditions.
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Based upon the above evaluation, the inspector concluded that the licensee's intrusion detection systems were functional, effective and met licensee commitment There were no vulnerabilities found that could be exploited to avoid detectio There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this are.2 Vital Area Access Control of Packages, Personnel and Vehicles The inspector evaluated the licensee's program to control access of packages, personnel, and vehicles to the vital areas according to criteria in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 of the PSP and Security Plan Implementation Procedures (SPIP)-008, Vehicle/Material Access Control, dated June 13, 199 This was to ensure that the licensee had positive access controls of personnel, places where packages and materials can enter the vital areas, and vehicles entering vital area Personnel, hand-carried packages or material, delivered packages or material, and vehicles were searched at the protected area entrance before being admitted to a vital are Security personnel searched for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, and other items that could be used for radiological sabotag The inspector found the following circumstances concerning personnel access control to vital areas. A coded, numbered picture badge identification system was used for licensee personnel who were authorized unescorted access to the vital area The code corresponded to vital areas that the licensee granted individuals authorized access t Picture badges issued to nonlicensee personnel had areas and periods of authorized access information magnetically encoded and showed that no escort was require Visitors authorized escorted access to vital areas were issued a badge that showed an escort was required, and were escorted by licensee-designated escorts while in the vital area Access to vital areas was limited to personnel who required such access to do their dutie Access to vital areas was controlled by key car The licensee installed intrusion alarm equipment on vital area portals, and security force personnel were required to respond to alarms from vital area portals in case of unauthorized entry, or inappropriate use of the key car Security personnel controlled access to the reactor containment when frequent access was necessary to assure that only authorized personnel and material entered the reactor containmen The licensee had compensatory measures for defective or inoperative access control and search equipmen The licensee had procedures for controlling access to protected area Access control program records were available for review and contained sufficient information for identification of persons authorized access to the vital area The licensee maintained access records of keys, key cards, key codes, combinations, and other related equipment for the period of a persons employment or for the duration of use of these item The inspector found the following circumstances concerning control of the entry and exit of packages and material to vital area Security personnel confirmed the authorization of, and identified packages and material at access control portals before allowing them to be delivered into vital area The
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licensee used security force personnel to identify and confirm the authorization of material before allowing it to enter reactor containmen The inspector found that the licensee had no vehicle vital area entrance Items to be delivered to vital areas were off-loaded near a vital area, then carried into the vital area by other mean This evaluation of the vital area access controls for packages, personnel and vehicles revealed that the criteria in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 of the PSP and SPIP-008 were carried ou There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this are.3 Alarm Stations and Communications The inspector evaluated the licensee's alarm stations and communication equipment to ensure application of the criteria in Chapters 4 and 5 of the PSP, SPIP-003, Central and Secondary Alarm Station Operations, dated August 30, 1993 and portions of the Safeguards Contingency Pla The inspector verified that annunciation of protected and vital area alarms occurred audibly and visually in the alarm station The licensee equipped both stations with CCTV assessment capabilities and communication equipmen Alarms were tamper-indicating and self-checking, and provided with an uninterruptable power suppl These stations were continually manned by capable and knowledgeable security operator The stations were independent yet redundant in operation. Alarm station's interiors were not visible from the protected area, and no single act could remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alar Alarm stations' walls, doors, floors, ceiling and windows were bullet-resistant at the high-powered rifle rating (UL752).
The inspector evaluated the provision, operation, and maintenance of internal and external security communication links, and determined that they were adequate and appropriate for their intended functio Each security force member could communicate with an individual in each of the continuously manned alarm stations who could call for assistance from other security force personnel and from local law enforcement agencie The alarm stations had the capability for continuous two-way voice communication with local law enforcement agencies through radio as well as the conventional telephone servic The licensee had compensatory measures for defective or inoperable communication equipmen Based on this evaluation, the inspector concluded that the licensee was complying with the criteria in Chapters 4 and 5 of the PSP, SPIP-003, and portions of the Safeguards Contingency Plan..
There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this area.
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3.0 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (81001)
This area was evaluated to determine if the security program for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) was commensurate with regulatory requirements and Chapter 8 of the PS The inspector verified the existence of a physical barrier around ISFSI Pad No. 1 and No. 2 and assessed it as adequate to deter intrusions and control acces The inspector observed the initial operational intrusion detection tests at Pad No.2 as well as the 7-day testing of the detection system at Pad No. The inspector verified the alarm annunciations and assessment capabilities for both pad Arcess control was implemented at the gate of each protected area pa During this evaluation, the inspector observed the placement of the first spent fuel container on Pad No. Compensatory measures were implemented when system or equipment failures occurre The inspector observed security officers posted for compensatory measures while the protected area entrance was unsecured and maintenance personnel were working on the assessment aids to the pa Based on this evaluation, the inspector concluded that the licensee was complying the criteria in Chapter 8 of the PS There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this are *
4.0 Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
(CLOSED) !FI 50-280, 281/95-12-01, Access Authorization Supervisor Training:
Lesson plans and handouts for the Fitness For Duty Supervisor Initial Training and Fitness For Duty Supervisor Refresher programs were changed to address the aberrant behavior issu Since these were common training programs at VPSPS and North Anna Power Station, the Nuclear Training at the Innsbrook Technical Center made the change (CLOSED) !FI 50-280, 281/95-12-02, Reportability of Arrests in the Access Authorization Program:
The inspector interviewed 11 contract personnel to ascertain that they were aware of the requirement to report all arrests except traffic violation Te-individuals indicated that they were aware of their responsibility to report all arrests except traffic violation One individual said he was not sure if he had to report traffic violations to his superviso The inspector informed that individual that he did not have to report traffic violation.0 Review of UFSAR Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the UFSAR description During a portion of the inspection period (April 8-12, 1996) the inspector reviewed the applicable sections of the UFSAR and Security Program Plans that related to the
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inspection areas discussed in this repor The inspector verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameter.0 Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 12, 1996, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.