IR 05000280/1984034
| ML18142A205 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1985 |
| From: | Burke D, Marlone Davis, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18142A201 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-84-34, 50-281-84-34, NUDOCS 8503140316 | |
| Download: ML18142A205 (5) | |
Text
Report Nos.:
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 50-280/84-34 and 50-281/84-34 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket-Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
November 5-30, 1984 Inspectors:~~Insp~
~~d~r~
Approved by*
~
. ~S--~<-,-*1&1c-1r""'o--'d"'"",--=-,.s"""e'-c+t-i-o n-C~h_i_e_f ___________ _
Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY 11 Jo.."' 6 5 Date Signed II Ja.r1 Date Signed l'lc{~d Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 180 inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations and operating records, refueling operations, plant maintenance and surveillance, plant security, followup of events, and licensee event report Results:
In the areas inspected, one violation was identified in the area of plant operations; failure to follow procedures-paragraph 5.b.
85031403
-
PDR ADOt°~ 850307 G
osooo2eo PDR
,
- REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted R. F. Saunders, Station Manager D. L. Benson, Assistant Station Manager H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Operations M. R. Kansler, Superintendent of Technical Services H. W. Kibler, Superintendent of Maintenance D. Rickeard, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff S. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics R. Johnson, Operations Supervisor R. Driscoll, Director, QA, Nuclear Operations Other licensee employees contacted included control room operations, shift technical advisors (STAs), shift supervisors, chemistry, health physics, plant maintenance, security, engineering, administrative, records, and contractor personnel and supervisor.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with certain individuals in paragraph 1 abov The apparent violation in paragraph 5.b was discussed with lice~see managemen.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Operations Unit 1 and 2 operations were inspected and reviewed during the inspection perio The inspectors routinely toured the control room and other plant areas to verify that plant operations, testing, and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications (TS) and procedure The inspectors verified that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, and pl ant housekeeping efforts were adequate. _The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled, and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, piping hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags,
component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration date Some tours were conducted on backshift Inspections included areas in the Unit 1 and 2 cable vaults, switchgear rooms, control rooms, and cable penetration areas to verify certain breaker and equipment positions for safety-re 1 ated component The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of ECCS system During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted periodic inspections in the accessible areas of the Safeguards Buildings and the boric acid flats; several manual chemical and volume control system (CVCS) valves on the Unit 2 side had missing or illegible identifi-cation tags, which verify the valve mark numbe The missing or illegible tags (due to paint, boric acid, etc.) are being replaced with new tag CVCS piping, heat tracing, and insulation replacement work continues on the shutdown Unit 1 side of the fla Unit 1 con-tainment inspections were also conducted during the mont The NRC is reviewing the licensee's submitted proposal for operating Unit 1 without the fire protection oil collection system installed on reactor coolant pump (RCP) 18; an interim oil collection arrangement and additional compensatory measures are being implemente Unit 1 remained shutdown in a refueling and maintenance outage for the duration of the reporting perio Unit 2 began the reporting period in a cold shutdown condition with the 11A
loop drained for seal and bearing repair on the 11A
RC The unit was taken critical on November 19, 1984, and experienced a reactor trip as the unit was being placed on line on November 2 The reactor trip was due to a low water level condition in the 11 C 11 steam generato The 14 inch manual isolation valves (2-FW-16, 47 and 78) in the main feedwater lines had been closed during the outage and not reopened, and bypass isolation valve 2-FW-85 was 75% closed. The licensee stated that Periodic Test 2-PT-15.3, Main and Auxiliary Feedwater CSD check valve Test, was performed, but the valves were apparently reclosed and not reopened as required, nor was this valve closure documente The inspectors examined the Unit 2 Startup Checklist procedure OP-lA and found that two of the three startup hold points were not properly signed of In addition, no systems were listed in OP-lA for perfor-mance of valve checklists at any of the three hold points (200°F, 350°F and 450 PSIG, or criticality), although the Shift Order Book did require the performance of valve checklists on the Engineered Safe-guards systems and the reactor coolant syste This failure to follow procedures is a violation of TS 6.4.B (50-280/84-34-01).
Another example of this violation occurred during Unit 2 restart and power operation; operations personnel did not properly log outstanding annunciator alarms in the Annunciator Logbook as required by procedure ADM-29.3, nor was the weekly review of the logbook performed/documented as require Following the Unit 2 restart, several alarms were annunicated indicating, for example, that equipment was operating
'
between normal and TS 1*imiting conditions (e.g. - Accumulator levels, RWST, CAT, and spent fuel pool levels, Fire Protection System trouble, etc.). The alarms were subsequently cleared or logged, and the reviews completed by November 27, 198.
LER Review The inspectors reviewed the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) listed below to ascertain that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective action taken and planne Certain LERs were reviewed in greater detail to verify correction action and determine compliance with TS and other regulatory requirement The review included examination of logbooks, internal correspondence and records review of SNSOC meeting minutes, and discussions with various staff member Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie (Closed) LER 281/80-10 concerned the failure of the containment purge exhaust fan to trip during an automatic isolation of containment purge; the purge isolation valves closed as require The purge exhaust fans in Units 1 and 2, 1-VS-F-5A and B were subsequently removed during the accomplishment of Design Change 78-S-34 (Closed) LER 280/84-21 concerned a missing fire watch in the Unit 1 cable tunnel with the Carbon Dioxide System for the area temporarily locked out; personnel were retraine (Closed) LER 280/84-07 concerned the improper connection of instrument air tubing from the main feedwater regulating va 1 ve ( FRV) actuator The tubing was connected to the wrong port of the three-way solenoid operated valves (SOVs) that de-energize to vent air, allowing the FRV 1s to close rapidl The instrument air tubing arrangement was corrected and the ability of the SOV 1 s to vent air from the FRV actuator when the SOV 1 s are de-energized was teste Maintenance and operations personnel were rei nstructed on the requirements for properly classifying and testing equipment when performing maintenance on safety-related systems or compon_ent (Closed) LER 280/82-94 concerned TV-SS-106 A&B (reactor coolant system hot leg sample trip valves) which failed to fully close following a sampl While under administrative control, the valves were opened and sample draw The valves were then closed and no leakage was observe The valves subsequently performed satisfactorily and passed type 1C 1 testin.
Plant Physical Protection The inspector verified the following by observatio Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende..
_,_ '
it 4 Isol.ation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personne 1 were properly i dent ifi ed, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access control.