IR 05000277/1983012
| ML20023D929 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1983 |
| From: | Anderson C, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20023D923 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-83-12, 50-278-83-12, NUDOCS 8306060170 | |
| Download: ML20023D929 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-277/83-12 Report No. 50-278/83-12 50-277 Docket No. 50-278 DPR-44 License No. DPR-56 Priority Category C
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Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At: Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted:
April 18-22, 1983 Inspector:
3@~4 s//v[r3
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S. Richards, Reactor Engineer date i 4 T3 Approved by:
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w C.fAnderson, Chief, Plant Systems date Section i
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 18-22, 1983 (Report No. 50-277/83-12 and 50-278/83-12)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection of licensee control of tem-
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parary electrical jumpers and actions to ensure operability of refueling interlocks. The inspection involved 35 inspector-hours onsite.
Results: One violation was identified for failure to follow procedure with two examples noted (paragraphs 2 and 3).
8306060170 930523
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PDR ADOCK 05000277
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO)
W. Birely, Senior Engineer - Licensing
T. Cabrey, Shift Technical Advisor J. Dawson, I&C Engineer R. Fleischmann, Station Superintendent
J. Hesler, Shift Technical Advisor G. John, Surveillance Coordinator J. Mitman, Results Engineer
E. Morgan, Assistant Operations Engineer
S. Roberts, Operations Engineer D. Smith, Outage Manager A. Wasong, Reactor Engineer J. Winzenreid, Technical Engineer
- denotes those present at the exit interview on April 22, 1983.
2.
Control of Electrical Jumpers By letter dated April 11, 1983, the licensee reported that the refueling interlocks for Unit 3 had been partially defeated by the application of jumpers.
The Rod Position Information System (RPIS) provides an input to the rsfueling interlocks which indicates whether or not each control rod is fully inserted into the reactor core. The licensee reported that a jumper had been installed in the electronic circuitry for three control rods so that the circuitry would indicate the rods as full-in. These jumpers were installed due to difficulties with the RPIS for those rods.
When the jumpers were installed, the control rods were verified to be full-in; however, no positive controls were placed on the rods to prevent rod motion with the jumpers installed. The defeated portions of the refueling interlocks were not challenged during the period the jumpers were installed due to refueling operations being conducted consistent with the interlock constraints.
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At the time of the inspection, the licensee had suspended use of the jumper procedure pending review and probable revision of the procedure to increase control over the use of jumpers.
The licensee had also reviewed i
the jumper log for potential deficiencies associated with other installed jumpers. The inspector reviewed the jumper log to determine if any other installed jumpers could effect the Unit 3 refueling interlock operation, however no deficiencies were noted.
The inspector also visually observed in the RPIS cabinets that no other control rods in Unit 3 were jumpered to give a full-in position indication.
The inspector noted that Unit 3 jumper 4-5 had been cleared from the log with an annotation that the jumper tag had been found in a Unit 2 panel.
The log indicated that the jumper was installed across point 11 of tempera-
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ture recorder 3-02-3-89 which is a thermocouple monitoring the reactor vessel head flange temperatJre. The jumper log remarks section had an annotation to the effect that the thermocouple was required to be replaced prior to startup. The jumper was issued February 25, 1982 and cleared from the log on November 22, 1982.
By reviewing Maintenance Request Forms (MRF) and the strip chart recording paper for the jumpered thermocouple, the inspector determined that the jumper had been installed in Unit 2 vice Unit 3 and had been removed about June 14, 1982, however, the jumper was not cleared from the log at that time, and the tag was apparently left in the Unit 2 cabinet.
Procedure GP-2A, Reactor Startup Order Check-Off List, requires that the jumper log be reviewed for the installation of any jumpers that may be adverse to startup. This checklist was performed for Unit 3 on April 5 and 8, 1982. The jumper log is also required to be reviewed by the I&C Engineer periodically. Jumper 4-5 was reviewed on May 10 and September 13, 1982. The inspector noted that although the jumper was installed in the opposite unit for which it was logged, four separate reviews apparently did not result in a determination being made as to the jumper's actual status. The inspector concluded that failure to maintain an accurate record of jumper status in accordance with procedure A-42 is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (277/83-12-01; 278/83-12-01).
During the inspection period, Unit 2 was operating at power. The inspec-tor noted that Unit 2 control rod 18-31 was jumpered to provide a " full-in" position indication. The inspector questioned whether this jumper had an effect on plant operation at power. The licensee had completed a preliminary review of all active jumpers and had concluded that the jumper, number 62-1 installed March 26, 1983, did not adversely effect plant operation. The jumper had been installed for testing which was complete and because the jumper was no longer required it was removed.
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Upon further review the licensee determined that the jumper could effect the Reactor Manual Control System such that the rod withdrawal sequence could be violated, however the licensee stated that operating procedures,
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l visual control room indications, and operator training would have prevented any l
unsafe situation from occurring. The inspector concurred that withdrawal of the control rods in the incorrect sequence due to the jumper was f
l unlikely. The licensee stated that an in depth review of each active
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jumper was in progress at the time of the inspection and that the review would have noted the discrepancy.
The licensee ~ further stated that the report to the NRC concerning defeating refueling interlocks with jumpers would be revised to reflect the installation of Unit 2 5mper 62-1.
This item is unresolved pending further NRC review of licensee actions regard-ing control of the installation of temporary jumpers (277/83-12-02).
3.
Refueling Interlock Surveillances and Testing Technical Specifications require that the refueling interlocks be func-
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tionally tested periodically during refueling to ensure interlock opera-I bility. The inspector reviewed the surveillance procedures associated with this testing and reviewed the results for selected dates.
The inspector noted that Surveillance Test (ST) 12.1A, revision 2, was I
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required to be performed weekly during refueling, however it had only been completed once during the eight weeks that fuel movement had been con-ducted.
Licensee review indicated that ST 12.1A had been recently revised and that the frequency had been incorrectly changed to weekly from once prior to each refueling. The inspector observed that the prior revision of the ST only required the testing be performed once.
This item is designated an Inspector Follow Item pending licensee revision of ST 12.1A to indicate the correct frequency (277/83-12-03; 278/83-12-02).
The inspector reviewed the results of the ST 12.1A which was completed during the present refueling on February 20, 1983 and noted that revision 1 of the procedure had been performed. The inspector observed that revision 2 should have been utilized as required by the licensee Quality Assurance Plan, Section 6.2.
Revision 2 was in effect as of January 4, 1983. Revision 2 contains additional requirements for ensuring the system has been restored to normal following completion of the test which were not provided for in revision 1.
Licensee representatives stated that the use of other than the current revision was an administrative oversight.
This is a second example of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criter-ion V.
The inspector reviewed other surveillances performed to check the refuel-ing interlocks and noted no discrepancies. The inspector also discussed testing requirements for work done on systems associated with the inter-locks with licensee personnel. The inspector observed that the " full-in" position switch of the control rod position indication probes (PIP) are not functionally tested by procedure when the PIP is replaced or when removed and reinstalled for Control Rod Drive (CRD) replacement. The licensee stated that when a CRD is replaced, the rod is notched back to the full in position and that the operator would note the function of the full-in reed switch by the presence of a green backlight on the control room full core display. The licensee further contended that during a PIP replacement, the operator would also note the green backlight. The inspector observed the full core display for the unit undergoing refueling and concluded that the presence of a green backlight is difficult to ascertain even when specifically looking for it at close range due to the low illumination of the backlight. The inspector also stated that when a PIP is replaced, a sufficient functional test is not performed because the rod associated with the PIP is not notched out of the core to verify that the green backlight goes out when the rod is not full-in. The licensee contended that sufficient controls and checks govern work on PIP's, however they agreed to review their procedures in this area for adequacy.
This item is designated an Inspector Follow Item (277/83-12-04; 278/83-12-03).
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in paragraph..
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Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1
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on April 22, 1983 and summarized the purpose and findings of the inspec-tion. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was present at the exit inter-j view.
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