IR 05000277/1983013
| ML20023D783 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1983 |
| From: | Blough A, Mccabe E, Williams J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20023D774 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-83-13, 50-278-83-13, NUDOCS 8306030312 | |
| Download: ML20023D783 (4) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I 50-277/83-13 Report No. 50-278/S N 3 Docket No. 50-277; 50-278 License No.
Category C
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Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name:
Peach Bettom Atomic Power Station Meeting At: USNRC, Region I, King of Pitssia, Pennsylvania Meeting conducted: May 6, 1983 NRC Personnel:
bC kh 33 D A. R. Blough, Sr. Resident Inspector date signed WC0%N k
Tll3l83 J. H. Williams, Resident Inspector date signed Approved by:
$ 6 kW Sil?l&7 Ebe C. McCabe, Jr., Chief date s gned l
Reactor Projects Section 2B Enforcement Conference on May 6, 1983 (Report 50-277/83-13, 50-278/83-13)
Meeting Summary: Special enforcement conference convened to discuss findings of Region I Inspections 50-277/83-05, 50-278/83-05; and 50-277/83-09, 50-278/83-09, rel ative to violations of procedural controls and Technical Specification require-ments. Senior Philadelphia Electric Company and NRC Region I management personnel attended this two-hour meeting at the Region I office.
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8306030312 830520 PDR ADOCK 05000277
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DETAILS
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Attendees Philadelphia Electric Company S. L. Daltroff, Vice President, Electric Production M..J. Cooney, Superintendent, Generation Division - Nuclear R. H. Moore, Superintendent, Electric Production - Quality Assurance C. F. Mengers, Directore Research and Testing Division G. N. DeCowsky, Chief Electrical Engineer, Electrical Engineering Division W. T. Ullrich, Superintendent, Nuclear Services
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R. S. Fleischmann, Station Superintendent, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station C. E. Anderson, Engineer, Research and Testing Division S. R. Roberts Operations Engineer, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station W. W. Bowers, Engineer, Electrical Engineering Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission R. W. Starcstecki, Director, DPRP -
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Projects Branch 2, DPRP E. L. Conner, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2D
C. J. Anderson, Chief, Plant Systems Section, DETP G. Barber IE Enforcement Staff J. M. Gutierrez, Regional Counsel, Region I D. F. Johnson, Project Engineer, DPRP A. R. Blough, Senior Resident Inspector
J. H. Williams, Resident Inspector D. J. Holody, Enforcement Specialist, Region I 2.
Meeting Purpose To discuss three events associated with procedural and technical specification i
adherence, to emphasize their seriousness, and to obtain licensee views on causes and corrective actions.
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Events of Concern The NRC identified the following violations as being of concern.
3.1 Primary Containment Violation involving failure to use an approved procedure (seeNRC:RIreport 277/83-05,278/83-05).
3.2 HPCI Exhaust Drain Line PCIS Isolation Logic Modification withtut associated Technical Specification change (see NRC:RI report 277/83-05, and 278/83-05).
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-3-3.3 Defeating of Refueling Interlocks with jumpers in Rod Position Indication System (Peach Bottom LER No. 3-83-11).
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Cause and Safety Significance The NRC stated that these events plus the events described at the enforce-ment conference in January 1983 indicate a trend of failure to follow approved procedures and administrative controls.
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Licensee Discussions The senior Philadelphia Electric Company representative acknowledged the
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seriousness of the violations and indicated that the company was striving j
for "zero defects." He indicated that only one of the three events was repetitive - the primary contairunent violation.
5.1 The licensee described the sequence of events leading to the primary containment integrity violation and expressed the opinion that the event was an isolated case of personnel error. A technician, in troubleshooting an instrument, failed to use a surveillance test
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procedure which requires double verification and did not realize the instrument was connected to primary containment. A discussion of organization and personnel accountability followed, including dis-ciplinary actions of the persons involved. Various licensee repre-sentatives provided corrective action commitments, as follows.
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(1)
Instrument technicians are receiving a 2-day BWR technology course.
Twelve technicians on shift and 22 of 58 other technicians have
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completed the training. The licensee stated a copy of the lesson plan would be provided to the resident inspectors.
(2) Refresher training in Administrative Procedures is being provided
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to instrument technicians.
(3) The technician's guidelines document was revised and discussed, and copies were given to technicians.
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(4) The Station Superintendent issued a memorandum on procedures, emphasizing the requirements for safety-related work.
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j (5) The licensee is in the process of reorganizing QC functions to provide more centralized management, clearer lines of responsi-bility, and better independence.
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-4-5.2 The licensee discussed the HPCI drain line modification (Mod 532) and indicated it was made without recognizing the need for a Technical Specification change. The corrective actions associated with this event
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(1) Mod 532 was made before improved review procedures were implemented as a result of IE Circular 80-18. The improved Safety Evaluation Review procedures add one level of review and have been implemented for all groups that generate safety evaluations.
(2) A training course for the Electrical Engineering Division on Safety Evaluations and technical specifications was conducted. The licensee stated he would infom the resident inspectors regarding plans for similar training in the Mechanical Engineering Division.
(3) All work tasks of the responsible engineer were reviewed to ensure a pattern of Technical Specification omissions was not present.
For 31 other tasks. Technical Specification applicability deteminations were handled properly in each case.
5.3 The licensee stated that the defeated refueling interlocks involved three separate personnel errors, in that shift supervisors (SLO's) approved jumpers without recognizing their inconsistency with refueling interlock requirements. The licensee indicated that corrective action for this violation included:
(1) Use of the jumper log has been suspended until a procedure is developed to reduce the likelihood of this type of event happening again. Also,the need for the jumper log will be reduced by developing approved procedures for frequently used jumpers. The licensee discussed his plans for the jumper log procedure with respect to independent reviews, safety evaluations-and emergency provisions.
(2) The jumper logs were reviewed to see if additional problems existed.
(3) Disciplinary actions were taken against responsible personnel.
After discussions on each violation and specific and generic corrective actions, the NRC thanked the licensee for his input and indicated that NRC review would be facilitated by the licensee-provided infomation.
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