IR 05000259/1992039
| ML18036B103 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1992 |
| From: | Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18036B102 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-92-39, 50-260-92-39, 50-296-92-39, NUDOCS 9212280278 | |
| Download: ML18036B103 (33) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 DEC L.4 69R Report Nos.:
50-259/92-39, 50-260/92-39, and 50-296/92-39 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 3B Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Inspection Conducted:
Nove er 3-1992 Inspector:
W.
M. Sartor, Jr.
/2.
Dat S'gned Team Members:
A. Gooden, RII J.
Munday J.
Wil (
lysts, Inc.)
Approved by:
.
. s-<
~
~
W.
.
artor, Acting Chi Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Date igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the Control Room Simulator, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC),
and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).
The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's post-exercise critique.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The licensee's emergency response organization demonstrated the ability to implement the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures in a manner which 9212280278 921204 PDR ADOCK 05000259 Q
provided adequate protection for the health and safety of the public.
Areas of concern that required corrective action by the licensee included:
1) offsite monitoring teams were not controlled in a manner that would be most effective in quantifying an offsite release; (Paragraph 10); 2) offsite monitoring teams were not provided the administration of potassium iodide (KI)
in accordance with procedures (Paragraph 10);
and 3) press releases were misleading in the way information was provided (Paragraph 8).
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- T. Adkins, Program Manager, Emergency Preparedness-Chattanooga
- S. Arnold, Auxiliary Unit Operator, Operations
- T. Ballon, Supervisor, Customer Group
- C. Benton, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Exercises
- J.
Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Power Operations
- P. Byrd, Radiation Control Shift Supervisor
- A. Brittain, Site Security Manager
- P. Cassidy, Safety Engineer, Industrial Safety
- J. Corey, Radiation Control Manager
- T. Cornelius, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- C. Dexter, Manager, Browns Ferry Training
- J. Ford, Engineer, Emergency Preparedness
- S. Foster, Material Coordinator
- H. Hollins, Supervisor, Work Control
- H. Jones, Site Engineer
- K. King, Engineer, Emergency Preparedness
- B. Marks, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Programs
- B. Mitchell, Health Physicist, Radiation Control
- F. Nilsen, Mechanical Engineer, Technical Support
- J. Parshall, Operator Training
- G. Pierce, Manager, Site Licensing
- M. Reeves, Auxiliary Unit Operator, Operations
- S. Rudge, Site Support Manager
- J. Sabado, Chemistry and Environmental Manager
- J. Scalice, Plant Manager
- R. Simpkins, Health Physicist, Radiation Control
'J.
Wallace, Site Licensing Engineer
- N. Wallette, Auxiliary Unit Operator, Operations Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
- Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated emergency response capability and a major portion of the basic elements within the licensee's Emergency Plan, as required by 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(14)
and Section IV.F of Appendix E to
CFR Part 50.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and discussed with licensee representatives prior to the exercise.
The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to exercise fully the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided
sufficient information to the State and local governments for their limited participation in the exercise.
The controllers and evaluators were appropriately trained to support the exercise with proper interactions between controllers and players in most instances.
An exception was observed in the radiological assessment area of the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).
There a controller aggressively encouraged a member of the meteorological staff to provide meteorological data to the status board plotter and on another occasion was observed discussing scenario environmental data with a player.
The prompting did not excessively impact the objective assessment of the dose assessment activities and the concern was discussed with a licensee representative following exercise termination.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's organization was observed during the exercise to determine whether the requirements of Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to
CFR Part 50 (as addressed in the Emergency Plan)
were implemented with respect to descriptions, responsibilities, and assignments of the onsite emergency response organization.
The inspector determined that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that primary and alternate assignments for the positions in the augmented emergency organization were clearly designated.
During the exercise the inspector observed that staff was available to fill key, functional positions within the initial onsite emergency organization.
Following the decision to activate the Technical Support Center (TSC)
and Operations Support Center (OSC), designated individuals were notified and responded to their respective onsite emergency facility to assume the duties of assigned emergency positions.
Another inspector observed the activation and staffing of the offsite CECC in Chattanooga, Tennessee.
Again, pre-designated staff responded promptly and activated the emergency response facility.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether arrangements to accommodate State and local personnel at the EOF were adequate, and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as specified by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to
CFR part 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.C of NUREG-0654 (Revision 1).
An inspector noted that the licensee's Emergency Plan and procedures identifies other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response.
The limited participation of this exercise did not include these organizations; however, arrangements for requested offsite assistance resources were in place.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(4)
and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and to determine whether that scheme was adequately implemented.
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) -1,
"Emergency Classification Logic," was implemented by the licensee's staff to promptly identify and classify each emergency condition and to escalate to more severe classifications as the simulated accident progressed.
The licensee's classifications and emergency declarations were appropriate throughout the exercise.
The Notification of Unusual Event was declared by the Shift Operations Supervisor (SOS) at 0346 CST based on emergency action level (EAL) FU3 and SUI (primary system leakage exceeding technical specification 3.6.C. 1 and technical specification limiting conditions of operation reached requiring shutdown).
The Alert was declared at 0427 CST based on EAL FA4 (total leakage greater than 40 gpm).
The Site Area Emergency was declared at 0540 CST by the Site Emergency Director (SED)
based on EAL HS10 (explosion causing damage to virtual equipment).
At 0707 CST the SED upgraded the emergency classifi-cation to a General Emergency based on EAL FG3 (the loss of two fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third).
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Methods and Procedures 982301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and a
means to provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.d, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for providing emergency information to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and for alerting and mobilizing the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
The inspector noted that BFN and CECC Implementing Procedures for notifications had been established and were adequate to provide guidance to personnel responsible for initial notification to the State via the Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) in the CECC.
An inspector
noted that the ODS notified the offsite authorities (State)
regarding the NOUE and the Alert within five minutes of the event notification from the SED.
Although the information provided to the ODS for notifications was approved by the SED, an inspector noted that the initial emergency notifications to the NRC were made without approval nor any official record of the information being transmitted.
This did not have a
negative impact on notifications as observed during this exercise as the NRC was not participating in the exercise.
The Alert Notification System (ANS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) was not actuated during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that adequate communications capability existed among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organizations and offsite authorities.
The inspector did not note any significant problems with the communications equipment utilized during the exercise, and backup systems were not required to be implemented.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Public Education and Information This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public with five press releases issued during the exercise.
A review of the press releases identified a concern that information was misleading or not sufficiently complete to quantify the concern to the public.
Specifically, the release identified as "Final 84" which informed the public of the General Emergency declaration stated "...and field monitoring teams from the plant also have recorded, elevated levels of radiation offsite".
No amplifying information concerning the release was provided.
The next release,
"Final 85", was provided 40 minutes later as a chronology of events.
The listing at 0707 again noted the elevated levels of radiation offsite.
It also separately noted that "Radiation levels one mile downwind from the plant at an altitude of 800 feet measured less than what would be received while watching TV for eight hours".
The
"Final A'5" release was made at 0820 CST and should have quantified the release with more recent information.
The licensee indicated the decision to not activate the Joint Information Center (JIC) for this exercise was a contributing factor to these misleading releases.
The inspector informed the licensee that this concern would be tracked as an Inspector followup item (IFI).
IFI 50-259, 260, 296/92-39-01:
Press releases did not accurately quantify the radiological release.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities to include the Simulator Control Room (SCR),
a
~
Simulator Control Room (SCR)
This was the first use of the SCR for an NRC-evaluated exercise.
During the earlier portion of the exercise when the SCR operations were observed, the inspector noted that the use of the simulator enhanced the control room crew's performance.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was activated at 0532, approximately 65 minutes after the Alert classification.
The facility staff responded promptly during this off-hours exercise and appeared to be cognizant of their duties and responsibilities.
The TSC was well equipped and TSC personnel made excellent use of the status boards.
c ~
Operational Support Center (OSC)
The OSC was declared operational at the same time as the TSC.
Sufficient personnel were available to the OSC Director during the exercise to permit 16 team tracking forms to be approved by the OSC Director.
Noise discipline was occasionally a problem that was properly addressed by the OSC Director to maintain command and control.
There were no major equipment or facility problems identified that negatively impacted the OSC's capability to support activities as directed by the TS d.
Central Emergency Control Center (CECC)
The CECC was promptly staffed and was fully operational within 54 minutes of the Alert declaration.
Security for the CECC was well maintained throughout the exercise.
The CECC Director assumed the responsibility for communications and protective action recommendations (PARs) from the SED in the TSC upon becoming operational.
The CECC was observed to be well organized and equipped.
Numerous status boards assisted in maintaining the awareness of ongoing events and were generally well maintained.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by
CFR 50.47(b)((9),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.B, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program reviewed by the inspector included an, engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated accident.
The dose assessment activities observed in the CECC did not support the PAR decisionmaking process as envisioned by the scenario developers.
Because PARs were provided following the General Emergency classification based on the loss of two fission product barriers with the potential loss of the third, the General Emergency and subsequent PAR formulation based on field team data did not occur.
Although the health and safety of the public were adequately provided for as observed during this exercise, a
concern surfaced as a result of the command and control of a field monitoring team.
Specifically, a team was withdrawn from a sampling location prior to its obtaining an air sample that would have been instrumental to PARs based on iodine activity.
The inspector also noted that the consideration of providing KI to the field teams was not
'onsistent with EPIP-7 and CECC EPIP-9.
The licensee acknowledged the concern and identified the area for corrective action.
The inspector informed licensee representatives that the concern would be tracked as an IFI.
IFI 50-259,260,296/92-39-02:
Offsite monitoring teams were not controlled in a manner most effective for quantifying the release, and team personnel were not considered for KI administration.
No violations or deviations were identifie Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10),
and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
The inspector verified that the licensee had and adequately used emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations (PARs) for the offsite populace within the 10-mile EPZ.
The licensee also initiated protective actions for onsite workers following declaration of the Alert by conducting an accountability of those personnel inside the protected area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine the deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise, and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted player critiques in the facility immediately following the exercise.
On November 5, 1992, the licensee also conducted evaluator/controller critiques prior to the formal presentation to facility management on the following day.
The licensee's critique to their management on November 6 was itself an area that needs improvement to increase effectiveness of the emergency response effort.
Specifically, although the evaluators presented both corrective action items and improvement items to their management, the presentations were not made in a manner that would elicit either management concern or their support for corrective actions.
In that respect, management neither acknowledged the problems nor addressed their support for corrective action following the presentation.
No violations or deviation were identified.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed)
IFI 50-259, 250, 296/91-39-01:
Overall, poor coordination and communications between TSC, OSC, and repair teams.
During this annual exercise, the coordination and communications with the repair teams were effective and provided for timely status report.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on November 6, 1992, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The exercise Team Leader described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results to include the IFIs listed below.
Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number 50-259,260,296/92-39-01 Descri tion and Reference IFI - Press releases did not adequately quantify the offsite release (Paragraph 8).
50-259,260,296/92-39-02 IFI - Review of offsite monitoring team utilization for effective release determination and personnel need for KI (Paragraph 10).
I Attachements Goals and Objectives, Narrative Summary of Exercise Sequence
'ORO>VNS I'"KRRYNUCLEARPLANT (SHV)
.l.99Z EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE GOALS AND 09 ELECTIVES The 1992 BFN Radiological Emergency Plan Exercise will be a full scale exercise consisting of full participation by the TVA and partial participation by the State and Local emergency response agencies.
erci e oal TVA's goals for the 1992 BFN exercise are as follows:
1.
Allow plant and offsite personnel to demonstrate and test the capabilities of the emergency response organization to protect the health and safety of plant personnel and the general public in accordance with the Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan (NP-REP),
BFN Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs),
and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) EPIPs.
2.
Identify significant weaknesses, strengths and areas which may be improved in emergency response capabilities, organization or emergency plans.
3.
Provide an interactive exercise to ensure proficiency is maintained in plant and offsite emergency response capabilities.
e ci
'tive A.
Control Room/Simulator Ob jectives 1 ~
Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Operations Supervisor (SOS) to recognize conditions, classify emergencies, and make required notifications in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the Control Room staff's ability to assume the initial responsibilities of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC),
and CECC prior to their activation.
3 ~
Demonstrate the ability of the SOS to manage Contxol Room activities in a manner to prevent interference with the classification, analysis, or mitigation of an accident.
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to organize, dispatch and txack response teams as needed until the OSC is functional'-
Demonstrate the ability to perform a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room staff to the TSC staff.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to recognize problems that cannot be quickly resolved by the Control Room staff and their deferral to the TSC for resolution.
7-Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Operations Supervisor to periodically inform the Control Room staff of the status of the emergency and of actions curxently being planned by the TSC.
COC4:6298E Page
8/19/92
8 ~
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to keep onsite personnel apprised of the emergency status through periodic PA system announcements, prior to acti~ation of the TSC.
9.
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to use proper procedures.
10- Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff, through detailed logkeeping, to maintain an accurate chronological account of equipment and plant status including the corrective actions taken.
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff, through an effective command and control process, to make a timely determination of the cause of an incident and perform mitigating actions to place the unit in a safe and stable condition.
12. Demonstrate the ability to provide an effective flow of information between the Control Room, TSC, OSC, NRC, and CECC.
13. Demonstrate the adequacy of Simulator/Control Room facilities, resources, and equipment to support emergency operations.
14. Demonstrate the Control Room staff's ability to continuously evaluate available information and redefine/confirm conditions and event classification.
~ Demonstrate the adequacy of Simulator/Control Room communications to support emergency operations.
8.
Technical Support Center Obiectives Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize TSC emergency response personnel and activate the TSC in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the Site Emergency Director's (SED) ability to provide effective command and control and manage TSC activities in a manner to prevent interference with the classification, analysis, or mitigation of an event.
3.
Demonstrate the problem-solving capabilities of the TSC staff in support of the effort to identify the causes of an incident, mitigate the consequences, and place the unit in a safe and stable condition.
4.
Demonstrate the TSC's ability to initially assume the primary responsibilities of the CECC prior to CECC activation.
5.
Demonstrate the SED's proficiency in classification of conditions and direction of mitigation activities-6.
Demonstrate the Site Vice President's proficiency in directing site resources to support accident mitigation activities.
7.
Demonstrate the TSC's ability to formulate, coordinate, implement, and track onsite protective actions.
COC4:6298E Page
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8.
Demonstrate the TSC's ability to perform timely assessments of onsite radiological conditions through surveys and/or installed monitoring equipment information.
Demonstrate the TSC's ability to maintain an accurate account of equipment status, plant status and corrective actions through detailed chronological logkeeping.
10. Demonstrate the TSC's ability to determine the appropriate sampling and monitoring required to support accident investigation and mitigation.
Demonstrate the TSC's abilitv to maintain effective communications between the Operations Support Center, Control Room, CECC, and NRC.
12. Demonstrate the TSC's ability to maintain effective communications between the various groups within the TSC.
13. Demonstrate the adequacy of TSC communication systems to support emergency operations.
14. Demonstrate the ability of the SED to perform periodic briefings for TSC/OSC staff and onsite personnel.
15. Demonstrate the ability to assemble onsite personnel within the protected area and provide an accountability report to the SED within thirty minutes of sounding the emergency siren.
16. Demonstrate Security's ability to maintain effective site and Control Room access controls-17. Demonstrate the adequacy of TSC facilities, resources, and equipment to support emergency operations.
18. Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to use proper procedures.
19. Demonstrate the abili'ty of the TSC to continuously evaluate available information and redefine/confirm the conditions and event classification.
20. Demonstrate the ability to perform a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room staff to the TSC staff..
C.
Operations Support Center Objectives Demonstrate the abi.lity to alert and mobilize OSC response personnel and activate the OSC in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC staff, through an effective command and control process, to coordinate and initiate activities in a timely manner.
3 ~
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC staff to properly plan required tasks:
then, organize, brief, and promptly dispatch response teams-COC4:6298E Page
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4.
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC response teams to quickly and effectively enter the plant, make necessary repairs, and adequately de-brief upon their return.
5.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communications between OSC response teams and the OSC '
ability to track each team.
G.
Demonstrate the effective transfer of information between the OSC, TSC, RADCON laboratory, and Chemistry laboratory including briefings to keep OSC personnel apprised of the emergency status.
7.
Demonstrate the OSC's ability to maintain OSC status board information accurate and current.
Demonstrate the adequacy of OSC resources, facilities, and equipment to support emergency operations.
9.
Demonstrate the OSC's ability to maintain an accurate account of equipment, plant, and response team status, including corrective actions through detailed chronological logkeeping.
10. Demonstrate the adequacy of Site Radiological Control (RADCON)
activities and personnel to effectively support accident mitigation efforts while ensuring adequate worker protection.
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC staff to use proper procedures.
12. Demonstrate the ability of the RADCON staff to perform effective inplant and site boundary surveys during radiological emergencies while using proper procedures and following good RADCON and ALARA practices.
13. Demonstrate the OSC's ability to track changing radiological conditions through survey results and/or in-plant monitors; and incorporate the information into personnel protective actions.
14. Demonstrate the OSC's ability to control internal and external exposures, and personnel contamination of onsite emergency workers including exposure tracking.
15. Demonstrate the timely and efficient activation of the plant environmental monitoring van including establishment of adequate communications .
Demonstrate the ability to conduct habitability surveys for the TSC, OSC, and Control Room.
17.. Demonstrate the OSC's ability to maintain effective communications between the various groups within the OSC.
18. Demonstrate the adequacy of OSC communication systems to support emergency operations.
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D.
Central Eniergency Control Center Ol>jectives Demonstrate the Operations Duty Specialist's ability to make initial notifications to State agencies in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize CECC emergency response personnel and activate the CECC in a timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate the CECC Director's ability to maintain effective command and control in the CECC.
Demonstrate the CECC's ability to effectively call upon and obtain TUA corporate, vendor, or other outside support resources as appropriate or needed.
(technical, logistics, financial, federal, industrial, etc.)
~
Demonstrate the CECC's ability to establish and maintain effective communications between the various emergency centers (CECC, Control Room, TSC, Joint Information Center (JIC), Radiological Monitoring.
Control Center (RMCC), and State/Local Emergency Operations Centers).
~
Demonstrate the CECC's ability to establish and maintain effective communications between the various groups within the CECC.
7.
Demonstrate the CECC's ability to effectively dispatch and control Radiological/Environmental Monitoring Teams, and coordinate with the State when applicable.
8.
Demonstrate the CECC's ability to obtain, analyze, and utilize meteorological, onsite and offsite radiological conditions, and source term information to develop dose assessments in a timely manner.
9-Demonstrate the CECC's ability to inform, update, coordinate offsite activities with, and provide protective action recommendations to the State in a timely manner.
10- Demonstrate the CECC's ability to analyze current plant conditions, identify projected trends and determine the potential consequences.
Demonstrate the adequacy of CECC communications systems to support emergency operations.
12. Demonstrate the CECC's ability to maintain CECC status board information accurate and up to date.
13. Demonstrate the adequacy of CECC facilities, resources, and equipment to support emergency operations-14. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain adequate security access control for the CECC.
15. Demonstrate the CECC's ability to maintain an effective interface with the NRC, including NRC responders-16. Demonstrate the proficiency of CECC personnel with emergency procedures, equipment, and methods.
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17. Demonstrate the CECC's ability to maintain an accurate account of plant status, ongoing activities, external TVA correspondence, corrective actions taken, and protective action recommendations through detailed chronological logkeeping.
18. Demonstrate the ability of Environmental Monitoring Teams to efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures to perform dose rate surveys, collect and analyze radiological samples, and conduct other prescribed radiological activities.
19. Demonstrate the Environmental Monitoring Team's abilities to adhere to appropriate contamination control procedures in field conditions.
20. Demonstrate the CECC's ability to adequately monitor and control the exposure levels of offsite TVA personnel.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively transfer radiological survey information from the field and keep field teams informed of emergency conditions.
22. Demonstrate the adequacy of the Environmental Monitoring Vans to support emergency operations.
(monitoring equipment, supplies, communications equipment, etc.)
23. Demonstrate the CECC's ability to continuously evaluate available information and redefine/confirm the conditions and event classification.
24. Demonstrate the ability to perform a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Technical Support Center (TSC) staff to the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) staff.
Note:
Some of the above objectives may depend on actions which the players are free to chose to do or not to do as part of their response, to an accident.
Therefore, depending on these player decisions, one or more of the above objectives may not be applicable during the exercise.
If player response includes actions subject to an objective, it will be evaluated.
These objectives are evaluated using an extensive set of criteria that will be included in the exercise package-COC4:6298E Page
8/19/92
The above generic objectives will be supplied to the participants the week of the Exercise to clarify the expectations of the Controllers/Evaluators; however, to maintain confidentiality of the scenario contents, the information on this page is
~ provided to the exercise participants In addition to the annual aspects of an Emergency Exercise, the following aspects of the Corporate EP Six-Year Exercise Plan (Corporate EPK-4, Attachment 1) are expected to be included:
1.
Medical/Rescue Drill (~expired by 6-year plan)
2.
Plant RADCON Drill (Optional by 6-year plan)
3.
Off-hours Exercise Start before
am (Optional by 6-year plan)
Accountability Drill (Optional by 6-year plan)
To support to the Corporate EP six-year Exercise Plan, the followingadditional objective(s) are included for this exercise:
C.
Operations Support Center Objectives io. Demonstrate the adequacy of the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT)
response to an inplant injury.
(This objective is limited to the onsite portion of the response)
The followingdrills willbe conducted during the exercise:
1.
Accountabili.ty Drill 2.
Plant Radiological Monitoring Drill (Environs Monitoring)
3.
CECC/State Communications Drill TSC/CECC Communications Drill 5.
CECC Radiological Dose Assessment Drill 6.
Plant RADCON Drill 7.
Medical Drill COC4:6298E Page
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Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1992 Graded Exercise Page
Exercise C BFN Graded Exercise Initial Conditions Unit 1:
Defueled in long term shutdown
" Equipment in lay-up status (current conditions)
Unit 2:
" 100% power on'day 166 of a continuous run
" Reactor Coolant Dose Equivalent Iodine 131 (DEI) increasing, current level is 0.96 uCi/g l131 (up from 0.00013 uCi/g 95 days ago)..
" Reactor Protection System (RPS) Alternate Circuit Protection Inoperative for routine testing/preventative maintenance
" Surveillance Instruction (Sl) 4.9.A.2.C(b), Main Bank 2 Battery Discharge Test is in progress, batteries are being recharged per step 7.3.77 for last 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, Estimate 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> to completion of charging and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> until termination of the Sl.
" Unknown to the plant staff, the ventilation fan for Battery Room 2 is spinning loose on the shaft (the shaft is turning but the fan itself is not turning)
~ This allows the explosive gases from charging the batteries to accumulate in the room.
Unit 3:
" Loading fuel for initial startup after long term shutdown.
82 bundles loaded with one bundle in movement.
Weather:
" Clear and cold conditions early this morning with light winds.
Low temperature in the middle 20s.
Today will be sunny and warmer with high temperatures in the middle 50s.
Winds will be light and out of the west.
Note: This exercise is scheduled to begin at 0330 on November 4, 1992 and last until about 1000 on the same day.
Note: Elapsed times are used in this description instead of clock times.... 7= 0:00 will be 0330; therefore, T= 1:30 would be 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> later or 5:00 am.
RcvbaL 10/27/92 11:13 AM
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant I992 Graded Exercise Page 2 Narrative Summary of Exercise Sequence:
Reactor vessel level sensing reference leg line train B has developed a hairline crack and a small leak that is slowly increasing.
In the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the leak has increased substantially.
At T=O:05, the operators receive the results of the unidentified leak rate calculations per Sl-2 showing the unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak rate has increased to 4.0 gpm in the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
This is an increase of over 2 gpm since the last measurement yesterday.
Technical Specification 3.6.C.1(b) limits unidentified leakage increase to 2 gpm in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period; therefore, in accordance with Technical Specifications, the operators begin a controlled shutdown at 10 megawatts per minute.
A Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) should be declared based upon Emergency Action Level (EAL) FU3-Leakage Exceeding Tech Spec 3.6.C.I or SUI - Tech Speci.CO Reached Requiring ShutdoM/n. At about T = 0:15, alarms indicate a differential pressure between the Drywell and Suppression Pool which causes the operators to start a train of Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) and initiate Drywell venting per AOI-64. The operators will continue to attempt to identify the source of the leak into the drywell.
At 0:40, the reactor vessel level sensing reference leg line train B leak that has been increasing, suddenly breaks causing a leak of >40 gpm.
This leak results in train B level instrumentation failing upscale and the loss of half of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiation logic due to the failure of the level instruments.
The operators will increase the rate of load reduction in preparation of having to Scram the unit. At about T=O:45, alarms indicate that both Drywell sump pumps are running.
This indicates that the leak exceeds the 40 gpm capacity of one pump.
Using this, the operators will determine the leak rate to be greater than 40 gpm and subsequently declare an ALERT based upon EALF24-Total leakage greater than 40 gpm (identified and unidentified).
The TVA emergency facilities will fully activate at this time and the State and Local Governments will partially activate for increased monitoring of the situation.
The high Drywell pressure causes the operators to initiate a manual SCRAM about 50 minutes into the sequence; Following the SCRAM, the Dose Equivalent Iodine 131 (DEI) normally increases substantially; but, in this case the jump is even more dramatic.
The increasing DEI during the last 95 days indicates fuel cladding defects which accounts for the unusually high post-SCRAM DEI. About one minute later, an Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) fluid line seal in the turbine building fails resulting in the loss of EHC control to the Turbine Bypass valves after about 4 minutes.
If attempted, the inboard MSL Drain valve will not open due to mechanical binding.
These failures will force the steam produced from the reactor's decay heat to the Suppression Pool instead of the Condenser as would be the normal case.
At this point, operators reduce pressure as low as allowed by the cool down rate to minimize the leakage and continue to evaluate the pressures and temperatures.
Revised: 10/27/92 11:13 AM
Brogans Ferry 1Viiclear Plant I992 Graded Exercise Page 3 Upon receiving a start signal initiated by the high Drywell pressure at T=1:05, Diesel Generator C attempts to start but fails due to a clogged fuel oil filter. At around T=1:25, the annunciator horn in the Control Room fails. While the annunciator lights still operate, the audible alarm will not work.
Due to the increased chance to miss an incoming alarm, the Control Room Staff will press to have this repaired.
The horn is repaired after about 30 minutes.
The combination of the batteries in Battery Room ¹2 being recharged from the battery surveillance test and the inoperative room ventilation lead to an explosive atmosphere in the room. At about T=1:50, a battery shorts and explodes in the 250v Battery Room ¹2 further igniting the explosive atmosphere in the Battery Room.
The shock of the resulting explosion is felt in the Control Room.
A co-worker calls to inform the Control Room that an electrician entering Battery Room ¹2 to perform the 4-hour temperature test per Sl-4.9.A.2.C(b) step 7.3.77.1 was injure'd by fragments when the battery exploded and was burned by battery acid and could not exit the area following the injury. A SlTE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE) will be declared based on EAL HSI0 - Explosion Causing MajorDamage Involving VitalStnictures or Equipment and Notin Cold Shutdown.
The State and Local Governments will fully activate their emergency centers at this time.
When the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) arrives at Battery Room ¹2, there is no current indication of a fire. The MERT team assesses the situation, locates the injured person, and provides initial treatment for the injuries.
The injured person will be transferred to an offsite hospital for treatment (the offsite portions of the activities will be simulated).
At about 2:40, valve 2-FCV-70-47 spontaneously closes due to a failure of the valve controller and stops flow to the RBCCW system into the Drywell. Due to the loss of RBCCW and steam being dumped to the Torus, the Drywell and Suppression Pool temperatures begin increasing.
To control containment temperature and pressure, Suppression Pool sprays are initiated with one pump and Suppression Pool cooling is initiated with a second pump.
Between T=3:00 and T=3:35, the Control Room alarm for "HPCI Room Flood Alarm" sporadically activates but will clear when attempted.
When investigated, there will be no water in the HPCl room. At around T=3:05, high temperature in the Reactor Building Steam Tunnel will cause high temperature alarms to annunciate in the Main Control Room.
Due to entry into procedure EOI-3, the operators return the Reactor Building to the normal ventilation system at around T=3:10.
When the Suppression Pool pressure-reaches 12 psi, Drywell sprays are initiated and cycled as needed to control Drywell pressure.
NOTE:
The building MUSTbe on normal ventilation before T=3:15 to support the release pathway QEVI569i ll/2,('fQ / }00
'
Brogans Ferry Nuclear Plant I&2 Graded Exercise Page 4 At 3:20, penetration 2-X-107B located in the mezzanine on Elevation 565 begins leaking, indicated by increasing Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) readings, and at 3:30 it catastrophically fails. The dose rates in the Reactor Building increase as the steam from the Drywell moves into the building. The release is small enough to allow the normal ventilation to continue to be used resulting in a ground level release.
A ground level release coupled with an extremely adverse meteorology and an exceptionally high iodine content of the reactor coolant results in the maximum site boundary iodine concentrations.
About a half-hour later (T=04:00), field monitoring teams locate iodine concentrations in excess of 1.46E-6 uCi/cc beyond the site boundary (this is equivalent to 5 R/hr Thyroid Dose).
The Site Emergency Director declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY due to RGI -...Environmental Meast/rements at or Beyond the Site Boundary (of)... >I.46E-6uCiiccIodine.
Due to the high dose rates measured in the field, the Control Room places SBGTS back in service around T=4:15.
The exercise will continue two to three hours after the release begins to provide time for the field personnel to complete their activities.
The site will recover from the event by cooling down to stop the instrument line leak, repairing the penetration to re-establish containment, and placing shutdown cooling in service for long term cooling.
Revisal: 10/27/92 Ii:l3 AM
i
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- NRC Graded I
i CEmeryvm
'Prgumbes I
I I
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globes 20, tooz 0800 Browns )-erry Nuclear Plaf 5:00 6:0 I
l I
O s
tanlo Q-O 0:05 Unldenlllied Leak Rale 4.0 gpm (>2gpm Increase) per Sl-2 T/S require unit shutdown.
0:15 Operators Inlllate the T/S required shutdown and dechre an Unusual Event (NOUE)
0:15 Venting Drywellper AOI-64 0:40 Lealdng Instrument Line breaks creating leak of >40 gpm. Most level Inslumenlation Is lost as well as half of the ECCS Inillatlon logic (ALERT)
0:42 Water Level indication problems begin In CR 0:45 Drywell Sump pumps indicate drywem leakage >40 gpm 0:50 Drywell pressure approaching 2 45 psl and the operator manually Scrams the reactor 0:51 DEI Increases substanlially due lo lhe SCRAM and lhe pre.existing fuel cladding defects (
3:30 Penetration 2-X-107B fails 4k Q
O leaking O
later Bell In CR 1:25 Annunc fails, visual annunchtors are operalional 3:20 Release begins via NORMALVENTILATION The release rale DOES NOT require SBGTS 3:45 Dose Rates measured at Site Boundary of >5R/Hr Thyroid (General Emergency)
O 2:00-3:00 Stale & Local Governments Activating Emergency Centers 4:15 Dose Rates cause lhe CR put the RxBldg on SBGTS mitigating Ihe release 3:00 High Steam Tunnel Temp causes CR annunciation Confidential information Do Not Divulge 3:10 EOI-3 causes Normal Ventilation to be re established (for the dose rates BUILDINGMUST BE ON NORMALVENT)
Initial Conditions 3:00 "HPCI Room Flood Alarm" sporatically activales Unit 1 - Defueled In long lerm shutdixvn 240 ValveFCV7047 pon usly closes ln the RBCCW System 3:20 Penetration 2-X-107B Elev 565 Mezzanine) begfns 0:00 Battery Board 2 Load Test Sl 4.9%2.C(b)
ln progress - charging ballerles 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 0:51 EHC Leak In the Turbine Bldg fails the Turbhe Bypass Valves closed 1:05 Containment venting lhru Torus Inlthted 1:05 DG "C" falls lo starl due to clogged fuel filters 0:45-1:45 TSC/OSC/CECC Stafgng 1:50 A battery shorts and explodes In Battery Board Room 2 while being recharged from Ihe earlier load lest (SAE & Medical Emergency)
1:51 Fire Alarm due lo Batlery Board Room Explosion o
1:50 Medical Emergency-Worker injured by exploding battery fragments and acid (Simulate Ambulance/Hospital)
Unil2-100% Power on day 166 of continous run
- Increased DEI over lasl 95 days from 0.00013 to 0.96 uci/g I131 equivalenl
- Sl 4.9.A.2.C(b), Battery Board Load Test in progress - recharging batteries
- Ventilation fan for Battery Board Room 2 is loose on shaft - fan NOT turning
- RPS Alternate Circuit Protection OOS for testing by Customer Group Unit 3-Loading Fuel for Initialstaitup ager long term shutdown.
82 bundles loaded with one In movement MOUE (FU3/SU1)
ALERT (FA4)
Total RCS Leakage -or-Primary Leakage >40 gpm TS Re ulred Shutdown Site Area Emergency (HS10)
Explosion causing major damage Involving vital slruclures or e ui ment General Emergency (RG1)
Environmental Rad Levels 6:(