IR 05000259/1992006

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Repts 50-259/92-06,50-260/92-06 & 50-296/92-06 on 920214.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Transportation of Radioactive Matl
ML18036A649
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 03/20/1992
From: Decker T, David Jones
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18036A648 List:
References
50-259-92-06, 50-259-92-6, 50-260-92-06, 50-260-92-6, 50-296-92-06, 50-296-92-6, NUDOCS 9204080162
Download: ML18036A649 (5)


Text

i+a,a Afcu P

+

0 C

O 4e II/I e

IP IP

+w*w+

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:

50-259/92;06, 50-260/92-06, and 50-296/92-06 Licensee:

Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place

. 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:

50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License Nos.:

DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 H

Facility Name:

Browns Ferry 1, 2, and

Date Signed ZC Date Signed Inspection Conducted:

February 14, 1992 Inspector:

D.

W. 'nes.

Approved by: Mii.

T. R. Decker, Chief Radiological Effluents and.Chemistry Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY-Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the area of transportation of radioactive material.

Results:

One potential violation was identified. The licensee had failed to brace a shipment of low specific activity radioactive material to prevent shifting of lading during transport.

Following the inspection and discussions among Regional, Headquarters, and Department of Transportation (DOT) specialists and management, it was determined that the pertinent regulations lacked the specificity to support a Notice of Violation

.,9204080162 9203iq PDR ADOCK 05000259

PDR

.

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • R. Baron, Manager, Licensing
  • G. Bugg, Manager, Radwaste
  • J. Corey, Manager, Radiation Control M. Putman, Supervisor, Radwaste
  • P. Salas, Manager, Compliance and Licensing
  • J. Scalice, Plant Manager S. Wetzel, Compliance Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, and office personnel.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission W. Bearden, Resident Inspector E. Christnot, Resident Inspector

  • C. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview.

t 2.

Transportation of Radio active Material (86750)

CFR 71.5 required the licensee to comply with the applicable regulations of the Department of Transportation (DOT)

in

CFR Parts 170 through 189 when transporting licensed material outside the confines of the plant or other place of use, or when delivering licensed material to a

carrier for transport.

On February 12, 1992, a

tractor and flat bed trailer transporting a shielded container of low level radioactive waste overturned at the off-ramp from I-65 to I-40 near Nashville, Tennessee.

The shipment was enroute from the Browns Ferry site to Quadrex Recycle Center in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

The container was a lead-lined, 7.5 ft. x 7.5 ft. x 18 ft.

II During the accident the shielded container became dislodged from the flat bed trailer and came to rest on end in the highway median.

The Tennessee Department of Radiological Health responded to the incident and maintained control of the container until it was taken to a local wrecker service storage yard.

The container was examined for damage and surveyed for contamination and radiation levels. Initiallyone metal box weighing 49,100 pounds.

Enclosed in the shielded outer container were two 4.75 ft. x 5.7 ft. x 8 ft. steel boxes which individually weighed 3,960 pounds and 1640 pounds.

The radioactivity content of the inner containers was 243.53 microcuries and 11.96 microcurie penetration of the container's outer layer of steel was found.

The penetration was approximately 10 inches long and less than

inches in width at its maximum.

A subsequent closer examination revealed two minor cracks in the container's outer layer of steel which were less than 3 inches in length.

The lead lining was not penetrated and survey results indicated that no contamination had escaped from the container,.

Radiation surveys of the container indicated that the dose rates at the surface of the container and at 2"meters from the surface were at the same levels found by the licensee prior to shipment of the container and were within DOT limits.

The container was returned to the Browns Ferry site on February 13, 1992.

On February 14, 1992, the licensee removed the top of the outer container to determine whether the two inner containers had been damaged.

The inspector observed that the -fastening devices used to hold the tops on the inner containers were intact and that there was no obvious physical damage to the observable surfaces of the inner containers.

The inspector also observed that the inner containers were positioned such that they were in or near contact with one interior side and end of the outer, container. This left a space of approximately 12 inches between the apposite interior side and end of the outer container and the inner containers.

The licensee indicated that during preparation for shipment the inner containers were centered in the outer container and that there had been approximately 6 inches of space between the interior sides of the outer container and the inner containers.

The inspector noted that no bracing materials had been used to prevent movement of the inner containers during transport.

The licensee indicated that the decision to not brace the inner containers was a

"judgement call" based on the potential external radiation exposure which workers would have received while installing the bracing.

The manifest for this shipment indicated that the dose rates were 500 and 800 mrem/hr at the external surfaces of the inner containers.

The inspector also reviewed the manifest and shipping papers for the above shipment (Shipment No.

920211)

and determined that they included the information required by 49 CFR 172.200 through 179.204.

An apparent violation of DOT regulation

CFR 173.425(b)(6)

was identified.

The issue was reviewed by Region II management, as well= as officials of NRC Headquarters and the US DOT.

The results of this review are discussed in the following paragraphs.

No violations or deviations were identifie.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on February

= 14, 1992, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed above.

The inspector indicated that the licensee's failure to brace the inner containers for the above shipment was a potential violation of the DOT regulation

CFR 173.425(b) (6).

The licensee indicated that their interpretation of that regulation was that the requirement for'bracing applied only to the package and not to the contents of the package.

The licensee maintained that for the subject shipment the package was the outer container and therefore the, inner containers were not required to be braced.

The inspector advised the licensee that their views would be relayed to NRC management and given due

'consideration.

The Transportation Branch, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards was contacted to assist in reviewing the issue.

They, in turn, contacted officials in the U.

S.

Department of Transportation for a

further interpretation of the requirements of the regulations.

Upon further review, all parties (Region Il, HQS, and DOT)

considered that the regulations lacked sufficient specificity to support a Notice of Violation-.

Proprietary information is not contained in this report.