IR 05000247/1978031
| ML19274C921 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/15/1978 |
| From: | Keimig R, Rebelowski T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19274C920 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-247-78-31, NUDOCS 7901050367 | |
| Download: ML19274C921 (9) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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Region I Report No. 50-247/78-11 Docket No. 50-247 License No. DPR-26 Priority
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Category c
Licensee:
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003 Facility Name:
Indian Point Nuclear Generatino Station, Unit 2 Inspection at: Buchanan, New York Inspection conduc ed: Septem er 27-October 7,1978 Inspector :
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F. Rebelow' ski, Resident Reactor Inspector
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Approved by:
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[Section Nti.g, Chief,,Wactor Projects R. fl. Keimi/
date signed 1, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 27-OrLober 7, 1978 (Repert No. 50-247/78-31)
Areas Inspected:
Routine 1":?ection by the resident inspector of plant operations including:
tour of facility; observation of reactor operator requalification training; observation of physical protection in the areas of access control, barriers, search, escort, communications and compensatory measures; and, maintenance of nuclear components.
The inspection involved 24 inspector hours on site by the NRC resident inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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7901050 % 7 Apr
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Mr. A. Decker, Technical Engineer Mr. J. Halpin, Maintenance Engineer
- Mr. T. Law, Plant Manager
- Mr. C. Limoges, Reactor Engineer Mr. J. Makepeace, Technical Engineering Director
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- Mr. W. Monti, Manager, Nuclear Power Generating Depar nent Mr. A. Nespoli, Operations Engineer
- Mr. M. Shatkouski, Chief Operations Engineer Mr. R. Warren, Security Supervisor The inspector also interviewed and observed other licensee employees including members of operations, technical services, health physics, security and maintenance staffs.
- denotes attendees at the exit interview.
2.
Maintenance Outage The licensee entered into a maintenance outage on Septembr 15, 1978 to repair the No. 21 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals and to perform other maintenance items.
The outage was completad on October 6,1978.
a.
Reactor Coolant Pump Repairs The licensee determined through an increase in pressure in 2nd stage-seal, that the No. 21 RCP seals were deteriorating.
(1)
Review of Prerequisite Maintenance Items The inspector examined the Maintenance Work Package (No.
7871) which was issued to mair:tenance personnel.
The following items were verified:
Administrative approval of the Maintenance Work
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Request (MWR) was obtained prior to initiation of work on RCP; Procedures to perform work, R.C.P. Motor and Coupling
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Removal, 2/3, CM-RCS RCPS 1.3, dated March 19, 1976, R.C.P. Seal Overhaul, 3/3 CM-RCS RCPS 1.22, were approved and technically adequate;
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Quality Control requirements were detailed;
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The inspector verified that maintenance personnel
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were qualified to perform the repairs; The replacement material certifications were not
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available at time of inspection.
This item will be reviewed at a subsequent inspection; (50-247/78-31-02)
Radiation Work Permits 1829 and 1832 were issued for
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the pump repairs.
(2) Hydrostatic Test The licensee replaced the complete seal package. As part of the verification of the work performed, the MWR required an operational hydrostatic test of the reactor coolant system.
The inspoctor witnessed the hydrostatic test on. September 28, 1978. The Reactor Coolant System
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was 292F.and s 2200 psig.
The inspector observed that radiological controls were established which required additional protective clothing, eye protection and use of respirators.
The inspector also observed that precautions were instituted and followed to keep personnel exposures as low as reasonably achievable.
No leakage was observed in area of RCP No. 21.
b.
Additional Outage Items (1)
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) No. 23 Flange Leakage During the hydrostatic test, the licensee identified leakage at the Reactor Coolant Pump No. 23 pump casing to loop volute flange.
The licensee retensioned the flange bolts, but the leakage continued.
The licensee then increased the torque values after review by the Nuclear System Supplier and further evaluation by the licensee's staff.
No further leakage was observe (2)
Safety Injection Pump No. 23 (SIP)
Prior to criticality, the SIP No. 23 was declared inoperable, thus extending the outage. The No. 23 SIP was used to refill the Boron Injection Tank upon completion of repairs to the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) valves.
During startup of SIP No. 23, the operator noted that the discharge pressure did not increase.
The pump was secured immediately.
Examination of the pump (MWR 7952) identified the failure of a bushing and sleeve at a high pressure stage of the pump.
This failure was attributed to loss of flow which was caused by a partially restricted suction strainer.
With regard to the safety injection pump, the following items were addressed by the inspector:
Suction strainers exist in all intake elbows of SI
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Pumps; The strainers were originally installed during startup
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testing; The strainers do not appear on plant process and
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instrumentation diagrams (PID's).
The inspector stated that the strainers in the SI suction lines must receive a safety evaluation for their continued use, and the strainer, if approved, must be fabricated to an approved plan and a modification request must be instituted. Also, the use of the strainers would require specific surveillance procedures to insure uninterrupted flow.
The above three items are considered unresolved items and will be reviewed again by the inspector.
(50-247/
78-31-01)
c.
Additional Observations / Verifications The inspector observed no inadequacies in the licensee's
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tagging or plant valve statu.
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All LC0's associated with observed component repairs were
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met.
The inspector did not identify any items of noncompliance
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during his observations and verifications of the maintenance repair items.
3.
Condenser Tube Anomaly The licensee experienced higher than nornal chloride indications on the secondary condensate system during startup.
In<estigation by the licensee determined that five condenser tubes were severed and other tubes were damaged. The apparent cause was the dislodgement of the end plates at steam dump piping encasement in the condensers.
The plates were rewelded and strongbacks were fabricated to preclude this type of occurrence.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
4.
Review of Plant Operat'uns a.
Shift Logs and Operating Records (1)
The inspector reviewed the following logs and records, where applicable, for the period of September 15 thru September 30, 1978:
(a) Senior Reactor Operator's Log (b) Watch Supervision Log (c) Conventional Nuclear Plant Operator's Log
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(d) Night Order Book (e) Jumper Log (f) Locked Gate List (g)
Running Equipment Log (h)
Significant Occurrence Reports
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(2) The logs and records were reviewed to verify:
(a)
Log Book Reviews were being conducted by the staff; (b)
Instructions in the Night Order Book did not conflict with the Technical Specifications; (c) Jumper Log entries did not conflict with Technic l Specifications; (d)
Significant Occurrence Reports confirm compliance with Technical Specification reporting and L.C.0.
requirements; (e)
Log book entries involving abnormal conditions are sufficiently detailed; (3) Tne inspector used the following acceptance criteria for the above items:
(a) Technical Specifications; (b) Licensee Procedures -
0AD-3, " Plant Surveillance and Log Keeping Policy";
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SAP-126, " Jumper Log",
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SAP-124, " Reporting of Anomalous Conditions" (4)
Findings No items of noncompliance or unresolved items were identified during the inspector's review of logs and records.
b.
Plant Tour The inspector's tour consisted of entry into containment during hydrostatic testing of main coolant loop and a tour of turbine hall to observe radiation controls and plant cleanlines (1) Observations in Containment No fluid leaks were observed
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Pipe hanger and seismic restraints observed were
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acceptable Selected valves were correctly positioned
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Equipment and cauticn tags observed reflected proper
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information Control operators indicated knowledge of selected
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illuminated annunciators Control room manning observed at several times
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during the inspection was in conformance with the requirements of the facility Technical Specifications.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Observations of Physical Security The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, during regular and off-shift hours, that tha selected aspects of the security plan were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical security plans and approved procedures.
(a) Physical Protection Security Organization Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a
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full time member of the security organization with authority to direct physical security action was present, as required.
Manning of all three shifts on various days was observed
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to be as required.
All physical security members observed appeared capable
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of performing their assigned task.
b.
Physical Barriers Selected barriers in the protected area (PA) and vital areas (VA) were observed and random monitoring of isolation zones was performed. No items of noncompliance were identified.
c.
Access Control Observations of the following items were made:
Identification, authorization and badging
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Access control searches
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Escorting
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Communications Compensatory measures, when required
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d.
Findings
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The inspector identified no items of noncompliance.
6.
Operator Requalification Training The licensee maintains a simulator training facility on site.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for requalification train-ing for required control manipulations.
On September 29, 1978, a group of reactor operators (from Public Service Electric and Gas Company, New Jersey) were in the simulator facility under the instruction of the licensee's training coordinators.
a.
Program The requalification training program consisted of the following simualtor manipulations:
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Bringing the reactor through solid, pressurizer bubble and reactor startup
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Reactor startup to 100% power
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Plant shutdown and cooldown
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Reactor startup with induced instrumentation malfunctions
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Rapid load changes in manual mode
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Reactor trip control for BOLA and E0L.
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Malfunctions of nuclear steam supply system
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Malfunctions of nuclear components and instrumentation with reactivity anomalies.
b.
Observations The inspector witnessed operators on board.
Three operators were at board with three operators as observers.
The operators changed positions at periodic intervals giving each operator at least four hours per day board time.
The inspector also witnessed the operators reactions to a startup at 350 F with a rod drop, failure of main feed supply and loss of one channel of pressurizer instrumentation.
The inspector identified no inadequacies during his observation of the training.
7.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph 2.a and 2.c.
8.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the inspection findings including the unresolved item.