IR 05000206/1987007
| ML13323B246 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Johnson P, Obrien J, Qualls P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323B245 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-87-07, 50-206-87-7, 50-361-87-06, 50-361-87-6, 50-362-87-07, 50-362-87-7, NUDOCS 8705270354 | |
| Download: ML13323B246 (8) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No /87-07, 50-361/87-06, 50-362/87-07 Docket No, 50-361, and 50-362 License No DPR-13, NPF-10, and NPF-15 Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company P. 0. Box 800 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection at:
San Clemente, California Inspection Conducted:
arch 9 - April 17, 1987 Inspectors:
____ ils, roe Inspector Date Signed rien, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Approved by:
-_
P. hnson, Chief, Date Signed ReactcProjects Section 3 Inspection Summary:
Inspection on March 9 - April 17, 1987 (Report Nos. 50-206/87-07, 50-361/87-06 50-362/87-07)
Areas Inspected:
Routine project inspection in the areas of corrective action, open item followup, overpressure protection, and independent inspection. Inspection Procedures 30703, 92720, 92701, and TI 2500/19 were covere Results: In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie PIII ADC DR
DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted
- D. Schone, Quality Assurance (QA) Manager
- D. Herbst, Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) Supervisor
- N. Maringas, ISEG Engineer O* Corser, Compliance Engineer
- R. Plappert, Compliance Engineer
- S. Allman, SDG&E Manager, Nuclear
- J. Winter, SDG&E Engineer
- B. Katz, Operations and Maintenance Support (O&MS) Manager
- J. Harmon, QA Supervisor O* Zintl, Compliance Manager
- K. Johnson, Engineering Supervisor oW. Lazear, QA Supervisor S. Gosselin, Supervisor, NSSS Mechanical Engineering M. Rodin, O&MS Supervisor M. Farrell, O&MS Engineer M. Barr, Compliance Engineer
- Denotes attended meeting on March 13, 198 oDenotes attended meeting on April 16, 198 In addition, other members of licensee staff were contacted during the course of the inspectio. Corrective Action (IE Manual Chapter 92720)
The inspector reviewed the licensee programs and procedures for control and review of Operational Events, internally identified problems, QA audits, NRC inspection findings, employee concerns and special report For each of these areas, it appeared to the inspector that appropriate instructions were provided to:
O Ensure that a problem is reported to the appropriate levels of plant management and, if required, to the NR o Establish actions and responsibilities to resolve the proble O Prioritize problems with safety significanc o Set forth a method to follow corrective action to completio O Ensure that completed items are closed ou O Require periodic QA audit O Require a quality trend progra a. Operating Events The inspector reviewed the licensee program to identify, report, track, correct, review and close out operational events including LERs and generic letter The program appeared to the inspector to function efficientl Internally Identified Problems The inspector followed through on the licensee's corrective actions for several internally identified problems. The problems appeared to have been tracked and corrected according to licensee procedure c. QA Audits The inspector reviewed the followup procedures and tracked through the licensee system several QA audit identified deficiencies. The deficiencies appeared to have been identified, tracked and corrected in accordance with licensee procedure d. Employee Concern Program The inspector reviewed this program in Inspection Report 50-206/87-0 Special Reports by Internal or Other Organizations The inspector reviewed the licensee corrective action system for both ISEG items and INPO items. The system appeared adequate to ensure that problems were tracked and corrected in an appropriate manne f. Periodic QA Report The licensee receives a periodic report from the QA organization concerning the status of identified plant discrepancies. The licensee reporting system appeared to the inspector to prevent a large backlog of corrective item g. Quality Trend Program The inspector reviewed the licensee corrective action quality trend program. The program appeared to be effective in identifying repetitive problems and to help identify possible solutions to thes. Temporary Instruction 2500/19 The inspector reviewed the low temperature transient overpressure protection in place at the facilities. Unit 1 changes the setpoint of the PORVs when the plant is at a low temperature. Units 2 and 3 use the installed mechanical relief valves in the Shutdown Cooling Syste The inspector reviewed the safety evaluations for all three units, and verified that the setpoints conformed to 10 CFR 50 Appendix G. The inspector reviewed system drawings and it did not appear to the inspector that a single failure could disable or render inoperable the system Operation of the systems is controlled by licensee procedures. The operators are trained in the use of these procedures. In Units 2/3 the licensee, by procedure, limits charging pump usage to one pump. PORV electronics and setpoints appeared to be verified periodicall.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector reviewed the following open items with conclusions as noted:
a. 50-206/85-31-01 (Closed). The licensee committed to make some circuit modifications. These modifications are tracked internally by the licensee's tracking system The NRC audits these programs and has a periodic modification review. The current scheduled date for the licensee to make the circuit modifications is during the Cycle XI refueling outage, currently scheduled for fall of 1990. The followup item is closed as the modification tracking is being done internally by the licensee and the NRC monitors the licensee program b. 50-206/86-20-01 (Closed). The Writer's Guide problems were resolved with a revision to the guide with an effective date of February 9, 1987. This revision incorporated the INPO standard c. IN-86-25 (Closed). ISEG Report 86-ISE077 reviewed this notice for all three unit No problems were identified. This item is closed for all three unit d. 50-361 and 50-362/IB-86-03 (Closed). The licensee sent to the NRC a letter dated November 17, 1986. The licensee evaluation showed that their ECCS systems were not vulnerable to the single failure described. This item is close /84-15-01 (Closed).
TCN 1-4 to S0123-XI-2.1 was issued to resolve the potential problem of using commercially procured material in safety-related systems. This item is close f. 50-361/85-35-01 (Closed). The inspector reviewed licensee procedures TCN 10-8 for S0123-XI-1.8 and TCN 0-3 for SO123-XVII-5.2.1. The Control of Problem Equipment (COPE) program appeared to be fully implemented by these change g. Special Reports 50-361/21-65-XI and X2 (Closed). These are the same issues as listed in LER-82-165. The licensee did a complete system snubber examination. A total of 7 were found damaged and were replaced. The evaluation said that the damage probably occurred during a March 1981 water hammer transient during startup testin A licensee evaluation indicated that the feedwater piping had not been overstressed. These items are close h. 50-362/79-09-01 (Closed). This item discussed an inspector's concern that piping be inspected for mechanical damage prior to installing insulation. The licensee provided information to the inspector that, after the hot functional testing phase of startup, the insulation was removed completely and a total piping inspection was conducted. This item is close i. 50-362/84-24-02 (Closed). This item concerned the licensee finding during testing that the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system flows were slightly below the FSAR values. The licensee conducted an evaluation which determined that the flowrates were adequate and within safety margins. This item is close LER 50-362/82-06. This concerned an Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation caused by a connector termination which by a single failure resulted in the ESF actuation. The connector deficiency has been corrected by DCP 3-146CE. This item is close k. 50-206/GL-86-16 (Closed). The Westinghouse ECCS models listed in this letter were not used at San Onofre. This item is close. 50-206/85-11-01, 50-361/85-11-01, 50-362/85-10-01. The licensee revised Procedure S0123-XIII-13 to limit the amount of combustible materials allowed to be kept in plant areas containing safety-related equipment. These items are close m. 50-361/86-25-09 (Closed). The inspectors verified that the licensee had these records available for review. These records undergo the same licensee review by the quality control program as the records reviewed at the time of the NRC audit, which were satisfactory. In addition, the NRC monitors licensee actions in this area. This item is close Licensee Followup of 10 CFR Part 21 Reports (1) Closed 10 CFR Part 21 Reports:
(50-206, 50-361, 50-362)
The inspector examined the 10 CFR Part 21 packages for the below listed outstanding items. The inspector reviewed the packages to verify that the licensee entered each into their system, the appropriate engineering disciplines reviewed the package, and appropriate correction action was taken. The inspector further verified that when appropriate, the identified part or component was entered into the COPE system to alert the SCE purchasing system to the problem. Based on this review, the following open items are closed (all 3 units):
85-20-P Defect on undervoltage trip device (GE-AK&AKR)
86-15-P Limitorque - motor lead insulation breakdown 86-18-P Limit switch cracking on Limitorque valves 86-22-P Disqualification of Wilmar undervoltage relays 86-23-P Atwood & Morrill MSIV Thrust Bearing Problems 86-25-P Buchanan 724 Terminals for Limitorque Valves
86-26-P SOR Inc. prefixed Gauge Pressure Switches 86-28-P Contromatics - manual jackscrew failures (2) (Open) Part 21/86-20-P - Foxboro E and H Series Controller (Unit 1 only)
Neither the licensee's Rosemead office nor the onsite review group that handles Part 21 reports (O&MS) had received this report. A copy of the Region V file copy was presented to the onsite review group, and their review is in progress. This will be followed up during a future inspectio No violations or deviations were identifie o. 50-361/86-25-02 (Closed). This issue involved a licensee commitment to formalize a corrosion monitoring program for portions of the saltwater cooling and auxiliary feedwater systems. The inspector reviewed the San Onofre Maintenance Management System (SOMMS) and the Repetitive Maintenance Order (RMO) that was issued to address this issue. Also reviewed was a sample of completed RMOs for painting and corrosion control efforts. This item is close p. 50-361/86-25-03 (Open). This item dealt with a training deficiency for the operators, and their understanding of the auxiliary feedwater pump overspeed tri Procedure review is completed. Some of the on-the-job training (OJT) had been completed but not completely documented. Also a videotape for future training was committed but had not yet been produced. The expected action completion date is May 29, 198 q. 50-361/86-25-04 (Closed). This item dealt with how the licensee will assign responsibility for evaluating lessons learned from a Major Operating Event. The licensee responded to this issue in their NOV response, dated February 13, 1987. Basically, the ISEG is responsible for evaluating Major Operating Events, and this effort will be tracked using the San Onofre Commitment Register. This item is close r. 50-361/86-25-05 (Open). A review of all safe shutdown equipment and the training requirements for manual operations of that equipment is still in progress. The licensee was unable to provide a tentative completion dat s. 50-361/86-25-06 (Open). The licensee has corrected those material discrepancies identified in the report, and the operations department is still reviewing what additional Auxiliary Feedwater Valve position indication is required. Tentative completion date is April 30, 198 t. 50-361/86-25-07 (Closed). This item involved a concern by the inspector regarding internal temperatures in the Class IE inverters and the need for additional temperature recording capability. The inspector reviewed the engineering evaluation performed and data sheets of temporary monitoring equipment that was installed to
assess this concern at various plant power levels. A further review of SOMMS history indicated no trend of heat-related failures of these components. This item is close u. 50-361/86-25-08 (Closed). This item involved a concern that a single fused circuit protective device was used to feed two (2)
branch circuits in an Engineering Safety Features instrument power supply. Also, it was noted that fuse and circuit arrangement was not installed in accordance with the National Electric Code (NEC)
and'the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) Standard. The inspector reviewed and verified the information in the revised 10 CFR 50.59 report and engineering evaluation, that basically said:
(1) San Onofre Units 2 and 3 electrical design and materials are governed by the applicable IEEE and ANSI standards, not the above mentioned standard (Noted in the report was the fact that, in this case, they do not disagree.)
(2) As originally installed, each branch has its own circuit protection, each properly sized as per standard (3) The connector is properly sized, the conductors are the same wire size, it was qualified by Cyberex for use with two conductors, and it meets industry standards, including the NEC inten This item is close v. 50-206/85-31-02 (Open). This item dealt with the licensee replacement of carbon-steel bolts with stainless-steel bolts for the body-to-bonnet flange on qualified valves. The inspector reviewed the licensee engineering evaluation and submittal to the NRC. This item remains open pending NRR's review of the licensee calculation /85-37-01 (Closed). During an NRC inspection in June, 1986, (86-26), this item was closed with the exception of waiting for retest of the Safety Valves and to submit this data to the NRC resident inspectors. The inspector verified that these actions were completed and data was in compliance with S01-1-2.4, 1-6.64, and applicable standards. This item is close x. 50-206/85-37-02 (Closed). This item dealt with the above mentioned test and discrepancies with the test procedure and the before/after calibration checks done on the Hydroset.device gauges. The inspector reviewed.the revised test procedures, most recent test data and calibration test checkoff sheets, and verified that the test now eets the applicable ASME standards. Further, the licensee has reviewed other ISI safety valve tests and those procedures identified as requiring revision and retesting have been complete This item is close /86-22-01 (Closed). The inspector reviewed a study conducted by the license to identify the source of colloidal ferrous oxide and magnetite seen in the RCS and refueling cavity, and to assess its
affect on operations. This study concluded that the material is sediment from grit blasting associated with the 1980 Steam Generator Sleeving Project. This same problem was seen to a much larger degree during an earlier outage. Operational and radiological concerns are or will be tracked under separate followup items. This item is close.
Facility Tours On several occasions during the course of the inspection, the inspectors made inspection tours of the different units with the following observations:
In general, housekeeping appeared in good order with no significant amount of combustible material observed improperly placed in an are o A health physics barrier was partially loose; licensee personnel corrected the item when brought to their attentio o No significant material condition defects were observe o No safety hazards were note.
Exit Meeting Exit meetings were held on March 13 and on April 16, 1987, with persons denoted in paragraph 1. The items mentioned in this report were discussed at these times.