IR 05000155/1983013
| ML20024F412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1983 |
| From: | Axelson W, Gloersen W, Kers L, Patterson J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024F407 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-83-13, NUDOCS 8309090356 | |
| Download: ML20024F412 (22) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-155/83-13(DRMSP)
Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Site Charlevoix, MI Inspection Conducted: July 25 - 28, 1983
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Inspectors:
. P. Patterson Date 7[
N oersen Date
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8/23/83
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Date
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/lb Approved by: %. L. A:b;on, Chief ((
Y $3 Emergency Preparedness Section Date
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Inspection Summary Inspection on July 25 through 28, 1983 (Report No. 50-155/83-13(DRMSP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by eight NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise. The inspection involved 137 inspector - hours onsite by four NRC inspectors plus the resident inspector and four consultants.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, however, some weaknesses observed by the NRC team have been listed in an Appendix to the letter to the licensee. These weaknesses should be corrected by the licensee in conjuction with the licensee's own self-critique of the exercise.
8309090356 830824 PDR ADOCK 05000155 G
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DETAILS i
1.
Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Patterson, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational
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Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
W.. Gloersen, OSC, Onsite (out-of-plant) Radiological Monitoring Team,~
and offsite monitoring teams L. Kers, EOF J. Martin, TSC,0SC, and on-site (out-of-plant) Radiological Monitoring team
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G. Bethke, Control Room A. Loposer, TSC
'G. Wright, Control Room and EOF
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-J. Strasma, Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) ~
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Consumers Power Company (CPCo) and Areas Assigned / Observed i
D. Hoffman,' Plant Superintendent,-TSC (Site Emergency Director)
L. Darrah, Assistant Shift Superintendent, Control Room (Controller)
B. Alexander, Senior Engineer,.0SC
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R. Marusich, Staff. Engineer, OSC (Controller)
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M. Dickson, General Health Physicist, TSC (Plant Lead Controller)
P. Loomis, (CPCo-General Office) Emergency Planning Administrator, EOF B. Henton, Emergency Planning Coordinator (Midland Nuclear Plant), EOF
- J. Wilson, OSC and offsite monitoring teams (Controller)
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- R. 'Harrington, OSC and offsite monitoring teams (Controller)
R. Grupp, Big Rock Point Public Affairs Director, JPIC
'R. Abel, Operation and Maintenance Superintendent, TSC
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R. Schrades, General Supervisor, Nuclear Instrumentation and Control A. Katarsky, Nuclear Emergency Planner
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J. Dodson, General Supervisor Region Plant Public Affairs R. Silverman, (CPC0 - General Office), Director of Radiological Services C.'Axtell, Chemistry and Health Physics Superintendent
- L. Baumgart (Detroit Edison), Off-site (State Police)
T. Kevern, (CPC0 - NUTECH), EOF (Controller)
- G. Reed, (CPC0 - NUTECH), OSC (Controller)
G. Zech,-(CPCO)- NUTECH), TSC (Controller)
- Denotes those not-present at exit interview.
2.'
General An exercise of the licensee's Site Emergency Plan (SEP) was conducted at the Big Rock Point Plant on July 25-26, 1983, testing the integrated response of the licensee, State, and local organizations to a simulated emergency. The exercise tested the licensee's and-local agencies'
l capability to respond to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a
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major release. The scenario began with a small, unidentified leak developing in the reactor's cleanup system non-regenerative heat exchanger which later developed into a small loss of coolant accident (LOCA) as the heat exchanger's tubes ruptured. As the reactor water level decreased, loss of offsite power and diesel generator equipment failures, due to contaminated fuel, resulted in uncovering the core.
Later, a return of AC power caused a power surge which failed the vacuum relief instruments in the containment exhaust vent resulting in a false vacuum relief signal which opened the vacuum relief valves and allowed the fission products in containment atmosphere to be vented to the stack. Attachment 1 describes the scenario in detail. The exercise was integrated with a test of the Charlevoix County Emergency Services Plan, Emmet County Emergency Operations Plan, and State of Michigan Emergency Preparednes; Plan. This was a full scale exercise for the State of Michigan.
3.
General Observations a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements using the Big Rock Point SEP and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).
b.
Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly, and timely.
If the event had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public, c.
Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with eight NRC observers. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
observations on the response of the State and Local governments will be provided in a separate report.
d.
Critique The licensee held a critique at the Holiday Inn in Petosky, Michigan, on July 27, 1983.
In additon, a public critique was held in Petosky,
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Michigan on July 28, 1983, to present both the onsite and offsite findings by the NRC and FEMA representatives, respectively.
4.
Specific Weaknesses Noted
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No major weaknesses were detected by the NRC team. Minor weaknesses are listed under Specific Observations, Section 5.
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Specific'0bservations
a.
-Control Room Following initial conditions of reactor status, which were preceded by the announcement on the Public Address (PA) of the start of the exercise, messages from the Controllers came at specific changes in operations'as required by the scenario. These messages were sufficient to give the players enough indication that reactor conditions were degrading steadily at least at that time. The NRC observer was very impressed by the astuteness and-professionalism exhibited by.the Controllers. Maximum free play in approaching solutions to scenario problems were permitted by the shift crew.
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Data sheets were modified "on the spot" by.the controller to reflect the free play approaches. His performance contributed directly to the superior performance of the CR crew and the smooth flow of the
exercise.
Control room operators demonstrated a superior knowledge of their t
procedures and made detailed use of them. These procedures included
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not only Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs), but also normal operating procedures, electrical and pipe and instrument drawings, technical data book and technical specifications. The
Shift Supervisor (SS) was clearly in charge; e.g.; he directed his CR crew's effort, controlled access to CR, and coordinated problem solving..The CR crew was very thorough in examination of alternate courses of action. For example, efforts to isolate individual reactor systems to control and stop the leak rate into the sump were thorough and exhausting and continued till near the end of the
exercise.
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Weaknesses identified by the NRC observers included:
1.
Announcement of EAL for the Notice of Unusual Event (NUE) was
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not made until 10 minutes'after the SS declared the NUE.
2.
No formal, announcement was made over the PA or substitute
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mechanism (during the two hour electrical power failure) for
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the Alert, Site Area or General Emergency.
3.
Announced reactor status changes or other major plant conditions
'which effected the accident'were not made. These EAL type.
announcements and description of plant conditions are required by EPIP 4B.
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The SS's log was not always maintained in a timely and detailed manner. This also is required by EPIP 4B.
The Site Area Emergency was not recorded in the-log.
Periods of greater than i
45 minutes saw no log entry during time spans which included significant events.
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To summarize, the Control Room lead by the SS and his Operators plus the controllers performed quite well and all contributed
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significantly in a team effort. The weaknesses identified are relative and can be overcome with concentrated effort on communications through normal means provided at the plant and as
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. stipulated in the EPIPs.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The Plant Superintendent as Site Emergency Director (SED) sent to the SS's office.(at 1309) upon Notification of an Unusual Event (NUE) because this exercise occurred during his normal daytime working _ hours. The NRC observers noted that he had directed the notifications to be made to State and local County Government agencies and had his communicator begin calling any support personnel not on site to be prepared to respond to the emergency.
The Alert was declared at 1330 based on increased sump running time, reactor pressure approximately 450 psig and falling while containment pressure was rising. These conditions were indications
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of Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) as described in EPIP #1.
The transition of the TSC in taking over the management and direction of the accident-from the SS in the Control Room was smooth and without confusion, however, no formal vocal announcement was made by
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the SED when he took charge at the Alert Level. This change of command should be announced to the extent that all players are informed in both the Control Room and TSC including all support personnel. When the SED left the TSC briefly later in the exercise c
he did make a formal announcement naming his temporary replacement.
_ Physically, the TSC includes a long narrow corridor on one side of
.the Control Room and the glass fronted Shift Supervisor's office.
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Communications between players, unless face to face, is awkward and j
difficult. The SED or his immediate technical support staff must l
leave the SS's office and speak individually to those in the
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corridor - or use the security card reader at the entrance to the (
Control Room to get access.
Consequently it was difficult for the NRC observers to determine whether interaction was taking place
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between the TSC and the Control Room.
It initially appeared to NRC
observers that TSC actions were not as supportive as they could have
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been to the Control Room and OSC. However, a later post exercise anaylsis determined that the SED and his staff were gathering information and projecting its usage to help mitigate the accident as their function intended.
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Posting of current status board information on various plant
parameters was weak and ineffective. Dose assessment calculations l
were being made but not posted by the Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent and his supporting staff as conditions and data i.
developed. Protective action recommendations based on these dose assessment calculations were forwarded to the SED for his decision
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making relating to onsite and offsite evacuation if required.
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However, very little of this radiological data was plotted on the status board. Plots were set up for the Containment Air Monitor (CAM) readings, area monitor readings, and whole body and thyroid dose at one mile; but only one area monitor was plotted on the first day of the exercise, July 25, 1983. No data was plotted on the second and final day of the exercise, July 26, 1983. The dose rate data developed by the Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent seemed excesssively high for the containment sphere and adjacent areas. An NRC observer surmised that this data did not fit well with other data for the TSC and adjacent areas. Yet no attempt was made to resolve this apparent discrepancy.
Briefings by the SED did not include the TSC support personnel assigned in the TSC corridor area. Their updating and communication with the SED was not always obvious. The TSC area dimensions made it more difficult for the SED to conduct periodic briefings to the entire TSC complement at one time. This facet will have to be practiced during a drill situation until the TSC area is expanded as currently considered by the licensee. When the EOF was activated there appeared to be good dialogue and meaningful exchange of information between the SED and his counterpart in the EOF.
The PA system, with a speaker in the adjacent Control Room, should have been better and more frequently utilized by either the SED or a designated communicator particularly for reactor operational updates. Small signs, each about 9" x 3" with printed Emergency Levels on them, were hung outside the SS's office as the emergency leve. changed, whether escalating or de-escalating. This will not substitute for PA announcements. There was good interchange between the SED and the GOCC Director prior to EOF activation on decision-making, accident classification, and projected release information.
NRC observers concluded that during the two hour power loss on the second day, an excessive amount of simulated conditions prevailed in the TSC.
For realism the electric lights could have been turned off in areas non-critical to the actual outage in process at the plant.
Telephone service could be indicated as non-functional by having labels put over each telephone indicating it could not be used.
1.
The main deficiency observed in the TSC is the structural limitation as described earlier in this paragraph. This area is scheduled for major design changes to improve communications and contact between the players and their counterparts in the Control Room.
2.
More frequent formal announcements should be made by the SED for emergency classification changes and briefings on changing reactor conditions. As much as possible, these announcements should be made to the entire TSC support staff, t
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Operational Support Center (OSC)
The OSC was promptly activated ab'ut 1333 after the plant assembly siren was sounded for an alert. The Radiation-Chemistry technicians were immediately available with survey instruments to monitor the assembled staff prior to their being dispatched. The stack radiation monitor alarm trip point was set at 2 mR/hr.
to provide an early warning of increased radiation levels. This eliminated the need for someone to constantly monitor the instrument readout. At 1355 the OSC was fully staffed and began operations. Current plant conditions were established and posted on the status board.
The On-site Survey Team (OSST) completed a site boundary survey in a very proficient manner. " Frisking" by the OSST members at the OSC entrance was properly done and on a regular basis. At one point, a Rad. Chem. Technician who returned to the OSC with a repair team asked for OSC background radiation readings to assure that the Frisker probe was not affected by an elevated background. Later in the exercise, after the release had started, the Frisker at the OSC entrance was moved inside the OSC to take advantage of the shield wall to reduce background. The OSC staff realized that with an elevated background, the Frisker became a monitor for gross contamin-ation only. These observations by the NRC team conclude that both staff and technicians were well versed in radiation monitoring principles and how they related to emergency conditions in the plant, and their actions reflected the thoroughness of their emergency training.
The post-accident sampling team displayed a high degree of manipulative skills and proficiency in obtaining a post-accident sample and then diluting it, specifically a liquid core spray sample. The team suited up in full Anti-Contamination clothing with Biopacks in less than 10 minutes. The Health Physics Chem Supervisor briefed the team on their assignments, dose rates and precautions.
The team practiced sample handling techniques in a dry run prior to being dispatched. Techinques included good ALARA practices. Doses to team members would have been minimal. Their demonstration reflected superior training.
Two offsite survey teams were dispatched to the Charlevoix County Sheriff's office to check out emergency kits and instruments on the second day of the interrupted exercise about 0730 (reported separately). Repair teams were also utilized in the exercise to work on the makeup demineralizer as observed by the NRC team.
To cope with the loss of AC power a sound powered telephone and a radio were put into use by the OSC Director.
The NRC observer noted that habitability surveys (direct radiation and airborne activity) were performed in a timely and effective manner. The Controller-Player interaction was timely and appropriate. The Players asked thought provoking and relative questions which reflected their knowledge of the plant including
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projected as well as current radiation levels. While outdoor radiation surveys were being taken, one HP technician frequently requested the Controller to inform him whether he should be measuring beta radiation, i.e., he wanted to know whether he was detecting a plume or a contained source.
Weaknesses identified by the NRC team members assigned to the OSC are as follows:
1.
The OSC staff was not aware for over 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> that a General Emergency had been declared. The TSC neglected to notify the OSC of the classification change. However, the OSC also neg-lected to contact the TSC to ask about emergency conditions.
2.
Radio messages onsite were not preceded or concluded with, "This is a drill".
3.
During the two hour loss of all AC power, the OSC failed to use a battery powered air sampler which was available.
4.
Background noise in the OSC is a significant hindrance to group communications and telephone conversations. OSC operating
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space, facilities, and equipment were very limited, but appar-ently functional.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
The EOF was fully activated shortly after 0715 on the second day at the Site Area Emergency Level which carried over from that same level when operations closed on the first day of the exercise. The EOF at this stage is prepared to take over from the General Office Control Center (G0CC) in Jackson, Michigan. The declaration of a General Emergency at 0809 was made by the GOCC, as was proper according to the licensee's Emergency Plan.
The various supporting groups in the EOF including health physics, technical support, communications, administrative and logistical worked well together. Teamwork was evident. Procedures including EPIPs and others were being referred to when needed.
Controllers allowed use of free play in curtailing reactor conditions, plume tracking or other facets of the emergency which could have more than one solution. A system for transmitting messages between the E0F and other locations used a facsimile machine as opposed to the prior exercise which tried a " Whisper-Writer" with limited success.
Comments on the facsimile usage were mostly positive by players and/or Controllers / Evaluators. The NRC observer noted that the log of messages recorded over 130 messages distributed before noon.
Clerical assistance was well utilized and made a significant con-tribution to internal was well as external communications. Logistics planned ahead for supplies, food, lodging or whatever else could be provided for those directly involved in the emergency exerice. An NRC observer and also the NRC team leader noticed that the EOF
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Director had not made any reactor status announcements on major emergency changes or any announcements relating to emergency classification between 0809 (when General Emergency was declared)
and 0930. The NRC team Leader informed the licensee's Exercise Coordinator of this deficiency and the problem was remedied shortly.
From there on, all significant reactor conditions, emergency classification changes, or other meaningful information were announced formally by the EOF director to all participants in the EOF at the same time.
The EOF staff and management demonstrated good resourcefulness by re-establishing communications only a few minutes after the AC power failure.
Status boards were well defined with all key areas and parameters listed. A General Information Board was well used, although initial information was a bit slow in being posted.
One NRC observer felt that another status board was needed to list reactor equipment status. On the top of each board was listed the person responsible for posting the information on that board. For traceability and checking its accuracy, this was a unique, simple guide.
Two representatives of the Michigan State Department of Health were present throughout the time the EOF was activated and were privy to any health physics or dose assessment information being generated by the emergency participants. The Health Physics Support Team Leader provided clear and effective direction to his staff. The map used for plume tracking in the main room of the EOF could be improved upon by using a 0 - 5 mile EPZ map with more detail particularly within two miles of the plant. This would have been more effective when evacuation of a manufacturing firm of 150 employees was recommended by the EOF Director after conferring with the SED in the TSC. This firm is just beyond the licensee's property lines on Highway M-31.
An NRC observer felt that dose calculation procedures based on actual release need to make stronger demands for information relative to the duration of the release. Projected doses, in addition to dose rates, need to be available on a routine basis for comparision with EPA Protective Action Guides. Dose rates, per hour of release or of exposure, are acceptable for potential releases, but actual releases need to take the projected release duration into account.
Communications with offsite agencies and also with the offsite monitoring teams was handled well. Breaks in radio reception occurred between the EOF and offsite monitoring teams. A separate telephone trunk line should be established for the NRC phone lines, both ENS & HPN.
In a real loss of power as simulated in this exercise, these two phones would also be out of order. They are presently on a bus powered by a diesel generator.
When de-escalation was recommended to the Alert Level at about 1316 on the second day, it was done at the EOF Controller's request. He overrode the players' objections to allow the State of Michigan to fulfill their FEMA requiremnt to show reentry before 2:00pm, the scheduled time for the exercise to be completed.
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e.
Offsite Monitoring Teams Two offsite monitoring teams each consisting of an HP/ Chem technician and a maintenance person, were dispatched from the County E0C in the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Office in a timely manner. The teams were briefed on plant conditions before they were dispatched from the OSC to the County EOC, however, one of the team members indicated to the inspector that it was difficult to hear everything i
due to the noise level of the compressors in the OSC. Survey monitoring equipment was checked for operability by the teams prior to leaving the county EOC. The inspector observed that there was no back up radiation equipment available in the emergency kits.
Although backup equipment was available in the plant, there may been have unnecessary radiation hazards confronting field team members if they had to return to the site to replace a failed monitor. Radio contact was established with the EOF prior to departing from the County EOC. The backup system for communications between the field teams and the E0F consisted of a call-in procedure using a pay phone. The field monitoring teams requested an emergency phone number over the CB radio. This practice is not a good idea since it could create rumor control problems from an unwanted listener on the plant's CB channel.
In addition, a roll of currency compatible with the local pay telephones should be available in the emergency kit.
After the teams departed from the County EOC, radio communications were lost for some time between Field Team No. I and the Boyne City EOF. During that_ time, Field Team No. 2 acted as a relay between Field Team No. I and the E0F. Although Field Team No. 2 acted properly in taking appropriate actions to compensate for the poor radio communications, the utilization of the team was limited severely during parts of the exercise. More effort must be made by the licensee to minimize the size of the areas of poor or no radio l
reception. Also, these areas should be marked clearly on the maps used by the offsite monitoring teams.
The field monitoring teams quickly located the monitoring and sampling locations as specified by the EOF, however, the inspector
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noted some initial difficulty when the EOF directed Field Monitoring
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Team No. 2 to a location in Sector E.
The problem was due to the l
fact that the field monitoring team maps did not have the sector
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overlay on them. The maps used by the offsite monitoring teams should be equivalent to the ones used in the EOF to minimize this confusion.
The field teams demonstrated familiarity with their operating procedures in reading beta gamma monitoring results and promptly reported their results to the EOF. The inspector observed Field Team No. 2 correctly collect and handle a radioiodine/ particulate-air sample.
Gross activity (Ci/m ) was determined and recorded in the field and the information was transmitted promptly~to the EOF. The inspector also observed good health physics practices when Field Team No. 2
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O efficiently collected, bagged, and labeled a vegetation sample and a road surface smear. However, the team did not turn in all the environmental samples collected per EPIP-5F and 50 to the Boyne City EOF for further/ future analysis.
All field team members were provided with appropriate personnel'
monitoring devices, however. individual team members did not monitor their exposure during the exercise nor did the EOF request, information on their exposure.
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Items which should be considered for improvement include:
1.
More effort must be made by the licensee to minimize or eliminate the size of the areas of poor or no radio reception.
This effort may be accomplished by increasing the range of the radios and providing separate CB Channels for plant and offsite communications.
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A backup radiation monitor s,hould be available in' the emergency
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kits at the County EOC;in the Charlevoix County Sheriff's
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office.
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Field teams should not request emergency telephone numbers over the CB radio to be used for their call-in procedure via ~a pay phona since this may create rumor control problems. Also,La
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roll of coins compatible with the local pay phones.should be-included in the field monitoring teams emergency kits.
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Maps used by the field monitoring teams should be equivSlant to the EPZ Sector Maps used by the EOF to minimize confusion in
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locating sampling locations.
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Team members.should keep track of their individual exposures.
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Joint Public Information Center _(JPIC)
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l The JPIC was located ~at the.Petosky Holiday Inn in the same location
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where the entrance and exit meetings were held as well as the joint NRC/ FEMA presentations on July' 28, 1983. The facility as observed by the our Publicl Affairs.0fficer'was considered to be large enough for both licensee plus news media _ personnel. The-public address system functione'd well. Adequate' telephone and typeeriters were
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provided. All facets of a communication system were.considereds
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excellent. There was good coordination with the EOF Director and'his
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technical supp' ort staff. A computer terminal was available as well?
i as an operable facsimile system to transmit messages. The v'
spokesperson plus supporting technical manager were both well
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qualified and knowledgeable and able to communicate key information-
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when deemed necessary.
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Briefings were held to report major changes in the emergency or eme.r-gency classification changes. They were held on fairly regular time.
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schedules. Briefings were videotaped for replay to newly arrived
- media representatives to bring them up to date. Written announce-im x ment's were also available.
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TheJNRC' observer' felt that the JPIC was sometimes slow to report a N_
major change in accident conditions. The news center had the infor-mation, but for.their reasons to assure confirmation and accuracy, were not.always timely in their news release. For example, the
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radiation release began about.1015, still it was not mentioned at the 10.30 briefing.
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Overal'1,-the JPIC was a great improvement in operations, equipment,
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and communications ability from those observed in the prior April
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'1982_ emergency exercise.
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Exit Interview
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- An exit interview was held at the: conclusion of the-licensee's critique in which the team, leader summarized the observations and preliminary
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findings of the teim. The GOCC was not observed by NRC during this
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exercise. Minor weaknesses were discussed with licensee management at
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I this exit. interview and in subsequent telephone calls during the week of
. The li'ensee management agreed to address these items
. August 1, 1983.
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upon receipt of the final report.
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The Plant Manager,'who served as SED during the exercise, also made some
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comments in summary of the exercise. He stressed that with the outage q.
for refueling,;1 imitation.of using only one half of the Control Room for
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the exercise, and unavailability of key personnel for the exercise
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because of, priority assignments, it was more difficult than normal to 7, conduct a.succe'sful emergency exercise. The next emergency exercise s
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will. definitely be scheduled to avoid an outage period.
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i-Attachment: Exercise Scenario Outline
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I ' % . g i .. - k BREX-83 BIG ROCK POINT NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE INFORMATION SECTION 8.3 DAY ONE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS . __ "'
. . . . BREI-83 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Approximate Scenario Time Time Key Events (July 25, 1983) 1200 00/00 Plant in running at 215 mwt.
Operations is midway through an additional hr check of level rise in the ecciosure sump. The source of leakage to the reactor cooling water tank remains unidentified.
1215 00/15 An Auxiliary Operator (AO) reports data indicating leakage into the enclosure sump has increased to.8 gpm.
1230 00/30 Chem lab reports radionuclide analysis of the RCW tank indicates increasing fission product inventory over the previous analysis.
1245 00/45 A reduction in reactor power is initiated to investigate the source of leakage. Additional dirty sump leakage data collection in progress.
1300 01/00 An A0 reports data indicating leakage into dirty sump has increased to ~2 gpm. The Shift Supervisor notifies the Plant Superin-tendent that an LCO exists with respect to Tech Spec 4.1.2 (c).
1310 01/10 An Unusual Event is declared by the Shift Supervisor. Notifications are made to Consumers Power Company duty personnel, tha NRC, the County Sheriff and Michigan State Police.
1330 01/30 Plant shutdown through notch insertion continues, further reducing reactor power to ~50% rated power.
1400 02/00 Reactor is at 25% rated power with shutdown still in progress.
1415 02/15 Reactor is Suberitical. A Liquid Process radiation alarm occurs.
1430 02/30 Reactor cooling water monitor is pegged high and the enclosure dirty sump leak rate appears steady between 3-5 gpm.
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. M BREX-83 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (cont'd) Approximate Scenario Time Time Key Events 1445 02/45 Dew cell alarms occur. Reactor pressure takes a sharp turn downward.
1447 02/47 The Reactor scrams on high containment pressure. All dew cells are pegged.
1452 02/52 Reactor pressure is ~450 psig and falling.
Containment preseure is rising. Feedwater at full flow trips on low suction (Hotwell empty).
1455 02/55 An Alert is declared due to indications of a LOCA. Follow-up notifications are made to offsite agencies and authorities.
1500 03/00 Contain:nent pressure peaks at ~16 psig and levels off. Reactor pressure is ~250 psig with water level full scale high.
1515 03/15 A feed pump is returned to service, but could not regain the steam drum level before tripping on low suction.
1525 03/25 The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) are activated.
1530 03/30 Containment pressure is 5 psig and falling.
Reactor water level is nearly offscale low.
RDS actuation has occurred. Core spray valves have opened and core spray flows are 380 gpm and 270 gpm (backup and sparger flows respectively).
1535 03/35 The General Office Control Center (GOCC) is staffed in Jackson, Michigan.
' ' l 1540 03/40 A Site Area Emergency is declared due to reactor water level < 2'9" above the core, ( indicating a LOCA in excess of makeup capa- ' Personnel accountability is completed city.
satisfactorily.
l 1545 03/45 All nonessential personnel are evacuated from the site and Security restricts access.
Reactor pressure is down to 5 psig.
l 1550 03/50 The GOCC assumes responsibility if not previously.
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- - - - _. - _ _ . BREX-83 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (cont'd) Approximate Scenario Time Time Key Events 1600 04/00 Containment pressure is <2 psig. Reactor water level sensors remain offscale low with core spray flows at 460 and 320 gpm.
1630 04/30 End of first day of the exercise. Main-tenance activities and Operations actions are simulated to continue throughout the night.
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. - . . A . , BREX-83 BIG ROCK POINT NUCLEAR PLANT , ' EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE INFORMATION <
SECTICN 8.4: DAY TWO INITIAL CONDITIONS . '
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o . . , . BREI-83 BIG ROCK POINT NUCLEAR PLANT SEP EXERCISE SCENARIO Initial Conditions (0700, July 26, 1983) 1.
A Site Area Emergency had been declared at 1540 on July 25, 1983 due to reactor water level being less than 2'9" above the core.
2.
Through the night, containment water level has risen due to the addition I of core spray water. The Sphere is isolated.
i 3.
The diesel fire pump (which failed shortly after starting during the I LOCA) has been repaired by the Maintenance Department.
4.
The Plant is now on the recycle mode for core spray with #1 core spray pump l in service and the electric fire pump being used as the source of cocling water.
5.
The Make-up Demineralizer has not been repaired. Maintenance is still l trying to repair the timing sequence.
6.
All instrumentation in the containment that is not LOCA qualified has l failed.
7.
Restricted access to the Site has continued.
l l 8.
No other evolutions are in progress at this time.
l l l l l l l HANDOUT 8.3 . -- , - -
. . D' , BREX-83 BIG ROCK POINT NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE INFORMATION , l l l l ' l , SECTION 8.5: DAY TWO SEQUENCE OF EVENTS i I e l l l l l l i , I
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. - BREX-83 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (cont'd) Approximate Scenario Time Time Key Events (July 26, 1983) 0700 19/00 Reactor water level is offscale low. Contain- . ment pressure is slightly negative. Contain-ment water level is at 587'. A core spray pump is in service on recycle.
0715 19/15 Core spray flow is 310 gpm.
0730 19/30 Reactor water level remains offscale low with pressure at 1-2 psig.
0800 20/00 A loss of offsite power occurs. Core spray flow is O gpm (no power to the core spray pumps).
0805 20/05 AO's dispatched to station power room to strip 1A (or 2A) buss and transfer power for core spray pump to the emergency buss.
0810 20/10 A General Emergency is declared by the GOCC Director. Offsite authorities are notified.
0815 20/15 various attempts are made by the Operators to regain reactor core spray.
0830 20/30 Containment pressure is slowly rising to several pounds.
0900 21/00 Radiation levels begin to rise via hand-held instrumentation (fuel gap release is beginning to occur).
j 0910* 21/10 The near-site Emergency Operations Facility 1s staffed.
l 0930 21/30 Area radiation levels continue.to rise.
Localized fuel melt begins.
l 0945 21/45 The EOF assumes responsibility if not previously.
1000 22/00 Power to the offsite 46Kv line is restored.
i I
- This event may occur sooner due to prepositiening of personnel.
8.5.1 . - - __ ...,
- . BREX-83
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (cont'd) Approximate Scenario Time Time Key Events 1005 22/05 Operators return a core spray pump to service and initiate the process of transferring loads from the emergency buss to normal station power.
1008 22/08 Enclosure spray in service starts depressur-j izing containment.
l 1010 22/10 All emergency buss loads are returned to normal station power. However, a power , surge to the 1Y bus has failed vacuum ' relief instrumentation. This causes a false enclosure vacuum indication in the control room and both exhaust vent valves to open. Containment pressure forces contaminated atmosphere up the stack.
1012 22/12 Field monitoring teams are directed to track the plume.
j 1013 22/13 The prompt alerting system sirens and emer-gency broadcast system (both will be simu-lated) are utilized to notify the public, if not done previously.
1014 22/14 Press briefings are established at the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC), if not done earlier.
( 1015 22/15 I & C disables the vacuum relief instrumenta-tion, however, the vent valves remain open I and the release of containment atmosphere I continues up the stack.
1030 22/30 I & C attempts to isolate the exhaust vent path by cycling the vacuum relief instrumentation.
1100 23/00 An exhaust butterfly valve indicates closed.
The stack release is terminated.
' 1115 23/15 Primary System conditions stabilize. Offsite authorities are continuing to be updated.
l . 8.5.2 l l
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- - BREX-83 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Approximate Scenario Time Time Key Events 1145 23/45 Plant conditions continue to improve with greater assurance over control of the reactor.
1200 24/00 Through discussions with the leading facil-ities and organization managers, the emer-gency classification is de-escalated. A post accident chemistry sample is taken.
1215 24/15 Reentry activities are initiated both onsite and offsite.
1300 25/00 Recovery organizations are established as final reentry activities are completed.
1330 25/30 Control of the plant is maintained. Offsite authorities are updated.
1400 26/00 Following notification to all personnel involved, the exercise is ended.
8.5.3 l }}