ML20024F406

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Forwards IE Insp Rept 50-155/83-13 on 830725-28.No Noncompliance Noted.List of Identified Weaknesses Re Control Room,Technical Support Ctr & Offsite Monitoring Teams Encl
ML20024F406
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/24/1983
From: Paperiello C
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Dewitt R
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
Shared Package
ML20024F407 List:
References
NUDOCS 8309090350
Download: ML20024F406 (4)


See also: IR 05000155/1983013

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'AllR 2 4 M'

Docket No. 50-155

Consumers Power Company

ATTN:

Mr. R. B. DeWitt

Vice President

Nuclear Operations

212 West Michigan Avenue

' Jackson, MI 49201

Gentlemen:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by J. P. Patterson,

W. B. Gloersen, and L. L. Kers of this office on July 25-28, 1983, of

activities at Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant authorized by NRC Operating License

No. DPR-6 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. D. P. Hoffman, Plant

Superintendent, and others of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined.during

the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective

examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and

.. interviews with personnel.

No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified during the

course of this inspection.

We are including as an appendix to this report a list of weaknesses identified

in this inspection.

Corrections for these weaknesses should be made by the

licensee in conjuction with the licensee's own critique of this emergency

. preparedness exercise.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure (s)

will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office,

by telephone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written

application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of

the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the re-

quirements of 2.790(b)(1).

If we do not hear from you in this regard within

the specified periods noted above, a copy of this letter and the enclosed

inspection report will be placed in the Public Document Room.

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Consumers Power Company

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We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

-

C.

. Paper (ello, Chief

Emergency Preparedness and

Radiological Safety Branch

Enclosures:

1.

Appendix

2.

Inspection Report

No. 50-155/83-13(DRMSP)

cc w/encls:

D. J. VandeWalle, Nuclear

Licensing Administrator

1

D. P. Hoffman, Plant

Superintendent

DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)

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Resident Inspector, RIII

Ronald Callen, Michigan

Public Service Commission

S. Ferris, FEMA Region VII

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Appendix

Listed below, are the weaknesses which should be corrected as a result of the

emergency preparedness exercise conducted on July 25 and July 26, 1983 by the

Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant.

Control Room

1.

Announcement of the Emergency Action Level (EAL) for the Notice Of

Unusual Event (NUE) was not made utstil 10 minutes af ter the Shif t

Supervisor (SS) declared the NUE.

2.

No formal, announcement was made over the PA or substitute mechanism

(during the two hour electrical power failure) for the Alert, Site Area

or General Emergency.

3.

Announced reactor status changes or other major plant conditions which

effected the accident were not made. These EAL type announcements and

description of plant conditions are required by Emergency Plan

Implementing Procedure (EPIP 4B).

4. .

The SS's log was not always maintained in a timely and detailed manner.

This also is required by EPIP 4B.

The Site Area Emergency was not

recorded in the log.

Technical Support Center (TSC)

1.

Structural limitations of the TSC area including the SS office and the

long narrow corridor adjacent to the Control Room makes it awkward to

properly administer. The Plant Superintendent has verbally assured the

NRC Team Leader that this area is being' tentatively scheduled for

structural changes pending approval of corporate funding in the next

year's budget.

2.

More frequent, formal announcements should be made by the Site Emergency

Director (SED) for emergency classification changes and briefings on

changing reactor conditions.

Operational Support Center (OSC)

1.

The OSC staff was not' aware for over 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> that a General Emergency

had been declared. The TSC neglected to notify the OSC of the

classification change. However, the OSC also neglected to contact the

TSC to ask about emergency conditions.

2.

Radio messages onsite were not preceded or concluded with, "This is a

drill".

3.

During the two hour loss of all AC power, the OSC failed to use a battery

powered air sampler which was available.

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Appendix

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4.

Background noise in the OSC is a significant hindrance to group

communications and telephone conversations.

Offsite Monitoring Teams

1.

- More effort must be made by the licensee to minimize or eliminate the

size of the areas of poor or no radio reception. This effort may be

- accomplished by increasing the range of the radios and providing separate

CB Channels for plant and offsite communications.

2.

A backup radiation monitor should be available in the emergency kits at

the County E0C in the Charlevoix County Sheriff's office.

3.

Field teams should not request emergency telephone numbers over the CB

radio to be used for their call-in procedure via a pay phone since this

may' create rumor control problems. Also, a roll of coins with the local

pay phones should be included in the field monitoring teams emergency

kits.

4.

Maps used by the field monitoring teams should be equivalent to the EPZ

Sector Maps used by the EOF to minimize confusion in locating sampling

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locations.

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Team members should keep track of their individual exposures.

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