IR 05000116/1994001

Insp Rept 50-116/94-01 on 940110-11.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Review of Plans Procedures & Revs of Safeguards Events & Fixed Site Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Matl of Moderate Strategic Significance

ML20059L407
Person / Time
Site:	University of Iowa
Issue date:	01/25/1994
From:	Belanger J, Creed J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059L404	List: IR 05000116/1994001 ML20059L403
References
50-116-94-01, 50-116-94-1, NUDOCS 9402070013
Download: ML20059L407 (3)

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i I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  !

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REGION III j L

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Report No. 50-116/94001(DRSS)

, Docket No. 50-116 License No. R-59 Safeguards Group No. V

Licensee: Iowa State University of  !

' Science and Technology l Ames, IA 50011 i

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Facility Name: University Training Reactor (UTR-10)  !

Inspection At: Nuclear Engineering Laboratory, Ames, IA j Inspection Ccnducted: January 10-11, 1994 l

Type of Inspection: Routine. Announced Physical Security Inspection Inspector: Q . ide.fwfgi / / GL D/79'

J. L. Belanger * Date Serior Physical Security Inspector Approved By: I /6/

R. Creed,-Chief Date feguards and IR Section Inspection Summary Inspection on January 10-11. 1594 (Report No. 50-Il6/94001(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Included a review of Plans Procedures and Revisions, Reports of Safeguards Events; and Fixed Site Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic Significanc Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements in the areas inspected. The licensee's physical protection system adequately implemented the applicable provisions of 10 CFR Part 73. The physical-structures, equipment and procedures were adequate to allow the licensee to control access to designated security areas. The security program minimized the potential for unauthorized removal of special nuclear material and facilitated the location and recovery of missing material. The inspector observed that the licensee contirved the onsite storage of High Enriched Uranium fuel following core conversion to Low Enriched Uraniu I The daily, weekly and annual checks and tests required by the security plan were adequately performed. Detection aids, lighting, communications, physical barriers, locks, and access control systems performed as designed. Campus public safety officers provided excellent response suppor PDR ADOCK 05000116:

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted In addition to the key members of. the licensee's staff listed below, the .

inspector interviewed other employees and members of the security organization. The asterisk (*) denotes those present at the onsite Exit Interview conducted on January 11, 199 ,

• J. Adams, Reactor Manager

• T. Zimmerman, Health Physicist - .

• E. Sobottka, Director, Environmental Health and Safety L. Jaeger, Director of Public Safety ,

2. Entrance and Exit Interviews At the beginning of the inspection, Mr. J. Adams, Reactor Manager ,

was informed of .the purpose of this inspection, its scope and the topical areas to be examine , The inspector met with the licensee representatives, denoted in '

Section 1, at the conclusion of onsite inspection activities. A general description of the scope and conduct of the inspection was ;

provided. Briefly listed below are the findings discussed during-

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the exit interview. The details of each finding listed below are referenced, as noted in the repor ,

(1) The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments that no violations, deviations, or unresolved items were identifie (2) The licensee acknowledged the inspector's observation that the facility continued to store the High Enriched Uranium, i approximately one year and seven months after the fuel was eligible for shipmen The licensee stated that want to ship the HEU because of !

limited storage space. They can currently only off load i half of the LEU core because of the space taken up by the HEU. The licensee advised the inspector that the Department '

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of Energy has informed them'that' they are last on the priority shipment list because of. the small quantity of HEU l that they possess. (Report Details, Section 4)  ;

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3. Clear Functional /Proaram Areas Intaected (MC 0610) ,

Listed below are the areas which were examined by the inspector within the scope of these inspection activities in which no violations, t deviations, unresolved or open items were identified. These areas were l reviewed and evaluated as deemed necessary by the inspector to meet the specified " Inspection Requirements" (Section 02) of the applicable NRC :

Inspection Procedure (IP) as applicable to the security pla Sampling !

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a reviews included interviews, observations, testing of equipment and documentation review that provided verification of the licensee's ability to meet security commitments. The depth and scope of activities were conducted as deemed appropriate and necessary for the Program Area and operational status of the security syste !

Number Proaram Area and Inspection Reauirements Reviewed 81401 Plans. Procedures and Reviews: (01) Plan Revisions, (02) !

Unapproved Revisions; (03) Records of Revisions; (04)

Procedures; (05) Security Program Revie Reports of Safeauards Events: (01) Trace Investigation; (02) Incidents; (03) Events 81421 Fixed Site Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material !

of Moderate Strateaic Sianificance: (01) Use and storage; ,

(02) Detection and Surveillance; (03) Access Control; (04)

Response, (05) Search; (06) Testing and Maintenanc . Fixed Site Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate -

Strateaic Sianificance ,

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The inspector observed that the licensee continues to store HEU onsite ;

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despite the fact that the material was eligible to be shipped sixteen '

months ago and there was no inoication that it was to be shipped in the immediate futur Iowa State University's reactor facility was one of many test and I research reactor facility to convert to low enriched cores to reduce the potential for nuclear proliferation. All of the HEU was out of the '

reactor core on May 6, 1991. The material was required to be in storage for one year after removal from the core prior to shipment. May'1992 would have been the eligibility date for shipmen l The HDi is Depar' a of Energy (DOE) owned. -A DOE representative at a :

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rece 7RTR (Tu v M earch, Training Reactors). industry meeting noted that Ir.,a Statt Yve sity is last on the list of DOE priority facilities for i shipment because of the small quantity of material :

compared to other facilitie The significance of the HEU onsite is two fold: (1) The material is less secure from theft because it is now outside the reactor core; and-(2) it significantly impacts the licensee's storage capability in that they can only store one half of the LEU core outside of the reacto The licensee stated that a shipment date is indefinite. In addition to the low priority given by DOE, there is also a problem of shipment cas The BMI cask, currently in use, weighs ten tons. ISU's crane is rated for five tons. Consideration is being given.to using the 6M container i but there has not been a Safety Analysis Review performed. At the present time, there is no commitment by DOE to conduct such a revie ,

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