IR 05000057/1986001
| ML20205H462 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Buffalo |
| Issue date: | 07/29/1986 |
| From: | Doerflein L, Elsasser T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205H452 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-057-86-01, 50-57-86-1, NUDOCS 8608200082 | |
| Download: ML20205H462 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report N /86-01 ,,
Docket N License No. R-77 9 fority -
Category F Licensee: State University a New York at Buffalo
Rotary Road Buffalo, New York 14214 Facility Name: Buffalo Materials Research Center Inspection At: Buffalo, New York Inspection Conducted: March 24 and 25, 1986 Inspector:
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T. Doerflei L
Project Engineer 7 !!f6
' date 4cketo oj Section IB i l
Approved by: ,L '
'T. 'C. El sa
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'e,' Chief 7/ZI!
date Reactor Pr cts Section 3C Inspection Summary: Inspection on March 24 and 25, 1986 (Report No. 50-57/86-01)
Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection by a region based inspector of licensee action on previous inspection findings; allegation followup; facility operations; logs, records, and surveillance testing; organization, review and audit; radiation controls; and fuel specification Results: No violations were identified in the areas examined.
i 8608200082 860806 PDR ADOCK 05000057 G PDR
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DETAILS Persons Contacted
- Mr. L. G. Henry, Director, Buffalo Materials Research Center
- Mr. J. P. Griffin, Senior Health Physicist
"Mr. P. M. Orlosky, Operations Manager Mr. M. A. Pierro, Radiation Safety Officer f The inspector also contacted reactor operators during the course of the ( inspectio * Denotes those present at the exit interview.
l Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (57/83-03-03): Failure to post and control personnel access into a high radiation area. The inspector verified the licensee installed a steel barricade for the high radiation area on the neutron deck. The inspector noted that the entrance to the high radiation area was locked and the the keys were maintained by the control room operator i The inspector also noted the high radiation area was properly posted. No j additional posting problems were found during a facility tour. The in- i spector had no further questions and considers this item close (Closed) Violation (57/84-03-01): Failure to provide double encapsulation for a sample capable of generating airborne radioactivity. The inspector reviewed a memorandum issued November 12, 1984, to all operators reminding them to pull targets straight up from the irradiation tube and to maintain visual contact with the targets during removal. In addition, the memo-randum specified actions to be taken if the sample was lost. The inspec-tor also noted that since this event the licensee visually inspects and I leak tests all quartz ampules before they are loaded into an isotope pro-duction facility can. The inspector verified that the corrective actions noted above have been incorporated into an operating procedure. The in-spector also verified that the licensee installed continuous gaseous and particulate monitors on each deck inside containment. The inspector had no further questions and considers this item close (Closed) Followup Item (57/84-03-02): Licensee to review procedure OP-49,
"Use of the Isotope Production Facility," for inclusion of instructions for fragile and buoyant samples. Based on discussions with licensee personnel and a review of procedure OP-49, the inspector verified that the procedure was reviewed and revised to include: precautions to be imple-mented when extracting targets from the irradiation tube; effects of and actions to take on the release of buoyant cans; and requirements to leak test quartz ampules by immersion in hot water before loading into an iso-tope production facility can. The inspector had no further questions and considers this item close .
. Allegation Followup Allegation RI-85-A-086. The NRC received an anonymous allegation concerning the adequacy of the heating plant annual radiation survey and potential contamination of the stack. The inspector reviewed the containment building ventilation system configuration and noted that the 18 inch diameter containment exhaust duct does not discharge into the steam plant stack. Instead it enters, runs upward inside, and terminates above the top of the steam plant stack. The discharge point is 167 feet above ground level. Under normal conditions this containment ventilation exhaust duct is for the filtered exhaust of some experimental facilities and high level fume hoods. The stack
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duct flow is driven by two blowers, one in the facility basement and another in the steam plant. The inspector verified continuous gaseous and particulate monitors were installed on the exhaust duc Based on discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector noted that the only routine entries into the steam plant stack are the annual maintenance inspections. In addition, the inspector observed that the entrance to the stack was posted with instructions to notify health physics personnel prior to entry. The licensee indicated that stack entries are not allowed while processing isotopes in fume hoods and that; prior to entering the stack, radiation surveys are taken of the exhaust duct. Routine contamination surveys are not performed; however, the licensee indicated that when contamination surveys were performed, such as during the duct replacement several years ago, the results were negative. During recent maintensnce on the exhaust blower in the steam plant, minor contamination (100-200 cpm) was found on the rotor; however, this was internal to the containment exhaust syste Based on his review, the inspector found the licensee's controls adequate and had no further questions on this ite On February 26, 1986, the NRC received an anonymous telephone call stating that approximately two years ago the caller saw two indivi-duals taking core bores of the ground outside the containment building and that_one of the individuals had what appeared to be a Geiger Counter, the needle of which deflected quite high. Based.on discus-sions with licensee personnel and a review of maintenance records, the inspector noted that in May 1984 the licensee replaced the horizontal section of the underground vent line for the liquid radio-active waste tanks. The vent line had not lost its integrity; how-ever, it had sagged which created a negative slope. This allowed water to collect in the line and negated its venting functio ,
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s In preparation for the vent line replacemen?, the licensee took two soil samples on November 22, 1983. The insscctor reviewed the analysis records for these samples and noted that the activity of both samples was background. The licensee could not recall taking any other soil samples. The inspector also noted that the vent line replacement was described in the 1984 Annual Operating Repor Based on his review the inspector concluded that the caller probably e
. , witnessed the individuals taking the soil samples noted above. The apparent Geiger Counter meter deflection was most likely the result
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of an instrument battery check. The inspector had no further questions concerning this ite . Facility Operations On March 24, 1986, upon arrival, the inspector toured the facility with licensee representatives. The inspector found that, in general, house-keeping, security, and radiological controls were adequat The reactor operated at full power during the inspection with the excep-tion of a brief shutdown on March 25 to replace a power supply in the control rod drive system. During the tour and subsequent observations from the control room, the inspector verified the correcLJ s6atus of plant conditions and equipment. The inspector also verified that the facility was manned in accordance with Technical Specification requirements and '
that plant logs accurately reflected plant condition No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Logs, Records, and Surveillance The inspector reviewed licensee records (identified in Attachment A)
of plant operations, maintenance, and surveillsnce testing to verify that: the required records were being maintained; plant operations were conducted in accordance with Technical Specification require-ments; significant problems are highlighted and adequately explained; ,
and equipment surveillance is conducted at the assigned frequenc l i
During this review, the inspector noted that procedure OP-2, " Reactor '
Pre-Operation Checklist," required a test of the low reactor water level scram level switch and one (of two) of the level switches used to provide a high or low water level alarm. The licensee stated that the decision on whether to test the high or low water level switch is left up to the operator performing the checklist. The inspector pointed out that Technical Specification Table 3.1 requires all three water level switches (scram, high and low level alarms) be checked for operability prior to operatio The licensee immediately revised the procedure to ensure all three levels switches are tested. .The inspector had no further concerns on this item. No other discre-pancies were note ;
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. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's control of experiment The inspector noted that for each experiment, the licensee had a completed " Service Request and Experiment Safety Analysis." This form documents a description of the experiment, a description of the material involved, major sources of radioactivity and strength, the facility used, personnel authorized to conduct the experiment, the estimated reactivity worth of the experiment, the safety analysis, and the Operating Committee (Nuclear Safety Committee if required)
review and approval. No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Organization, Review and Audit On August 19, 1985, Amendment No. 20 to the operating license was issued which changed the name of the reactor facility, introduced a private management company into the organizational structure, and redistributed responsibilities related to radiological safety. The reactor facility, now known as the Buffalo Materials Research Center (BMRC), is still owned by the State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo. However, operation of the reactor and its support facilities is managed by a private company, Buffalo Materials Research Inc. (BMR). The university, as the licensee, maintains overall responsibility for the operation of the facilit In this regard, independent overview and radiological safety monitoring is performed under the direction of the Radiological Safety Officer (a SUNY employee) who reports to a different university vice president than the one to whom the center Director (a BMR employee) reports. The inspector reviewed the existing staffing / organization at the facility and found it to be in conformance with Technical Specification (TS) requirement The inspector reviewed the Nuclear Safety Committee (NSC) meeting minutes for 1984 and 1985. In addition to verifying proper meeting frequency and quorum, the inspector determined that the NSC performed its review res-ponsibility required by the Technical Specifications. The inspector also reviewed the 1985 Operating Committee meeting minutes and other records to verify that, as required by Technical Specification, the Operating Com-mittee was reviewing and approving experiments which did not present new significant safety problems, approving additions to or revisions of opera-ting procedures, and performing facility inspections. No unacceptable conditions were identifie ,
C The inspector also verified that the licensee is performing the annual third party audit of reactor operations. The licensee has an agreement with two other_ universities with research reactors for exchanging audit services. An independent consultant has also been used. The most recent audit report was not issued at the time of the inspection; however, the licensee indicated no problems were presented orally during the audi The inspector also noted that no significant problems were identified in the audit reports reviewed.
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. Radiation Control The inspector reviewed records of the radioactivity in gaseous and liquid effluents during 1985. The records indicated that the radioactivity levels of the releases were below the Technical Specification limits.
The inspector also reviewed completed data sheets for procedure OP-26,
" Area and Effluent Monitor Operability Check," and the quarterly effluent and area monitor calibration checks to verify that the area and effluent monitors were properly calibrated and tested. No unacceptable conditions were identifie . ' Fuel Specifications Based on a review of the Technical Specifications and discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector noted that the licensee does not use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Accordingly, the licensee did not require an Order to reduce the quantity of HEU. No licensee action was required. The inspector had no further questions on this ite . Exit Interview On March 25, 1986, the inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and findings of the i inspection. At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the license .
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Attachment A Records Reviewed The following records were reviewed during the inspection:
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Reactor Log - August 19, 1985 through March 25, 1986.
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Primary Coolant Log - March 1985 through March 25, 1986.
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Reactor Maintenance Log for the 1984 - 1985 time perio Surveillance Results for the 1984 - 1985 time period.
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This included the following procedures and data:
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OP-2, Reactor Pre-Operation Checklist
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OP-3, Post Operation Checklist
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OP-76, Temperature Neasuring Systems .
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OP-77,- Quarterly Instrument Check i
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OP-81, Containment Building Leak Test
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OP-82, Control Rod Inspection I
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