GO2-88-074, Provides Status of Activites in Addressing Aspects of NRC Re Dcrdr.Supplementary Rept Will Be Submitted Upon Completion of Items Identified in Status Rept
| ML17279A938 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1988 |
| From: | Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| GO2-88-074, GO2-88-74, TAC-56181, NUDOCS 8804110122 | |
| Download: ML17279A938 (70) | |
Text
i4 REG iORY INFORMATION DISTRIBU N SYSTEM (RIDS)
A'CCESSION NBR: 8804110122 DOC. DATE: 88/03/29 NOTARIZED:
NO "F*CIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Prospect>
Unit 2i Washington Public Poee
'UTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SORENSEN> G. C.
Washington Public Poeer Supply System RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
DOCKET 0 05000397
SUBJECT:
Provides status of activites in addressing aspects of NRC 871013 ltr re detailed control room design reviee. Supp 1 rept submitted upon completion of items identified in status.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
A003D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL i SIZE:
TITLE: OR/Licensing Submittal:
Supp 1 1 to NUREG-0737(Generic Ltr 82-33)
NOTES:
INTERNAL:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA SAMWORTH> R MB EG 01 S/DRPS DIR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
1 1
REC IP IENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD NRR/DLPG/HFB 10 RES/DE/EIB COPIES LTTR ENCL 7
7 1
1 EXTERNAL:
LPDR NSIC 1
1 1
NRC PDR 1
1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 17 ENCL 16
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968
~ 3000 George Washington Way
~ Richland, Washington 99352 March 29, 1988 G02-88-074 Docket No. 50-397 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW (TAC NO. 56181)
REFERENCE:
LETTER, G.W.
KNIGHTON (NRC)
TO G.C.
SORENSEN (SS),
SAME SUBJECT, DATED OCTOBER 13, 1987 Gentlemen:
The Supply System has studied the Safety Evaluation (SE) which summarized the findings of the Staff's review of the November 1, 1985 WNP-2 Summary Report submittal (G02-85-758) and the Site Audit on July 15 through July 18, 1986.
We would like to provide a status of our activities in addressing the aspects of the October 13, 1987 letter.
The elements of our response (enclosed),
follow the sequence presented in the SE.
With regar d to the request for a proposed schedule and a supplementary summary report to that which has been submitted; the Supply System will provide the supplement upon the completion of those items as identified in our status.
SSOeXXocm 880Sa9 P
Page Two DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVEIW Recognizing the length of time this issue has been
- ongoing, the numerous reviewers and requirements changes between historical and present conditions, the Supply System is proposing the deferral of further audits and the attainment of concurrence with the Staff on a
firm approach to closure e of the issue.
To this end, the Supply System would encourage further discussion of a closure path on this issue upon Staff review of the attached response.
Should you have any questions, please contact Mr.
P.L.
- Powell, Manager, WNP-2 Licensing for the establishment of a
closure path discussed above.
Very truly yours, g(J A G.C. Sorensen,
- Manager, Regulatory Programs GCS:RJB:dg Attachments cc:
JB Martin -
NRC RV NS Reynolds - BCP8R RB Samworth -
NRC DL Williams - BPA (399)
NRC Site Inspector - 901A
RESPONSE
TO TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW 2.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF A QUALIFIED MULTIDISCIPLINARYREVIEW TEAM The concern expressed in the Safety Evaluation that while trained Human Factors Specialists par ticipated in the Pre-Licensing
- PDA, they did not participate in the Post-Licensing DCRDR, is acknowledged to be an accurate observation.
The Supply System assur es that the Human Factors Specialists utilized in the Preliminary Design Assessment were charged with review and comment upon the continuing program.
The intent and result of this activity was a
program capable of administration by key utility members without further consultant involvement.
The Technical Evaluation acknowledges the demonstrated effectiveness of our Review Team to have improved our control room.
As a result of the expressed
- concern, we will commit to utilize a Human Factors Specialist in the closure review of the presently identified remaining work task commitments.
This commitment is made with the intention of addressing and closing this concern and to assure compliance with Supplement 1 to NURK-0737 and Standard Review Plan NUREG-0800 Section 18.1.
2.2 FUNCTION AND TASK ANALYSIS TO IDENTIFY CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR TASKS AND INFO/NATION AND CONTROL RE UIREMENTS DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
Response
included in Section 2.3 (following).
- 2. 3 COMPARISON OF DISPLAY AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS WITH A
CONTROL ROOM INVENTORY For the following
- reasons, the Supply System considers element 2
(identification of operator tasks) and element 3 (identification of control room display and control requirements) complete and in compliance to NUREG-0737, Supplement 1:
1.
WNP-2 Emergency Operating Procedures have been primarily written to the function level and have followed the BWROG Emergency Procedure Guidelines.
Identification and attention to operator tasks are basic to development of guidelines and procedures and are intrinsic to both.
2.
The WNP-2 DCRDR Function and Task Analysis methodology (described in submittal G02-81-84, February 17, 1984 and attached hereto as Attachment 1) pr ovides for analysis of principal control functions to identify Decisions (D) and Actions (A) i.e.,
operator tasks from which control and display requirements are identified.
~AS l
3.
The WNP-2 methodology was accepted in the Supply System's response to a condition of the five percent operation license; the WNP-2 Task Analysis has been performed as described by the methodology.
A brief re-description is attached hereto as Attachment 2 to fur ther justify why an augmented task analysis is not necessary.
2-4 A
CONTROL ROOM SURVEY TO IDENTIFY DEVIATIONS FROM ACCEPTED HUMAN FACTORS PRINCIPLES The Supply System agrees with the Staff's judgment in that this element has been completed.
As our control room surveys
- continue, the status of deficiencies evolve.
To aid in the closure of the Technical Evaluation Report (TER), Appendix 2, Deficiencies in WNP-2 Control Room Observed Durin NRC Surve
- Check, the following status and explanations are offered.
Each deficiency was reviewed using the WNP-2 selection criteria.
The following terms and definitions are referred to in our discussions for Appendix 2
and subsequent Appendices in the TER.
Discussions following are formatted to correspond to the appendices in the TER.
Category Category Category Category Category I-Safety Related, Minimum Opportunity to Correct Error II-Safety Related, Some Opportunity to Correct Error III-Reliability Related, Minimum Opportunity to Correct Error IV-Reliability Related, Some Opportunity to Correct Error V-No Impact on Safety or Reliability
2.5 ASSESSMENT
OF HED's TO DETERMINE HHICH ARE SIGNIFICANT AND SHOULD BE CORRECTED Element 2.5 is considered to be sufficiently addressed by our previous response to the items identified in Appendix 2
and by our response to Elements 2.6 and 2.7 which follow.
2.6 SELECTION OF DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS
Response
included in Secti on 2. 7 (fol 1 owing).
2.7 VERIFICATION THAT SELECTED IMPROVEMENTS HILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY CORRECTION AND HILL NOT INTRODUCE NEM HED s The issue of cumulative/interactive impact of HED's was addressed during the DCRDR program in several ways.
Reviews were performed by related subjects and not by just individual items; e.g.
- location, style, functions and arrangement of controls and indicator s, mimicking, demarcation lines, color padding and labeling were all performed under one HED per control room panel rather than individually.
Many of the proposed control room changes were mocked up on the actual control room panels to review the cumulative and interactive effects of proposed design changes prior to actual implementation.
Also, an operators log was initiated both during the mockup stage and used subsequent to implementation to provide for operator feedback on interactive concerns as well as for the identification of additional or new items for correction.
This feedback was in addition to post implementation reviews performed by HNP-2 DCRDR personnel.
The cumu-lative/interactive impact of future design changes will be assessed periodically by control room surveys conducted by a WNP-2 Review Team which includes personnel familiar with Human Factors.
The Technical Evaluation Report (TER) noted that the HNP-2 Human Factors Engineering Standards should be reviewed and upgraded as needed to resolve concerns noted and that development of the standards should be a continuing process.
The Human Factors Engineering Standards have been reviewed and modified to include the areas of concern expressed in the elements of the TER and the Standards have been split out to cover specific areas.
The following is a
summary of changes as presented for review.
These Standards have been revised several times since initial development and will continue to be upgraded as needs are identified.
SUQNRY OF CHANGES TO THE HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING STANDARDS 1)
STANDARD LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (HFES-1)
A survey of the control room and remote shutdown room was made to identify abbreviations/acronyms that were not authorized by this Standard.
A revision was then made to the Standard to include the abbreviations/acronyms that were acceptable from a
Human Engineer-ing standpoint.
For those abbreviations/acronyms that were not acceptable, action was initiated to have the abbreviation/acronym changed to conform to the Standard.
2)
CONTROLS STANDARD (HFES-5)
Standard revised to include shape and color coding used at WNP-2 for controls.
3)
DEMARCATION STANDARD (HFES-10)
New standard prepared to provide guidance for the selection and application of demarcation lines on control room panels.
4)
VISUAL DISPLAYS STANDARD (HFES-7)
Standard revised to include selection and application of meter color banding.
NOTE:
No revisions were made to HFES-2 (Annunciator Window Color Standard) since it does include the color coding scheme discussed in Attachment 3 of the TER and is considered to be acceptable.
Element 2.7b suggests reverification of the three items identified in Appendix 3.
We have done so and the result is described in Appendix 3 to this report.
2.8 COORDINATION OF CONTROL ROOM IMPROVEMENTS WITH CHANGES FROM OTHER PROGRAMS The WNP-2 Engineering Instruction for Special Design Review ensures a
centralized Human Factors review for every Basic Design Change meeting the established criteria of change to any control room or remote shutdown room panel.
Excerpts from the Engineering Instruction is herein included as Attachment 3 for review.
2.9 OTHER DCRDR ACTIVITIES The remaining Appendixes 4
and 5 of the TER are addressed in this element's response.
2.10 CONTROL ROOM IMPROVEMENTS.
IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES AND JUSTIFICATION FOR NOT CORRECTING SIGNIFICANT HEDS The SE requested WNP-2 to identify any Category I
or II HED's which it did not intend to correct and provide justification for not correcting them.
A review of all HED's was performed by the Supply System.
All Category I and II HED's have been corrected and have been previously identified in the WNP-2 DCRDR Summary Report or prior submittals.
The SE also requested that the status of HED's with adequate resolutions but with actions remaining for correction be included in this report.
The following is provided for the purpose of delineating progress in the closure of activities noted in Appendix 5
and rationale concerning those items either not yet completed or whose previous recommendations for resolution have been modified or requires clarification.
C-9.2 D-7.3/7.6 D-7'4 E-3.70 F-3.76 TA-G-1 TA-G-11 TA-G-13 TA-G-14'A-5.0.0 TA-5.0.1 TA-5.1. 1 TA-5.1.3 Item 1
Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Item 8 Items 2/3 TA-5.2.2 TA-5.2.3 TA-5.2.4 TA-5.2.5 Item 1
TA-5.2.5 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 7 RHR Steam Condensing Mode Deactivation Replace Large CRT's with Small Desk Modules Upgrade Alarm Typer/CRT Messages Install Redundant Annunciator Controls Upgrade Fire Panel Ann. Title Engravings Revise Emerg.
Procedures Writer's Guide Revise Emergency Procedures Revise/Modify CR Emerg.
Flow Chart Incorporate ECCS Keep-Fill Pump in EP's Revise Emergency Procedures Revise Emergency Procedures Revise Emergency Procedures Step 5 to be Revised to Clarify Action Evaluate Potential Storage Areas for Borax/Boric Acid Substeps 8.7&8 Remove/Place as Attachment or New Procedure Substeps 8.2.c Typo/Should Read 8.2.e Provide Alternate CRD Vent in Place of CRD-V-64 Modify RCIC Standpipe/Change Plant Procedures Revise Emergency Procedures Resolve Drywell Vent Capability per BWROG EP Guide Revise Emergency Procedures Provide Instruct. for Responding to Abnormal Secondary Containment Diff. Press. /Temperature A Temp. Limits for Steam Tunnel/Sample Racks SR13/14 Revise PPM 5.3.1 Regard to Higher Rad. Levels Revise PPM 5.2.5 to Specify Actions Based on Maximum Safe Operating Levels Revise E.P. Minimize/Clarify Water Level Terminology Open Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Closed Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
)
TA-5.2.6 TA-5.3.1 TA-5.3.2 TA-5.3.5 TA-5.3.6 TA-5.3.7 TA-G-2 TA-G-4 TA-G-10 TA-5.1.3 Item 9 Revise Emergency Procedures Revise Emergency Procedures Revise Emergency Procedures Revise Emergency Procedures Revise Emergency Procedures Revise Emergency Procedures Review PPM Vol's. 2,3,4,13 Against EP's Resolve Manual Throttle of CRD Pump Discharge Improve RPV Temperature Monitoring Alternate Method of Boron Injection Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed The following pages are the status of the items listed as open within the previous status or that require clarification.
The titles are synonymous with the Staff's Technical Evaluation Report Appendices for clarity and correlation.
APPENDIX 2
to the Staff's TER DEFICIENCIES IN MNP-2 CONTROL ROON OBSERVED DURING NRC SURVEY CHECK APP-2 81 The use of yellow "post-it'" has been significantly reduced by the use of formatted information stickers for tagging and identifying equipment deficiencies or status.
This process has been procedurally approved.
Only six yellow "post-it'" were noted in a recent review of the control room.
These were
- dated, approved and used to provide operational data for which the formatted information stickers were not intended for.
The use of "post-it'" is not considered a deficiency if used in a judicious manner as noted in this review.
This item is considered closed.
(Also see APP-2 84 below).
APP-2 82 Operations, as a
- routine, does not leave
- items, such as boxes of chart
- paper, laying on benchboards.
If done, it is considered very uncommon and only of a transitory nature.
Reviews to date have not noted any further instances of the above concern.
This item is considered closed.
APP-2 83 The use of dymo-tape in the control room is allowed as long as it is judiciously and accurately applied.
A review of the thr ee areas noted was performed as well as the rest of the control room.
No dymo-tape was found on panel P827 as noted and panel P814 was found with two small temporary dymo-tape labels.
The reviews indicate that dymo-tape had been sparingly
- applied, and appears accurate and neat in appearances.
Individually, each dymo-tape application was assigned as a
Category V deficiency.
Combined they wer e still judged as a Category V and, as
- such, no further action is required.
This item is considered closed.
APP-2 84 Per procedure, operational instructions or information is allowed to be posted on control room panels provided they are dated and approved.
A recent review of the control room indicates that the use of such is minimal and those that are posted are dated and verified.
This item is considered closed.
A review of the Excess Flow Check Valve Isolation Status Display position indication on Panel P851 was performed for reflected
- glare, luminous
- contrast, and engraved lense legend readability.
Lense readability was considered good but luminous contrast poor.
Indicating lamp lense diffusers were removed; luminous contrast was significantly improved but lense legend readability was severely reduced.
The Supply System recognizes this deficiency as a Category II deficiency.
The Supply System recommends that the lense diffusers be removed to ensure good luminary contrast for valve position identification and that valve indentification legend labels be installed adjacent to each display of the same size and matrix design for valve identification reference.
The need for including X-Y coordinates will be based on the final positioning of the legend labels.
This recommendation will be completed by the end of the R-3 Outage.
APP-2 k'6 A review for reflected glare on the vertical meters on Panel P813 was performed.
These are four vertical oriented meters on the panel.
Reflective glare is apparent on the upper portion of the meters due to their location across the top of tHe panel.
A review of their function and operational.use was conducted.
o Three meters monitor containment outlet cooler fan temper atures.
These are not used for control data as the fan cooler controls are run at 100K
- open, and are not used for any identified abnormal event.
Operations records data from these meters once a
ghift for monitoring cooler efficiency.
Their scales gange from 50 F
to 400 F.
Their normal operating range is below 150 F, well below the area where glare exists.
Containment Temperature Monitoring is a
highly redundant and diverse
- system, with monitoring both on adjacent Panel P814 and on main bench board
,Panel P601.
Thus, if fan cooler performance
- degrades, redundant and diverse monitoring capability is available.
o One meter monitors containment pressure from -5 PSIG to +3 PSIG.
This meter is used in conjunction with the Containment Inerting System to monitor containment pressure during N
inerting and subsequent makeup.
The control range is from
-0.5 PSIG to
+1.0
- PSIG, just below the reflective glare area.
Redundant monitoring (two diverse meters) is available on the main bench board Panel P601.
Inerting and Makeup is a highly controlled evolution, and a
redundant operator monitoring Panel P601 is a normal practice.
Based on the
- above, the Supply System recognizes this concern as a Category V for the three cooler fan outlet temperature monitors and a Category IY for the containment pressure monitor.
Based on these
- ratings, expenditure of budget and manpower resour ces are not warranted.
APP-2 87 A review of the annunciator response controls and labels for visibility was performed for Panel FCP-2.
It was noted that no other controls are located on the
- panel, the controls are located just below the annunciator
- alarms, the controls have been distinctively coded by color padding and a
white-mushroom head used for the acknowledge push button, and are consistent with other annunciator response controls in arrangement, coding and labeling throughout the control room.
- Also, the escutcheon labels are readily readable.
Based on the
- above, the lack of adequate visibility of the overall label "Annunciator" on top of the color pad is considered a Category V deficiency and does not warrant the expenditure of manpower or resources.
APPENDIX 3
DEFICIENCIES IN WNP-2 CONTROL ROOM OBSERVED DURING NRC VERIFICATION CHECK APP-3 81 Supply System Human Factor Engineering Standards do not specify color guidelines for indicating light bezels.
A review of the WNP-2 control room notes that bezels are of a
low luster, low contrast design.
- Thus, the indicating'ight bezels do not provide any visual distr action nor appear to have any safety or reliability concern.
Providing guidelines
'for procurement could also be excessively restrictive from a part availability and economic viewpoint.
Based on the
- above, the Supply System recognizes this concern as a Category V deficiency which does not warrant budget and manpower resour ces.
APP-3 82 The WNP-2 contr ol room has approximately 40 BISI display panels.
These panels are consistent in design and have low luster indicating light bezels that do not provide a
visual distr action for the operator.
The panels provide no control function and are for status monitoring only.
In conjunction with the response noted for APP-3 kl above, the Supply System recognizes this concern as a Category V deficiency which does not warrant budget and, manpower resources.
APP-3 83 During the initial phase of the WNP-2 DCRDR Program, in 1981, a color code standard for annunciator alarms was prepared for prioritization.
This standard was reviewed against the applicable sections of NUREG-0700 and is consistent with the guidelines.
Each annunciator was reviewed against the DCRDR standard and a color code assigned.
All annunciator alarm tiles were color coded prior to WNP-2 initial fuel load.
The prioritization color for each tile is controlled by Engineering Design documents and the standard was reissued as Human Factors Engineering Standard HFES-2, Annunciator Window Color Standard (not HFES-1, Standar d List of Acr onyms and Abbreviations).
The Supply System believes that the existing application is consistent throughout the control room and is sufficiently controlled to ensure that prioritization coding is maintained.
A
APPENDIX 4
DEFICIENCIES IN THE WNP"2 CONTROL ROOM OBSERVED DURING NRC IMPLEMENTATION CHECK APP-4 81 A
labeling review was conducted for all annunciator controls and deficiencies corrected.
All individual control switches presently have their required escutcheon label and each overall control group have their required annunciator group label.
This item has been completed.
APP-4 82 Due to parts procurement difficulties, several acknowledge controls were installed during system design improvements that did not match existing acknowledge controls.
This was done to restore the system to operability prior to plant startup from an outage.
Subsequently, the correct acknowledge controls were procured and are now installed.
This item has been completed.
APP-4 83 The Supply System will review the annunciator alarm system intensity to ensure that operators are capable of distinguishing the alarm signal from ambient noise.
The review will be completed by the end of R-3 refueling outage.
The schedule for resolving any noted deficiency will be based on Engineering evaluations at that time.
The Supply System recognizes the importance of the operators need to distinguish alarms and assigns this issue a Category II until the review is completed.
APP-4 k'4 The Supply System has been and is presently pursuing viable options on reducing the noise level within the control room.
Various noise level tests have been made around the control room to determine the sources.
The frequencies and associated dB magnitudes have been measured in order to determine what might be incorporated to reduce the levels
1 it f
One factor should be kept in mind regarding the uniqueness of the WNP-2 Control Room.
The WNP-2 Control Room contains a number of back panels (such as the computer
- panels, Reactor Protective System relay panels, and other misc.
panels) which are normally found elsewhere in the non-PGCC (Power Generation Control Complex) type control room.
Therefore, it is believed that there wi 11 be an inherent noise level which is higher when compared to non-PGCC type plants.
When the noise level is broken down by frequency and dB magnitude and then compared to various industrial standards such as; Speech Interference
- Levels, NUREG-0700 Exhibit 6.1-26, etc.,
the WNP-2 Control Room approaches the "slightly raised" voice ar ea.
The Supply System has subcontr acted out to The National Health Ser vices (JAN '87) and the Boeing Technical Services (JULY
'87) to have noise level tests made.
These results also indicated that the WNP-2 Control Room is within the upper acceptable limits.
Based on the above, the Supply System views this concern as a Category IV deficiency.
- However, the Supply System believes that improvements in the control room environment is conducive to operator job satisfaction and long term reli-ability and therefore is pursuing viable options to try and reduce the noise levels to a lower value.
APP-4 85 The location and seismic, mounting concerns of the phone on panel P800 was previously recognized by the Supply System.
A design change was issued in March 1986 and implemented during the R-2 outage that mounted the phone on the panels front vertical section for seismic mounting and to keep the phone cord from
, interacting with panel controls.
This item is considered complete.
APP-4 86 Reflective glare on two Graphic Display System (GDS)
CRT screens results in their being hard to read.
A number of factors need to be taken into consideration while addressing the glare problem.
1)
The glare is primarily caused by the overhead fluorescent lights.
2)
An overhead visor was installed to reduce the glare.
This helped but did not eliminate it.
3)
The brightness control on the CRT has been incr eased to the maxi-mum available.
4)
The CRT's have been in use for 3 years and these CRT's are scheduled to be replaced in the near future.
Due to item 3) above, the screens have burnt in and contrast has dimmed.
5)
An anti-glare material has been discovered which reduces the glare from outside light sources.
- However, the maximum size presently available is for a 13 inch CRT whereas the GDS displays are 21 inches'he two GDS displays on panels P601 and P602 are not required for plant operation or for implementation of emergency procedures'here are no technical specification requirements for their operability.
The displays were installed as additional aids for the operator and ar e redundant to existing control room hardware displays.
Display redundancy is also maintained by a third GDS display used by the Control Room Supervisor and the Shift Technical
- Advisor, and a
four th GDS display located in the Technical Support Center.
Based on the above, the Supply System views this concern as a
Category III deficiency.
- However, in light of improving the GDS display screens for readability, the Supply System is pursuing the possibility of obtaining the anti-glare material.
APPENDIX 5
CONCERNS RELATIVE TO MNP-2 HED'S C-6.84/C-6.85; APP-5 81 The computer trend recorder located on panel P603 which was enclosed by the control rod drive demarcation lines has been deleted.
This i,tern is considered closed.
D-1.27; APP-5 82 Originally, color banding of the control room instr umentation had been done on a temporary basis for the GE type 180 meters, i.e.,
the color bands were applied to the case rather than the instrument scale.
The installation creates a parallax problem when reading the instrument scales.
However, the concern regarding the amount of error created due to the parallax was determined to be nominal.
The color banding is installed as an operator aid and not for accuracy.
The following items were taken into account when evaluating this response:
1)
The Operators have training sessions on how to deal with parallax situations.
2)
The risk of creating an additional problem is greatly enhanced whenever a cover is removed from a GE-type 180 meter indicator.
3) 4)
Color banding can be directly applied,to recorder scales whereas on indicator
- scales, the cover must be removed.
This can only be done during outage periods in most cases.
Color banding is now controlled
'by our Operations Group.
By having color banding put on the meter scales, the process is more complicated,
- thus, a higher risk of creating a problem.
5)
Color banding installations are checked and maintained presently by the Operators Group.
6)
In light of the above, the color banding on the type 180 indicators will be left installed on the case unless the unit is to be repaired/replaced'.
At that time the color banding will be installed on the meter scale.
New units which are to be installed which require color banding shall have the color banding inserted prior to panel installation.
Due to the above, the Supply System views this concern as a Category V.
1'
D-3.59; APP-5 ¹3 Supply System Human Factors Engineer ing Standard HFES-1, Standard List of Acr onyms and Abbreviations, was drafted prior to llNP-2 Commercial Oper ation.
Revisions to HFES-1 has occurred as needs are identified.
Prior correspondence with the NRC had deferred updating the computer displays until the R-2 outage due to the planned replacement of computer system hardware.
Updating and standardization of computer displays for consistent use of acronyms and abbreviations, and consistency with related annunciator alarm descriptions, was completed during the R-2 outage in 1987.
Subsequently, HFES-1 has been re-reviewed and revised as warranted.
This deficiency is considered closed;
- however, continued maintenance and application of HFES-1 is considered a Category III issue.
E-l.34; APP-5 ¹4 Several vertical panels have annunciator response controls above the nominal height of 25 inches.
Contr ol room annunciator response controls have been color padded and control shape coding has been applied uniformly.
These coding techniques, along with demarcation application to surrounding
- controls, have improved significantly their visual identification by their uniqueness.
- Also, a review of the panels of concern shows that no similar push button controls are in proximity to any of the annunciator response
- controls, and that operators have adjusted and respond to their present locations without any expressed concern.
The Supply System evaluated this as a
Category Y discrepancy which does not warrant the manpower and budget expenditures'.necessary to upgrade.
E-3.71; APP-5 ¹5 The above deficiency notes that control coding techniques for easy recognition of controls, should be used.
The 'Supply System has applied such coding to the extent practical and as consistent as'he existing design component availability and nature of the deficiency allowed.
Former Supply System responses have documented their various uses.
To ensure that recommended coding techniques, such as color, color shading, demarcation and
- shape, that have been applied to the lNP-2 Control Room are maintained and applied in a consistent
- manner, the appropriate Human Factors Engineering Standards have been revised accordingly.
This deficiency has been identified as a Category III by the Supply System and resulting appropriate action completed.
E-5.54; APP-5 86 The five instruments in question involve the scale markings on GE type 180 meters.
These meter scales had been changed out with scales made from our graphics unit.
The graphics unit did not have any standards to use except for what was called out on the Maintenance Work Request (MWR).
As a result, the scale and legend marking standard referenced in Human Factors Engineering Standard HFES-7 was not being used on all work.
Due to the above condition, the Supply System views this concern as a
Category II.
A scale and legend marking standard will be put in place for our gr aphics-unit by July 1, 1988.
An MWR for upgrading the meter scales in question will also be in place by July 1, 1988.
F-5.72; APP-5 87 The above response to discrepancy E-3.71 (APP-5 85) adequately resolves and closes this issue.
- Also, the Human Factors Engineering Standard HFES-1, Standard List of Acronyms and Abbreviations, is not the appropriate location for noting control coding techniques as noted in the TER.
F-6.114; APP-5 88 The above deficiency notes that DEH Valve Contr ol push buttons are labeled "raise" and "lower" instead of the preferred "open" and "close".
These controls are backlighted engraved switches unique to the Westinghouse DEH System.
Per the Supply System's previous response:
The DEH panel was demarcated by control function and group labels applied; e.g.,
Pressure Control, Turbine Control, Bypass Valve Control.
The controls noted above are part of the turbine control group on the BWR control panel.
Operating experience to date indicates that with the added demarcation, group labeling and DEH training provided prior to startup, any apparent operator misunderstanding has been clarified.
Recent discussions with simulator training engineers has noted that specific training is provided on the DEH system and that no training evaluations have ever indicated a
concern relative to this
- issue, nor has any operator expressed or shown confusion.
Also, valve position information is directly available above the controls for positive feedback and is the primary means of monitoring valve performance.
Based on Supply System evaluation, this concern. is categorized as Category V and with the existing position feedback and training, does not warrant the administrative and engineering manpower and budget resources necessary to upgrade these unique Westinghouse control lenses.
(16)
C-9.2; RHR Steam Condensin Mode Deactivation Finding C9.2 provided recommendation for the removal of controls, displays and alarms associated with the deactivated RHR Steam Condensing Mode.
Removal was scheduled for the third refueling
- outage, spring of 1988.
- However, due to engineering
- manpower, constraints and higher priority efforts
- ongoing, removal of the associated
- controls, displays and alarms must be defer red to the fourth refueling outage.
The components in question were reviewed to ensure the deferral would not provide an unacceptable Human Factors risk.
The components are well
- grouped, do not provide a visual distraction to the operator, and have been visibly identified as being deactivated.
Experience since initial plant startup in 1984 has not identified any operational deficiencies resulting from the above.
Based on the above
- reasons, the Supply System has determined that deferral of this item is acceptable.
This is considered a Category III deficiency.
F-3.76; U
rade Fire Alarm Tile En ravin Finding F-3.76 identified the need to'pgrade the engraved descriptions on the control room fire annunciator alarm panels.
Procurement and installation of the new engraved lenses was scheduled for the second refueling outage.
- However, due to engineering constraints and higher priority efforts
- ongoing, the installation of new lenses must be deferred until fiscal year 1989.
Also, Engineering is reviewing the existing Alarm Monitoring System for possible replacement with state-of-the art solid state equipment which would probably eliminate the existing annunciator windows.
If this design is selected, upgrading of the existing engravings would not be required.
The concern relative to the existing engraved descriptions has been minimized by the preparation of individual fire alarm annunciator procedures.
These procedures are located in the control room and provide sufficient direction and information to the operator for proper alarm response.
l/ith the new procedures, the Human Factors concern has been reduced such that the delay in upgrading the engraved descriptions is acceptable.
This is considered a Category III deficiency.
TA-G-13; U
rade Emer enc Procedure Flow Chart and Table The deficiency noted that the Emergency Procedure Flow Chart needed updating to conform to the latest procedures, contained several Human Factor format and color concerns, and that its display table did not conform to NUREG-0700 anthropometric standards.
The flow chart has been updated and temporarily located in a
more suitable mounting.
A permanent display table is being manufactured and will be installed by the end of the third refueling outage.
This is considered a Category IV deficiency.
(17)
TA-5.1.3 Item 4; Stora e Area for Borax and Boric Acid Specific Emergency Pr ocedure Finding Item 4 for PPM 5.1.3 Stated:
Borax and Boric Acid for alternate boron injection is stored in the warehouse outside the plant security fence.
Its location may delay response to the ATWS event if alternate boron injection is required.
Supply System
Response
Dated 11/Ol/85 Noted That:
Potential storage areas within the plant security fence would be evaluated.
Areas would be reviewed based on the necessity of keeping boron out of the reactor coolant dur ing normal operation.
An area will be selected to accommodate the Borax and Boric Acid which will not compromise normal plant operations.
Potential storage areas within the plant were reviewed and none found acceptable.
Per Engineering and Operations evaluations, the possibility of contamination by these chemicals of the primary system is sufficient that they should not be stored in any area of the plant associated with the plant's drain or radwaste systems.
- Thus, the existing storage ar ea appears the most practical and appropriate location.
Also, Operations access to the warehouse has been improved since the original deficiency was noted which improves access response times.
This deficiency is considered a Category V
and does not warrant any further action.
TA-5.2.3; Dr ell Vent Ca abilit Specific Emergency Procedure Finding Item 7 for PPM 5.2.3 Stated:
Step 11 directs use of the two inch containment purge exhaust valves for venting if containment pressure exceeds the limit (approximately 90 PSIG).
The two inch vents are considered inadequate for dealing with a heat sour ce causing containment pressurization to 90 PSIG.
Supply System response dated 11/01/85 noted tHat:
As a participant in the BWR Owners Group subcommittee for the Emergency Procedure Guidelines, WNP-2 is cognizant of the forthcoming Revision 4
to the guidelines regarding containment venti ng and combustible gas control.
Evaluation and resolution of the WNP-2 venting capability is dependent on the provisions to be addressed in Revision 4 of the guidelines.
As.noted in the
- FSAR, WNP-2 will implement the guidelines when issued.
Recommendation 7 will be implemented not later than the second refueling outage following EPG Revision 4 approval by the NRC.
The above response is still accurate.
Resolution of this finding is still awaiting NRC approval of EPG Revision 4.
This is considered a Category II deficiency.
TA-G-2; Review PPN's A ainst Emer enc Procedures System Operating, General Operating, Abnormal and Emergency Plan Procedures were reviewed for compatibility to Emergency Procedures.
Abnormal Procedures addressing primary systems leakage into secondary containment were revised to remove conflicting instruction.
HHP-2 believes that the intent of
- this finding has been met and thus can be closed.
- However, attention for consistency between procedures, through
- routine, review/revision of operating procedur es during their two year required review cycle, will be a continuing process over the life of the plant.
ATTACHMENT 1
FUNCTION AND TASK ANALYSIS CF THE WNP-2 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES
. WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUFPLY SYSTEM
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TABLE OF CONTENTS l.0 INTRODUCTION.
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1 2.0 DEFINITIONS.
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3.0 METHODOLOGY.
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3 3.1 General......
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3 3.2 Identification of Princial Control Functions.........
4 3.3 Identification of Decision and Action Functions.......
5 3.4 Decision Analysis....
3.5 Action Analysis.....
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7 3.6 Classification of Information................
8 4.0 AFPLICATION.
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9 5.0 SEMINARY.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This docuaent describes a methodology for function and task analysis of WNP-2 EOPs.
Applications for the results of the analysis are also dis-cussed.
- 2. 0 DEFINITIONS Action Function:
An operator function involving a con-scious
- movement, operation of con-trois, or execution of a series of procedural steps.
Example:
"Inject boron into the RPV with SLC."
Control Requirement:
The specific controls required to en-able the operator to accomplish an action.
Examples:
Pump breaker con-trol switch, valve control switch, selector switch.
Decision Analysis:
A form of task analysis in which ope-rator decisions are identified and I
systematically examined to identify information requirements.
Page 1 of 11
Decision Function:
An operator function involving a determination, evaluation, or judge-ment through which a procedural branch path is selected.
Example:
" f sup-pression pool temperature cannot be maintained below the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit.
Function:
A higher order activity by which the plant operating crew meets the objec-tives of the operating procedures.
Within the context of this document, functions include decisions and actions.
lnformation Requirement:
Knowledge of system or plant status required as an input to a decision.
Examples:
Pmp status, breaker stat-us, valve lineup status, RPY wat r level status.
Page 2 of 11
Instrumentation Requirement:
Specific parameters,
- displays, and design characteristics required to fulfillan information requirement.
Example:
Pressure indicator with a range of 0 - 150 psig.
Task:
A well defined subdivision of a func-tion; a specific activity contributing toward the accomplishment of a func-tion.
Examples:
CLosing a valve, tripping a breaker.
Task Analysis:
A systematic process by which operator tasks are identified and. examined in terms of the conditions, control, in-strumentation, skills, etc. associated with the task.
3.0 METHOOOLOGY 3.1 General The EOPs specify the emergency functions of the plant operating crew.
Through analysis of these functions and their constituent tasks, control and information requirements necessary to support the performance,of the EOPs will be determined.
Page 3 of ll
The function and task analysis of the EOPs will be conducted in the following steps:
(1)
Principal control functions will be ideii.ified.
(2)
Decision and action functions will be identified for each prin-cipal control function.
(3)
Control and information requirements will be identified for each decision and action function.
The result of the function and task analysis will be identification and application of action and decision functions and the control and information requirements necessary to performing the procedures.
3.2 Identification of Princi al Control Functions The new, symptomatic BWR EOPs typically define principal control functions.
These functions generally correspond to the grouping of procedural steps within the EOPs.
Examples include RPV water level control, reactor power control, suppression pool level control, and primary containment pressure control.
Page 4 of ll
3.3 identification of Decision and Action Functions The EGPs specify performance of the principal control functions in series of procedural steps containing decision and action func-tions.
These decisions and action functions will be separately identified for analysis in terms of control and information require-ments.
To facilitate subsequent
- analysis, the decision and action functions identified in the functional analysis wiU. be classified as follows:
Dl - Decisions which require comparison of a paraoater to a pre-determined value or limit, such as "above" or "below".
02 - Decisions related to system status, such as "open" or "initi-ated".
D3 Decisoins based upon a procedural requirement, such as "If Boron Injection is required".
04 - Decisions that are judgmental or which require an estimation of the future state of parameters or system status.
Examples in-
-'lude "Xf RPV water level cannot be maintained",
"Zf RCIC is available",
and "If adequate core cooling can be assured".
Page 5 of ll
l, t'
Al - Actions that are not directly conditioned upon an explicit decision process, such as "Open the discharge valve" or "Monitor RPV water level".
A2 Actions that are directly based on. the less complex decision functions (type 01 and 02), such as "If pressure is below 10
- psig, then step the pump".
A3 - Actions that are directly based on the more complex decision functions (type 03 and 04), such as "If reactor power is above the AFRM downscale trip or cannot be determined, then trip the recirculation pumps".
3.4 Occision Anal sis Before making a decision, the operator rrust gather and process a set of information.
This set includes both information explicitly identified in the step itself such as plant variables, system para-
- meters, and associated limits, and certain supplemental or implicit information.
Implicit information may be required to varying degre s, depending upon existing plant conditions, and on system or component availability at the time the decision must be made.'age 6 of ll
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In the decision analysis process, each identified decision function will be examined in terms of the information, both explicit and implicit, the operator requires to effect an evaluation of plant conditions and make he decision.
Explicit information needs may be obtained directly from the EOP step itself.
Implicit information needs must be derived through analysis of the operator's expected
- response, system characteristics, and procedural requirements.
Actions specified in the EOPs generally requ're the performance of a particular act or the execution of a series of procedural steps.
In the task analysis process, each identified action function will be examined in terms of its constituent tasks.
Controls required for the performance of each task may then be identified using available technical reference material, operator input, and installed equip-ment.
In addition to identifying control requirements, analysis of operat-or actions will also identify a set of implicit information require-ments.
Once the action has been taken, the operator must obtain feedback information to verify that the action was performed pro-perly and that it resulted in the desired effect.
This feedback Page 7 of 11
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information may be the same set of information processed to make the decision leading to the action, an independent set, or more likely, an intersecting set. It necessarily includes considerable informa-tion pertain'ng to system status, system availability, ccmponent operating status and system performance.
All of this information falls into the category of implicit information.
3.6 Classification of Information To facilitate subsequent
- analysis, the information requirements identified through the analysis of operator decision and action functions will be classified
'as follows:
Il - Directly measurable plant paraneters, such as RPV water level, suppression pool temperature, or RCIC steam line pressure.
I2 - Param ters derived from one or more type Il parameters, such as RPV saturation temperature or the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit.
I3 - Type Il parameters as a function of tioa, such as RPV cooldown rate.
I4 - Parameters related to system status, such as valve position or breaker status.
Page 8 of ll
As previously discussed, the information may be explicit, implicit, or both, depending upon the decision or action function which requires it.
- 4. 0 APPLICATIQN A sample functional analysis is illustrated in Figure 1.
The format and content shown is for illustrative purposes only and is not designed to be prescriptive.
The results of the function and task analysis will be used in the follow-ing applications:
(a)
Identifying operator information and instrumentation requirements for refining the Graphics Display System (SPDS).
(b)
In conjunction with the DCRDR, identifying operator control, infor-mation and instrumentation requirements for emergency operating procedures.
(c)
Verifying provision of instrumentation under Regulatory Guide 1.97.
(d)
Refining plant-specific emergency operating procedures.
Page 9 of ll
(e)
Identifying performance and knowledge requirements for development of operator training programs.
- 5. 0 SLHMARY Through functional analysis of the NNP-2 emergency operating procedures,
'principal control functions and specific emergency response action and decision functions will be identified.
The identified action and deci-sion functions will then be analyzed to detemine tl~ information and con-trol requireaants necessary to support the accomplishment of theSe func-tions.
The information and control requirements thus determined are used to define or prioritize requirements for procedures, training, and can-trol room system improvements.
Page 10 of ll
Document 830<)-I Appund!s A
PC/P Nonitor and control Al
< gulCS Primary containment.
pressure trend 13 Gee primary containment pressure control PC/P below primary containment pressure.
PC/P-I Operate Ithu following sys(.erne, as requir<<dl o
Containment pressur e control systems.
Use containment pressure control system operat 1 ng proc<.'dure. I A2 See b<<l ow None A2 See Table A-21, Drywel 1/Containment HYAC and Cooling System Gee Table A-22, Drywall/Containment Purge System None Iu) GBGT fand drywel 1 purgeI, 42 Gee Tabl e A-23, SBGT Syst'm A2 Gee Table A-22, Drywell/Containment Purge System only when the temperature in the space 11 being evacuated is below Dl None 1212 F (Oaximum Noncondansible Evacuation Temperature) ).
Use IGOGT and drywull purge operating proced<<roc).
A3 None
((CAUTION ()21) )
lG See Caution 21 PC/P-2 Deform suppression chamber press<<re roachos Dl-Suppression chamber pressure trend Lthe Pressure Suppression
)'ressure)
CI7.4 psig (Suppression Chamber Spray Initiat) on Pressure) I, but on)y if lruppression chamber pressure is above None 1.7 psi g (l1arl: I I I Containment Spray Initiation Pressure Limit)I Isuppression pool water level Figure 1.
Sample Functional Ana1ysis DRAFT Revision 0 Page ll of ll
ATTACHMENT 2
H
'I 4
SUMMARY
, HNP-2 EOP TASK ANALYSIS The purpose of this Attachment is to illustrate the steps performed in the EOP Task Analysis by a
specific
- example, thereby demonstrating that no further information or purpose would result in augmenting the Task Analysis.
The overall process is simple in concept, i.e., identify the information and controls required to perform the EOP steps and then show that the required information and control exists for the HNP-2 Oper ators.
STEP 1:
IDENTIFICATION OF REQUIRED INFORMATION AND CONTROL (I/C)
An example is shown on Table 1, Sheet 5.113 and Table 1-10, Sheet 5.367 (attached).
In the second column in the Table 1 example, the EOP step is
- given, broken down to identify Decisions (D),
Information
( I),
or Action (A) required.
A comparison to the BHROG EPG's in the first column is also done to ensure completeness of the HNP-2 EOP's.
For each Action (A) or Decision (D) that requires system information, i.e.,
implicit Information/Control, reference to a complete Table for that system is given; in the example,eference to the ADS/SRV system Table 1-10 '(attached) is made.
At this
- point, a
conscious decision was made to express the required system Information/Co'ntrol in term of generic BHR requirements.'his was
'done to satisfy the NRC concern that the Task Analysis not be done with the Plant specific Control Room capabilities in mind.
That is, if the required system Information/Control were taken from further analysis of HNP-2 system procedures, then apriori the required Information/Controls exist at HNP-2.
STEP 2:
By using our
- approach, we ensure completeness of the required Information/Controls and maintain an independence from knowing the HNP-2 capabilities before Step 2,
below.
Therefore, there is no need to augment the Task Analysis.
COMPARE REQUIRED I/C TO AVAILABLEI/C AT HNP-2 h
To correlate the required Information/Control
( I/C) to the available I/C, the form attached as Table 3, Sheet 5.707 for this example was used.
Note that the explicit and implicit (via Table 1-10)
Information/Control requirement are correlated to a table entry number on the form 2-XXX (as 2-002 for this example).
Going to Table 2,
Sheet 5.402 (attached),
entry 2-002 is given as RPV Pressure.
The requirements for this parameter are summarized from Table 1
on the left of the heavy vertical line.
In the example Page 1 of 7
- given, pressure for bypass valves full-open of 930 PSIG is given (marked by an arrow).
To the right is given available WNP-2 I/C that may be used to satisfy the requirements.
The available Information/Control is given with its Location (e.g.
CR-P601 is Control Room Panel P601),
- Range, Setpoints, Resolution, and Limits, if applicable.
The comparison of required versus available per parameter is therefore available on one sheet and the findings (if any) are summarized in the final Step 3, below, as part of the Walkdown/Talk through.
STEP 3.
SUMMARIZE COMPARISON WITH WALKDOWN/TALKTHROUGH For the final step the CRDR Task Force consisting of personnel familiar with the writing of the EOP's, Human Factors, and the Task Analysis, used the WNP-2 Simulator and stepped Senior Reactor Operators through the EOP's.
This provided the opportunity to summarize the comparison of required verses available I/C from Table 2,
and note any Operator and Human Factors feedback.
- Although, the example used here did not result in any findings, Table 3, Sheets 5.707 and 5.775 are presented as examples.
In total, the EOP Task Analysis resulted in approximately 100 findings which were reported in the Summary Report submittal (G02-85-758).
The depth of the Task Analysis has thus been demonstrated and any augmentation would not result in new findings nor supplement the existing Task Analysis.
Page 2 of 7
X ft
Table I.1-0:
RDS/SRV Statue E(X7
~f-ss goJel 8>
RPV water level RPV water level limit (low level 1)
RPV water level limit (low level S)
Drywell pressure Drywell pressure limit (high)
Drywell pressure trend RPV pressure RPU pressure change/trend Local suppression pool water temperature trend Suppression pool level change/trend LPCS pump discharge pressure LPCS pump discharge pressure limit RHR pump discharge pressure RHR pump discharge pressure limit Tailpipe acoustic/temperature/pressure change Benerator output change SRV accumulator pressure SRV accumulator air header pressure g-00 IS 2-W2 Il QeQ ]if IS z-oa'll 2-okbg I1 097
~T->8 IS g-055 ISIl Il g ggl I1 I1 Z1 5'l Automati c initiati on 1 ogi c status Timer initiated/reset status
. Manual ADS initiation status Drywel'1 pressure logic seal-in status SRU control switch position SRV solenqid demand signal status SRV control power status ADS logic power status g-ov8 Z4.
Z4 Z4 Z4 Z4'4 Z4 Z4 HPCS System (see Table I -6)
LPCS System. (see Table I -8)
LPCI Mode of RHR (see Table l 9) 4 AHib(Y S7~u 5 NA NA NA 2-oV8 Page 3 of 7
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ATTACHMENT 3
SUPPLY SYSTEM ENGINEERING INSTRUCTION
SUBJECT:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SPECIAL DESIGN REVIEW EI 2.40 Rev.
5 EFFECTIVE DATE:
~f -3~ -K APPROVING MANAGER:
C:L'u',
- ~tC 1.0 2.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE This instruction outlines the process by which BDC's are reviewed for special topics.
Criteria are provided to establish if the BDC re-quires special design reviews for the following special topics:
ALARA Industrial Safety/Fire Protection Securi ty Emergency Preparedness Equipment qualification Human Factors Environmental ASME Compliance Control System Failure Pipe Break/Missil e Electrical Separation Appendix R Fires Pene tra tions Reactor Core and System Analysis Parameters DEF INITIONS None
- 3. 0 PROCEDURE Responsibility Cognizant Engineer Action
.1 Reviews BDC and PMR design package content against Special Review Criteria (See.1) to determine if special review should be performed.
.2 If special reviews are appropriate per criteria, obtains names of Reviewer from Engineering Administration and inscribes names in appropr iate spaces on Design Review/Appr oval for m.
.3 Submits package to designated reviewer.
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EI 2.40 Rev.
5 CRITERIA FOR HWAN FACTORS REVIEWS F. 1 F.2 F.3 Special reviews for human factors considerations must be performed if any of the following cr> teria are sa is se Changes are made to main control panels.
Changes are made to remote shutdown panels.
Changes are made that will modify the operating environment of the main control room by changes in such items as colors of room or panels, light levels, sound levels, addition of flashing lights or modulated
- sounds, floor panel
- changes, etc.
CRITERIA FOR ENV!RONENTAL REVIEWS G.l G.2 G.3 G.4 1
Special reviews for environmental consideration must be performed if any of the following crltersa are satyrs le:
Changes are made that will materially change rates, concentrations, or quantities of chemical solutions released to the water or soil.
Changes are made that will materially change location and/or quan-tity of water discharged to the river or to the soil.
Changes are made to the Waste Treatment System.
Changes are made that will require erection of new structures or earth moving operations outside of previously disturbed areas.
G.5
'hanges are made that will result in increased off site noise levels.
G.6 Changes are made that will alter the makeup water intake confi gura-tion, or will materially change the location and(or quantity of water withdrawn from the river or from wells.
G.7 G.S Changes are made that will materially alter the rates or quantities of nonradioactive
- gases, vapors, or particulates released to the atmosphere.
Changes are made that will increase the risk of accidental release of significant amounts of petroleum products or other toxic or hazardous materials.
G.9 The Engineer determines that the design change should be reviewed for environmental impact.
)
Page 2 of 2
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(I P'
h March 28, 1988 DISTRIBUTION gDocket File PDR LPDR PD 5 Rdg JLee DOCKET NO(S).
$Q-397 Hr. G. C. Sorensen, Hanager Regulatory Programs Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0. Box 968
- Richland, WA 99352
SUBJECT:
WASHINGTON, PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEH -, WNP-2 The following documents concerning our review of the subject facility are transmitted for your information.
Notice of Receipt of Application", dated Draft/Final Environmental Statement, dated Notice of Availability of Draft/Final Environmental Statement, dated Safety Evaluation Report, or Supplement No.
dated Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, dated I
Notice. of Consideration of Issuance of Facility Operating License or Amendment to Facility Operating License, dated
[g Hi-Weekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Operating Licenses Involving No li if'l*d C
id i,d d~f W]
Exemption, dated Construction Permit No.
CPPR-
~
, Amendment No.
dated Facility Operating License No.
, Amendment No.
dated Order Extending Construction Completion Date, dated Monthly Operating Report for transmitted by letter dated Annual/Semi-Annual Report-transmitted by letter dated
Enclosures:
As stated Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc:
See next page OFFICES SURNAME/
DATEP 1am.....
.J
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NRC FORM 318110/801 NRCM 0240 OFFlCIAL RECORD COPY
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Hr. G. C. Sorensen, Manager Washington Public Power Supply System WPPSS Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
CC:
Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.
Bishop, Cook, Purcell 5 Reynolds 1200 Seventeenth
- Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Mr. G.
E. Doupe, Esquire Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99532 Mr. Curtis Eschels, Chairman Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council Mail Stop PY-ll Olympia, Washington 98504 Mr. P. L. Powell, Licensing Manager Washfngton Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968, MD 956B Richland, Washington 99352 Mr. A. Lee Oxsen Assistant Managing Director for Operations Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968, MD 1023
- Richland, WA 99352 Mr. R. B. Glasscock, Director Licensing and Assurance Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968, MD 280 Richland, Washington 99352 Mr. C.
M. Powers WNP-2 Plant Manager Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box MD 927M Richland, Washington 99352 Regional Administrator, Region V
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596 Chairman Benton County Board of Commissioners
- Prosser, Washington 99350