ENS 52239
ENS Event | |
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22:30 Sep 13, 2016 | |
Title | Unanalyzed Condition Involving Station Service Water Trains |
Event Description | Based on a walk down in the Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) with the NRC Resident [Inspector], it was observed that a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe that provides a normally pressurized source of fire water supply to the overhead sprinkler system in the SWIS is not Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielded similar to the horizontal segment of the same line near the ceiling. In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB has a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps. Only one train at a time would be affected during the event. This is due to the physical characteristics of the postulated MELB and the configuration/separation relative to the source line and target pumps and/or associated Motor Control Centers (MCCs) that support pump operation.
Since the Service Water trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then two Service Water trains could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, all four Service Water trains were operable, therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi). Currently, Service Water Train B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.8. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.7.8. Currently, Emergency Diesel Generator B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.8.1. The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
This is an update to Event Number 52239. On September 13, 2016 at 2228 EDT, Comanche Peak reported an unanalyzed condition involving station service water trains per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Specifically, the reported condition involved a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe in the SWIS that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB had a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps. On October 6, 2016 at 1410 hours0.0163 days <br />0.392 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.36505e-4 months <br /> CDT, a section of eyewash station pipe in the Unit 2 Safeguards Building was identified as a result of extent of condition walkdowns that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of this unshielded pipe, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 2 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 2EB2-1. This MCC provides power to Unit 2 Train B Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment. The affected eyewash station pipe was isolated shortly after it was discovered to not be adequately shielded for a MELB. Since 480V MCC 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then 2EB1-1, 2EB2-1 and both trains of the Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment was operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi). The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. Notified R4DO (Werner).
This is an additional update to Event Number 52239. On September 13, 2016 at 2228 EDT and again on October 6, 2016 at 2009 EDT, Comanche Peak reported unanalyzed conditions involving Station Service Water System trains and a 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The reported conditions involved sections of piping that were not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded piping, the MELB had a potential impact to the function of safety-related equipment in the Service Water Intake Structure and the Unit 2 Safeguards Building. On October 10, 2016 at 1708 CDT, as a result of ongoing extent of condition walkdowns, a section of fire protection pipe in the Unit 1 Safeguards Building was identified that was not adequately shielded for a MELB. In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of this unshielded pipe, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 1 Train B Switchgear 1EA2, Unit 1 Train B 480V MCC 1EB4-2, and Unit 1 Train B Distribution Panel 1ED2-2. Only one of these power supplies at a time would be affected. 1EA2 provides 6.9KV electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, panels, sequencer, and transformers. 1EB4-2 provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, panels, and transformers. 1ED2-2 provides 125VDC electrical power to EDG 1-02 channel 1 starting circuit. The affected fire protection pipe was isolated shortly after it was discovered to not be adequately shielded for a MELB. Since Unit 1 Train A Switchgear 1EA1, Unit 1 Train A 480V MCC 1EB3-2, and Unit 1 Train A Distribution Panel 1ED1-2 have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then both trains of Unit 1 6.9KV power (1EA2 and 1EA1), both trains of Unit 1 480V power (1EB4-2 and 1EB3-2), and both trains of Unit 1 125VDC power (1ED2-2 and 1ED1-2) along with the safety-related equipment they supply could potentially have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the time of discovery, none of the affected Train A equipment was inoperable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. Notified R4DO (Werner).
This is an update to Event Number 52239. On November 17, 2016 at 0730 CST, during ongoing extent of condition walkdowns in the Boric Acid Transfer Pump Area of the Auxiliary Building, two pressurized fire protection pipe segments were identified that did not contain Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielding. In the event of a MELB crack along the unshielded portion of these pipes, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 1 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 1 EB4-1. This MCC provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers. At 0743 CST, Technical Specification 3.8.9 Condition A was entered for one AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable. At 1021 CST, MCC 1 EB4-1 was declared Operable after MELB shielding was installed on the affected fire protection lines. Since Unit 1 Train A 480V MCC 1 EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, given the MELB condition, 1 EB4-1, 1 EB3-1 and both trains of the Unit 1 safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers they supply could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 1 EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers were operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. Notified R4DO (Azua).
This is an update to Event Number 52239. On December 5, 2016 during ongoing extent of condition walk downs in the Auxiliary Building, pressurized fire protection pipe segments (a flange and a pipe elbow) were identified which did not contain Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielding. In the event of a MELB crack along the un-shielded portion of the pipes, a MELB had the potential to impact Unit 2 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 2EB4-1. This MCC provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 2 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers. At approximately 1355 CST Technical Specification 3.8.9 Condition A was entered for one AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable. At 1459 CST, MCC 2EB4-1 was declared Operable after MELB shielding was installed on the affected fire protection line locations. Since Unit 2 Train A 480V MCC 2EB3-1 and the associated Unit 2 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, given the MELB condition, 2EB4-1 , 2EB3-1 and both trains of the Unit 2 safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers they supply could have been inoperable and this represents an un-analyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 2EB3-1 and the associated Unit 2 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers were operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. Notified R4DO (Gaddy).
This is an update to Event Number 52239. On December 22, 2016 at approximately 1046 [CST] during ongoing extent of condition walk downs in the common Auxiliary Building (AB) corridor room (X-179), several normally pressurized Waste Processing (WP) pipe segments and one Vent & Drain (VD) segment which are greater than 1" nominal pipe diameter, did not contain MELB shielding. In the event of a MELB crack along the unshielded portion of these pipes, a MELB could have had the potential to impact Unit 1, Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 1EB4-1. This MCC provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers. Prior to the field walkdown, the subject WP and VD line segments were either isolated and depressurized (WP lines) and/or the AB sump discharges realigned (VD) such that the subject lines would pose no threat to the MCC 1EB4-1 if confirmed that shielding is required. As such, the identified condition does not adversely affect operability of 1EB4-1 and entry into a Technical Specification action statement was not required. Field activities continue to install MELB shielding in the affected locations. Since Unit 1 Train A 480V MCC 1EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, given the MELB condition, 1EB4-1, 1EB3-1 and both trains of the Unit 1 safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers they supply could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 1EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers were operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. Notified R4DO (Hay). |
Where | |
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Comanche Peak ![]() Texas (NRC Region 4) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
LER: | 05000445/LER-2016-002 |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.03 h-0.00125 days <br />-1.785714e-4 weeks <br />-4.1094e-5 months <br />) | |
Opened: | John Alexander 22:28 Sep 13, 2016 |
NRC Officer: | Steve Sandin |
Last Updated: | Dec 22, 2016 |
52239 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
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Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Unit 2 | |
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Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 528172017-06-21T15:00:00021 June 2017 15:00:00
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