On 11/15/2011 at 1952 [EST], while performing a
Fire Protection Program review, it was determined that one of the '
Multiple Spurious Operation' (
MSO) modifications implemented during the P3R18 refueling outage adversely impacted Peach Bottom's fire
safe shutdown analysis conclusions. New cabling that was routed for the Unit 3
High Pressure Coolant Injection (
HPCI) system steam supply valve lacks appropriate
fire barrier protection in the event of a postulated fire-induced damage to this cable. This cable is routed through a fire area in which the only credited and protected method of reactor level control for a fire in this area is
HPCI. Postulated fire-induced damage in the cable could prevent the steam supply valve from opening, thereby causing the
HPCI pump to be unavailable for an Appendix R fire. An
hourly fire watch has been established as a compensatory action.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.