ENS 46685

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v t e ENS Event
09:04 Mar 19, 2011
Title	Safety Injection Discharge to the Reactor
Event Description	Following a scheduled plant shutdown for refueling the operators were forced to close the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) to limit plant cooldown. While opening MSIV's to restore steam to the secondary, a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection (SI) occurred. The MSIV bypass valves were opened to equalize pressure across the MSIV's. Steam header pressure dipped when the MSIV for 'C' Steam Generator (S/G) was opened. The low steamline pressure bistables are rate sensitive and actuated to cause the SI when steam pressure dipped. Lowest steamline pressure was 1040 psig, the low steam line pressure SI actuates at 615 psig. During the SI the PZR [Pressurizer] PORV's cycled approximately 10 times to limit RCS pressure. When the PORV's opened the 'B' PZR Code Safety Main Control Board (MCB) and plant computer alarm actuated but the actual MCB indication did not change nor does plant response indicate that a PZR Code Safety opened. This appears to be an indication problem related to the PORV's cycling. All equipment functioned as required. The station electric buses are aligned to normal offsite power. Decay heat removal is being discharged to the atmospheric relief valves with no indication of primary to secondary leakage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * UPDATE FROM MARCY BLOW TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1221 EDT ON 3/19/2011 * * * 1. The expected system actuations that occurred when the plant experienced a Safety Injection (SI) 03/19/11 at 04:04 CDT, previously reported on EN 46685 for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), is also reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for Specified System Actuation. 2. During the recovery of the Safety Injection (SI) actuation that occurred 03/19/11 at 04:04 CDT and previously reported on EN 46685, the Safety Injection Signal was reset which blocked any further automatic actuation. This was directed per the appropriate procedure step. There is no Technical Specifications allowed condition for both trains of ECCS to be inoperable, therefore the unit entered Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 due to the Auto SI feature being blocked. LCO 3.5.2 action C.1. directs immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3. The entry into TS 3.0.3 was made at 0411 CDT and exited at 0639 CDT when the Reactor Trip Breakers were reclosed which re-enabled the automatic SI signal. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for Accident Mitigation. NRC Resident was notified of the update. Notified R4DO(Cain).

ENS 46685 +/-
Where
Wolf Creek Kansas (NRC Region 4)
Reporting

10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation - ECCS Discharge 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
LER:	05000482/LER-2011-004 Regarding Automatic Safety Injection Actuation Due to Operating Crew Failure to Follow Procedures 05000482/LER-2011-004-01 Regarding Automatic Safety Injection Actuation Due to Operation Crew Failure to Follow Procedures 05000482/LER-2011-004-02 Regarding Automatic Safety Injection Actuation Due to Operating Crew Failure to Follow Procedures
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-2.17 h-0.0904 days <br />-0.0129 weeks <br />-0.00297 months <br />)
Opened:	Marcy Blow 06:54 Mar 19, 2011
NRC Officer:	Vince Klco
Last Updated:	Mar 19, 2011
46685 - NRC Website Loading map...
v • d • e

v t e Emergency Notification System
Wolf Creek with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation - ECCS Discharge
WEEKMONTHYEAR2025-11-05T16:03:00 [Table view]
[ENS list for Wolf Creek]

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