ENS 41418
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
17:00 Feb 17, 2005 | |
| Title | 24 Hour 91-01 Response Bulletin and Part 70 App a Unanalyzed Condition |
| Event Description | {{#Wiki_filter:The following information was provided by licensee via email:
The sponge jet blast system is a non-favorable geometry (NFG) decontamination unit that scours contaminated items with pressurized hydrogenous sponge media imbedded with aluminum oxide to decontaminate the items. The safety basis of the system is based upon extremely conservative calculations modeling 1-3g/cc Uranium dioxide in a specified, controlled sponge jet media. Based upon these calculations, criticality is not credible in the sponge jet system when using the specified media, which is the only media allowed in the unit. This critical item, for which an IROF (discussed below) was put in place, was that the physical characteristics of the sponge jet media could never be changed without criticality analysis. During a routine procedure review, a criticality safety engineer noticed that specific manufacturer and product information he had previously required was not present in the procedure for the sponge jet blaster. An IROF had been specified for the equipment with an action expected stating, 'Operator/Area Engineer utilize only approved aluminum oxide sponge media.' The configuration control process was bypassed and the approved sponge jet blast media was replaced with a media with double the specific gravity of the approved media and four times the content of hydrogenous material. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification, specifically, 'Any nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains (multi-parameter control or single parameter control) and less than a safe mass is involved.' Also, in accordance with Appendix A to Part 70--Reportable Safety Events (b) Twenty-four hour reports. Events to be reported to the NRC Operations Center within 24 hours of discovery:(1) Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of � 70.61. Sponge jet blaster contained the unauthorized material with contamination levels (2700 ppm U preliminary results) of Uranium. This is two orders of magnitude less than a critical concentration for an optimally moderated mixture. A very conservative mass estimate was made assuming the entire unit was filled with the 2700 ppm material, when less than 1/4 of the unit would contain material at any given time. This mass calculation estimates the mass total at 3.149 kg U which is an order of magnitude less than a critical mass. A more realistic estimate is 0.25 kg U [based on the amount of sponge media actually in the jet blaster (5 bags)]. Summary of Activity: The Sponge jet blaster has been shut down. Conclusions: There was much less than a critical mass of SNM involved. There was much less than a critical concentration. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed. }}[[Event description::Description::{{#Regex_clear:The following information was provided by licensee via email: The sponge jet blast system is a non-favorable geometry (NFG) decontamination unit that scours contaminated items with pressurized hydrogenous sponge media imbedded with aluminum oxide to decontaminate the items. The safety basis of the system is based upon extremely conservative calculations modeling 1-3g/cc Uranium dioxide in a specified, controlled sponge jet media. Based upon these calculations, criticality is not credible in the sponge jet system when using the specified media, which is the only media allowed in the unit. This critical item, for which an IROF (discussed below) was put in place, was that the physical characteristics of the sponge jet media could never be changed without criticality analysis. During a routine procedure review, a criticality safety engineer noticed that specific manufacturer and product information he had previously required was not present in the procedure for the sponge jet blaster. An IROF had been specified for the equipment with an action expected stating, 'Operator/Area Engineer utilize only approved aluminum oxide sponge media.' The configuration control process was bypassed and the approved sponge jet blast media was replaced with a media with double the specific gravity of the approved media and four times the content of hydrogenous material. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification, specifically, 'Any nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains (multi-parameter control or single parameter control) and less than a safe mass is involved.' Also, in accordance with Appendix A to Part 70--Reportable Safety Events (b) Twenty-four hour reports. Events to be reported to the NRC Operations Center within 24 hours of discovery:(1) Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of � 70.61. Sponge jet blaster contained the unauthorized material with contamination levels (2700 ppm U preliminary results) of Uranium. This is two orders of magnitude less than a critical concentration for an optimally moderated mixture. A very conservative mass estimate was made assuming the entire unit was filled with the 2700 ppm material, when less than 1/4 of the unit would contain material at any given time. This mass calculation estimates the mass total at 3.149 kg U which is an order of magnitude less than a critical mass. A more realistic estimate is 0.25 kg U [based on the amount of sponge media actually in the jet blaster (5 bags)]. Summary of Activity: The Sponge jet blaster has been shut down. Conclusions: There was much less than a critical mass of SNM involved. There was much less than a critical concentration. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed. }}| ]] |
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Westinghouse Electric Corporation Columbia, South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| License number: | SNM-1107 |
| Reporting | |
| Response Part 70 App A (B)(1) | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+18.4 h0.767 days <br />0.11 weeks <br />0.0252 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Michael Connelly 11:24 Feb 18, 2005 |
| NRC Officer: | Chauncey Gould |
| Last Updated: | Feb 18, 2005 |
| 41418 - NRC Website | |
Westinghouse Electric Corporation with Response, Part 70 App A (B)(1) | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 561992022-11-01T15:29:0001 November 2022 15:29:00
[Table view]Part 70 App A (B)(1) Unanalyzed Condition - Nuclear Material Received in Excess of License Limits ENS 543352019-10-16T04:00:00016 October 2019 04:00:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) an Item Relied on for Safety (Irofs) Determined to Be Inadequate ENS 532662018-03-15T15:30:00015 March 2018 15:30:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) Unanalyzed Scenario Associated with Uranium Recovery and Recycle System ENS 520902016-07-13T04:00:00013 July 2016 04:00:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1), Part 70 App A (A)(4) Degraded Safety Items Caused by Uranium Buildup ENS 483752012-10-04T14:00:0004 October 2012 14:00:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) Unanalyzed Accident Scenarios for Certain Consequences of Concern ENS 473302011-10-07T20:15:0007 October 2011 20:15:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) Dimension of Snm Carrying Pails Different from Value in Safety Analysis ENS 461382010-07-28T18:00:00028 July 2010 18:00:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) Incorporation of 'Incredible' Criticality Sequences Into Integrated Safety Analysis ENS 456552010-01-25T16:30:00025 January 2010 16:30:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) Unanalyzed Condition - Overflow of Uranium Bearing Ammoniated Wastewater ENS 419332005-08-19T19:30:00019 August 2005 19:30:00 Response Nrc Bulletin 91-01 Violation of Criticality Spacing Requirements ENS 417232005-05-20T22:40:00020 May 2005 22:40:00 Response, Part 70 App A (B)(5) Deviation from Integrated Safety Analysis, and a 24 Hour Notification - Bulletin 91-01 Criticality Control ENS 414182005-02-17T17:00:00017 February 2005 17:00:00 Response, Part 70 App A (B)(1) 24 Hour 91-01 Response Bulletin and Part 70 App a Unanalyzed Condition ENS 413722005-02-04T14:00:0004 February 2005 14:00:00 Response 24-Hour Notification-Bulletin 91-01 Criticality Control ENS 409852004-08-24T14:05:00024 August 2004 14:05:00 Response 24 Hour 91-01 Response Bulletin ENS 408882004-07-21T13:00:00021 July 2004 13:00:00 Response 4-Hour 91-01 Nrc Bulletin Notification Due to Adu in Non-Favorable Geometry Nitrogen Accumulator Tank ENS 408552004-07-07T21:00:0007 July 2004 21:00:00 Response Nrc Bulletin 91-01 - 4 Hour Report ENS 407932004-06-04T22:00:0004 June 2004 22:00:00 Response Licensee Reported a 4 Hour 91-01 Response Bulletin ENS 405672004-03-04T20:00:0004 March 2004 20:00:00 Response 24-Hour Notification - Bulletin 91-01 Criticality Control ENS 404402004-01-12T20:45:00012 January 2004 20:45:00 Response 24 Hour Notification Bulletin 91-01 Criticality Control ENS 402552003-10-16T19:30:00016 October 2003 19:30:00 Response 24 Hour Bulletin 91-01 Notification from Westinghouse Columbia Fuel Facility ENS 402462003-10-14T11:30:00014 October 2003 11:30:00 Response 24-Hour Nrc 91-01 Bulletin Report Involving Improper Mass Control ENS 401522003-09-12T14:32:00012 September 2003 14:32:00 Response Improper Scanning of Lead Rods for the Product Engineering Laboratory 2022-11-01T15:29:00 | |