ENS 47330
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
20:15 Oct 7, 2011 | |
| Title | Dimension of Snm Carrying Pails Different from Value in Safety Analysis |
| Event Description | It was reported to [the licensee's Environmental Health and Safety organization] on Oct 7, 2011 that the measurements on the 1.5 gallon pails used in the facility were found to be non-compliant with the governing Criticality Safety Evaluation, CSE-16-K Rev. 3, 'Common Containers.' This CSE authorized the deployment of 1.5-gal steel pails for miscellaneous use with SNM-bearing liquids. The safety basis for the design of these pails is addressed in credible scenario 4.1.4 in CSE-16-K. The primary contingency is passive engineered control FLOOR-115 which specifies the following dimensional requirements for the pails:
Top ID : 8.059 to 8.559 Bottom ID: less than or equal to 6.309 Inner Height: less than or equal to 8.217 Wall Thickness No Limit The controls, PROCUR-901 and -902, cover the ordering and inspection upon receipt for the pails, to meet the criteria of FLOOR-114. In June 2011 all of the pails were inspected by the Product Assurance (PA) department and judged to meet the dimensional requirements. The pails were then deployed to the floor and have been in use since then. On October 7, 2011, NCS Engineering was informed that the PA department had determined that their measurement methodology for the pails was incorrect. As a result, the actual top ID of the pail exceeded the IROFS limit by a margin of [approximately] 0.25 [inch]. This results in the facility being in a state that is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (i.e. the governing CSE). All other dimensions specified by the control FLOOR-115 are met, but the diameter aberration appears to affect all pails. As a result, the passive engineered IROFS FLOOR-115 is judged to have failed, eliminating the primary contingency. Calculation results modeling an infinite array of in tolerance pails containing oil-moderated UO2 with 6 [inch] S/S spacing for this condition results in a 95/95 Keff of 0.8569. Preliminary calculation results with the increased diameter case results in a 95/95 Keff of 0.8610. Therefore, with the proper spacing maintained (12 [inch] per control FLOOR-116), with no stacking (control FLOOR-104), an infinite array of the as-built pails would not exceed the SNM-1107 license 0.95 criterion. This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery due to the facility being in a state that is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (i.e. the governing CSE). The performance requirements for this accident sequence require the Overall Likelihood Index (OLI) be Highly Unlikely. With this failure the sequence is Unlikely. Immediate Corrective Actions: -- Upon identification of the issue operations staff removed the pails from the main process areas and segregated to prevent use. -- The event is being entered into the Corrective Action Process and a casual analysis initiated. The Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility is subject to Subpart H of 10 CFR 70 and this issue is addressed in the corresponding Integrated Safety Analysis. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and state authorities. |
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Westinghouse Electric Corporation Columbia, South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| License number: | SNM-1107 |
| Reporting | |
| Part 70 App A (B)(1) | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-2.87 h-0.12 days <br />-0.0171 weeks <br />-0.00393 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Gerard Couture 17:23 Oct 7, 2011 |
| NRC Officer: | Bill Huffman |
| Last Updated: | Oct 7, 2011 |
| 47330 - NRC Website | |
Westinghouse Electric Corporation with Part 70 App A (B)(1) | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 561992022-11-01T15:29:0001 November 2022 15:29:00
[Table view]Part 70 App A (B)(1) Unanalyzed Condition - Nuclear Material Received in Excess of License Limits ENS 543352019-10-16T04:00:00016 October 2019 04:00:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) an Item Relied on for Safety (Irofs) Determined to Be Inadequate ENS 532662018-03-15T15:30:00015 March 2018 15:30:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) Unanalyzed Scenario Associated with Uranium Recovery and Recycle System ENS 520902016-07-13T04:00:00013 July 2016 04:00:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1), Part 70 App A (A)(4) Degraded Safety Items Caused by Uranium Buildup ENS 483752012-10-04T14:00:0004 October 2012 14:00:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) Unanalyzed Accident Scenarios for Certain Consequences of Concern ENS 473302011-10-07T20:15:0007 October 2011 20:15:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) Dimension of Snm Carrying Pails Different from Value in Safety Analysis ENS 461382010-07-28T18:00:00028 July 2010 18:00:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) Incorporation of 'Incredible' Criticality Sequences Into Integrated Safety Analysis ENS 456552010-01-25T16:30:00025 January 2010 16:30:00 Part 70 App A (B)(1) Unanalyzed Condition - Overflow of Uranium Bearing Ammoniated Wastewater ENS 414182005-02-17T17:00:00017 February 2005 17:00:00 Response, Part 70 App A (B)(1) 24 Hour 91-01 Response Bulletin and Part 70 App a Unanalyzed Condition 2022-11-01T15:29:00 | |