ENS 41327
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
01:45 Jan 13, 2005 | |
| Title | 24 Hour Condition of License Report Regarding Halon System- Actuator Connection Error |
| Event Description | The following information was received via facsimile from the licensee:
Based upon information provided by Callaway on 1/12/05, it was determined that the manual pneumatic actuators on the Halon suppression systems are piped incorrectly which may result in the inability to actuate the Halon suppression systems manually or automatically. Each manual pneumatic actuator has clearly marked "A" and "B" ports. Per the M-658 vendor manual series & drawing M-658-00025, the "A" port shall be connected to the actuation pilot manifold or top of cylinder valve and the "B" port shall be connected to the solenoid valve. A field walk down was performed and in all but one case, the manual pneumatic actuator has been piped in the opposite configuration. This effects the Halon suppression system protecting the ESF switchgear rooms, the Rod Drive MG Set room, the North Electrical Penetration room, the South Electrical Penetration Room, the Switchgear & Switchboard rooms, and the Control Room cable trenches & chases. Based upon preliminary evaluation, it appears that the Halon suppression systems are inoperable. Fire watches were implemented for the affected areas. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
This event report is retracted based on the following information provided from Wolf Creek by facsimile: Investigation - Informational tests conducted by the Vendor (Chemetron) and witnessed by Wolf Creek, Callaway, and NRC personnel on January 26, 2005 determined that the Halon systems would have properly actuated in the as-found incorrect configuration (port 'A' and 'B' connections reversed). The only identified difference in the actuation sequence between the tests conducted in the incorrect configuration versus the correct configuration is a delay of less than 2 seconds from the time the solenoid received the discharge signal until the first cylinder actuated. There is no regulatory or National Fire Protection Association standard or guideline that places a time requirement on this interval. This very slight time delay would have had no effect on the designed function of the Halon suppression system to extinguish a fire. Additional details are provided in the Chemetron report, "Report on Actuation Arrangements for Halon Extinguishing System Units," (Wolf Creek correspondence 05-00072) that includes the test procedure and results. Regulatory Evaluation - Guidance for reporting to the criterion of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) is provided in section 3.2.4 of NUREG 1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR50.72 and 50.73." This guidance states that an LER is required for a seriously degraded principal safety barrier or an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a) states the following: The Operating Corporation shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the SNUPPS Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 17, the Wolf Creek site addendum through Revision 15, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 5, subject to provisions b & c below. Conclusion: - Based upon the information provided, the Halon suppression system would have operated to extinguish a fire. This condition is not considered reportable to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii), nor is it a violation of the Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). Consistent with this conclusion, ENS notification 41327 for this event is to be retracted. Notified R4DO (Whitten). NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Wolf Creek  Kansas (NRC Region 4) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Other Unspec Reqmnt | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-3.32 h-0.138 days <br />-0.0198 weeks <br />-0.00455 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Lance Lane 22:26 Jan 12, 2005 |
| NRC Officer: | Bill Gott |
| Last Updated: | Feb 16, 2005 |
| 41327 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 526662017-04-05T19:00:0005 April 2017 19:00:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition for Both Edg Transfer Line Connections ENS 506282014-11-19T21:37:00019 November 2014 21:37:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Postulated Hot Short Fire Event That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment ENS 504682014-09-18T16:55:00018 September 2014 16:55:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Postulated Hot Short Fire Event That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment ENS 494232013-10-09T22:30:0009 October 2013 22:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Postulated Hot Short Fire Event That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment ENS 481342012-07-25T21:02:00025 July 2012 21:02:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Identification of a Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition ENS 474122011-11-03T21:00:0003 November 2011 21:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition for a Postulated Control Room Fire ENS 470762011-07-20T18:15:00020 July 2011 18:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Fire Protection Program Concern ENS 469092011-06-01T18:15:0001 June 2011 18:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Both Trains of Component Cooling Water Declared Inoperable Due to Voiding ENS 464882010-12-17T21:35:00017 December 2010 21:35:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition - Potential Equipment Actuations Due to Electrical Short Circuits ENS 464282010-11-18T22:26:00018 November 2010 22:26:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Potential Post Fire Safe Shutdown Unanalyzed Condition ENS 461962010-08-21T22:00:00021 August 2010 22:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition One Train Eccs Declared Inoperable Due to Void in "a" Rhr Heat Exchanger ENS 461362010-07-28T19:22:00028 July 2010 19:22:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Three Auxiliary Feedwater (Afw) Trains Declared Inoperable ENS 458592010-04-20T18:07:00020 April 2010 18:07:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Five Potential Issues Discovered During Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Review ENS 456922010-02-10T00:00:00010 February 2010 00:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Potential Post Fire Safe Shutdown Unanalyzed Condition ENS 452772009-08-19T20:00:00019 August 2009 20:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Time to Establish Charging Flow Exceeded Thermal Hydraulic Analysis ENS 445862008-10-21T05:00:00021 October 2008 05:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition During Design Basis Fire in Area A-27 of Auxiliary Building ENS 441722008-04-26T18:18:00026 April 2008 18:18:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition Discovered Due to Improperly Installed Fuse Wiring in Class 1E Air Conditioning Unit ENS 441312008-04-10T15:15:00010 April 2008 15:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition "Analysis Indicates Containment Coolers May Not Have Automatically Started in Slow Speed Following Postulated Main Steam Line Break ENS 426032006-05-24T15:38:00024 May 2006 15:38:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition Discovered During Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Area Review ENS 423272006-02-10T17:00:00010 February 2006 17:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Potential for Loss of Safe Shutdown Capability ENS 421822005-12-02T00:30:0002 December 2005 00:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition - Emergency Diesel Capability ENS 421462005-11-16T21:30:00016 November 2005 21:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Potential Failure to Meet Required Response Times for Shutdown Outside Control Room ENS 420292005-09-30T14:45:00030 September 2005 14:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Potential Vulnerabilities Discovered During Design Basis Fire Review ENS 417862005-05-10T21:55:00010 May 2005 21:55:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Emergency Safety System Actuation Dampers Inoperable ENS 413272005-01-13T01:45:00013 January 2005 01:45:00 Other Unspec Reqmnt, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 24 Hour Condition of License Report Regarding Halon System- Actuator Connection Error ENS 413172005-01-07T23:00:0007 January 2005 23:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Loss of a Fire Safe Shutdown Success Path 2017-04-05T19:00:00 | |