05000529/LER-2009-001, Regarding Emergency Diesel Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Failure

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Regarding Emergency Diesel Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Failure
ML092160403
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 07/21/2009
From: Mims D
Arizona Public Service Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
102-06037-DCM/DFH LER 09-001-00
Download: ML092160403 (7)


LER-2009-001, Regarding Emergency Diesel Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Failure
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
5292009001R00 - NRC Website

text

10 CFR 50.73 L A P A

subsidiary of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation Dwight C. Mims Mail Station 7605 Palo Verde Nuclear Vice President Tel. 623-393-5403 P.O. Box 52034 Generating Station Regulatory Affairs and Plant Improvement Fax 623-393-6077 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 102-06037-DCM/DFH July 21, 2009 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 License No. NPF-51 Licensee Event Report 2009-001-00 Enclosed, please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-529/2009-001 -00 that has been prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. This LER reports a condition prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, associated with Emergency Diesel Generators. This condition was determined to have existed when it was concluded, during the investigation of an Emergency Diesel Generator 2B (EDG-2B) fuel oil transfer pump failure, Emergency Diesel Generator 2B may not have functioned for the full duration of its mission time and for a period that exceeded the TS required action time.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, copies of this LER are being forwarded to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regional Office, NRC Region IV and the Senior Resident Inspector. If you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact James Proctor, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs, at (623) 393-5730.

Arizona Public Service Company makes no commitments in this letter.

Sincerely, DCM/JAP/DFH/gat Enclosure cc:

E. E. Collins Jr.

NRC Region IV Regional Administrator J. R. Hall NRC NRR Project Manager - (send electronic and paper)

R. I. Treadway NRC Senior Resident Inspector for PVNGS A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway

  • Comanche Peak - Diablo Canyon Palo Verde
  • San Onofre

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007)

, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the deinformation collection.

3. PAGE Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 05000529 1 OF 6
4. TITLE Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Failure
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FAITYNMDOKTUBE NUMBER NO.

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 22 2009 2009 - 001 -

00 07 21 2009

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)

El 20.2201(b)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

[l 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

Cl 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 100 [1 20.2201(d)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

El 20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

[E 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

[] 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x)

[1 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

[E 73.71(a)(4)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

[I 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71(a)(5)

[1 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

N 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

6.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The direct cause for failure of the EDG-2B fuel oil transfer pump was determined to be an electrical short to ground inside the connection box.

The root cause of the condition was that the diesel fuel oil storage tank vault electrical conduit and penetrations were not effectively maintained and monitored to prevent the intrusion of moisture into the connection box. The presence of moisture initiated and sustained a corrosion process within the motor connection box for the EDG-2B fuel oil transfer pump which eventually resulted in the failure of the fuel oil transfer pump.

7.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediately after the failure, the terminal connection and associated connection box for EDG-2B fuel oil transfer pump were replaced. Retest results following the corrective maintenance were acceptable and the EDG-2B was declared Operable.

The following additional corrective actions were or will be implemented for all three units:

The five other site EDG connection boxes were inspected and tested and all were found to be acceptable.

A preventive maintenance task will be developed to inspect the connection box and test the power cables on a frequency of 18 months or less.

e The underground conduits between the Diesel Generator building and the diesel fuel vault will be inspected to verify the configuration is adequate to prevent water intrusion.

8.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

No similar conditions have been reported in the prior three years.

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