LER-2010-001, Essential Chiller B Inoperable Due to Incorrectly Positioned Head Pressure Control Bypass Valve |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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| 5292010001R00 - NRC Website |
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'10 CFR 50.73 A subsidiary of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation Dwight C. Mims Mail Station 7605 Palo Verde Nuclear Vice President Tel. 623-393-5403 P.O. Box 52034 Generating Station Regulatory Affairs and Plant Improvement Fax 623-393-6077 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 102-06159-DCM/JR March 29, 2010 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 License No. NPF 51 Licensee Event Report 2010-001-00 Enclosed please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-529/2010-001 -00 that has been prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. This LER reports an operation prohibited by technical specifications and a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function due to an incorrectly positioned essential chiller bypass valve.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, copies of this LER are being forwarded to the NRC Regional Office, NRC Region IV and the Senior Resident Inspector. If you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact Marianne Webb, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs, at (623) 393-5730.
Arizona Public Service Company makes no commitments in this letter.
Sincerely, DCM/RAB/TNW/JR Enclosure cc:
E. E. Collins Jr.
NRC Region IV Regional Administrator J. R. Hall NRC NRR Project Manager - (send electronic and paper)
L. K. Gibson NRC NRR Project Manager - (send electronic and paper)
R. I. Treadway NRC Senior Resident Inspector for PVNGS A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance
- Palo Verde & South Texas OWolf Creek
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007)
, the NRC may sfor each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the digits/characters finformation collection.
- 3. PAGE Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 05000529 1 OF 7
- 4. TITLE Essential Chiller B Inoperable Due to Incorrectly Positioned Head Pressure Control Bypass Valve
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE 1
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 NUMBER NO.05 0
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 26 2010 2010 - 001 -
00 03 29 2010 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 El 20.2201(d)
[I 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
__ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
E 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0l 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 100 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
The corrective action to prevent recurrence is to revise the Operations Department Practice
- 1, entitled Operations Principles and Standards to incorporate the following:
" Personnel performing independent verifications will be required to attend a briefing for the task for which they will be performing an independent verification.
Area operators performing independent verifications in the field will be required to have a copy of the procedure in hand if the independent verification sign-offs are embedded in the procedure. For procedures without embedded sign-offs, operators will have working copies of the component change records for the valves to be independently verified. This will enable the operators to validate the components, the required positions, and the use of place-keeping signatures.
- 8.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
Although Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station experienced similar events in the past in which valves have been left incorrectly positioned, none had specific corrective actions which would have prevented this event. None of the events were required to be reported by 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73.PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
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Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000530/LER-2010-002, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification Resulting from Containment Spray Nozzle Obstruction | Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification Resulting from Containment Spray Nozzle Obstruction | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - 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