05000529/LER-2006-002, Regarding Two Independent Trains of Auxiliary Feedwater Inoperable Due to Single Cause

Regarding Two Independent Trains of Auxiliary Feedwater Inoperable Due to Single Cause

ML062710405
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	09/14/2006
From:	Eubanks C Arizona Public Service Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
102-05566-CE/SAB/JAP/DFH LER 06-002-00
Download: ML062710405 (5)

LER-2006-002, Regarding Two Independent Trains of Auxiliary Feedwater Inoperable Due to Single Cause

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
5292006002R00 - NRC Website

text

10 CFR 50.73 A subsidiary of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Cliff Eubanks Vice President Nuclear Operations Tel (623) 393-6116 Fax (623) 393-6077 Mail Station 7602 PO Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 102-05566-C E/SABIJAPIDFH September 14, 2006 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 License No. NPF 51 Licensee Event Report 2006-002-00 Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-529/2006-002-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. The LER reports two trains of Auxiliary Feedwater rendered inoperable as a result of a single watertight fire door being left open and uncompensated.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, copies of this LER are being forwarded to the NRC Regional Office, NRC Region IV and the Senior Resident Inspector. If you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact James A. Proctor, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs, at (623) 393-5730.

Arizona Public Service Company makes no commitments in this letter.

Sincerely, CE/SAB/JAP/DFH/gt Attachment cc:

B. S. Mallett M. B. Fields G. G. Warnick NRC Region IV Regional Administrator NRC NRR Project Manager - (send electronic and paper)

NRC Senior Resident Inspector for PVNGS

422,

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/302007 (62004)

, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the digitscharacers fo each lock)information collection.

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3. PAGE Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 05000529 1 OF 4

.TITLE Two Independent Trains of Auxiliary Feedwater Inoperable Due to Single Cause

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR Y

SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR None 05000 NUMBER NO.

N05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 07 16 20062006 -002-00 09 14 2006 None 05000

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)

[] 20.2201(b)

E0 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2Xi)(C)

I@ 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 10 20.2201(d)

[I 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0l 50.73(a)(2Xviii)(A) 0 20.2203(a)(1) 0l 20.2203(a)(4) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

O 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

[I 50.36(c)(1)(D(A)

[I 50.73(a)(2Xiii)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL [I 20.2203(a)(2)(H)

[I 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(x)

[o 20.2203(aX2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

[I 73.71(a)(4)

O 20.2203(aX2)(iv)

[I 50.46(a)(3)Xii)

[I 50.73(a)(2Xv)(B) 0l 73.71(a)(5) 100 [E

20.2203(a)(2)(v)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(D(A) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0l OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

[I 50.73(a)(2X(iB) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

ICCDP total = 2E-11 + 0 + 2E-9 = 2E-9 This indicates the risk impact of the condition described above with barrier door C-A-06 between train 'A' AF and train 'B' AF pump rooms being left open and unattended, is not significant.

6.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The direct cause of the event was the ESO failed to follow procedural requirements for closing and securing door C-A-06. The root cause was the ESO inspecting the area inside door C-A-06 did not maintain sufficient attention to ensure the door was closed.

7.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The company implemented its' disciplinary policy for this event.

Signs for Units 1, 2, and 3 were posted at the entry to the A train AF room (C-A-01) alerting employees to secure the B train AF room door for each entry and exit.

A site wide communication was distributed and the Vice President of Nuclear Operation directed a plant stand down be held to discuss the importance of door C-A-06 being closed after entry or exit.

A local door alarm will be added to C-A-06 to alert personnel when the door is open.

Until the door alarm is installed, a compensatory measure will be established by posting a Security Officer at the entry point to the AF rooms to ensure plant personnel entering the AF rooms secure C-A-06.

8.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

In the past three years, two similar events were reported (LER 50-529/2005-003-00, and 50-530/2006-001-00). The corrective actions associated with these events did not effectively prevent recurrence. Note that the corrective action discussed in LER 50-530/2006-001 -00 to install a local door alarm on C-A-06 had not yet been completed at the time of this event; however, the interim corrective actions were ineffective.