05000528/FIN-2010004-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Assess Risk Prior to Maintenance on Containment Hatch |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a(4), for the failure of work management personnel to assess and manage an increase in risk prior to planned maintenance activities. Specifically, on May I , 201 0, the licensee failed to include maintenance on the containment equipment hatch hoist in the outage risk assessment while containment closure capability was required. The licensee has revised procedures, as a corrective action to restore compliance, to include provisions for operations management and containment coordinators to veriify that no work is in progress on equipment that affects containment closure capability while that capability is required. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request 3473278. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and is therefore a finding, because it affected the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Inspectors determined the finding significance could not be adequately assessed using Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, because the licensee did not maintain a quantitative shutdown probabilistic risk model. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is bound by risk insights from manual Chapter 0609 Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. Using figure 6.2, the inability to close the containment hatch was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding occurred greater than 8 days after the start of the outage. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control component because the licensee failed to appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the need to keep personnel appraised of work status, the operational impact of work activities, and plant conditions that may affect work activities. |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2010004 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Lantz J Bashore M Baquera D Reinert Z Hollcraft |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2010004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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