05000498/FIN-2009004-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Reportability Results in Two Trains of the Essential Chilled Water System Being Inoperable |
| Description | The inspectors identified an inadequate reportability review that resulted in a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.7.14 because the licensee had two independent loops of essential chilled water system inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time. The licensees reportability review failed to identify that the train B essential chilled water system was inoperable because the oil reservoir temperature was below the required value while the train C essential chilled water system was inoperable for planned maintenance. The licensee concluded that even though the chiller was inoperable, it was not reportable because the time it took to repair was less than the technical specification allowed outage time, however, the inspectors identified that essential chiller 12B oil reservoir temperature was below the required value. Consequently the inspectors continued to ask the licensee questions regarding the lower limit for the oil reservoir temperature and why the chiller was not considered inoperable from the time it was secured. As a result of this observation, the licensee performed another operability and reportability review and determined that the issue was reportable for having two loops of the essential chilled water system inoperable for longer than the technical specification allowed outage time. The finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1 worksheets from Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent actual loss of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed time, and did not screen as risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. In addition, this finding had human performance crosscutting aspects associated with decision making in that the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and did not conduct effectiveness reviews of safety-significant decisions to verify the validity of the underlying assumptions H.1(b) |
| Site: | South Texas  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000498/2009004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Tharakan B Hagar J Dixon |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2009004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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